071 LPD thread

Iron Man

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IMO, what you are describing may be more oriented towards a general purpose MEU assault force that can be suited to multiple different kinds of environments -- and I think for such a purpose, a more multirole loadout and having LCACs in the ship (even including 4 to use up all well deck spaces for LCACs) is entirely sensible. The ground force of an MEU is intended to go more inland and to continue to sustain themselves.

But for a Taiwan specific contingency, where the strategy will likely initially be much more about securing an initial beach head through speed, firepower, and numbers, I think jobjed's suggestion is logical.

For example, in the first wave of a beach assault, things like trucks and 155mm towed howitzers probably won't be of that much use. Instead, the goal would be to storm the beach initially with substantial fire support and other joint force activities. Once a beach head is secured, they will start thinking about depositing more longer term ground based fire support and ground based logistics/transport vehicles and hardware.

I can see the first phase of an amphibious beach assault to be made by a large number of amphibious IFVs from large LPDs, to advance up the beach, before LSTs, Zubrs and 726 LCACs start depositing non-amphibious heavier AFVs like MBTs and heavier IFVs to consolidate their position and secure a more thorough beachhead, and then to start landing vehicles needed to sustain a longer term invasion beyond the initial amphibious assault.
The first wave would certainly not include anything logistical. The jeeps that would come with the MBTs would be mounting antitank missile launchers, mortar launchers, and HMGs. Maybe not even the second wave. However, this certainly does not mean that the ARG will not have logistics vehicles or equipment. Once the beachhead is secured over a matter of hours, subsequent trips by the 726 and Z8s would certainly involve mostly or totally logistical equipment/vehicle transport from ARG to shore. On a small, highly connected island the size of Taiwan, if you can't secure a beachhead in a matter of hours, you're done. You can drive from the Taipei in the north to Kaosiung City in the south in less than 3 hours. Even if PLAAF/PLANAF manages to bomb every last piece of highway, road, and rail line, you could still go off-road and manage the entire length of the island in 8-10 hours cross-country. So we're not talking attack waves that originate from the mainland coastline in order to secure a beachhead. We're talking attack waves that originate from the ARG and whatever else came along with the ARG. So the first invasion force that originates from mainland coastline needs to be able to both secure the beachhead and hold the beachhead against reinforcements that arrive from elsewhere in Taiwan. For that you need logistical support to already be with you, not something that comes the next day after your spent ARG goes back to the mainland, loads up and comes back.

Of course, a big problem with relying on amphibious IFVs (even ZBD05 derivatives) for the first wave, is that it will force the motherships like LPDs to get relatively close (within a few tens of km at least) of the beach, putting it in threat of not only shorter range and more primitive fires like land based artillery and anti ship guns as well as naval mines, but also of course things like land based AShMs and attack helicopters and maybe even jets with AShMs if any still exist by that time.

One way to try and heavily compensate for that closing distance is by having a large number of LCACs to position LPDs and the like further out to sea and reducing the transit time of AFVs by virtue of the fast transport time of LCACs.

Substantial fire support and artillery bombardment against shore positions, and thorough AShM hunting will be complementary to the overall effort as well, and sea based AAW and air superiority with AEW&C and joint networking will reduce the threat as well.


One idea I've toyed with, for a purely Taiwan scenario, is if the Chinese Navy can build a fast speed LCU, something the size of the Mk 10 LCU; a 240 ton ship that is able to carry up to a single MBT, but able to operate at a relatively higher speed like 20+ knots similar to what BMT once proposed (
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), vs 10 knots of a Mk 10 LCU.

