071 LPD thread

plawolf

Lieutenant General
I think we have different ideas about what kind of force the word "spearhead" refers to in this context.

IMO, for a Taiwan invasion scenario, a "spearhead" would be the initial force that moves to seize a beach head or a staging area for the main force to later land at and to continue inland with.

What you describe, IMO, is more like enabling operations to search and destroy, sabotage, path find, and designate targets for. It is the mission profile for SOF and helicopter air assault, but they are not intended to seize the beach itself but rather to make the beach seizing operation easier.

In which case you can argue that the entire beach assault is just an enabling operation for you to land stuff later.

Taking a beach is not the ultimate mission, but a means to an end. The spearhead is, by my definition, the first significant forces in. A few small specops teams infiltrated in for covert recon and sabotage won’t really count, but massed air assault most certainly does in my book.

But to continue on this point will most likely mean we will just be going round and round arguing about semantics.

Technically speaking, yes, an 071 deploying 726s will still be "in range" of land based AShMs.
That is to say, the flight range of AShMs will be able to encompass 071s deploying 726s at range from the beach.

However, for land based ASHMs to be able to conduct those kinds of OTH anti ship targeting, they will need ISR assets, usually airborne or dedicated radar stations. I expect that by this part of the conflict, the ROC's airborne ISR forces will all be destroyed (P-3Cs, E-2s, and even fighter aircraft as well), with substantial degradation if not destruction of their land based anti ship ISR kill chain.

That means, despite the 100-200km ranges of ROC land based AShMs, their actual practical range will be limited to the horizon. That is why I believe there is a much greater AShM risk to 071s if they are deploying IFVs closer to shore (say within 40km) vs deploying 726 LCACs further from shore, over the horizon.

I think you are being way too optimistic in your assumptions about how easy and effective it might be to make enemy AShM batteries useless without having to destroy them.

OTH targeting is obviously preferred, but its lack is by no means enough to make AShMs useless.

A few quick examples off the top of my head:

Blind fire.

Not ideal, but if your front line units are reporting a massed 726 assault, you will have a very good idea of where the landing fleet is gathered.

You can blind fire your AShMs with waypoints to send them into your suspected target zone and switch on seekers for self-targeting.

You will have low probability of hits never mind kills, but you can easily up your odds. You can blind fire with one missile battery/launcher and spreads the waypoints to cover the biggest area possible. Then turn your radars to passive.

As soon as the escorts start engaging the first missiles, you can use their emissions to get a much better fix on the location of the landing fleet for a massed, concerntrated follow on missile attack.

Satellite uplink.

It would not be out of the question for the likes of the US to allow ROC forces access to their space based assets during a conflict.

Those assets would be pretty much untouchable by the PLA if the US has not directly enter the conflict.

While those satellites won’t be able to designate for coastal defence AShMs, they can give ROC AShM batteries precise coordinates to send their missiles so that they can lock on with onboard radar seekers.

Those are just some obvious examples, I am sure there are many other ways.

The key here is that such enemy counters takes time to organise and execute.

The 071’s owe defences and escorts should be able to easily handle localised piecemeal attacks, it’s the co-ordinated saturation attacks that will cause them the most problems and pose the highest risk.

So, unless you are be sure you have killed every AShM battery and launcher on Taiwan, you have to assume that they can launch those missiles at your ships, and do so in at least a semi co-ordinated way.

So those 071s doing OTH assault won’t be sitting pretty, but rather exposing themselves for extended periods to allow the enemy to mount the kind to attack that might punch through their defences.

Umm I agree that during the initial beach seizure phase (aka what I describe as the "spearhead") -- it makes sense to try and consolidate as much CAS, CAP and ISR and SEAD/DEAD together as possible.


Btw, when you suggest that my approach is "Your suggested approach is the western steamroller method to minimise losses. But that takes a long time of preparatory strikes to degrade enemy defences sufficiently to allow that approach.

If you follow the western playbook, you only deploy LDPs once all the AShM and air threat has been completely elmiminted and you only got coastal artillery to worry about."

