The Korean war

raider1001 said:

Explain this logic to me, since when does "winning respect" meaning giving more power to the enemy, or better yet, expand the war and pissing off all potential allies in UN when all of your troops in Korea is on the verge of starving to death? Official Chinese history really made me giggle by stating that invading South Korea had created a split between Britain and US when the exact opposite effect occurred.

Edit: Did China earned respect during the Korean War? Well, given the humiliation of the US Eighth Army at the Kunuri Gauntlet forced the UN to accept an audience with the Chinese envoy, made Britain to consider pulling out of Asia and the non-aligned nations trying to broke a peace deal between China and US, it definitely did earn respect from the international community. But after refusing to compromise with UN, forcing Britain to remain fighting in Korea while rejecting non-aligned countries' peace efforts, does China actually want respect? Well, it's really hard to tell...

Click to expand...

Winning respect important from the Korean war on It BOUGHT PEACE in China Nobody dare to touch Chinese territory in the long time.

It allow China to concentrate on developing the country. It gives self respect to Chinese people . For once it erase the label of Sick man of Asia

For your information had Mao heed the advice of General Peng Teh Huai, the outcome of Korean war will probably end up differently

He advices to consolidate Chinese win and wait for Logistic support to catch up and not just headstrong attacking Seoul. But Mao didn't listen to him. Remember China at this time is so poor No motorized logistic .Basically what you have is just infantry with light weapon. No Air Cover. Little of Artillery to speak about . No heavy Tank or Armour . They have to walk all the way from Yalu to Seoul. And yet they manage to hold off the mightiest army in the world with all their heavy equipment.

The starvation you alluded to, is because they have to carry their food on their back!

raider1001 said:

It is not about hypocrisy, it is about realpolitik. What does China trying to achieve by driving all non-aligned nations and European powers into American camp? May I remind people here that Britain, which happened to the "hypocritical" western power, explicitly stated to US that it is against more involvement in Asia (expanding the war by labeling China as aggressor), and that it will accept a status quo if China took the ceasefire offered by non-aligned nations on December 11, 1950 (the last option Britain offered is to defend South Korea if China did not accept ceasefire for the sake of honor). Explain this logic to me, since when does "winning respect" meaning giving more power to the enemy, or better yet, expand the war and pissing off all potential allies in UN when all of your troops in Korea is on the verge of starving to death? Official Chinese history really made me giggle by stating that invading South Korea had created a split between Britain and US when the exact opposite effect occurred.

Edit: Did China earned respect during the Korean War? Well, given the humiliation of the US Eighth Army at the Kunuri Gauntlet forced the UN to accept an audience with the Chinese envoy, made Britain to consider pulling out of Asia and the non-aligned nations trying to broke a peace deal between China and US, it definitely did earn respect from the international community. But after refusing to compromise with UN, forcing Britain to remain fighting in Korea while rejecting non-aligned countries' peace efforts, does China actually want respect? Well, it's really hard to tell...

Click to expand...

The only way China can get your kind of 'respect' is if they bent over everytime the west wanted something and said 'thank you' afterwards.

China is not interested in some condescending pat on the head, like a lapdog. It wants to be recognised and treated as an equal.

Britain bends over backwards for the US pretty much all the time, while Russia shows washington the finger when it suits them. Who actually gets treated with more respect by America? Im not talking about the worthless empty praise of the self rightous, vain and fickle press, we are talking about realpolitic, geopolitical respect for a countries core interests and national interests.

For all the west's vainglorious posing, its only power they truely respect no matter what they say. Ultimately, it is action that speak loudet than words.

No one in the west took China at all seriously, never mind having any care about Chinese interests.

That was why America completely dismissed China's very explicity warnings about Korea, and given McAurthorer's vainity, unashamed ambition and political zealetry as well as his well documented insuborganation, there was every chance he would have tried to push to Beijing after taking NK so easily.

But that is getting off the point. The fact of the matter is that before korea, the west couldn't have cared less about Chinese interest or feelings. Afterwards, in Vietnam, they showed a lot of respect to Chinese concerns.

And before someone tries to be self rightous and argue that fear and respect are different things, again the facts speak for themselves and prove that to not be the case.

Just look at how the US had conducted itself in its backyard of Latin America and also in the middle east. They have shown full well how much respect they have towards democrasy and the authority of democratically elected governments with all the coups they initiated to topple governments they do not like to install pro washington despots in their place as well as its unvavering support of brutally oppressive regimes in the middle east.

