054/A FFG Thread II

[Lethe]

It is scarcely credible that a nation that is heavily investing in building 1500-ton corvettes in very large numbers would suddenly become blind to the imperatives of hull numbers and cost-effectiveness. Particularly when the argument for corvettes is basically the same as the argument for frigates.

Back before USN went crazy after the Cold War, USN operated nearly a hundred frigates for the same reason that PLAN needs such vessels today: anti-submarine warfare. If your Navy consists entirely of billion-dollar vessels with >250 crew each then you won't have the hull numbers to prevent your high-value assets (and even those fancy destroyers themselves) from being sunk by submarines, let alone protect civilian assets from same.

It would be a colossal mistake for PLAN to abandon frigates, and PLAN to date has not been given to colossal mistakes.

 

[Tam]

What PLA watchers are suggesting is the PLAN is ending the 4000t tier and staying with just the 6000t and 10000t tiers. Pop3 has no idea if that's actually happening but he notes it's been 6 years since project start and the 054B still hasn't appeared. The 054's first steelcutting occurred only 2 years after project start; the 054A, 1 year; the 075, 4-5 years; 055, 4 years; 002, 5 years.

All these ships took less than 5 years to get from project start to steelcutting while the 054B has taken 6 years with still no sign of steelcutting.

Pop3 offers 4 potential reasons:

1. Funds are insufficient. This was a relatively common occurrence thirty years ago but practically impossible today.
2. Technological bottleneck. Possibility exists are doesn't seem likely given the PLAN's systemic competence and ample experience with R&D.
3. The prolonging of 054A production means the 054B's technological advantage over the 054A, as originally envisioned, has diminished. With the latest 054As' being equipped with many of the PLAN's latest systems originally meant for the 054B, the necessity for 054B reduces.
4. A recent reevaluation of the PLAN's desired composition could have concluded the 4000t segment was superfluous. The need for 4000t vessels in the PLAN lineup was decided by an assessment conducted over ten years ago and priorities could have changed since then.

I have a big doubt on 3.

054A's main and secondary radar systems can be regarded as near obsolete from the get go, generations behind Type 055. These radar systems are also well behind that of every contemporary modern frigate except for the Admiral Grigorovich and the Talwar class. Likewise, the radar systems for the Type 054B are conceivably a generation or two ahead of the 054A, if they are going AESA. In fact, the radar systems for the Type 054B might be versions or derived from systems off the Type 055, minus the Type 346.

It maybe that the Type 055 is also acting as the proving platform for a whole new generation of technologies, before these technologies, namely on radar, ESM and ECM, can be seen in other ships, namely 052E and 054B.

Also, go back to my previous post, there is the question of the SAM development for the frigate. I am not sure if the current HQ-16 is something you want to go forward with the new generation of frigate. You are faced with the choice of using the HQ-9, using both HQ-9 and HQ-16, developing new versions of the HQ-9 and HQ-16, and entirely new type of naval SAMs.

My other theory about a 054B delay, assuming there is any delay at all, is the development of the IEP system for it. That also represents a huge technology leap from the 054A. Its difficult to see the 054B just a B version of the 054A, when more and more, its not just an entirely new ship, but a whole generation forward.

No. 4 is something to consider, but then Lethe has already given the best argument against those. I am on the side that there is still this need for numbers, now more than ever, and this need for numbers isn't going to go away for the next ten years or more, given the size of the USN and its allied navies.

Given the USN is chasing its own new frigate program, the PLAN seems to like aping the USN, the USN's frigate program is going to get its due attention with the PLAN. We have also seen the British, the French and Italian Navies now working on "intermediate" frigates, and that for me tells that the PLAN was not wrong for having its own intermediate frigate in the first place. The Type 054A has proven itself to be the PLAN's best workhorse, unmatched by far --- over and over again with its numerous deployments and missions. This is not something to easily give up on.

It can be that the need for a frigate is still there, but the actual frigate design can be re-evaluated in response to contemporaries and that the bar has been raised for a "hit" frigate that can be a worthy successor to the 054A.

As for the 'prolonging' of the 054A production, that can be explained another way --- the design is very successful, exceeded its expectations, and has more than proven itself. It might be hard to recreate the ship's price/performance, so yes, the bar has been raised higher for its successor.

 

[jobjed]

It is scarcely credible that a nation that is heavily investing in building 1500-ton corvettes in very large numbers would suddenly become blind to the imperatives of hull numbers and cost-effectiveness. Particularly when the argument for corvettes is basically the same as the argument for frigates.