But I've always thought about an amphibious assault as requiring a substantial (though rapid) missile and air bombardment to rapidly destroy ROC air and naval forces and C2 facilities, along with SOF and air assault to sabotage and designate targets etc...

Surely you're not suggesting the PLA should conduct an amphibious assault under the conditions where the ROC still have an air force, a navy and an unmolested C2 system??

Of course I am not suggesting they try a beach assault with enemy defences untouched, that would be so absurd that I am surprised you would ask such a question.

As you yourself have pointed in this very discussion, it will be extremely hard and time consuming to gaurentee destruction of all Taiwan’s defensive assets with air and missile strikes alone. So why is it such a leap for you to appreciate that PLA game plans should and would make the assumption that Taiwan might still have significant forces hidden and surviving by the time they come to launch the landings, and plan accordingly?

My point is and has always been that the PLA won’t have the luxury of the weeks or months of intensive air and missile strikes needed to guarantee with a high degree of confidence that all Taiwan’s AShM batteries and launchers are dead before they have to start the invasion.

Under such circumstance, you are left with all the negatives of OTH amphibious assault while getting the main benefits massively impaired or eliminated entirely.

Thus it is far better to move your LPDs in closer, so they can deploy all their cargo of IFVs and marines in the shortest time possible and then pull those high value assets way back, out of missile range where they will actually be safe.

Such a move, because of it’s much shorter timeframe, means the PLAAF, PLAN and PLA missile forces could surge a much higher number of supporting assets and be able to suppress the enemy defences far more effectively.

Think of dozens or even hundreds of UCAVs deployed on grid formation where the entire target beach and much of the inland areas within weapons range of the beach gets UCAVs on station for the duration just waiting for concealed weapons and troops to reveal themselves.

Add in similar numbers of manned attack helicopters and fast jets acting as rapid reaction, with naval artillery doing suppression fire and EW assets disruption enemy communications and targeting etc, all done while there are no US satellites overhead, and you will have a solid chance that those 071s will be on their way back out to sea before the enemy could organise a serious, co-ordinated response.
 

Jiang ZeminFanboy

Senior Member
Registered Member
Which vessels right now (e.g 2018) could send z-10 helos in the case of Taiwan ?
Do you know how many z-10 helos could be potentially be used without type 075 LHD ?
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Which vessels right now (e.g 2018) could send z-10 helos in the case of Taiwan ?
Do you know how many z-10 helos could be potentially be used without type 075 LHD ?

With an estimated range of 800km and the Taiwan strait being 200km at its widest part, pretty much every Z10 that can fly can be deployed for a Taiwan beach assault mission from mainland bases directly without needing LHDs and still have decent time on station once they get there.

With such a long travel distance, you are going to have significant issues trying to sustain coverage for extended periods though.

For the kind of rapid surge strike as I favour, you can deploy nearly 100% of available Z10s for the beach assault if you want.

However, for OTH assault, you will at most be able to deploy 50%, since the duration of the landings for OTH assault will likely exceed the on station time of Z10s operating from mainland bases. So you will need a second wave of Z10s to come and take over once the first wave hits bingo fuel.

If it takes longer than 2 stretches of on station time, you might only be able to deploy 1/4-1/3 of your Z10 strength.

The same would apply to all support assets, even those with very long loiter times like UCAVs, as munitions expenditure rates will likely far outstrip loiter time for such a mission.
 

