Modern Carrier Battle Group..Strategies and Tactics
- Thread starter Kampfwagen
- Start date
Spartan95
Junior Member
And what range can that be done at? 10 feet? Or 10km?
Nonetheless, the claim that Free Electron Lasers are immune to atmospheric conditions are interesting. Will need to see how that turns out.
Yes, the US military has some impressive combat records and experience. And no doubt it will take a lot of damage to cause a CVN to be mission-kill. That does not mean it cannot be done.
The most powerful arm of a CBG is the air wing. If flight ops are sufficiently disrupted for a few hours, what do you think will happen to the CBG? All the land-based, air-launched and ship-launched missiles will be coming in from stand-off ranges.
And China has been accused of hacking into Pentagon's computers. They have also had their hands on a US EP-3. Yet you guys don't seem to wonder what they have eh?
When US intel under-estimates PLA's capability once, you'd think that the estimates would be adjusted accordingly, and it won't be too far off the next time. Unfortunately, even senior US officials (including the former CNO) acknowledge, US intel consistently under-estimates PLA's technological advances. Doesn't it make you wonder how much US intel doesn't know is happening in PRC?
Did you think I was stating the case that it is the end of the carrier age? Since when have I made that statement?
The point about the carrier is that when PLAN has 1 (or more operational), South China Sea effectively becomes a Chinese lake. Why do you think Southeast Asian countries are nervous about China's naval expansion (some more than others)?
Have a PLAN CBG put up its air defence bubble and basically they control all the air space in the South China Sea (including land-based aircraft from Hainan/Paracels). Heck, they can probably stage fighters from that air strip they built in the Spratlys too if they really want.
The same applies for East China Sea and Yellow Sea. In other words, when PLAN has an operational CBG, the 1st Island Chain effectively becomes an area where they are dominant in the ar, on the surface and below the surface. The only navy capable of challenging that is the USN. Which is why PRC is devoting resources into access-denial weapons.
And given their recent track record of surprises (ASAT, J-20), they may just have a few more surprises up their sleaves.
I'd say that the ASBM concept actually solves the issue quite elegantly.
A ballistic missile comes designed with a level of heat shielding to protect the missile from the heat of atmospheric re-entry. Hence, it already has an inherent level of protection against lasers. It may not be much, but it certainly beats cruise missiles.
Secondly, using a ballistic trajectory, the ASBM will be coming in almost directly on top of its target. I'd love to see someone point me in the direction of a warship that has radars pointing directly upwards to track an incoming ASBM. Without such an upward facing radar, the target ship will not be able to track the incoming track and designate missiles/CIWS/laser to take it out.
Thirdly, even if taken out in mid-air, gravity will be pulling the resulting debris down onto the target vessel anyway. If that ASBM is a DF-21, it will be what remains of a 14+ ton weapon. That's quite a lot of debris.
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Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
Excellent article on China's Missile centric strategy to defeat US platform centric warfare
Got an excellent section on ASBM and why all those THAAD is of no significant when it come to ASBM
OVERCOMING THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES
To cope with the rising missile challenge in the past several decades, the United
States has invested heavily in active missile defenses.84 Unfortunately, the current
and projected American strategies are unlikely to provide any reasonable
measure of effectiveness against China’s missiles. For its part,China has invested
in a number of countermeasures specifically meant to foilU.S.missile defenses.
Currently the U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) architecture is designed to
engage ballisticmissiles in their midcourse and reentry phases. The chief system
to strike down missiles in the midcourse stage is the sea-based SM-3 missile.85
The principal systems to engage ballisticmissiles in the reentry phase are the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), for the “upper tier” of the atmosphere,
and the PAC-3 SAMs and Navy’s SM-2 Block IV SAM, for the lower tier.86
However, even thismultilayered defense network has serious, and probably insurmountable,
limitations in terms of simultaneous-engagement volume, available
interceptor inventories, and interceptor performance.
The first limitation is on the number of targets that it can realistically engage
within a single time window. As no interceptor would have better than an 80
percent chance of success even under ideal conditions, it is almost certain that
two interceptors would have to be fired per target. However, one “target” does
notmean one missile. It is common for modern ballisticmissiles to release chaff
or from five to ten decoys, indistinguishable from the warhead to TMD sensors,
during the midcourse phase.87 The PLA also discusses firing previously decommissioned
obsolete missiles, less accurate or capable armed weapons (some releasing
their own decoys), and even cheaper SRBMs as “bait” for interceptors.
