North Korean Military.

johnboy

New Member
As long as we're ruminating about the NK military, I'd like to bring up what I think of as the lost opportunity in 1994. Remember when Clinton was supposedly very close to attacking North Korea over its nuclear program? I voted for the guy twice and was dismayed when the documents came out and the idea of really going to war with North Korea was never seriously considered at the top - it's pretty clear that Clinton would have accepted almost any deal to have avoided that step. Yet in terms of pre-emptive/preventative war, North Korea in 1994 was an almost perfect case and in hindsight that is quite clear.

The documents show that while Japan and South Korea were about as unenthusiastic as Clinton, they would have at least supported air strikes against nuclear targets. That might have led to war in and of itself, and if it hadn't, it would have called Pyongyang's bluff once and for all. In hindsight, it is clear that 1994 was the only opportunity that would ever exist to do something about North Korea AND exclude an obstructionist, uncooperative China at the same time. If war broke out now, to pacify China we would likely need to promise a complete withdrawal from the Korean peninsula afterwords, and even then China wouldn't probably raise a stink at the UN and posture on the world stage and before the domestic audience about American and Japanese warmongering. Finally, taking out North Korea in 1994 would have meant serious setbacks to the Pakistani and Iranian nuclear programs, to such an extent that Pakistan wouldn't have the bomb and Iran would be nowhere near it. Finally, if the occupation of North Korea became necessary, there would be plenty of South Korean help.

Compare and contrast that to Iraq and you see what I mean about a near-perfect scenario. It was doable back then, much more so than now. The benefits of having done it would have been enormous in terms of nuclear non-proliferation. *sigh*
 

Finn McCool

Captain
Registered Member
With all due respect, you've made my case for me. I acknowledged that the special forces -- who are chosen on the basis of loyalty and receive high standards of everything -- would stand and prove reliable. But for the vast bulk of those 1 million men, I keep in mind what we know about the typical North Korean, many of whom flee to China rather than starve. Word slips out that the population is not quite as docile as the government wants everyone to believe. Even without access to Western news sources, those people know a good bit about how what their government really is simply because they can compare the propaganda to reality. That would apply doubly to the rank and file when, as you point out, the shooting starts and they wind up starving and shell-shocked after a few days.

My point not that no one would fight for Pyongyang, but that most of that 1 million man military machine would quit once three things happened: 1) they were removed (or removed themselves) from political supervision; 2) the logistics broke down and left them without food, water or ammunition; 3) they were overwhelmed with superior firepower. Quick, large-scale collapses of resistance to a regime like Pyonyang's have happened before, and I'm not thinking of just Iraq.

Basically, I read your statement and thought "where am I off," because you said the same thing, only more elaborately and with a different emphasis :)

I think I got a little distracted when writing my post haha. I meant to emphasize that we shouldn't underestimate North Korean psychological willingness to fight but that, depending on various factors, war might seriously erode that willingness. My first point was that North Korea is a nation which constructs itself with a siege mentality; North Koreans are thought from an early age that their highest duty is to protect their nation because it is sort of the vessel of the Korean people's destiny. Every North Korean is aware that their nation is the way it is because of constant threat from the outside. They are taught that they will be fighting armies of barbaric racial mongrels who will kill everyone, etc. So while many people may not like how the country is run, we can't be sure if that will translate to a rejection of what they are constantly told is their "sacred duty".

My second point is something we agree on. The shock of war might produce a lot of "cognitive dissonance" in the mind of the average NK infantryman as he is faced with physical proof of the fact that the South and the US are militarily superior and his own nation cannot support him. In fact the best way to produce this morale-destroying realization may be through dropping food and leaflets on NK positions and stuff like that.

Finally, and this is just me nit-picking, but I never got the sense that the majority of NK special forces were created for political reasons. For example, the Iraqi Republican guard was created so that Saddam could divide the military and protect himself from coups. Perhaps there are units in the NK military which exist for that reason, but I can't think of any right now. I always got the sense that NK special forces are so large because they are intended to be used in a manner totally different from Western special forces, in a way much more similar to how the Soviets intended to use their Spetznaz and Airborne forces in the event of war with NATO. I think NK doctrine calls for special forces to be used as infiltrators en masse through tunnels, by minisubs and by paradrop (even from biplanes). The idea is to "seed" the path of the main force's advance with lots of smaller company or smaller sized units of elite light infantry that just cause chaos and make the defense "porous", and to mess with logistics etc. farther back from the front line.
 

johnboy

New Member
This is a misunderstanding, because when I wrote about political reliability, I wasn't thinking of the Republican Guard. I was thinking more along the lines of how Communist states in general select(ed) their officers, and in the case of crack units, the rank and file as well.

Finally, and this is just me nit-picking, but I never got the sense that the majority of NK special forces were created for political reasons. For example, the Iraqi Republican guard was created so that Saddam could divide the military and protect himself from coups. Perhaps there are units in the NK military which exist for that reason, but I can't think of any right now. I always got the sense that NK special forces are so large because they are intended to be used in a manner totally different from Western special forces, in a way much more similar to how the Soviets intended to use their Spetznaz and Airborne forces in the event of war with NATO. I think NK doctrine calls for special forces to be used as infiltrators en masse through tunnels, by minisubs and by paradrop (even from biplanes). The idea is to "seed" the path of the main force's advance with lots of smaller company or smaller sized units of elite light infantry that just cause chaos and make the defense "porous", and to mess with logistics etc. farther back from the front line.
 
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