The benefit of such a ship, IMO, is that they can likely be built en masse and relatively affordably by Chinese shipyards, and will have the range for a round trip from one side of the strait to the other, so they do not have to rely on big LPDs as a mother ship. The large number of LCUs mean there is no single point of failure like an LPD, though it will be harder to coordinate a mass LCU rush against a beach.

an LCU is obviously far less flexible than an LCAC in terms of being able to assault multiple different types of environments, but I think a high speed LCU in large numbers will offer substantial meat to an amphibious assault-lift force (in particular by their ability to deposit MBTs onto the beach), while being potentially much cheaper to produce and able to procure in larger numbers than 726 LCACs.
OTH requires nothing more than 40-45km from shore at most; that would get you below radar as well as visual horizon. That represents about a half hour trip for a 726. There is no land-based artillery or antiship guns possessed by Taiwan that could reach out that far; I also don't know of any Taiwanese joint capabilities to remote target whatever fires they may have. Antiship missiles are a non-factor since they are a threat regardless of how far out the ARG sits.

In any case, MEUs aren't meant to attack heavily defended shores, as swimming IFVs are just sitting ducks while they beach to all manner of attacks from entrenched tanks, guns, mortars, missiles, and artillery. The beach has to already be mostly cleansed of defenders by air strikes prior to landing, with only minimal to token resistance remaining; air superiority or even air supremacy will have already been achieved. The Chinese military will not be repeating another D-Day on Taiwanese beaches.
 

Blitzo

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The first wave would certainly not include anything logistical. The jeeps that would come with the MBTs would be mounting antitank missile launchers, mortar launchers, and HMGs. Maybe not even the second wave. However, this certainly does not mean that the ARG will not have logistics vehicles or equipment. Once the beachhead is secured over a matter of hours, subsequent trips by the 726 and Z8s would certainly involve mostly or totally logistical equipment/vehicle transport from ARG to shore. On a small, highly connected island the size of Taiwan, if you can't secure a beachhead in a matter of hours, you're done. You can drive from the Taipei in the north to Kaosiung City in the south in less than 3 hours. Even if PLAAF/PLANAF manages to bomb every last piece of highway, road, and rail line, you could still go off-road and manage the entire length of the island in 8-10 hours cross-country. So we're not talking attack waves that originate from the mainland coastline in order to secure a beachhead. We're talking attack waves that originate from the ARG and whatever else came along with the ARG. So the first invasion force that originates from mainland coastline needs to be able to both secure the beachhead and hold the beachhead against reinforcements that arrive from elsewhere in Taiwan. For that you need logistical support to already be with you, not something that comes the next day after your spent ARG goes back to the mainland, loads up and comes back.

I do not envision a US style ARG as the complete force in trying to assault and establish a beach head in a Taiwan contingency.
It won't be merely 071 LPDs, but it will also include LSTs, the various LCACs, the larger LCUs, and even STUFTs.

I expect the ships which are not involved in the first wave to do day 1 heavy lifting in terms of logistics after a beach head has been established -- but I do not envision LPDs to do that role on day 1. Instead, I think LPDs, with their large carrying capacity, are better suited to using most of that capacity on day 1 for fighting vehicles, and to rely on a combination of LSTs, LCACs, and LCUs for logistics, and on day 2 to rely on a combination of all those ships doing ferrying missions.



OTH requires nothing more than 40-45km from shore at most; that would get you below radar as well as visual horizon. That represents about a half hour trip for a 726. There is no land-based artillery or antiship guns possessed by Taiwan that could reach out that far; I also don't know of any Taiwanese joint capabilities to remote target whatever fires they may have. Antiship missiles are a non-factor since they are a threat regardless of how far out the ARG sits.

Yes, though I was talking about deploying amphibious IFVs rather than a 726 LCAC in regards to the AShm threat.

The problem I see with the amphibious IFV vs LCAC deployment tactic from an LPD, is that the amphibious IFV means an LPD is able to send more vehicles onto the beach at the same time, but it tends to force the LPD to get closer to shore given the slower water speed of the IFV. An LCAC otoh has a much greater ferry speed from the LPD to shore which allows the LPD to stay further from the beach, but it has the problem where the number of vehicles it can deposit onto the beach at one time is many times lower than that of amphibious IFVs disembarking directly from an LPD.