Thus a volley of ten missiles could produce fromfifty to a hundred targets, aside
from chaff. The TMD system would be forced either to select targets randomly
or to attempt to engage them all. Since the vast majority of the targets would be
decoys, the former would offer an impracticably low probability of picking out
PRADUN 27
the true warheads; the latter would exhaust the interceptor launch capacity at
once. Eitherway, theTMDsystemwould allowunengaged targets,many of them
presumably warheads, to penetrate to their targets. Notably, whereas decoys
would burn up during reentry, decommissioned or otherwise low-capability
missiles would survive and continue acting as decoys against reentry-phase defenses.
For these reasons, the PLA feels confident of its ability to saturate the
defense in this way in each launch window.88
The second major limitation of the TMD is in interceptor inventory. For example,
the United States is currently planning to procure 329 SM-3 missiles,
tasked with midcourse stage interception, for its entire navy.89 Because two interceptors
would most likely be fired per target, that entire inventory might intercept
atmost 160 or so targets.However, it is fallacious to assume an exchange
based merely on respective ballistic-missile and interceptor inventories. Factoring
in decoys released in the midcourse stage, 160 targets could correspond to as
few as sixteen to thirty-two actual missiles. If decommissioned missiles and the
like are added, the number of high-value airframes the Chinese would need to
deplete the entire SM-3 inventory falls even lower.Other interceptor systems are
similarly limited in their inventories. This means that a number of concerted
volleys of low-valuemissiles containing just several capable missiles, especially
if equipped with decoys, would inevitably deplete the entire TMD inventory, let
alone the fraction of it deployed to the theater.
The third limitation of the TMDlies in the doubtfulness of its interceptor capabilities.
Few realistic data exist. For example, the SM-3missile-based architecture
has demonstrated sixteen successful intercepts in twenty attempts.90
However, a prominent analysis suggests test conditions (which provide the basis
for developers’ claims) tend to be far fromwhat themissiles would deal with in a
real combat scenario.91What is more, the deployed systems are strictly limited in
the kinds of targets they can intercept at all.Notably, the PAC-3 and SM-2 Block
IV are designed for SRBM interception but would be ineffective against longerrange
ballistic missiles, due to the targets’ higher reentry speeds. The speed of a
PAC-3 interceptor, the faster of the two, is only 2.5 kilometers per second, allowing
it to intercept only missiles with ranges no longer than 1,500 km.92 Indeed,
U.S. forces deployed to the theater would be within 1,500 km of China’s launch
points. But the Chinese could respond by simply sending MRBMs on lofted trajectories,
traveling the same horizontal distance but descending at much higher
velocities and so easily outrunning lower-tier defenses. Also, although THAAD,
PAC-3, and SM-2 Block IV missiles can engage objects descending on set trajectories,
they cannot chase downMaRVs descending in unpredictable trajectories
at high hypersonic speeds.93 Finally, all lower-tier defenses have IR seekers;
simply enclosing reentry vehicles in cooled shrouds would throw them off.
28 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Hence, none of the missile defense systems in development by the United
States could provide effective protection from Chinese missiles. Moreover, because
fielding additional missiles and developing additional countermeasures
are always substantially easier and cheaper than expanding or enhancing missile
defenses, this is not an imbalance that the United States could realistically hope
to redress. This prospect ultimately gives China three options for dealing with
American theater missile defense. First, it could attack campaign-relevant targets
regardless of TMD.Using decoys, high reentry speeds, and penetration aids,
China would likely be able to strike its preferred targets with MRBMs and
ASBMs, accepting the risk of potentially losing a few missiles to interceptors.
Second, in the unlikely event that U.S. defenses proved particularly effective in
intercepting individual missiles, sustained high-volume missile volleys, possibly
including decommissioned missiles, could consistently saturate them, allowing
the majority of the missiles in each wave to leak through. Third, China might
attempt to target the TMD architecture itself early in the campaign. Attacking
PAC-3 batteries with MRBMs, THAAD TELs with ARMs, and TMD-capable
ships with either ASBMs or ASCMs would significantly degrade the TMD architecture
and greatly facilitate subsequent missile strikes against campaignrelevant
targets.