America and the west has shown full well that the only thing they prespect is power, be it in the form of control of key resources or military might.

You cannot blame others for heeding the lessons they drew from your own actions.

You guys all missed the point...by the time China defeated US Eighth Army during winter 1950, China was already deemed to be a major power in the international stage, which in why most of the UN members were to trying to appease China while holding US back. The US was forced to negotiate a ceasefire deal directly with China under pressure from UN, while just a month ago MacArthur was laughing all the way to the Yalu River. At that point the onus is on China whether to be taken seriously as a international power or be isolated as a new threat. The fact remains that US only gained the support from most UN members to isolate China after China chose to cross the 38th parallel.

Of course, it could also be argued that by driving off US forces in South Korea can earn even more respect. But could China, at the end of 1950, drove off US forces in South Korea? Both Peng Dehuai and Ridgway didn't think so. In fact, as more and more Chinese weaknesses were exposed during the Third, Fourth and Fifth Phase Campaign, the UN forces started to view Chinese military as less of a threat. Xue Yuan (徐焰) stated it perfectly, by the time the Chinese got defeated at Chipyong-ni, the Americans have all they need to know to defeat the Chinese. And after the Fifth Phase Campaign, the Chinese got mauled so bad that all divisions on average have only 3,000 men, forcing the Russians to sue for peace. By the time the war dragged to 1952, most of the American troops got pulled out because it is still the Russians that grabbed most of the attention.

raider1001 said:

You guys all missed the point...by the time China defeated US Eighth Army during winter 1950, China was already deemed to be a major power in the international stage, which in why most of the UN members were to trying to appease China while holding US back. The US was forced to negotiate a ceasefire deal directly with China under pressure from UN, while just a month ago MacArthur was laughing all the way to the Yalu River. At that point the onus is on China whether to be taken seriously as a international power or be isolated as a new threat. The fact remains that US only gained the support from most UN members to isolate China after China chose to cross the 38th parallel.

Of course, it could also be argued that by driving off US forces in South Korea can earn even more respect. But could China, at the end of 1950, drove off US forces in South Korea? Both Peng Dehuai and Ridgway didn't think so. In fact, as more and more Chinese weaknesses were exposed during the Third, Fourth and Fifth Phase Campaign, the UN forces started to view Chinese military as less of a threat. Xue Yuan (徐焰) stated it perfectly, by the time the Chinese got defeated at Chipyong-ni, the Americans have all they need to know to defeat the Chinese. And after the Fifth Phase Campaign, the Chinese got mauled so bad that all divisions on average have only 3,000 men, forcing the Russians to sue for peace. By the time the war dragged to 1952, most of the American troops got pulled out because it is still the Russians that grabbed most of the attention.

Click to expand...

Only fools or those with an agenda would apply hindsight to criticise past decisions.

Its all fine and well looking at history books to say, 'well if they did this or didn't do that things would have worked out better', but thats not how the world works in real life and certainly not how you judged the situation.

I don't understand why the United States stood for the humiliation that China inflicted on it in 1950. Why was the US so willing to sit around and do nothing in the stalemate around the 38th parallel? The Chinese fought very well in Korea, but when China and NK were intransigent on the issue of prisoner repatriation and whatever else held up the peace talks for two freakin' years, why didn't the UN just build up their firepower and smash the Communists then take Pyongyang again? Did the Russians make it known that entering NK again was a total nuclear war no-no? Given the firepower disparity between the two sides I think that was totally possible.

Its not like they didn't try. It wasn't just the communist forces that launched huge offensives.

But those offensives never got very far, and always resulted in appalling casualties. The US simply lacked the political will to take enough casualties to take Pyongyang. And even if they took Pyongyang, what would it achieve? Just a ceasefire line a little further north.

Remember the technology available at the time. You could bombard a mountain for days and still not take out that pesky strong point. Its infantry that needs to hoof it up and root out the strong points to take a position, and that is extremely costly to the attackers.

plawolf said:

Only fools or those with an agenda would apply hindsight to criticise past decisions.

Its all fine and well looking at history books to say, 'well if they did this or didn't do that things would have worked out better', but thats not how the world works in real life and certainly not how you judged the situation.

Click to expand...