In any case, MEUs aren't meant to attack heavily defended shores, as swimming IFVs are just sitting ducks while they beach to all manner of attacks from entrenched tanks, guns, mortars, missiles, and artillery. The beach has to already be mostly cleansed of defenders by air strikes prior to landing, with only minimal to token resistance remaining; air superiority or even air supremacy will have already been achieved. The Chinese military will not be repeating another D-Day on Taiwanese beaches.

Well, operation overlord occurred under circumstances where the allies had already carried out substantial bombing raids and had effectively achieved air superiority.

I fully expect the PLA to field the full range of air, missile and naval firepower they have in conjunction with substantial ISR to achieve air superiority, sea control in the strait and in proximity to the island, and to disrupt the command, logistics and communications of the defenders.
Naval gunfire, aerial bombardment and perhaps even cross strait long range rocket artillery, will be fielded to try and substantially soften up any landing sites.

However even if all that is achieved to a realistic standard (and the ability to successfully execute the early stage air and naval victories is far from a given), I still expect substantial live resistance against an amphibious landing to exist on the beach.


One way of substantially countering the defenders on the beach -- assuming the PLA are able to establish air superiority and conduct SEAD/DEAD over most of the western part of the island -- is by substantial and very competent CAS and air strike support, in particular from fixed wing aircraft.
But IMO, the PLA will not be able to do that on such a scale in the near future. They definitely have the weapons and the hardware to do it, look at all the various PGMs and targeting pods they've tested and offered for export. They're not exactly lacking in platforms either -- the couple hundred JH-7/As in air force and navy, the H-6Ks, and J-10 variants, would all be excellent candidates to equip targeting pods and PGMs onto, especially stand off wing kits so they can deploy their weapons farther from the island and any residual air defences that may still exist. (And J-16s of course, though it seems like the PLAAF seem to intend to equip a variety of PGMs and a new targeting pod on it.)
But the PLA have yet to buy into serious CAS capability and to have the ISR and joint training to test and continuously retest the well oiled machine.

Land based cross strait long range rocket artillery is another way of supplementing these sort of defender-softening operations, as well as naval gunfire artillery (though that means putting ships within a couple dozen km of the shore), but to have a more responsive, flexible and persistent anti-beach fire support capability -- and thus to make any resistance only minimal or token -- a very robust capability to call down precision air strikes must be developed.
Competent and widespread JTACs and FACs in the marines, army, but also an equivalent aboard naval ships, are essential.
 

delft

Brigadier
Better to close the ports and airports of the island for some weeks if the Taiwan authorities are stupid enough to cause a quarrel. After that a political solution might be all that is necessary.
 

cunnilingist

New Member
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Taiwan's air force and navy consists of 150 severely outdated F-16s (A/B), 4 obsolete destroyers, a bunch of smaller corvettes, and zero (might as well be) submarines. It doesn't take an idiot to see that within 24 hours the PLAAF and PLAN will have total and complete control of the skies and waters surrounding Taiwan. They can probably do this using only 50% of their assets.

After that it's just a matter of securing a beachhead under close air support.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Why people keep thinking 071s will be the spearhead in a Taiwan scenario when the PLAN has been investing in Zubrs is a little perplexing to me.

The first wave will more likely be heli-borne air cavalry, airborne and special forces teams sent in to use speed and forward air controllers to take out coastal defence missile batteries, radars, fortifications, artillery, troops and any other high value and/or weakly defended targets they can find.

This will probably be happening all along the coast, with a few choice mass landing sites pre-selected, but the PLA will probably only commit to final landing site(s) depending on where the first wave is most successful at taking out coastal defences.

The second wave will probably be more air cav to support the Zubrs, who will bring the heavy armour.

These will link up with the first wave units already established, and push up to secure a beachhead as the 071s move up to disgorge its massed IVF payload as fast as possible before pulling back for another load.

A full well deck force of IVFs from 4 or more 071s plus the first and second wave units will most likely be able to establish a secure and large enough beachhead for the LSTs to move in en mass.