Excellent article on China's Missile centric strategy to defeat US platform centric warfare
Got an excellent section on ASBM and why all those THAAD is of no significant when it come to ASBM
OVERCOMING THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES
To cope with the rising missile challenge in the past several decades, the United
States has invested heavily in active missile defenses.84 Unfortunately, the current
and projected American strategies are unlikely to provide any reasonable
measure of effectiveness against China’s missiles. For its part,China has invested
in a number of countermeasures specifically meant to foilU.S.missile defenses.
Currently the U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) architecture is designed to
engage ballisticmissiles in their midcourse and reentry phases. The chief system
to strike down missiles in the midcourse stage is the sea-based SM-3 missile.85
The principal systems to engage ballisticmissiles in the reentry phase are the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), for the “upper tier” of the atmosphere,
and the PAC-3 SAMs and Navy’s SM-2 Block IV SAM, for the lower tier.86
However, even thismultilayered defense network has serious, and probably insurmountable,
limitations in terms of simultaneous-engagement volume, available
interceptor inventories, and interceptor performance.
The first limitation is on the number of targets that it can realistically engage
within a single time window. As no interceptor would have better than an 80
percent chance of success even under ideal conditions, it is almost certain that
two interceptors would have to be fired per target. However, one “target” does
notmean one missile. It is common for modern ballisticmissiles to release chaff
or from five to ten decoys, indistinguishable from the warhead to TMD sensors,
during the midcourse phase.87 The PLA also discusses firing previously decommissioned
obsolete missiles, less accurate or capable armed weapons (some releasing
their own decoys), and even cheaper SRBMs as “bait” for interceptors.
Thus a volley of ten missiles could produce fromfifty to a hundred targets, aside
from chaff. The TMD system would be forced either to select targets randomly
or to attempt to engage them all. Since the vast majority of the targets would be
decoys, the former would offer an impracticably low probability of picking out
PRADUN 27
the true warheads; the latter would exhaust the interceptor launch capacity at
once. Eitherway, theTMDsystemwould allowunengaged targets,many of them
presumably warheads, to penetrate to their targets. Notably, whereas decoys
would burn up during reentry, decommissioned or otherwise low-capability
missiles would survive and continue acting as decoys against reentry-phase defenses.
For these reasons, the PLA feels confident of its ability to saturate the
defense in this way in each launch window.88
The second major limitation of the TMD is in interceptor inventory. For example,
the United States is currently planning to procure 329 SM-3 missiles,
tasked with midcourse stage interception, for its entire navy.89 Because two interceptors
would most likely be fired per target, that entire inventory might intercept
atmost 160 or so targets.However, it is fallacious to assume an exchange
based merely on respective ballistic-missile and interceptor inventories. Factoring
in decoys released in the midcourse stage, 160 targets could correspond to as
few as sixteen to thirty-two actual missiles. If decommissioned missiles and the
like are added, the number of high-value airframes the Chinese would need to
deplete the entire SM-3 inventory falls even lower.Other interceptor systems are
similarly limited in their inventories. This means that a number of concerted
volleys of low-valuemissiles containing just several capable missiles, especially
if equipped with decoys, would inevitably deplete the entire TMD inventory, let
alone the fraction of it deployed to the theater.
The third limitation of the TMDlies in the doubtfulness of its interceptor capabilities.
Few realistic data exist. For example, the SM-3missile-based architecture
has demonstrated sixteen successful intercepts in twenty attempts.90
However, a prominent analysis suggests test conditions (which provide the basis
for developers’ claims) tend to be far fromwhat themissiles would deal with in a
real combat scenario.91What is more, the deployed systems are strictly limited in
the kinds of targets they can intercept at all.Notably, the PAC-3 and SM-2 Block
IV are designed for SRBM interception but would be ineffective against longerrange
ballistic missiles, due to the targets’ higher reentry speeds. The speed of a
PAC-3 interceptor, the faster of the two, is only 2.5 kilometers per second, allowing
it to intercept only missiles with ranges no longer than 1,500 km.92 Indeed,
U.S. forces deployed to the theater would be within 1,500 km of China’s launch
points. But the Chinese could respond by simply sending MRBMs on lofted trajectories,
traveling the same horizontal distance but descending at much higher
velocities and so easily outrunning lower-tier defenses. Also, although THAAD,
PAC-3, and SM-2 Block IV missiles can engage objects descending on set trajectories,
they cannot chase downMaRVs descending in unpredictable trajectories
at high hypersonic speeds.93 Finally, all lower-tier defenses have IR seekers;
simply enclosing reentry vehicles in cooled shrouds would throw them off.
