ISIS/ISIL conflict in Syria/Iraq (No OpEd, No Politics)

SampanViking

SampanViking

The Capitalist
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I suspect that the biggest weakness of ISIS is actually the flip side of its apparent strength.
Despite the extensive coverage given to the core and leadership of foreign Jihadis, it is quite apparent that the back bone of the movement is the support from the local tribal leadership.

The game is as old as the Levant itself and all that has changed is the names of the players.
The strength of ISIS from this, is that when a tribe joins with the movement, that tribal territory immediately becomes ISIS terrirtory, whether a shot has been fired or not.

The flipside for ISIS is that this support is notoriously fickle and many triabl chieftains are most likely joining simply to increase their negotiation position with the State Government and that are likely to pocket concessions and switch back at the appropriate moment.

I would say that the greasing of palms with silver, is more likely to rapidly turn the ISIS advance tide more efficiently than any bombing campaign or other military action. In fact bombing is more likely to be counter productive, as one wrong strike and a business deal suddenly becomes personal.
 
Jeff Head

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
SampanViking said:
I suspect that the biggest weakness of ISIS is actually the flip side of its apparent strength.

Despite the extensive coverage given to the core and leadership of foreign Jihadis, it is quite apparent that the back bone of the movement is the support from the local tribal leadership.

The game is as old as the Levant itself and all that has changed is the names of the players.
The strength of ISIS from this, is that when a tribe joins with the movement, that tribal territory immediately becomes ISIS terrirtory, whether a shot has been fired or not.

The flipside for ISIS is that this support is notoriously fickle and many triabl chieftains are most likely joining simply to increase their negotiation position with the State Government and that are likely to pocket concessions and switch back at the appropriate moment.

I would say that the greasing of palms with silver, is more likely to rapidly turn the ISIS advance tide more efficiently than any bombing campaign or other military action. In fact bombing is more likely to be counter productive, as one wrong strike and a business deal suddenly becomes personal.
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This is correct Sampan...and it was (along with a lot of hard work, creating infrastructure, training the tribal militias and arming them, and convincing those leaders that the US was serious) how, the US, during the surge, defeated AQIR and the insurgency by going in, in a true counter-insurgency form, and turning the Tribal chieftains away from the other side.

The US was able to do this because it was not viewed as either Shia or Sunni, and because it demonstrated is willingness to work with...and financially, militarily, and building-wise, to work with either...and that that time, the US showed that it was decidedly serious about its involvement and making all of that happen.

And it worked where the other methods had been failing.

Now, the US is unwilling to commit its own forces to doing this again...and it is going to be difficult for any Iraqi government that is more beholden to one set of chieftains than another to do the same. But that is what they have to find a way to do.

I believe the inability...or unwillingness to do this...is the real root of whatever gains ISIL is making in Iraq. I know people who were involved in the successful US efforts back after the so-called "surge." The focus of the surge was this effort I just explained. And it worked...but then the US walked away from it, and the Iraqi government did not maintain what was necessary to have it hold.

Enter ISIS and took advantage of thise failings.

But all of that is just my opinion.
 
plawolf

plawolf

Lieutenant General
thunderchief said:
Well, actually, desert warfare is all about mobility and controlling sources of water . You cannot just build outpost in the middle of nowhere . You could stockpile food and ammo, but is very hard to stockpile enough water for even 100 men if there isn't large enough well around . ISIS understands that very well, they are constantly on the move, bypassing strong-points and attacking at unexpected places. On the other hand, I never saw attempting similar tactics, using small but mobile units to raid ISIS rear areas .
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I think you are overstating the logistical challenge a little. Especially for a force that has uncontested control of the skies.

In this day and age, water isn't that insurmountable an obstacle as it once was. Some washed out oil tankers will easily meet the water needs on dug in troops.

Yes, setting up strongpoints in the middle of nowhere will present logistical challenges, but that applies to IS as well as Iraqi government troops.

The biggest problem with fighting IS is that they melt into the civilian population at will and use them as camouflage and human shields to move unhindered over open ground, and only re-emerging once they are safely within the cover of an urban population centre, rending western air power and Iraqi heavy weapons largely useless.

By setting up in-depth defences far from population centres around all roads, what you do is strip IS of its civilian cover.

Such large scale defences would be all but impossible to overwhelm as IS has managed with conventional checkpoints. In order to have any chance of punching through such a big dug in checkpoint would require IS to concentrate their forces and attack over empty terrain, making them visible and vulnerable to coalition air power and Iraqi heavy ordinance.

On top of that, if IS is to attempt a major engagement in the middle of nowhere, they will themselves also face the same logistical problems you described. Only with total control on the skies, the Iraqis and coalition forces could majorly hinder Is' ability to keep their troops supplied in such a scenario.

At the same time, the US could shut off civilian GPS in the area, and deploy massed drones to patrol around population centres.

If IS tries to go off-road, the lack of GPS will make it much harder and more risky for them to be able to find where they want to go, especially if they disperse into small groups to try and avoid aerial detection and prosecution.

Even if some of them managed to successful find their way to their target location, the fact that they are approaching over open terrain rather than a secured road would alert defenders to be wary of them, so they could be challenged and engaged before they are able to get to the cover of the build-up areas.

The inhospitable local environment actually disproportionately favours government forces over a guerrilla force, because you don't need to control all the territory, only the bits that can support human life.

Its not like IS can go to ground in the middle of a desert and live off the land, as a guerrilla force could in a tropical jungle country for example.

Control all the water sources, and IS can have all the sand they want. The environment will kill them as effectively as drones and bombs if you can keep them from getting to anywhere they can resupply.
 
