054/A FFG Thread II

plawolf

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Also for the sake of fun discussion, at their current levels PLAN cannot win any battles at sea UNLESS it somehow manages to do a surprise attack and invasion.
PLAN simply cannot match the US 7th fleet in terms of firepower and operation experience. Throw in B2s and Raptors operating from Guam and they will have their hands full.
There are really only 2 ways PRC can achieve victory on the strategic level.

1. Obama says to Taiwan.. Sorry buddy you're on your own.
2. PLAN has to first destroy Yokosuka, Guam and Pearl Harbor which means nukes which means we're back to square one.

That is simply not true.

Without getting into a pointless X v Y debate, there are numerous flaws with your reasoning.

1) you are assuming the PLAN will be fighting alone while throwing in B2s and F22s on the USN side. That's clearly unrealistic and comparing apples to oranges.

2) you are focusing on a completely untested and effectively unquantifiable measurement of 'experience'.

The USN undisputedly has more experience than the PLAN at world wide patrols and conducting intensive bombing campaigns on opponents without any capability to threaten their ships.

Firstly, that is no substitute for real world combat operations against a near peer opponent with modern weaponry capable of launching decisive attacks on your ships. Under the conditions a real war would be fought under, both sides have precisely the same level of experience, which is zero.

Secondly, even allowing for an operational experience advantage of the USN as would be fair, it would simply be impossible to even guess at, never mind quantify, how big a role that experience would play. Anyone can stick their fingers in the air and claim any impact from none to utterly decisive without anyone else being able to effectively counter it. To engage in such an argument is to engage in an exercise in absolute futility.

3) you are completely disregarding geography and key assets.

Taiwan is closer to China than any US or Japanese base. China's supply route to its bases are also vastly shorter than American supply routes to its bases in the region.

In terms of both number of bases, how well they are defended against attack and assets available at those bases are simply in completely different leagues

Simply put, PLA commanders would be overjoyed if the USAF deployed B2s and F22s to its bases in the region in meaningful numbers during a conflict, as all that would achieve is place those very dangerous assets well within their effective engagement range without even having to consider nukes.

Taking out those bases is one of the primary reasons China has invested heavily in both cruise and ballistic missiles of late.

4) you are using unrealistic assumptions and completely flipping the decision making process.

The central premise of your argument is that the US will easily win any war with minimal cost, and that the US' default position would be to get involved, and that Obama has to actively 'opt out' of the war.

That is simply nonsense.

In a war with China over Taiwan, the outcome is far from assured, and the cost of such a war would be colossal irrespective of outcome for both sides.

Any half responsible US president would need to present a strong enough case to justify involvement at such enormous risks and costs to both himself and his country.

The question isn't whether Obama or any US president would 'allow' China to take Taiwan. It is infinitely more complext and nuanced than that, and I seriously doubt any US present will know that answer himself until he has to make the call for real.

As such, it make zero sense for China to launch a surprise attack, never mind a nuclear one, as all that would achieve is make American involvement a certainty, and make American resolve and commitment to the war absolute. Whereas without such a move, American involvement is far from certain, and even when engaged, American commitment and resolve would be half hearted at best, presenting the possibility of causing America to rethink its commitment if China made the price of war high enough.

Indeed, the only logical rationale for envisaging such an attack would be if one was out deliberately looking for an act to not only get America to engage in war with China, but also commit to it to the bitter end.

Such nonsense only belongs in the cheap kind of escapest literature I am proud to have never wasted my time on.
 
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Blitzo

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I love it when we play armchair admirals. :)
My opinion is they don't need any assets at all! Lol. Why? Because the odds it it happening is slim to none. The media and certainly politicians like to sensationalize things like this but in reality I just do not foresee PRC invading Taiwan by force. The odds of it happening is maybe just slightly higher than the odds of the US invading canada by force.

Now that is not to say the pentagon has not run computer sims on the invasion of canada because they have but they have run sims on 'alien' invasions as well.

You are joking right? I assume you're joking. I laughed, nice one.
Anyway, there are many different ways in which a China and the US may come into military confrontation in the western pacific, not only Taiwan.
But you're right, the idea of China wanting to invade Taiwan is ridiculous, but the idea of a future Taiwanese politician declaring independence is not.


Also for the sake of fun discussion, at their current levels PLAN cannot win any battles at sea UNLESS it somehow manages to do a surprise attack and invasion.
PLAN simply cannot match the US 7th fleet in terms of firepower and operation experience. Throw in B2s and Raptors operating from Guam and they will have their hands full.
There are really only 2 ways PRC can achieve victory on the strategic level.

1. Obama says to Taiwan.. Sorry buddy you're on your own.
2. PLAN has to first destroy Yokosuka, Guam and Pearl Harbor which means nukes which means we're back to square one.

I think you've made quite a few big assumptions there, but I won't address them otherwise we'll get bogged down in a hypothetical conflict scenario.

I will say that any PLA operation in the western pacific will involve air, naval and 2nd artillery forces (but using conventional IRBMs, SRBMs, and LACMs instead -- no nukes).