28 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Hence, none of the missile defense systems in development by the United
States could provide effective protection from Chinese missiles. Moreover, because
fielding additional missiles and developing additional countermeasures
are always substantially easier and cheaper than expanding or enhancing missile
defenses, this is not an imbalance that the United States could realistically hope
to redress. This prospect ultimately gives China three options for dealing with
American theater missile defense. First, it could attack campaign-relevant targets
regardless of TMD.Using decoys, high reentry speeds, and penetration aids,
China would likely be able to strike its preferred targets with MRBMs and
ASBMs, accepting the risk of potentially losing a few missiles to interceptors.
Second, in the unlikely event that U.S. defenses proved particularly effective in
intercepting individual missiles, sustained high-volume missile volleys, possibly
including decommissioned missiles, could consistently saturate them, allowing
the majority of the missiles in each wave to leak through. Third, China might
attempt to target the TMD architecture itself early in the campaign. Attacking
PAC-3 batteries with MRBMs, THAAD TELs with ARMs, and TMD-capable
ships with either ASBMs or ASCMs would significantly degrade the TMD architecture
and greatly facilitate subsequent missile strikes against campaignrelevant
targets.
Ambivalent
Junior Member
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
The argument that decoys make THAAD and SM-3 ineffective falls apart when one realizes that both these BDM's can intercept enemy missiles in space before they can deploy their decoys.
The article also implies that there is no mechanism for discriminating between decoys and warheads, which even the open source literature on the subject suggests to be quite possible and perhaps in service already.
I'm a little suspect regarding this article number one because the link provided does not work and number two because the number of SM-3 and THAAD being procured in not available in open source literature. The relevant P-40 Budget Justification Exhibits do not state a number of either missile to be procured as they do for other versions of Standard, or other missiles in general. Budget numbers are all top level with no detail and not cost per unit that might allow an enemy to estimate the numbers being bought.
The argument that decoys make THAAD and SM-3 ineffective falls apart when one realizes that both these BDM's can intercept enemy missiles in space before they can deploy their decoys.
The article also implies that there is no mechanism for discriminating between decoys and warheads, which even the open source literature on the subject suggests to be quite possible and perhaps in service already.
I'm a little suspect regarding this article number one because the link provided does not work and number two because the number of SM-3 and THAAD being procured in not available in open source literature. The relevant P-40 Budget Justification Exhibits do not state a number of either missile to be procured as they do for other versions of Standard, or other missiles in general. Budget numbers are all top level with no detail and not cost per unit that might allow an enemy to estimate the numbers being bought.
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
Sort of like determining what the outcome of a scientific experiment is before the research is even conducted and then conducting the research to come up with just those conclusions.
Happens all the time.
In this case, the defenses being developed by the US are capable of hitting the incoming missiles before they deploy decoys.
In addition, the defensive system is already working and developing new methods to defeat added capabilities to the new offensive system is not so difficult as the authors would have you believe, particularly when the principle offensive system for attacking a moving carrier at sea has not even been operationally tested at all yet, much less successfully.
While these defensive systems have been tested and are continuing to be tested as we speak. The US Navy and US Military takes very seriously the defense of these vessels and have been and continue to apply the budgets necessary and, more importantly, the talent necessary to solve the problem. And they are solving them.
I say again, the entire talk about the Ballistic missile offensive weapon against carriers that is getting so much press rings much more (to me at least) of a Sung Tsu deception plan more than a real system. I am sure the plan is being studied...but I will take it as an actual weapon system much more seriously when actual tests far out into the China Sea or beyond are conducted. Even then, I will still consider them playing into the very strength of the AEGIS system defenses and would be willing to bet that other, true asymetrical weapons systems are more than likely getting a cover by the loud pronouncements about this system.
But that is just my own opinion.
Sorry, but so many premises of this article are just flat out mistaken, or stretched to lead where the authors want it to lead.
Sort of like determining what the outcome of a scientific experiment is before the research is even conducted and then conducting the research to come up with just those conclusions.
Happens all the time.
