This is pretty straightforward and I don't understand why you, Scratch and Orthan, are having so much trouble understanding something so simple.
"Adm. Robert Willard, the head of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), made an alarming but little-noticed disclosure. China, he told legislators, was 'developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21/CSS-5 [medium-range ballistic missile] designed specifically to target aircraft carriers.'"
Now, most people do not interpret Admiral Willard's statement to mean that he's worried because China is conducting a wind-tunnel study (e.g. Scratch's goofy example) of an ASBM. It doesn't take a genius to understand that Admiral Willard is informing us that China is at the final step of testing an actual functioning ASBM.
To help you understand what successful testing means, China conducted a successful ASAT (i.e. anti-satellite test) in 2007; which was not in a wind-tunnel. Furthermore, China conducted a successful mid-course ground-based-interceptor (i.e. GBI) test in 2010; which also was not in a wind-tunnel.
Admiral Willard has officially confirmed in front of Congress that China is "
testing a conventional [ASBM]...designed specifically to target aircraft carriers." That is all that Admiral Willard is willing to reveal. China is conducting real-live ASBM test(s) and the results are presumably classified at this time. To clarify, this does not imply that China is conducting wind-tunnel studies. It means that Admiral Willard is not willing to share with you the results of China's ASBM test(s).
"14 May 2010
China Testing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM); U.S. Preparing Accordingly–Now Updated With Additional Sources
Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), recently testified in writing before the House (25 March) and Senate (26 March) Armed Services Committees that “China is… developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM designed specifically to target aircraft carriers.” Admiral Willard’s testimony in this regard has been covered in the Washington Times, and is receiving extensive attention in the Chinese blogosphere. More broadly, Admiral Willard’s testimony offers an excellent overview of China’s military progress, which has been particularly rapid in key areas that offer the potential to hold U.S. military platforms at risk in the Western Pacific.
The hearings themselves are worth watching. For the key exchange in Admiral Willard’s testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, go to minute 29:35 on the webcast–
Rep. Howard McKeon (R-CA), Ranking Committee Member:
“Admiral Willard, from PACOM’s perspective, how would you assess China’s intentions and capacity to develop and field disruptive technologies, including those for anti-access and area denial? Specifically, can you comment on China’s anti-ship ballistic missile capability and how it’s evolving?”
Admiral Willard:
“Thank you, Congressman McKeon. I can, and thanks for the question.
The China military capacity has been growing by and large unabated for the past 10 to 20 years. The past 10 years have been pretty dramatic, and as you suggest, this has included investments in what has broadly been termed anti-access capabilities. Area denial capability is another way to think about it. And these range from the investments in submarine capabilities, to investments in integrated air and missile defense capabilities, to—as you suggest—anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities at extended ranges from the mainland of China….”
That afternoon, Admiral Willard elaborated at a press conference:
Admiral Robert Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, “U.S. Military Overview of Asia-Pacific,” The Foreign Press Center, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 3:33 PM EDT, 25 March 2010.
Question: “Thank you, Admiral. Betty Lin of the World Journal. Some members –
some congressional members this morning were interested in the anti-ship ballistic missile threat. Could you talk about how significant the threat is and how PACOM is preparing to address the threat? And in your past dealings with the Chinese, have you talked about this? And what was their response for that?”
Admiral Willard: “Yeah, thank you.
What is being referred to as a technology development, a capability development by the People’s Republic of China to develop a ballistic missile with anti-ship capabilities – inside a broader collection of capabilities that represent anti-access, a term used to describe kind of a forward power projection capability from mainland China. Each of those capabilities are concerning without a knowledge of how they’re intended to be applied in the future.”
“So trying to understand what the ballistic – anti-ship ballistic missile system is designed for and against, and its relation with other anti-access capabilities – what that strategy entails is very much an issue that we would like to discuss mil-to-mil with the Chinese. I think this raises the importance of a continuous military-to-military dialogue, which, as you know, is currently suspended as a consequence of our announcement of the former Taiwan arms sale.”
“The issues with the PRC that we would like to discuss military- to-military include areas that we have opportunities to engage, areas of common interest, and then very frankly, these areas of broader uncertainty or concern. I think both governments and both militaries would benefit from that continuous dialogue.”