The large well deck is not just for LCACs, but more so as many IVF swimmers could get going in as short a time as possible.

Moving more IVFs down from vehicle decks faces several bottle necks that will mean your LPDs have to spend a good amount of time on station waiting for them all to file out. Time the LPD itself will be vulnerable to enemy missile and artillery attack.

LCACs can extend the reach of LPDs, but only by a few dozen miles at most in practical terms. Enough to be safe from artillery, but I have never heard of LCACs even being attempted to be launched from the hundreds of miles off shore an LPD will have to stay if it wants to stay out of range of modern AShMs.

A western expeditionary force will never attempt a landing with LPDs if the enemy has decent coastal defence AShMs operational.

Which is why their setup is a poor model for the PLA to use for a Taiwan scenario.

The slow speed of 726 development and induction may be an indication of this.

The recent build up of 726 and 071s is probably more to do with OBOR, where China might have to defend its vast investment in that project against foes more akin to what western expeditionary forces have been set up to deal with.
 

cunnilingist

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Do you think the PLA is stupid enough to try to land when there are AShMs defending the landing sites? Missile launch sites, air defense radars, etc are what you call high priority targets and would all be taken out with the initial airstrikes (airstrikes, not airborne/special forces "teams", jesus this is the 21st century, has the Gulf War not taught you anything?). Anything that does get through would be intercepted by PLAN assets waiting offshore. Taiwan is a small island with 23 million people. It does not have a lot to offer.
 

Blitzo

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Do you think the PLA is stupid enough to try to land when there are AShMs defending the landing sites? Missile launch sites, air defense radars, etc are what you call high priority targets and would all be taken out with the initial airstrikes (airstrikes, not airborne/special forces "teams", jesus this is the 21st century, has the Gulf War not taught you anything?). Anything that does get through would be intercepted by PLAN assets waiting offshore. Taiwan is a small island with 23 million people. It does not have a lot to offer.

Priority targets will of course be identified and killed as quickly as possible.

But how long do we think the PLA will give itself to try and find all of those sites before starting an amphibious assault, and what proportion of the AShM sites will they be able to successfully deny and destroy?


I suspect it will be far more likely that they end up missing some sites, and that at the very least the PLA overall will conduct any sort of amphibious assault with the presumption that some level of AShM threat still remains.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
Priority targets will of course be identified and killed as quickly as possible.

But how long do we think the PLA will give itself to try and find all of those sites before starting an amphibious assault, and what proportion of the AShM sites will they be able to successfully deny and destroy?


I suspect it will be far more likely that they end up missing some sites, and that at the very least the PLA overall will conduct any sort of amphibious assault with the presumption that some level of AShM threat still remains.

That is not without saying What he describe is after the initial suppression bombing run of the airforce is completed Plawolf is very knowledgeable forummer he has been around for a while on different forum
 

Blitzo

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Why people keep thinking 071s will be the spearhead in a Taiwan scenario when the PLAN has been investing in Zubrs is a little perplexing to me.

Because the Zubrs they have will be far from enough to spearhead an amphibious assault and we do not know how many they actually plan to order and how long it will take to fulfill their o

If they get some 20 Zubrs or so, then maybe we can start talking about Zubrs replacing 071s as the primary means of spearheading the first wave of an amphibious assault.



Until then, I think LPDs are the best (or at least the "least worst") option for the PLA to conduct a first wave amphibious assault with.
 

Blitzo

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That is not without saying What he describe is after the initial suppression bombing run of the airforce is completed Plawolf is very knowledgeable forummer he has been around for a while on different forum

What are you talking about?
The point of my reply was to say that it is very presumptive to believe that any bombing+SOF+missile campaign will be able to remove all ROC AShM capabilities, and it takes only a fraction of them to remain in operation to be able to credibly threaten the big ships like LPDs of an amphibious assault force disembarking amphibious IFVs relatively close to shore.


And my reply that you quoted was made to cunnilingist, not to plawolf.
 
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