In this case, the defenses being developed by the US are capable of hitting the incoming missiles before they deploy decoys.
In addition, the defensive system is already working and developing new methods to defeat added capabilities to the new offensive system is not so difficult as the authors would have you believe, particularly when the principle offensive system for attacking a moving carrier at sea has not even been operationally tested at all yet, much less successfully.
While these defensive systems have been tested and are continuing to be tested as we speak. The US Navy and US Military takes very seriously the defense of these vessels and have been and continue to apply the budgets necessary and, more importantly, the talent necessary to solve the problem. And they are solving them.
I say again, the entire talk about the Ballistic missile offensive weapon against carriers that is getting so much press rings much more (to me at least) of a Sung Tsu deception plan more than a real system. I am sure the plan is being studied...but I will take it as an actual weapon system much more seriously when actual tests far out into the China Sea or beyond are conducted. Even then, I will still consider them playing into the very strength of the AEGIS system defenses and would be willing to bet that other, true asymetrical weapons systems are more than likely getting a cover by the loud pronouncements about this system.
But that is just my own opinion.
Red___Sword
Junior Member
Re: J-20... The New Generation Fighter II
Hahaha, Bltize, if you are a rich guy, and I am a poor guy, to "WASTE", to me, dump unfinished drinks is waste enough; to you, maybe dump $1K worth of untouched meal, is only getting started to be "wasty". - Yet we are both "wasting".
JDAMs maybe guided, but think it as "expensive bombs". You call an otherwise delicated-workforce like F-22, to do the boring (if not danger, and IT IS ALWAYS DANGEROUS!) job - and almost anyone else can do - kind of job - and you think, as long as the F-22 didn't get shot down and the bomb hits, it is WORTHY.
....
Hear this hypothesis of mine - I got this NEW KIND OF ROCKETS, that can fire from a lot longer distant and more accurate than ever, the rocket pod do not spoil the J-20's stealth. So if I use J-20 with this rocket pod, let it do the "anyone can do" kind of job (still danger job), should I call the idea WORTHY?
I see your point of "stealth fighter penetrate the air defense better.", but please see my point of "if you want job done, call the PROFFESSIONALs to do the job."
Inaddition, who knows there isn't a dedicated stealth striker on the go?
Hahaha, Bltize, if you are a rich guy, and I am a poor guy, to "WASTE", to me, dump unfinished drinks is waste enough; to you, maybe dump $1K worth of untouched meal, is only getting started to be "wasty". - Yet we are both "wasting".
JDAMs maybe guided, but think it as "expensive bombs". You call an otherwise delicated-workforce like F-22, to do the boring (if not danger, and IT IS ALWAYS DANGEROUS!) job - and almost anyone else can do - kind of job - and you think, as long as the F-22 didn't get shot down and the bomb hits, it is WORTHY.
....
Hear this hypothesis of mine - I got this NEW KIND OF ROCKETS, that can fire from a lot longer distant and more accurate than ever, the rocket pod do not spoil the J-20's stealth. So if I use J-20 with this rocket pod, let it do the "anyone can do" kind of job (still danger job), should I call the idea WORTHY?
I see your point of "stealth fighter penetrate the air defense better.", but please see my point of "if you want job done, call the PROFFESSIONALs to do the job."
Inaddition, who knows there isn't a dedicated stealth striker on the go?
Anton Gregori
New Member
Re: J-20... The New Generation Fighter II
No point on its own, but it depends on the rest of the strategy. Presumably this would be part of a coordinated attack. Once the ship is disabled, follow-up attacks have a greater chance of success. Firstly, it's already operating at less than 100% capacity (fewer sensors or fewer planes in the sky), secondly, you can make it harder and more dangerous to fix the damage.
If you degraded the sensors for an hour or so, that window is enough for a volley of land-based cruise missiles to come in and do some more damage.
Then there's no point in constructing a straw-man scenario only to tear it down. If you agree that there are many ways a J-20 can be useful in hitting the support infrastructure, like the carrier and its battle group, then focusing on whether or not it could directly sink a carrier with the missiles available today just creates noise.
If you know that aircraft carriers are likely to play a role in any conflict that the J-20 is involved in, then it's worth asking how that knowledge affected the design of the plane. I admit that I don't know much about fighter design, but I figure that thrust/weight ratio is an important element in maneuverability. Bigger tanks mean more weight which means less maneuverability. And that particular trade-off leads me to think that the J-20 is intended to engage the enemy early - while he's still far enough away that he can't strike easily at mainland bases.