The Senate Armed Service Committee hearing lacked a direct exchange on Chinese ASBM development. The closest equivalent came in response to a question from Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT), when Admiral Willard discussed growth in Chinese access denial capabilities. See minute 102:29 of the webcast.
Even as China is improving its potential ability to hold U.S. aircraft carriers at risk, it is developing one of its own. In his written testimony, Admiral Willard stated, “China’s leaders are pursuing an aircraft carrier capability. In 1998 China purchased an incomplete former Soviet KUZNETSOV class aircraft carrier, which began renovations in 2002 at its shipyard in Dalian. I expect this carrier to become operational around 2012 and likely be used to develop basic carrier skills.”
In my personal opinion (as with all other writing on this website):
What is China doing, and why? While mounting evidence from Chinese doctrinal, service, technical, trade, and netizen publications suggests that
China has been developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) since the 1990s, this is the first official confirmation that it has advanced to the stage of actual testing. This data point should dispel notions previously held by some that Beijing could not, or would not, develop an ASBM. I know my own understanding of the issue has evolved considerably since Cortez Cooper and I testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March 2007, when I said: “China is… thought to be in the process of developing anti-ship homing warheads for its ballistic missiles, which is a very worrisome development. If they work, they would be extraordinarily difficult to defend against.” Three years later, almost to the day, many uncertainties remain, but the seriousness with which Beijing is pursuing ASBM capability is not one of them.
Admiral Willard’s disclosure, while disturbing, should surprise no one. Chinese development of ASBM systems and related capabilities has been documented publicly by previous U.S. government unclassified analyses (from the Department of Defense, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Congressional Research Service) as well as statements by senior officials (including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead).
In November 2009, Scott Bray, Senior Intelligence Officer-China, ONI, stated that: “ASBM development has progressed at a remarkable rate…. In a little over a decade, China has taken the ASBM program from the conceptual phase to nearing an operational capability. …China has elements of an [over-the-horizon] network already in place and is working to expand its horizon, timeliness and accuracy.” When the Navy’s Senior Intelligence Officer for China makes such a significant statement, attention is long overdue.
It’s not hard to see why China is developing and testing an ASBM–it strongly desires the ability to both deter advocates of independence on Taiwan and to prevent U.S. carrier strike groups (CSG) from intervening effectively in the event of a future Taiwan Strait crisis. Beijing has defined its immediate strategic concerns clearly in this regard. More broadly, the Chinese are interested in achieving an ASBM capability because it offers them the prospect of limiting the ability of other nations, particularly the United States, to exert military influence on China’s maritime periphery, which contains several disputed zones of core strategic importance to Beijing. ASBMs are regarded as a means by which technologically limited developing countries can overcome by asymmetric means their qualitative inferiority in conventional combat platforms, because the gap between offense and defense is the greatest here.
Since at least the mid-1990s, China has been engaged in a variety of efforts to develop an ASBM; current programs revolve around the “Delta,” or “D,” variant of the DF-21/CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). Chinese open source publications provide strong indications that Beijing has been developing an ASBM at least since the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This strategic debacle for China likely convinced its leaders to never again allow U.S. carrier strike groups intervene in what they consider to be a matter of absolute sovereignty. Even China’s military, in an apparent attempt to deter the U.S. from intervening vis-à-vis Taiwan and other claimed areas on China’s disputed maritime periphery, has provided significant hints of its own ASBM progress, as well as some thought-provoking mysteries. In an unexplained cartoon animation at the end of a lengthy 29 November 2009 program on ASBMs broadcast on China Central Television Channel 7 (China’s official military channel), a sailor falsely assumes that his carrier’s Aegis defense systems can destroy an incoming ASBM as effectively as a cruise missile, with disastrous results. The program is available in Parts 1, 2, and 3 on YouTube; start at minute 7:18 on the second clip to view this disturbing sequence.
What does this mean for the U.S.? If developed and deployed successfully, a Chinese ASBM system of systems would be the world’s first capable of targeting a moving carrier strike group from long-range, land-based mobile launchers. This could make defenses against it difficult and/or highly escalatory.