Back before USN went crazy after the Cold War, USN operated nearly a hundred frigates for the same reason that PLAN needs such vessels today: anti-submarine warfare. If your Navy consists entirely of billion-dollar vessels with >250 crew each then you won't have the hull numbers to prevent your high-value assets (and even those fancy destroyers themselves) from being sunk by submarines, let alone protect civilian assets from same.

It would be a colossal mistake for PLAN to abandon frigates, and PLAN to date has not been given to colossal mistakes.

056 production is likely to be capped at 64. They will patrol China's periphery for the next 25 years until replaced by a new design. Their purpose for existing is not the same as that of frigates. Their purpose is to free up frigates for expeditionary duties, not to perform expeditionary duties.

Your argument stems on the assumption that a 052E will not be as cost-effective as a 054B. Since ~2008 when the PLAN decided on having 4000t vessels in their lineup, the Chinese GDP has more than doubled and Chinese shipbuilding gotten bigger, better, and more efficient. The opportunity cost calculus of a more expensive 6000t ASW vessel versus a cheaper 4000t ASW vessel has no doubt changed. A 6000t hull form offers more room for acoustic dampening and insulation, more armament, a higher metacentric height for operation of helicopters in more adverse weather, longer endurance, better seakeeping, and greater flexibility for designers and operators in general. It's perfectly plausible for the PLAN to decide that the capabilities sacrificed by procuring a smaller hull form for their ASW screening force is no longer sufficiently justified by the costs saved.

The mass production of high-tech systems post-2008 may have also reduced the cost advantage enjoyed by the 054 family as the factories manufacturing active arrays and gas turbines have gotten better at doing so. It could be that it's no longer eye-wateringly expensive for the PLAN to evolve into a purely turbine-powered active-array-sporting force without compromising on hull numbers. Viewed in this context, a force structure consisting of 10kt 055s and 6kt 052Es is reasonable.

Also note the PLAN is not adopting the USN's moronic idea of a Burke-only force structure. We're just discussing the possibility of moving from a three-tier high seas force to two-tier force like most of the world's navies. What was previously a 10k-6k-4k structure may be reduced to a 10k-6k structure. Two-tier structure is used across the world as in the case of the ROKN with KDX-III and KDX-II, JMSDF with Aegis and Aegis-escorts, USN (soon) with Burkes and FFG(X), RAN with Hobart and Hunter, RuN with Gorshkov and Grigorovich, and IN with P15 and P17.

I have a big doubt on 3.

054A's main and secondary radar systems can be regarded as near obsolete from the get go, generations behind Type 055. These radar systems are also well behind that of every contemporary modern frigate except for the Admiral Grigorovich and the Talwar class. Likewise, the radar systems for the Type 054B are conceivably a generation or two ahead of the 054A, if they are going AESA. In fact, the radar systems for the Type 054B might be versions or derived from systems off the Type 055, minus the Type 346.

It maybe that the Type 055 is also acting as the proving platform for a whole new generation of technologies, before these technologies, namely on radar, ESM and ECM, can be seen in other ships, namely 052E and 054B.

Also, go back to my previous post, there is the question of the SAM development for the frigate. I am not sure if the current HQ-16 is something you want to go forward with the new generation of frigate. You are faced with the choice of using the HQ-9, using both HQ-9 and HQ-16, developing new versions of the HQ-9 and HQ-16, and entirely new type of naval SAMs.

My other theory about a 054B delay, assuming there is any delay at all, is the development of the IEP system for it. That also represents a huge technology leap from the 054A. Its difficult to see the 054B just a B version of the 054A, when more and more, its not just an entirely new ship, but a whole generation forward.

No. 4 is something to consider, but then Lethe has already given the best argument against those. I am on the side that there is still this need for numbers, now more than ever, and this need for numbers isn't going to go away for the next ten years or more, given the size of the USN and its allied navies.

Given the USN is chasing its own new frigate program, the PLAN seems to like aping the USN, the USN's frigate program is going to get its due attention with the PLAN. We have also seen the British, the French and Italian Navies now working on "intermediate" frigates, and that for me tells that the PLAN was not wrong for having its own intermediate frigate in the first place. The Type 054A has proven itself to be the PLAN's best workhorse, unmatched by far --- over and over again with its numerous deployments and missions. This is not something to easily give up on.