No point on its own, but it depends on the rest of the strategy. Presumably this would be part of a coordinated attack. Once the ship is disabled, follow-up attacks have a greater chance of success. Firstly, it's already operating at less than 100% capacity (fewer sensors or fewer planes in the sky), secondly, you can make it harder and more dangerous to fix the damage.
If you degraded the sensors for an hour or so, that window is enough for a volley of land-based cruise missiles to come in and do some more damage.
Then there's no point in constructing a straw-man scenario only to tear it down. If you agree that there are many ways a J-20 can be useful in hitting the support infrastructure, like the carrier and its battle group, then focusing on whether or not it could directly sink a carrier with the missiles available today just creates noise.
If you know that aircraft carriers are likely to play a role in any conflict that the J-20 is involved in, then it's worth asking how that knowledge affected the design of the plane. I admit that I don't know much about fighter design, but I figure that thrust/weight ratio is an important element in maneuverability. Bigger tanks mean more weight which means less maneuverability. And that particular trade-off leads me to think that the J-20 is intended to engage the enemy early - while he's still far enough away that he can't strike easily at mainland bases.
Re: J-20... The New Generation Fighter II
I honestly have no idea what you mean here.
Far out, I thought I've been quite clear on this matter -- the jobs F-22+JDAM or J-20+LS-6/FT bombs will be used for are completely different to ones F-15E or JH-7 or H-6 can do!! You can't send in a F-15E or JH-7 as the first wave to take down radar stations or SAM sites because they WILL BE DETECTED AND SHOT DOWN. F-22s or J-20s, stealthy, faster can strike those high value targets and get out without being shot down.
Do you think I'm proposing we use the F-22 or J-20 as CAS aircraft or something?? (To make it claer, I am NOT proposing that)
If you can use this hypotehtical rocket pod to hit high value targets without putting your own assets in danger then of course you don't ahve to put it on a J-20.
But at the moment we don't have a super rocket pod which can fire rockets that travel massive distances... and there are places only J-20 can go and targets J-20 can destroy.
I still don't really know what you mean here, can you stop being so abstract?
By the 'professionals" you mean JH-7, H-6, cruise missiles and the like, right?
The problem is that those professionals can't do what the J-20 can do. Understand that.
I honestly have no idea what you mean here.
Far out, I thought I've been quite clear on this matter -- the jobs F-22+JDAM or J-20+LS-6/FT bombs will be used for are completely different to ones F-15E or JH-7 or H-6 can do!! You can't send in a F-15E or JH-7 as the first wave to take down radar stations or SAM sites because they WILL BE DETECTED AND SHOT DOWN. F-22s or J-20s, stealthy, faster can strike those high value targets and get out without being shot down.
Do you think I'm proposing we use the F-22 or J-20 as CAS aircraft or something?? (To make it claer, I am NOT proposing that)
If you can use this hypotehtical rocket pod to hit high value targets without putting your own assets in danger then of course you don't ahve to put it on a J-20.
But at the moment we don't have a super rocket pod which can fire rockets that travel massive distances... and there are places only J-20 can go and targets J-20 can destroy.
I still don't really know what you mean here, can you stop being so abstract?
By the 'professionals" you mean JH-7, H-6, cruise missiles and the like, right?
The problem is that those professionals can't do what the J-20 can do. Understand that.
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Re: J-20... The New Generation Fighter II
So you're proposing risking J-20s to "degrade" the defenses of a CVBG, with unpowered munitions (like LS-6, FT series bombs -- only those can fit into the internal weapons bay at the moment)?
Wouldn't it be easier just to directly use relatively cheap anti ship missiles instead of expensive J-20s?
Support infrastructure as in airbases... Not carriers and its battle group -- F-22s don't operate from carriers, as I'm sure you know.
I do not agree that there are any ways a J-20 can directly hit a carrier and its battle group. That has been my stance all along. Taking out aerial assets, which will not be operating with the CVBG is a whole different matter.
And that leads to the question on how much heavier the J-20 is to the F-22... And from pictures we can see it's no more than half a meter longer if anything.