cunnilingist

New Member
Registered Member
Not sure where they get "five" CSGs from. In a Taiwanese conflict, the number is 3. 1 immediately available on the spot (the single forward-based CSG in Yokosuka), and 2 more probably within two weeks, sailing full steam from the ME and Atlantic theaters. 3 more CSGs would be on reserve standby("MCO-S/R"), available for reactivation within 30 days. 1 more CSG would be available for reactivation within 90 days ("MSS"). In other words, a conflict lasting 2 weeks or more would allow the USN to bring 3 CSGs to the area. A conflict lasting a month or more would allow the USN to gather 6 CSGs to the area. A conflict lasting 3 months or more would allow 7 CSGs to be assembled. The other 4 carriers would in their extended maintenance cycles and would not be available for combat. However, this is a theoretical capability, and it is not clear to me whether the USN has the logistics capability to surge all 7 CSGs into the same theater and adequately maintain their full combat capabilities for the duration of their deployments. To my knowledge this has never been demonstrated. There have been instances of 7 CSGs all active at the same time (actually only Summer Pulse 2004 comes to mind), but importantly they were deployed in several different theaters; in addition, months of planning went into it, with all CSGs having months of forewarning, as well as at the start of the surge 5 CSGs were already active and only 2 had to be surged. Perhaps RAND is suggesting that 5 CSGs are the limit of Western Pacific logistical capability.

This is such a titanic struggle. Complete insanity lol. It's like Superman vs General Zod.

Compare this with what Taiwan has right now and it's safe to say that my 24hr estimate is pretty accurate.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
In which case you can argue that the entire beach assault is just an enabling operation for you to land stuff later.

Taking a beach is not the ultimate mission, but a means to an end. The spearhead is, by my definition, the first significant forces in. A few small specops teams infiltrated in for covert recon and sabotage won’t really count, but massed air assault most certainly does in my book.

But to continue on this point will most likely mean we will just be going round and round arguing about semantics.

I agree that a spearhead can be described as the first significant forces in, but IMO massed air assaults are enabling operations for the purpose of assaulting the beach.

But this is just semantics indeed.




I think you are being way too optimistic in your assumptions about how easy and effective it might be to make enemy AShM batteries useless without having to destroy them.

OTH targeting is obviously preferred, but its lack is by no means enough to make AShMs useless.

A few quick examples off the top of my head:

Blind fire.

Not ideal, but if your front line units are reporting a massed 726 assault, you will have a very good idea of where the landing fleet is gathered.

You can blind fire your AShMs with waypoints to send them into your suspected target zone and switch on seekers for self-targeting.

You will have low probability of hits never mind kills, but you can easily up your odds. You can blind fire with one missile battery/launcher and spreads the waypoints to cover the biggest area possible. Then turn your radars to passive.

As soon as the escorts start engaging the first missiles, you can use their emissions to get a much better fix on the location of the landing fleet for a massed, concerntrated follow on missile attack.

Satellite uplink.

It would not be out of the question for the likes of the US to allow ROC forces access to their space based assets during a conflict.

Those assets would be pretty much untouchable by the PLA if the US has not directly enter the conflict.

While those satellites won’t be able to designate for coastal defence AShMs, they can give ROC AShM batteries precise coordinates to send their missiles so that they can lock on with onboard radar seekers.

Those are just some obvious examples, I am sure there are many other ways.

The key here is that such enemy counters takes time to organise and execute.

The 071’s owe defences and escorts should be able to easily handle localised piecemeal attacks, it’s the co-ordinated saturation attacks that will cause them the most problems and pose the highest risk.

So, unless you are be sure you have killed every AShM battery and launcher on Taiwan, you have to assume that they can launch those missiles at your ships, and do so in at least a semi co-ordinated way.

So those 071s doing OTH assault won’t be sitting pretty, but rather exposing themselves for extended periods to allow the enemy to mount the kind to attack that might punch through their defences.

I fully agree that not all AShMs will be able to be destroyed, and that they will remain a threat, which is why I believe there is a difference between having LPDs 40km away from the beach vs across the horizon.

The difference in our opinion is how effective the AShMs will be after the easier to find targets as part of the ROC's kill chain are destroyed. C2 centres, airborne ISR, radar stations, etc.

Blind firing AShMs is definitely one way of trying to make use of what efficacy they have left, but the threat such firing of AShMs will pose versus large landing ships well over the horizon with land based AEW&C support and air defence ships operating beyond the littorals, is much reduced IMO.

US satellite support can help provide OTH guidance, but I'm not sure if that should be assumed as a given, for practical reasons (is that even possible without pre-existing coordination to have datalinks and training to enable it), and political reasons (depending on how early in the stage the conflict is, US ISR support to ROC military may not be a given).