It can be that the need for a frigate is still there, but the actual frigate design can be re-evaluated in response to contemporaries and that the bar has been raised for a "hit" frigate that can be a worthy successor to the 054A.

As for the 'prolonging' of the 054A production, that can be explained another way --- the design is very successful, exceeded its expectations, and has more than proven itself. It might be hard to recreate the ship's price/performance, so yes, the bar has been raised higher for its successor.

I doubt the PLAN is facing technical difficulties with IEP. The Coast Guard have commissioned numerous electric vessels and have accumulated years of operational experience. There's also the option of first using hybrid systems instead of full electric if they're not fully confident in IFEP. I think the delay is due to rethinking in doctrine occurring in light of China's better than expected relative economic performance post-2008 (thank you, GFC, for shafting our competitors), increasingly hostile America both people and government, and an increasingly diminishing Russia that was previously relied upon to distract the US (Chinese and Russian GDP per capita are now equal).

See my reply to Lethe for my thoughts about the cost issue.

Ultimately, the PLAN could choose to maintain a three-tier structure, and it would understandable either way. Whatever the case, it's clear the PLAN is not proceeding with the 054B project as vigorously as they usually do. This conversation is to discuss possibilities behind that phenomenon.

 

[AndrewS]

I have a big doubt on 3.

054A's main and secondary radar systems can be regarded as near obsolete from the get go, generations behind Type 055. These radar systems are also well behind that of every contemporary modern frigate except for the Admiral Grigorovich and the Talwar class. Likewise, the radar systems for the Type 054B are conceivably a generation or two ahead of the 054A, if they are going AESA. In fact, the radar systems for the Type 054B might be versions or derived from systems off the Type 055, minus the Type 346.

It maybe that the Type 055 is also acting as the proving platform for a whole new generation of technologies, before these technologies, namely on radar, ESM and ECM, can be seen in other ships, namely 052E and 054B.

Also, go back to my previous post, there is the question of the SAM development for the frigate. I am not sure if the current HQ-16 is something you want to go forward with the new generation of frigate. You are faced with the choice of using the HQ-9, using both HQ-9 and HQ-16, developing new versions of the HQ-9 and HQ-16, and entirely new type of naval SAMs.

My other theory about a 054B delay, assuming there is any delay at all, is the development of the IEP system for it. That also represents a huge technology leap from the 054A. Its difficult to see the 054B just a B version of the 054A, when more and more, its not just an entirely new ship, but a whole generation forward.

No. 4 is something to consider, but then Lethe has already given the best argument against those. I am on the side that there is still this need for numbers, now more than ever, and this need for numbers isn't going to go away for the next ten years or more, given the size of the USN and its allied navies.

Given the USN is chasing its own new frigate program, the PLAN seems to like aping the USN, the USN's frigate program is going to get its due attention with the PLAN. We have also seen the British, the French and Italian Navies now working on "intermediate" frigates, and that for me tells that the PLAN was not wrong for having its own intermediate frigate in the first place. The Type 054A has proven itself to be the PLAN's best workhorse, unmatched by far --- over and over again with its numerous deployments and missions. This is not something to easily give up on.

It can be that the need for a frigate is still there, but the actual frigate design can be re-evaluated in response to contemporaries and that the bar has been raised for a "hit" frigate that can be a worthy successor to the 054A.

As for the 'prolonging' of the 054A production, that can be explained another way --- the design is very successful, exceeded its expectations, and has more than proven itself. It might be hard to recreate the ship's price/performance, so yes, the bar has been raised higher for its successor.

What is the purpose of a frigate?

It's traditionally been an affordable escort vessel for merchant ships or other ships like amphibs.
This mission still remains, given that China is the world's largest trading nation, and the vast majority of Chinese trade is seaborne. Plus there is always the Taiwan scenario.

So if you look at the threat vectors
1. Anti-air. I think the Type-54A still looks fine against the major threat (which is slow subsonic cruise missiles). The pace of technology change is slow as well.
2. Anti-ship. The anti-ship missiles look fine as well. The pace of technology change here is slow as well.
3. Anti-submarine. But in anti-submarine warfare, it could definitely benefit from a 2nd helicopter. And that it would be better for that helicopter to be Seahawk sized, rather than the current smaller Z-9.