Various obstacles could limit China’s ability to deploy ASBMs effectively, particularly in the areas of detection, targeting, data fusion, joint service operations, and bureaucratic coordination. When it comes to targeting a carrier strike group, there will not be a sharp red line between no capability and full capability. Some Chinese writers believe that even the significant likelihood of a capability may have a large deterrent effect. The ASBM is envisioned primarily as a deterrent weapon by Chinese analysts; to many this makes it inherently “defensive” in nature.
But make no mistake: efforts at deterrence themselves, however envisioned, can have significant strategic consequences. In this regard, it is worth noting that Beijing has consistently opposed a wide variety of U.S. missile defense efforts; if a missile specifically designed to strike an aircraft carrier is “defensive,” then how can a system specifically designed to intercept an incoming missile not be “defensive,” and hence acceptable?
On a more disturbing note, authoritative PLA sources reveal overconfidence in China’s ability to control escalation, which is itself an extraordinary danger. Chinese ASBM deployment could increase bilateral and regional tensions and may only prompt U.S. forces to deploy countermeasures rather than prevent carrier strike group employment.
When assessing possible ASBM futures, the following bears remembering: China has prioritized ballistic missiles for decades, enjoys a formidable science and technology base, and can be expected to devote considerable resources and expertise to ASBM development. If and when the DF-21D is developed sufficiently, Beijing might reveal a dramatic weapon test to the world—with or without advance warning—in some way geared to influencing official and public opinion in Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. Such an unprecedented public demonstration could be used to signal either growing Chinese power during a time of stability, or Beijing’s resolve in a time of diplomatic tension or crisis. If not addressed properly, a successful test could create the impression that American power projection capabilities—and the regional credibility that depends on them—had been dramatically diminished.
The fact of a hit, however manipulated and revealed, could change the strategic equation—much as the efficacy of the 20–21 July 1921 test-bombing of the battleship Ostfriesland was hotly contested by the U.S. Navy (and remains debated to this day), yet altered service budgets immediately and helped catalyze development of what later became the U.S. Air Force. Is there today a Chinese equivalent of Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (the iconoclastic visionary who championed the Ostfriesland demonstration to further the development of air power) eager to promote such a test to further the cause of the Second Artillery (China’s strategic rocket forces, which would likely control an ASBM) and its pioneering of new ways of warfare?
This much is clear: with the DF-21D ASBM, China appears to be intent on fielding a system that directly threatens U.S. carriers. If not countered properly, this could weaken the U.S. military alliances and reassurances that have helped maintain peace in the Western Pacific for over six decades, in part by preventing costly and dangerous arms races. The game and its governing rules are changing, whether we like it or not. Only through serious investment in counter-targeting efforts and other countermeasures can we prevent Beijing from changing the game uncontested.
What is being done to address this challenge? China’s ASBM is part of a much larger pattern in which the development and proliferation of various weapons systems–such as ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, and naval mines–threatens to hold U.S. platforms at risk in vital areas of the global maritime commons. Today U.S. operations in the Western Pacific appear most threatened in this regard, but similar challenges are emerging in the Persian Gulf, and might eventually materialize elsewhere. Fortunately, U.S. ships will not offer a fixed target for such “asymmetric” weapons, including Chinese ASBMs. U.S. military planning documents, including the March 2010 Joint Operating Environment and February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)—the Pentagon’s guiding strategy document—clearly recognize America’s growing “anti-access” challenge; the QDR charges the U.S. military with multiple initiatives to address it. In a world where U.S. naval assets will often be safest underwater and in more dispersed networks, President Obama’s defense budget supports building two submarines a year and investing in a new ballistic-missile submarine, as well as a variety of missile defense systems. How best to develop and implement ASBM countermeasures is a topic of vigorous discussion in U.S. Navy circles. The U.S. is already taking important steps to prevent a Chinese ASBM from changing the rules of the game in the Western Pacific, but continued effort and vigilance of the highest order will be essential. As Admiral Willard suggests, Chinese ASBM development should also be raised in sustained discussions with China’s military to help reduce misunderstanding and miscommunication, which could produce disastrous and unintended results.