Overall, I do believe that AShMs will remain a threat even after the kill chain is defeated, but that their threat within the horizon from the beach is substantially greater than that beyond the horizon.




Of course I am not suggesting they try a beach assault with enemy defences untouched, that would be so absurd that I am surprised you would ask such a question.

I asked, because the way you described my proposal for bombardment seemed different to how I envisioned it, so I wanted to make clear we were on the same page.



As you yourself have pointed in this very discussion, it will be extremely hard and time consuming to gaurentee destruction of all Taiwan’s defensive assets with air and missile strikes alone. So why is it such a leap for you to appreciate that PLA game plans should and would make the assumption that Taiwan might still have significant forces hidden and surviving by the time they come to launch the landings, and plan accordingly?

My point is and has always been that the PLA won’t have the luxury of the weeks or months of intensive air and missile strikes needed to guarantee with a high degree of confidence that all Taiwan’s AShM batteries and launchers are dead before they have to start the invasion.

Under such circumstance, you are left with all the negatives of OTH amphibious assault while getting the main benefits massively impaired or eliminated entirely.

I agree the PLA won't have weeks and months of bombardment before launching an amphibious assault.
At most, I will give them a week, maybe even only half a week.

During that time period, how realistic is it to destroy the fighting capacity of their navy, air force, airborne ISR, main fixed radars, to target known SAM and AShM launch sites, and to target their known C2 centres and primary logistics centres, to effectively gain command of the sea and to deny the ROCAF the ability to launch planes (though air superiority will only be achieved after a continued phase of SEAD/DEAD)?

Under such circumstances I expect a significant portion of their AShM and SAM force to remain intact, as much well as most of their ground forces.
But I think much of the kill chain and networking and C2 behind those systems will be denied, and I think the PLA would be willing to conduct an amphibious assault under such conditions in the immediate future.
As time goes on, I expect the PLA to seek to achieve a greater degree of destruction and a higher proportion of opposing AShM and SAM sites in that first phase prior to launching an amphibious assault.



Thus it is far better to move your LPDs in closer, so they can deploy all their cargo of IFVs and marines in the shortest time possible and then pull those high value assets way back, out of missile range where they will actually be safe.

Such a move, because of it’s much shorter timeframe, means the PLAAF, PLAN and PLA missile forces could surge a much higher number of supporting assets and be able to suppress the enemy defences far more effectively.

Think of dozens or even hundreds of UCAVs deployed on grid formation where the entire target beach and much of the inland areas within weapons range of the beach gets UCAVs on station for the duration just waiting for concealed weapons and troops to reveal themselves.

Add in similar numbers of manned attack helicopters and fast jets acting as rapid reaction, with naval artillery doing suppression fire and EW assets disruption enemy communications and targeting etc, all done while there are no US satellites overhead, and you will have a solid chance that those 071s will be on their way back out to sea before the enemy could organise a serious, co-ordinated response.

I have no issue with this, and I think it can dovetail and complement with a first phase bombardment.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
I believe this is the 5th and not the 6th Henri got it wrong
The 6th LPD Type 071, currently under construction at Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard, photographed by a Shanghai spoiler on December 18th.
DRjVTukUEAAcl1h.jpg
 

asif iqbal

Lieutenant General
6 x LPD

I believe that is the largest LPD amphibious force outside US

I remember when they had the single unit we used to drool all over the Internet for photos of the well deck and hanger trying to get a handle of the capacity

Now it's just another day !

I seriously hope a spy satellite flys overhead in 2018 and confirms 2 x LHA under construction
 
D

Deleted member 13312

Guest
6 x LPD

I believe that is the largest LPD amphibious force outside US

I remember when they had the single unit we used to drool all over the Internet for photos of the well deck and hanger trying to get a handle of the capacity

Now it's just another day !

I seriously hope a spy satellite flys overhead in 2018 and confirms 2 x LHA under construction
Would not the correct term be LPD for the Type 71 ?
 
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