Miragedriver

Miragedriver

Brigadier
SAA T-72 with TURMS-T upgrade
(Tank Universal Reconfiguration Modular System T-series)
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Back to bottling my Grenache
 
janjak desalin

janjak desalin

Junior Member
plawolf said:
(...)
Firstly, consider moving the front lines out of the cities and into the open deserts.
Have the Iraqis dig trenches ad/or build barricades out in the middle of nowhere to check IS advances far from built up areas that IS can use to hide in.
Rather than have a single check point on the roads that easily form bottlenecks, build temporary diversions so you split the one road into dozens of branches that each lead to a separate checkpoint, like a toll road entrance/exit, and force IS to fight there.
Also, issue the Iraqis with secure communication gear and their jam the crap out of all other signals in your chosen battlefield.
If IS divide their forces, denying them effective communications will make their forces easier to pick of piecemeal, and prevent them from acting together.
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Precisely! That's a more specific detailing of the layered defense tactical approach I suggested above.
To even more detail: get the defenses out of the cities/towns so that the first line of defense is at level horizon distance (5351 m/3.325 mi) from the city/town edge and the final defensive line ~2 km/ 1.243 mi from the edge. In such a layered defense, rather than digging down and using horizontally aligned trenches for all layers, I'd build up the first four layers with arced and full circle, fire team sized, sandbag positions. The first three layers layers [the skirmishers (at ~5350, 4900, 4450 m)] would simply build up 160 degree parapets. If, and when, the assault were to amass, or to come to within ~ 450 meters of each line, the skirmishers would to fall back to the next line. The fourth layer [medium infantry (~3700 m)], would build up structures with 160 degree parapets and 200 degree parados (protection from rear support fire). This is the heart of the defense, intended to be held. The fifth layer (2000 m) would entrench and provide fire support. In the event of the fourth layer being overrun, the fifth layer would provide the FPF (which i doubt any insurgent force could withstand) and, if necessary, the final hand-to-hand stand (arrrrgggghhh).
thunderchief said:
Well, actually, desert warfare is all about mobility and controlling sources of water. You cannot just build outpost in the middle of nowhere . You could stockpile food and ammo, but is very hard to stockpile enough water for even 100 men if there isn't large enough well around .(...)
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Correct!
Nevertheless, in COIN, the logistical advantage is one that the state level combatant maintains over the non-state level combatant. Using the distances I've suggested above, for an organized system of defensive positions, it would not be unfeasible to construct a simple pvc based water supply out to the fifth (entrenched) level of defense that could be augmented by a rubber/nylon hose system out to the fourth level. The skirmishers positions would simply have to run water from the fourth level to their own positions. Remember, plawolf and I are theorizing static defensive positions, not assault operations. Under these circumstances, it is ISIS/ISISL that has to consider access to a water supply.

And, btw, I neglected to include 60mm mortars in my list of light support weapons that the Iraqi army could use effectively against ISIS/ISIL.
 
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P

PanAsian

Major
I think there is some overestimation of what the official governments of Iraq and Syria, but especially Iraq, are capable of. If their troops can barely stand their ground, what makes you think they can get something like layered defense accomplished. There is the issue of available manpower in general, then the technical quality and loyalty of that manpower. All of which is horrid.
 
kwaigonegin

kwaigonegin

Colonel
Ultra said:
I must have been sleeping under a rock... only saw this news now.

Iraqi army conduct in Ramadi 'surprised all of us,' deputy prime minister says
By Mick Krever, CNN
Updated 2237 GMT (0537 HKT) May 25, 2015

(CNN)The Iraqi army's willingness to let Ramadi fall to
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"surprised all of us," Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq told CNN on Monday.

"It's not clear for us why such a unit, which was supposed to be trained by the Americans for years, and supposed to be one of the best units in the army, would withdraw from Ramadi in such a way."

"This is not the army that we are willing to see or we are expecting to see."
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Maybe I'm old school but how about have a no repercussions honest to God face to face talk with the Iraqi troops and commanders and ask them why.

It appears this is an extremely serious problems with the Iraqi army and until this is sorted out then everything else is moot. No amount of advanced weaponry and tactical training will do any good if the underlying cause is not identified and resolved!
 
janjak desalin

janjak desalin

Junior Member
PanAsian said:
I think there is some overestimation of what the official governments of Iraq and Syria, but especially Iraq, are capable of. If their troops can barely stand their ground, what makes you think they can get something like layered defense accomplished. There is the issue of available manpower in general, then the technical quality and loyalty of that manpower. All of which is horrid.
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Actually, the layered defense I've suggested would be far less manpower intensive than the thousands of troops that supposedly fled Ramadi. I'm talking about one battalion of ~880 troops for the outer defense of Ramadi. Nevertheless, my earlier posts such as:
janjak desalin said:
That's just it, they're not a nation! There is no sense of one unified 'we' in Iraq! Without that, these is no concept or feeling of a greater whole worth fighting or dying for.
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,
is that really a testament to ISIS/ISIL's ruthlessness, or evidence of the lack of motivation, will, and heart of those Iraqi brigades?
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,
...too many developing nations use military equipment more in the service of their regime police/security apparatus than in the service of foreign policy/national security. interestingly, recent history, over the past several decades, has illustrated how poorly internally oriented militaries perform when faced with external challenges.
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,
and
as a result of their orientation, Assad's forces have hidden behind heavy and long-range weaponry for fear of getting bloody.
as i posted as a comment on NYT.com, it seems that ISIS/ISIL is the only party in this war that is willing to suffer the casualties necessary to win. and this, my fellows, is a significant advantage!
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,
indicate my awareness with the psycho-political realities on the ground.
 
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