But the key thing is that we currently see a number of technological developments which look like they will revolutionise anti-submarine warfare. Examples include underwater drones/subs, drone surface ships, airborne drones with ASW sensors, underwater gliders, LIDAR which has been proven to work to a depth of 200 metres, heat bloom signature detection, SQUIDs, autonomous torpedoes, wake-tracking etc etc. Remember that all these can be combined with deep learning (AI) algorithms

So we know ASW warfare is going to change drastically, but nobody really knows what ASW warfare is actually going to look like in 10 years time.

Therefore it would make sense to wait until a clearer picture arises of what ASW warfare will look like, before committing to a future frigate design.

===

2 alternative visions for an ASW frigate would be as:

a) A launchpad for helicopters and unmanned airborne drones which use LIDAR/SQUID/Infrared

b) Or would a future ASW ship be a mothership for unmanned fighter submersibles and underwater recon gliders

 

[Blitzo]

Also note the PLAN is not adopting the USN's moronic idea of a Burke-only force structure. We're just discussing the possibility of moving from a three-tier high seas force to two-tier force like most of the world's navies. What was previously a 10k-6k-4k structure may be reduced to a 10k-6k structure. Two-tier structure is used across the world as in the case of the ROKN with KDX-III and KDX-II, JMSDF with Aegis and Aegis-escorts, USN (soon) with Burkes and FFG(X), RAN with Hobart and Hunter, RuN with Gorshkov and Grigorovich, and IN with P15 and P17.

A two tier blue wtaer fleet would certainly be interesting.

I'd wondered a few years back if they might end up progressing to a 10k+ ton and 6k ton class fleet structure after a 3 tier 10k, 6k and 4k ton fleet but I'd assumed that would be sometime after 054B had finished its production run.
Fortunately, a two tier fleet of 10k ton and 6k ton ships would still be fairly healthy (assuming something like a 1:2 or 1:3 procurement ratio), compared to the USN's very top heavy surface combatant fleet where Burkes and Ticos make up the majority of the hulls and look likely to do so even with LSC and FFGX plans.



If they truly do decide to forgo the 054B completely then I wonder how up to date the rumours of the "less than 24" order for 054B actually is...

Then there's the question of what HD and HP will end up doing to contribute to the future of the surface combatant fleet, as they won't be building 054Bs and I'm not sure if they'll be able to build 052D/Es. I can't imagine JN and DL will be the only two yards saddled with surface combatant orders.

 

[Blitzo]

What is the purpose of a frigate?

It's traditionally been an affordable escort vessel for merchant ships or other ships like amphibs.
This mission still remains, given that China is the world's largest trading nation, and the vast majority of Chinese trade is seaborne. Plus there is always the Taiwan scenario.

So if you look at the threat vectors
1. Anti-air. I think the Type-54A still looks fine against the major threat (which is slow subsonic cruise missiles). The pace of technology change is slow as well.
2. Anti-ship. The anti-ship missiles look fine as well. The pace of technology change here is slow as well.
3. Anti-submarine. But in anti-submarine warfare, it could definitely benefit from a 2nd helicopter. And that it would be better for that helicopter to be Seahawk sized, rather than the current smaller Z-9.

The 054A is fine for dealing with small quantities of medium intensity threats or in contributing to defending against high intensity threats, but their AAW/SAMs, AShMs and ASW systems are far from enough going forwards in coming decades.

1. AAW: the proliferation of newer and more capable AShM systems in coming years means supersonic and stealthy cruise missiles will become more prevalent, with the PLAN having to face the possibility of more complex saturation attacks than present. That in turn places higher AAW demands on frigates. I think as of now, any new frigate design intended to operate for the first half of the 21st century will need to at least have a capable active phased array radar with VLS capable of holding a respectable number of MRSAMs with the ability to engage a respectable number of targets simultaneously. It doesn't need to have the VLS capacity of an 055, but I think the days of having a maximum arsenal of 32 HHQ-16s per ship for all threats, will not exist for too long.

2. Late YJ-83 variants are respectable, but they will soon be obsolete as well. Preferably a supersonic and/or stealthy AShM with more advanced multimode guidance should be in the works. Obviously a frigate won't be carrying dozens of such missiles but they probably can't rely on the same quality as yesteryear.

3. For ASW, not only would having a larger helicopter and one more helicopter help, but having a moderately larger hull for more quietening, more quiet propulsion, more complex onboard sonar systems, and deployment of UUVs or USVs would be beneficial.