Let's say J-20 does have a longer range, and it is intended to strike CVBGs... and it didn't require AShMs... do you think the PLAAF will risk these fighters trying to go past the defenses of a CVBG?
One of the S requriements of the "4s" for J-20 was supermanouverability, which again, doesn't necessarily mean you have to be super light nor a high T/W ratio. I think the F-22's T/W ratio is slightly lower than the F-15's, but the former is obviously considered mroe manouverable.
Can you say again what you mean by engaging the enemy "early"? Do you mean attacking the enemy's base of operations or attacking them as they take off or before they get within 500 km of the chinese coast or what?
Can you just sum up what roles you think the J-20 will have? I'm not quite sure where you're coming from, with the whole "strike at the enemy before they strike you" thing.
So you're proposing risking J-20s to "degrade" the defenses of a CVBG, with unpowered munitions (like LS-6, FT series bombs -- only those can fit into the internal weapons bay at the moment)?
Wouldn't it be easier just to directly use relatively cheap anti ship missiles instead of expensive J-20s?
Support infrastructure as in airbases... Not carriers and its battle group -- F-22s don't operate from carriers, as I'm sure you know.
I do not agree that there are any ways a J-20 can directly hit a carrier and its battle group. That has been my stance all along. Taking out aerial assets, which will not be operating with the CVBG is a whole different matter.
And that leads to the question on how much heavier the J-20 is to the F-22... And from pictures we can see it's no more than half a meter longer if anything.
Let's say J-20 does have a longer range, and it is intended to strike CVBGs... and it didn't require AShMs... do you think the PLAAF will risk these fighters trying to go past the defenses of a CVBG?
One of the S requriements of the "4s" for J-20 was supermanouverability, which again, doesn't necessarily mean you have to be super light nor a high T/W ratio. I think the F-22's T/W ratio is slightly lower than the F-15's, but the former is obviously considered mroe manouverable.
Can you say again what you mean by engaging the enemy "early"? Do you mean attacking the enemy's base of operations or attacking them as they take off or before they get within 500 km of the chinese coast or what?
Can you just sum up what roles you think the J-20 will have? I'm not quite sure where you're coming from, with the whole "strike at the enemy before they strike you" thing.
Asymptote
Banned Idiot
Re: J-20... The New Generation Fighter II
I agree with this viewpoint. It is almost impossible to single handily sink an aircraft carrier like back in WWII with the kamikaze style attack. With AAW surrounding the carrier and CAP constantly on the lookout, it is almost impossible to penetrate the defense nowadays with one hit attack with "conventional" non-stealth aircraft. The successful strategy would rely on a war of attrition - constant barrage of AShMs (either land based, sea launched or air launched) to slowly degrade the defence, and to completely empty the enemy AA munitions. The J-20 *could* serve as first strike weapon to deliver AShMs in early stage, as it can get much closer to the target, thus greatly increase the penetration and destruction of the target. It can also serve as CAP for the follow on bombers to intercept enemy CAPs.
I thought this argument relies ENTIRELY on the capability of the engine - larger aircraft due to larger internal fuel tank - doesn't necessary mean the sacrifice of maneuverability - its all relative to the thrust to weight ratio which depends on WS-15's capability. While we can't expect miracle, I think WS-15's design is still evolving, and could gain significant advances as China's overall industrial capabilities advances.
I agree with this viewpoint. It is almost impossible to single handily sink an aircraft carrier like back in WWII with the kamikaze style attack. With AAW surrounding the carrier and CAP constantly on the lookout, it is almost impossible to penetrate the defense nowadays with one hit attack with "conventional" non-stealth aircraft. The successful strategy would rely on a war of attrition - constant barrage of AShMs (either land based, sea launched or air launched) to slowly degrade the defence, and to completely empty the enemy AA munitions. The J-20 *could* serve as first strike weapon to deliver AShMs in early stage, as it can get much closer to the target, thus greatly increase the penetration and destruction of the target. It can also serve as CAP for the follow on bombers to intercept enemy CAPs.
I thought this argument relies ENTIRELY on the capability of the engine - larger aircraft due to larger internal fuel tank - doesn't necessary mean the sacrifice of maneuverability - its all relative to the thrust to weight ratio which depends on WS-15's capability. While we can't expect miracle, I think WS-15's design is still evolving, and could gain significant advances as China's overall industrial capabilities advances.