And I guess Peng Dehuai is a fool that advised Mao not to launch Third Phase Campaign in December 1950 because of anti-China agenda after reading a lot of history books published in the 90s? It is perfectly clear to Chinese ground commanders at late 1950 that they can't sustain offensives into South Korea, so why bother to invade and expose its own weakness in the first place?

plawolf said:

Its not like they didn't try. It wasn't just the communist forces that launched huge offensives.

But those offensives never got very far, and always resulted in appalling casualties. The US simply lacked the political will to take enough casualties to take Pyongyang. And even if they took Pyongyang, what would it achieve? Just a ceasefire line a little further north.

Click to expand...

You are confused again. Why did during July 1951, when there are no mountain strong points and half of the Chinese army got wiped out, US did not re-invade North Korea? There was a US deal made with NATO during December 1950, in which after China entered the war, NATO decided they would support the war only if US presence in Europe is not compromised. As such, the US could only afford enough manpower to guard South Korea while most of its ground forces is stationed in Europe to counter the Russians. And by those "huge" offensives, you meant those limited offensives took by the UN forces during the stalemate period, which were normally regiment sized attacks, are meant to destroy North Korea, you are seriously mistaken.

raider1001 said:

And I guess Peng Dehuai is a fool that advised Mao not to launch Third Phase Campaign in December 1950 because of anti-China agenda after reading a lot of history books published in the 90s?

Click to expand...

Trying to be cute? Because I assume you have the intelligence to understand my original point, if not, by all means like us know!

Please leave the childishness out of it unless you wish to be treated like a child.

It is perfectly clear to Chinese ground commanders at late 1950 that they can't sustain offensives into South Korea, so why bother to invade and expose its own weakness in the first place?

Click to expand...

And you know this how exactly?

You are confused again. Why did during July 1951, when there are no mountain strong points and half of the Chinese army got wiped out, US did not re-invade North Korea?

Click to expand...

Again, I question where you are getting your information like 'half the chinese army being wiped out' and 'divisions down to 3000 men' you have been waving like facts.

There was a US deal made with NATO during December 1950, in which after China entered the war, NATO decided they would support the war only if US presence in Europe is not compromised. As such, the US could only afford enough manpower to guard South Korea while most of its ground forces is stationed in Europe to counter the Russians. And by those "huge" offensives, you meant those limited offensives took by the UN forces during the stalemate period, which were normally regiment sized attacks, are meant to destroy North Korea, you are seriously mistaken.

Click to expand...

Again, what version of history have you been reading to suggest that the UN were only launching regiment sized attacks?

There was no quid pro quo where both sides decided the 38th was a good place to stop at the offset.

When the PVA movement in and enjoyed huge success to start with, they were hoping to push the UN out of Korea. That proved to be an unattainable goal, and when the US pushed the PVA and NK forces back past the 38th parallel, they had no plans to call it quits there and there either. They were blunted and pushed back to the 38th, and only after that that both sides reached and unspoken understanding that this was where the line will be drawn.

In the end, both sides worn themselves out and battered to an effective standstill out of sheer exhaustion. Both sides knew they were not able to achieve complete victory, so they settled into static defensive positions and slugged it out while the negotiators hammered out a deal.

plawolf said:

Trying to be cute? Because I assume you have the intelligence to understand my original point, if not, by all means like us know!

Please leave the childishness out of it unless you wish to be treated like a child.

Click to expand...

Launching personal insults by suggesting someone has "agenda" in discussing history tend to be viewed as childish, but since this is an internet forum, I presume what you did is normal.

And you know this how exactly?

Click to expand...

* Appleman, Roy (1990), Ridgway Duels for Korea, 18, College Station, TX: Texas A and M University Military History Series, ISBN 0890964327
* Zhang, Shu Guang (1995), Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, ISBN 0700607234
* Shrader, Charles R. (1995), Communist Logistics in the Korean War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, ISBN 0313295093
* Spurr, Russell (1988), Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea 1950-51, New York, NY: Newmarket Press, ISBN 1557040087

Again, I question where you are getting your information like 'half the chinese army being wiped out' and 'divisions down to 3000 men' you have been waving like facts.

Click to expand...