Of course, for all this one doesn't necessarily need a larger 6k ton hull, as a notional 054B based on 054A could in theory accommodate all of those upgrades to an extent. I myself am doubtful if a two tier fleet structure makes sense so quickly and whether the 054B rumours over the last few years all ended up being nothing.
But I do think 054A as it is certainly is not capable of withstanding the future demands of AAW and ASuW (and ASW, which you do also agree with)

 

[Lethe]

056 production is likely to be capped at 64. They will patrol China's periphery for the next 25 years until replaced by a new design. Their purpose for existing is not the same as that of frigates. Their purpose is to free up frigates for expeditionary duties, not to perform expeditionary duties.

Their mission set is not the same, but the logic behind their existence is very much the same. Corvettes have some advantages in terms of operating in shallower waters, but their main strength is that they are cheap enough to build in large numbers to provide a high level of presence and coverage in a region of great strategic interest (i.e. China's littoral waters, which are crawling with submarines). 052D could execute almost all of 056's mission set much better than 056 itself can, but China could not afford to build nearly as many 052Ds and they would consequently offer much poorer coverage and presence.

The same is true for frigates. Using a billion-dollar vessel with expensive radars and long-range AAW as an ASW asset is an error. Anti-submarine warfare is about creating a hostile environment for submarines to operate in, and that is largely about creating a high density of detection and prosecution capabilities in the area. You can't escape the need for numbers. Without numbers there are inevitably holes in the screen that hostile submarines will slip through. The cost of high-end AAW capabilities is directly opposed to the need for numbers for the ASW mission (while at the same time making those expensive assets much more valuable targets in themselves. No need to avoid what you are trying to kill.)

With submarines having the advantages of stealth and initiative, an effective ASW screen requires large numbers of assets which in turn requires an asymmetric cost relationship between the submarine and defending/prosecuting assets. Tasking a half-dozen billion-dollar 052Ds to hunt a billion-dollar submarine is an automatic win for the submarine even if it never fires a shot. 056 is effective because it is so cheap, and 054A/B are effective too because they are inexpensive assets without superfluous capabilities like giant APARs and HQ-9s.

Also note the PLAN is not adopting the USN's moronic idea of a Burke-only force structure. We're just discussing the possibility of moving from a three-tier high seas force to two-tier force like most of the world's navies.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but most of the world's navies are shit and have more value for PLAN today as cautionary tales than as models to emulate. USN's post-Cold War follies are well-known, as are Russia's economic-industrial struggles. European nations military forces are basically on life support and are totally unprepared and unstructured for high-end conflict. The only nation that China should be using as an example of how a Navy in its position SHOULD be structured is probably Japan, and JMSDFs most distinguishing characteristics are an unusually large number of mid-size surface vessels and ASW helicopter carriers, both a function of lessons learned from WW2 when the nation was strangled by American submarines.

 

[Blitzo]

Their mission set is not the same, but the logic behind their existence is very much the same. Corvettes have some advantages in terms of operating in shallower waters, but their main strength is that they are cheap enough to build in large numbers to provide a high level of presence and coverage in a region of great strategic interest (i.e. China's littoral waters, which are crawling with submarines). 052D could execute almost all of 056's mission set much better than 056 itself can, but China could not afford to build nearly as many 052Ds and they would consequently offer much poorer coverage and presence.

The same is true for frigates. Using a billion-dollar vessel with expensive radars and long-range AAW as an ASW asset is an error. Anti-submarine warfare is about creating a hostile environment for submarines to operate in, and that is largely about creating a high density of detection and prosecution capabilities in the area. You can't escape the need for numbers. Without numbers there are inevitably holes in the screen that hostile submarines will slip through. The cost of high-end AAW capabilities is directly opposed to the need for numbers for the ASW mission (while at the same time making those expensive assets much more valuable targets in themselves. No need to avoid what you are trying to kill.)

With submarines having the advantages of stealth and initiative, an effective ASW screen requires large numbers of assets which in turn requires an asymmetric cost relationship between the submarine and defending/prosecuting assets. Tasking a half-dozen billion-dollar 052Ds to hunt a billion-dollar submarine is an automatic win for the submarine even if it never fires a shot. 056 is effective because it is so cheap, and 054A/B are effective too because they are inexpensive assets without superfluous capabilities like giant APARs and HQ-9s.

Regarding the underlined part, I agree with it in principle, but I would wonder about whether that is also true for blue water operations.

