The learning curve for China to operate an AC and CBG is certainly steep at the beginning, and they also make sure to take the time to build a strong foundation, as we've been seeing on Liaoning. The future time lags between commissioning and operational effectiveness will certainly be shortened, indeed, accelerated. Your estimates of future schedules are on the much more conservative side. Much of the training of the CV-17 crew, say, are to be done on CV-16. Besides, once you've gone through the entire process from end-to-end, you have confidence and a pretty good idea how things will play out, unlike the trial-and-error you would have on your first go. To be sure, PLAN will induct bigger and more complicated carriers, but they would be incremental and will not be the repeat of Liaoning experience.
052C/052D Class Destroyers
- Thread starter Jeff Head
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The learning curve for China to operate an AC and CBG is certainly steep at the beginning, and they also make sure to take the time to build a strong foundation, as we've been seeing on Liaoning. The future time lags between commissioning and operational effectiveness will certainly be shortened, indeed, accelerated. Your estimates of future schedules are on the much more conservative side. Much of the training of the CV-17 crew, say, are to be done on CV-16. Besides, once you've gone through the entire process from end-to-end, you have confidence and a pretty good idea how things will play out, unlike the trial-and-error you would have on your first go. To be sure, PLAN will induct bigger and more complicated carriers, but they would be incremental and will not be the repeat of Liaoning experience.
I don't think you have any basis to say that my estimates are on the "much more conservative side". Liaoning has been in commission for 5 years and it's still not ready to conduct flight ops at the required tempo needed for full or even nearly full combat effectiveness; at least we have not seen photographic evidence of this. I expect it will take a few more years. Every fighter taking off fully loaded for its intended mission. Trapping, launching, refueling, arming, all at the same time. All 3 launch spots occupied. Night time ops. Confirmed 36 (or whatever) aircraft on board. Etc., etc., etc. I expect future carriers to train up faster than Liaoning, but how much faster is just personal opinion. The other matter is how fast the PLAN plans on putting out carriers, another limiting (in the future probably more limiting) aspect of CV/N induction in the PLAN, another matter of personal opinion.
Lethe
Captain
Of course we cannot know how rapidly PLAN will induct carriers in future, but we can make an educated guess.
Because I expect China-US relations to continue to deteriorate over the medium-term, in accordance with Power Transition Theory, I expect that PLAN will be motivated and funded to "close the gap" with USN, including with respect to aircraft carriers.
Irrespective of the number of carriers PLAN ultimately intends to operate, I expect the timing will follow the pattern laid out in my previous post, of relatively rapid induction in the 2020s and 2030s, slowly reverting to replacement rate in the 2040s and beyond.
Support for this theory and the schedule it suggests can be found in the undoubted general contour of deteriorating relations between the US and China over the past decade, which is as Power Transition Theory would expect, and in the fact that CV-17/002 exists in its present form at all. It has been said that PLAN didn't really want a second STOBAR carrier, but the timelines for CATOBAR development required it. That is to say, rather than simply wait until CATOBAR was ready -- which would be more in keeping with general PLA practice over the last generation -- PLAN saw a need to get a second carrier in service sooner. Rumours that CV-18/003 is late in development and may already have commenced construction also fit with this pattern.
Against this theory is the fact that China's overall defence spending remains flat, i.e. tied to broader economic growth. At some point, the heightened risk of conflict occasioned by deteriorating relations with the United States would compel China to break the link between GDP growth and military spending in favour of the latter. This has yet to occur. Obviously an in-depth discussion of the political factors noted above is outside the scope of this thread (which of course is already off-topic...), I merely want to illustrate the factors underlying my projections for China's future carrier construction schedule.
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I don't buy this theory at all. "Closing the gap" in carrier numbers is nearly nonsensical when we are talking about ships the size of the Liaoning and "CV-17", or even somewhat larger ships like "CV-18" and "CV-19". They would all be easily beaten by Nimitz and Ford class carriers during high seas confrontations with twice their full complement of aircraft and decades more operational experience. In fact I suspect the PLAN would not attempt to directly pit these carriers against the USN carriers at all. On the other hand there are plenty of non-anti-US missions for these carriers, which is why I think the PLAN feels comfortable taking its time ramping up to supercarriers. At the very least, even if the Chinese leadership is concerned about deteriorating US-China relations enough to accelerate military buildup, it ramping up carrier production would not be some kind of attempt to close some kind of carrier gap, but rather simply to put out more military assets in preparation for armed conflict. Also, let's not lose sight of the fact that the original discussion was about CBGs, NOT "carriers", meaning your insistence on dates of commission do not actually reflect the subject at hand.
Logic confirm announcements similar to SS-N-27/3M-54E
PLAN Anti-ship/surface missiles
https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/plan-anti-ship-surface-missiles.t6345/page-40#post-472389
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Excellent photos...thanks for finding them and posting them.First clear-ish image of 052D YJ-18 launch from Modern Ships magazine. In fact, this is the first clear image of YJ-18 launched from any platform.
Lethe
Captain
I agree that China would not actively seek to place its carriers in direct confrontation to US carriers, at least not without support from land-based assets. But that does not mean that China's carriers are irrelevant in a hypothetical conflict involving the two nations. They are not about to sit at the pier waiting to be bombed by B-21s. They would be deployed in ways that maximise their utility and generate asymmetrical advantages in favour of China.
This is basically what I am suggesting. I am not saying that China would pursue some "crash buildup" of carriers specifically, nor do I believe the schedule I outlined earlier constitutes such. Rather I see it as a reasonably rapid but nonetheless measured and unhurried expansion of a capability that China has heretofore lacked. This is similar to how China's number of large amphibious vessels has "exploded" over the last decade -- which is certainly not because China is undertaking some Stalinist program of amphibious expansion in preparation for imminent conquest of the Asia-Pacific.
I think one can reasonably suggest that investment in aircraft carriers is an *inefficient* way of counter-balancing US capabilities. If the perceived risk of conflict escalates rapidly, it could well result in resources being diverted away from carriers to more immediately productive ends, e.g. submarines.
As you have probably noticed I'm not particularly interested in this distinction. One lags the other by a few years -- ok. Instead of "six carriers" you can read "five CBGs" if you like. I'll stick with the metric that is more easily assessed and quantified.
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Except that you did talk about closing the carrier gap, which is a direct comparison of USN carriers to Chinese carriers. Otherwise why even talk of a "gap"? If China's carrier ramp-up is not to directly compete with USN carriers (as was your earlier implication), then I can think of multiple ways the Chinese military can spend its money to deter the US military more effectively OTHER than buying carriers, something you are acknowledging here as well. In summary, China's carrier build-up does not need to be hastened, is not directly competing with USN carriers, and is not as useful against the US military as other military assets. Therefore your compressed carrier construction timeline seems to me unlikely to be what actually happens. IMO China is building carriers for mostly non-US reasons, at least for now, though the construction and operational experience gained from these fledgling carriers will obviously be invaluable in the future. Although in the long term China possibly intends to have the experience and the properly-sized carrier (and air wing and escort force) to directly confront USN carriers on the high seas, this goal is certainly to be achieved decades from now, assuming it actually intends to eventually transition to much larger nuclear carriers.
Or "four CBGs", if I like. A metric that is more easily quantified but has no real world meaning is still a less-than-useful metric.