The following links (most recent first) offer further background on Chinese ASBM development. If you know of others, please send them to me, together with any ideas and insights, by accessing the “Contact” tab on the toolbar above. And feel free to post your comments below.
Testimony of the Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett, Hearing on “China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, 20 May 2010, p. 3.
Jan van Tol, with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 18 May 2010).
“China’s Maritime Moves Prove a Game-Changer,” Canberra Times, 17 May 2010, A9.
Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic Implications of Obscurants: History and the Future,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2010), pp. 73-84.
Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2010), pp. 39-62.
Peter J. Brown, “China’s Navy Cruises into Pacific Ascendancy,” Asia Times, 22 April 2010.
Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 9 April 2010.
Wendell Minnick, “Chinese Anti-ship Missile Could Alter U.S. Power,” Defense News, 5 April 2010, p. 6.
Greg Torode, “Beijing Testing ‘Carrier Killer,’ US Warns,” South China Morning Post, 3 April 2010.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Eyes in the Sky,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 4 (April 2010), pp. 36-41.
Andrew Erickson, “China Testing Ballistic Missile ‘Carrier-Killer’,” Danger Room, Wired.com, 29 March 2010.
Gary J. Sampson, “China’s Development of Asymmetric Capabilities and Taiwan Strait Security,” Facing China, 29 March 2010.
Bill Gertz, “Threat in Asia is Anti-Ship Missiles: China, Rogue Nations Watched,” Washington Times, 23 March 2010.
The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 15 March 2010).
Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Why AirSea Battle?,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 19 February 2010.
Capt. Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “No Game Changer for China,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 2 (February 2010), pp. 24-29.
Andrew Erickson, “Take China’s ASBM Potential Seriously,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 2 (February 2010), p. 8.
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 2010 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 February 2010).
Ballistic Missile Defense Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010).
Major Kim Nødskov, Royal Danish Air Force (Ret.), The Return of China: The Long March to Power—The New Historic Mission of the People’s Liberation Army (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, January 2010).
Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon, eds., Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 25 January 2010).
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “China Develops ASBMs,” Observer Research Foundation, 5 January 2010.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Ballistic Trajectory—China Develops New Anti-Ship Missile,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, China Watch, 4 January 2010.
Greg Torode, Chief Asia correspondent, “Is China’s Rocket Science all it’s Cracked up to be, Experts Ask,” South China Morning Post, 3 January 2010.
Cdr. John Patch, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Fortress at Sea? The Carrier Invulnerability Myth,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 1 (January 2010).
Jean Hobgood, Kimberly Madison, Geoffrey Pawlowski, Steven Nedd, Michael Roberts, and Paige Rumberg, “System Architecture for Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Defense (ASBMD),” (Monterey, CA: Department of Systems Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009).
“The PLA Air Force Over the Horizon Radar Brigade,” The Taiwan Link, 24 December 2009.
“China: Fielding a New Anti-Ship Capability,” STRATFOR, 18 November 2009.
Tony Capaccio, “China’s New Missile May Create a ‘No-Go Zone’ for U.S. Fleet,” Bloomberg, 17 November 2009.
“Required Reading: Naval War College Review Articles on China’s DF-21/ ASBM,” Missile Defense, Steeljaw Scribe, 15 November 2009.
“Mark Stokes on Missile Defense,” Project 2049 Institute, 4 November 2009.
Mark Stokes, “China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability: the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Challenge to U.S. Maritime Operations in the Western Pacific and Beyond,” Occasional Paper, (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 14 September 2009).
Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn 2009), pp. 53-86.
Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile: Developments and Missing Links,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn 2009), pp. 87-115, A1-2.
編集委員 加藤洋一 [Yoichi Kato, National Security Correspondent], “[Part 2] 「中国空母は脅威ではない。ゲームチャンジャーは対艦弾道ミサイルだ」” [China’s Aircraft Carrier is Not at Threat. The ‘Game Changer’ is the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile], “中国、海軍大国への胎動” [Part 2 in the Series “The Rise of China’s Naval Power”], 朝日新聞 Globe [Asahi Shinbun Globe], 10 August 2009.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Suitland, Md.: Office of Naval Intelligence, July 2009).
Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Military Development: Maritime and Aerospace Dimensions,” presented at Defense Foundation Forum, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC, 17 July 2009.
Paul S. Giarra and Michael J. Green, “Asia’s Military Balance at a Tipping Point,” Op-ed, Asian Wall Street Journal, 17 July 2009.
“Important Chinese ASBM Article,” Information Dissemination, 25 June 2009.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese ASBM Development: Knowns and Unknowns,” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. 9, No. 13 (24 June 2009), pp. 4-8.
“More Chinese Netizen Commentary on Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program,” The Taiwan Link, 23 June 2009.
“China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program: Checkmate for Taiwan?,” The Taiwan Link, 17 June 2009.
“Hearing on the Implications of China’s Naval Modernization for the United States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 11 June 2009.
Paul S. Giarra, “A Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: Implications for the USN,” Statement Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, 11 June 2009.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Facing a New Missile Threat from China (Op-Ed): How the U.S. Should Respond to China’s Development of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Systems,” CBS News, 28 May 2009.
Jeffrey Lewis, “DF-21 Delta Confirmation,” Arms Control Wonk, 9 May 2009.
“ASBM – follow up,” Information Dissemination, 1 May 2009.
Andrew S. Erickson and David Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 135, No. 3 (May 2009), pp. 26-32.
Cdr. Paul S. Giarra, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Watching the Chinese,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 135, No. 3 (May 2009).
“Near-Term BMD Defenses Against Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles Fitted with MaRVs,” Information Dissemination, 10 April 2009.
Sean O’Connor, “Dragon’s Fire: The PLA’s 2nd Artillery Corps,” IMINT & Analysis, 8 April 2009.
Martin Sieff, “Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles,” United Press International, 2 April 2009.
National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, (NASIC, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, OH, April 2009), NASIC-1031-0985-09.
“PLAN ASBM development,” Information Dissemination, 28 March 2009.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 March 2009).
Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009.
Sean O’Connor, “OTH Radar and the ASBM Threat,” Imint & Analysis, 11 November 2008.
Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Westport: Praeger, 30 September 2008). See Chapter 6, p. 167.
Sam Roggeveen, “U.S. Reacts to China’s Carrier Killer,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 15 August 2008.
Bill Sweetman, “Navy Reacts to Missile Threats,” Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, Aviation Week, 14 August 2008.
Christopher P. Cavas, “Missile Threat Helped Drive DDG Cut: Zumwalt Class Could Not Down Chinese Weapons,” Defense News, 4 August 2008.
王伟 [Wang Wei], “战术弹道导弹对中国海洋战略体系的影响” [The Effect of Tactical Ballistic Missiles on the Maritime Strategy System of China], 舰载武器 [Shipborne Weapons], no. 84 (August 2006), pp. 12–15, reprinted as Danling Cacioppo, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), trans., Naval War College Review 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 133–40.
Wendell Minnick, “China Developing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles,” Defense News, 14 January 2008.
Larry M. Wortzel, The People’s Liberation Army and Space Warfare: Emerging United States-China Military Competition (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 17 October 2007). See especially section on attacking an aircraft carrier and the role of space assets.
Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA Command, Control, and Targeting Architectures: Theory, Doctrine, and Warfighting Applications,” Chapter 5, pp. 191-235, in Andrew Scobell and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and National Bureau of Asian Research, 4 September 2007). See pp. 210-11 for discussion and Chinese sources on attacking moving aircraft carrier battle groups.
Richard Fisher, Jr., “New Asian Missiles Target the Greater Asian Region,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, 24 July 2007.
Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 11 May 2007). See especially section on “Attacking Deployed Carrier Battle Groups,” pp. 12-14.
Cortez A. Cooper III, Statement Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “PLA Modernization in Traditional Warfare Capabilities” panel, “China’s Military Modernization and its Impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific” hearing, Washington, DC, 29 March 2007.
Andrew S. Erickson, Statement Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “PLA Modernization in Traditional Warfare Capabilities” panel, “China’s Military Modernization and its Impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific” hearing, Washington, DC, 29 March 2007, pp. 72-78."