OT, but how many ships does the USN's 7th fleet actually have on a regular basis, in terms of combatants purely?
Because by 2020 the PLAN is going to have about 20 aegis type DDGs, and nearly 24 near aegis type frigates, probably with more in the pipeline. And of course that will only be 052C/Ds, 055s and 054/A/Bs. It doesn't include older Sovs, 052B, 051C, 052s, and 053s, which will retain relevant capabilities.
We can also expect up to 6 071 LPDs by 2020, I think, as well as an 075 LHD or two, with possibly one extra carrier just commissioned by 2020.

What is the tally of surface combatants, subs and power projection ships (carriers, LHDs, LSDs) for the 7th fleet? It's quite difficult to find. Is what is written here accurate?
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So 1 CVN, up to 14 Aegis DDGs or CGs (of which 10 are permanently forward based), and up to four amphibious assault ships of one which is an LHD. And of course, up to 6 SSNs.
Is that it? Or have I missed out some other ships?
 

Blitzo

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Ah, we're tallking about totally different scenarios. This entire time I am talking about a ship for within the first island chain to reinforce 056's and lead 022's when things get hot to keep it a no-go zone for hostiles.

Since there are so many variations of the LCS it can get confusing as an example, I will go back to using the Tuo River instead. I think the PLAN can use a cross between the Tuo River and the 054A for the job, which Jeff Head's description closely matches. It doesn't even have to be modular.

With the PLAN's current fleet I don't think it can keep the waters within the first island chain clear with just 056's, 022's, and its subs, when all parties' naval, air, and coastal defenses are taken into account. That means the 054A which is not particularly fast or stealthy, therefore not particularly survivable despite its load of naval SAMS, will have to be the additional muscle which is also a waste of its blue water capabilities.

Let's just say if there are 60 x Type 022 and 30 x Type 056, then around a dozen of this ship class should suffice.

Basically what you're saying is that you want a 3000 ton missile boat, with light air defence capabilities? The problem remains, if it doesn't have the full air defence capabilities of a true frigate, it won't be suvivable in westpac once things hit the fan like you describe.

The truth is, in the scenario you propose, you will need the entire PLAN, if not a large fraction of it, in westpac to comfortably deal with the situation.
A dozen of these missile boat frigates and 056s, 022s, simply aren't survivable in westpac against JMSDF or USN without support from PLAN destroyers and frigates.

Reading your posts, I get the impression that you believe any contingency in westpac can or should be dealt with by the PLAN's non blue water ships, is that correct? In other words, it will leave 052C/Ds, 055s, 054As, free for blue water duty?
Because I have a very different vision for the PLAN. We are now well into OT territory, but I think it is still relevant to the subject at hand.
I believe that in the future, even once PLAN has a full modernized, critical mass fleet, it will still keep most of its blue water fleet, anywhere from two thirds to three quarters, near its home waters. Its green water ships like 022s and 056s will of course still be in service as well.
So for example, if the PLAN by 2030 ends up with 48 DDGs (052C/D, 055), and 48 FFGs (054A/B), and say... 5 carriers, 6 LPDs, 3 LHDs, they will only ever forward deploy one third to one quarter of those ships at any one time.
Say, only 10 DDGs, 10 FFGs, 1 carrier, 2 LPDs, 1 LHD will not be in the western pacific at any one time. The rest of the 38 DDGs, 38 FFGs, 4 carriers, 4 LPDs, 2 LHDs, will remain in the western pacific. That's because realistically, the PLAN's biggest concern is still the USN and JMSDF, and they need a fully comprehensive, combined naval taskforce to have a chance of victory. Of course that isn't to say that the forward deployed numbers cannot change. If there is a situation in africa that needs another carrier or LHD, and if the situation back home is relatively benign then the PLAN will naturally be flexible. But the key point is that in any high intensity air-naval conflict in the western pacific, the PLAN should rely on most if not all of its large surface combatants and power projection ships, which are all blue water by association. But just because they are blue water capable doesn't mean they always have to be forward deployed. A blue water capable CSG for China is just as useful parked in front of their own doorstep as it is parked in the Indian Ocean. So in my vision for the PLAN, they will have more than enough capable FFGs and DDGs to do long endurance patrols in westpac with the ability to defend themselves, during peacetime, and also enough FFGs and DDGs to contribute to relevant CSGs, ESGs and SAGs during wartime. So they won't need dedicated Tuo River/054A hybrids. They'll have enough frigates to do the job, and to do the job better.

If the USN reduces its forward deployed presence in westpac, say, in favour of spreading its ships across the Indian Ocean and near the Straits of Malacca, then the PLAN will naturally respond. But in the forseeable future, any westpac high intensity conflict must be handled by the PLAN in its entirety, not only by 056s, 022s, subs, and a dozen Tuo River/054A hybrids, of which such a force would be massacred.
 

by78

General
A 054A group photo (I count six of them):
16092213713_785258bc85_o.jpg
 

Blitzo

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Variety is the spice of life, and I think this kind of thing is good for crew morale, but more importantly has some PR value. Shows the PLAN aren't completely grim faced and serious.

Unless you think taking an hour or two to choreograph this is a waste of time or is indicative of unprofessionalism, in which case, try to appreciate the humour.
 
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