For regional ASW of one's peripheral waters -- i.e.: a fixed area of water in terms of location -- one can of course improve the ASW screen by increasing the number of ASW platforms per unit area (per unit time I suppose).

But for blue water ASW, I imagine the ASW mission is more focused around being able to protect the task group and the waters surrounding the task group, which is a moving area of water. I would wonder if the demands of a larger hull for better blue water performance and endurance as well as the potential to carry more ASW related systems (whether it's sonars or having a larger hull able to accommodate two helicopters vs one) might make the benefits of having a larger hull more worthwhile. Having more hulls won't necessarily be better for blue water ASW operations if they're unable to keep up with the task group as effectively, and if they lack the endurance such that they require refuelling or resupply more often, even if we leave aside potential superior qualitative ASW capabilities of a slightly larger hull.


If they do go for a 10k and 6k ton force composition, the ASW question regarding numbers will also depend on how many of each class they end up building, vs the number of ships that the equivalent expenditure could attain for three tier 10k, 6k and 4k ton fleet instead.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but most of the world's navies are shit and have more value for PLAN today as cautionary tales than as models to emulate. USN's post-Cold War follies are well-known, as are Russia's economic-industrial struggles. European nations military forces are basically on life support and are totally unprepared and unstructured for high-end conflict. The only nation that China should be using as an example of how a Navy in its position SHOULD be structured is probably Japan, and JMSDFs most distinguishing characteristics are an unusually large number of mid-size surface vessels and ASW helicopter carriers, both a function of lessons learned from WW2 when the nation was strangled by American submarines.

I do think many of the world's leading navies don't seem to have very healthy force compositions for their surface combatants, by weight at least. But if the PLAN did go with a 10k and 6k ton blue water fleet I think it would still be far healthier than many of those navies.
In fact such a composition would not be too dissimilar from the JMSDF's surface combatant force composition albeit the PLAN will likely have much larger production runs of the ships in each weight class. Interestingly enough the JMSDF doesn't really have many surface combatants in the 4000 ton class, but does have quite a few in the 5000-7000 ton category (with their top end aegis ships being 10k ton of course)

 

[Gloire_bb]

Frigate is worth condidering, if:
1)navy lack numbers for a general-purpose warship.
2)warship of this size can gain nice discount on price, w/o sacrificing general capability too much.

Interesting example of such a warship is new and advanced Russian Derzky-class corvette(read: light frigate). Many see its appearance as a necessity, all larger programs failed to give numbers. But it is not ehat i am talking about.
Among its numerous technical novelties, it brings one more card to the table: it is very modular and UCV-oriented, including heavy ucvs.
Nature of preferable UCV carrier is debatable, but most existing combatants clearly won't do.

Point is, 052D is clearly not prohibitevely expensive and clearly can be built in numbers; on the other hand building appropriate and modern 054a follow-on brings us dangerously close to the pricetag and building restrictions of 052 class.
Answer may lie not just in economy, but in tasks.

 

[Lethe]

But for blue water ASW, I imagine the ASW mission is more focused around being able to protect the task group and the waters surrounding the task group, which is a moving area of water. I would wonder if the demands of a larger hull for better blue water performance and endurance as well as the potential to carry more ASW related systems (whether it's sonars or having a larger hull able to accommodate two helicopters vs one) might make the benefits of having a larger hull more worthwhile. Having more hulls won't necessarily be better for blue water ASW operations if they're unable to keep up with the task group as effectively, and if they lack the endurance such that they require refuelling or resupply more often, even if we leave aside potential superior qualitative ASW capabilities of a slightly larger hull.

The archetypal affordable blue-water ASW combatants are the US FFG-7 frigates and their predecessors in the Knox class, both around 4000 tons full load. These ships were built to be first-rate ASW combatants at low cost because that is what the threat demanded. Everything unrelated to ASW was merely "adequate". PLAN today faces a similar threat and needs similar ships. The 054A is probably the closest thing to a next-gen FFG-7 that exists, although it's not perfect: 30+ knot speed would be preferred, and more importantly a second helicopter. With those features 054B would certainly be slightly larger, but no more than 5000 tons full load.

The hull is a secondary matter, the systems and the crew to operate them are more significant. You could strip a lot of systems out of 052D and offload the crew that operate them and that would go a long way to cutting costs, but then it would be oversized with an inefficient layout and require more crew than a clean-sheet design. Why bother when you can create a more optimised design?