* George, Alexander L. (1967), The Chinese Communist Army in Action: the War and its Aftermath, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, OCLC 284111
* Millett, Allan R. (2010), The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came From the North, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, ISBN 9780700617098
* Shrader, Charles R. (1995), Communist Logistics in the Korean War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, ISBN 0313295093
* Farrar-Hockley, Anthony (1990), Official History: the British Part in the Korean War, Volume II, London, England: HMSO, ISBN 0116309539
* And my grandfather for being a member of the Chinese 180th Division during the Fifth Phase Campaign

Again, what version of history have you been reading to suggest that the UN were only launching regiment sized attacks?

Click to expand...

* Chae, Han Kook; Chung, Suk Kyun; Yang, Yong Cho (2001), Yang, Hee Wan; Lim, Won Hyok; Sims, Thomas Lee et al., eds., The Korean War, Volume III, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, ISBN 9780803277953
* Farrar-Hockley, Anthony (1990), Official History: the British Part in the Korean War, Volume II, London, England: HMSO, ISBN 0116309539
* Hermes, Walter G. (1992), Truce Tent and Fighting Front, Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, .
* Malkasian, Carter (2002), A History of Modern Wars of Attrition, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, ISBN 0275973794

There was no quid pro quo where both sides decided the 38th was a good place to stop at the offset.

When the PVA movement in and enjoyed huge success to start with, they were hoping to push the UN out of Korea. That proved to be an unattainable goal, and when the US pushed the PVA and NK forces back past the 38th parallel, they had no plans to call it quits there and there either.[source?] They were blunted and pushed back to the 38th,[source?] and only after that that both sides reached and unspoken understanding that this was where the line will be drawn.

In the end, both sides worn themselves out and battered to an effective standstill out of sheer exhaustion. Both sides knew they were not able to achieve complete victory, so they settled into static defensive positions and slugged it out while the negotiators hammered out a deal.

Click to expand...

Now it is my turn...provide your sources.

raider1001 said:

Launching personal insults by suggesting someone has "agenda" in discussing history tend to be viewed as childish, but since this is an internet forum, I presume what you did is normal.



* Appleman, Roy (1990), Ridgway Duels for Korea, 18, College Station, TX: Texas A and M University Military History Series, ISBN 0890964327
* Zhang, Shu Guang (1995), Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, ISBN 0700607234
* Shrader, Charles R. (1995), Communist Logistics in the Korean War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, ISBN 0313295093
* Spurr, Russell (1988), Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea 1950-51, New York, NY: Newmarket Press, ISBN 1557040087



* George, Alexander L. (1967), The Chinese Communist Army in Action: the War and its Aftermath, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, OCLC 284111
* Millett, Allan R. (2010), The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came From the North, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, ISBN 9780700617098
* Shrader, Charles R. (1995), Communist Logistics in the Korean War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, ISBN 0313295093
* Farrar-Hockley, Anthony (1990), Official History: the British Part in the Korean War, Volume II, London, England: HMSO, ISBN 0116309539
* And my grandfather for being a member of the Chinese 180th Division during the Fifth Phase Campaign



* Chae, Han Kook; Chung, Suk Kyun; Yang, Yong Cho (2001), Yang, Hee Wan; Lim, Won Hyok; Sims, Thomas Lee et al., eds., The Korean War, Volume III, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, ISBN 9780803277953
* Farrar-Hockley, Anthony (1990), Official History: the British Part in the Korean War, Volume II, London, England: HMSO, ISBN 0116309539
* Hermes, Walter G. (1992), Truce Tent and Fighting Front, Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army,

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

.
* Malkasian, Carter (2002), A History of Modern Wars of Attrition, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, ISBN 0275973794



Now it is my turn...provide your sources.

Click to expand...

Raider I agree with most your argument and your analysis based on your primary and secondary sources that you have provided.

However, would you mind telling me how many divisions and the identity of the divisions that were reduced to below 3000 men? The historical society of Wisconsin is in my university campus and I have skimmed through some of your sources regarding the chinese numbers, and failed to find the statement regarding half of the chinese army being wiped out and specially the statment of " all the divinsions were below 3000men"

Also, all your sources regarding the numbers are either produced by American historians or Chinese historians who stuided and written the document in the US. They have limited access to chinese archives and could contain a fair amount of bias, and therefore might not be all that correct. I had a men in the hospital telling me " my dad killed dozens of your kind in korea when I was your age, their platoon wiped out 2 of your companies in one day without a scratch on ourside." while i was doing volunteer. hahahaha I almost believed him