PLA deployment against India

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Mate

New Member
darth sidious said:
How much does your general know about chinese army in the 50s????
from your post you have no idea what their equipment is let alone their tatics
country bashing and Flaming is not allowed

he may have known some command level thing but not down to equipment and squad tatics

I am sorry to hear the such arrogance.

You seem to have understanding problem too. I have already mentioned that the person in Q was deployed on Chinese border in 1960's and he is an officer rank. I have already mentioned that the Chinese attaches know him. I am sure i have done it in best of english even if its not my native language.

The question will be what is your background to question such issues? What is more important what is your background to understand these issues. If you are a high ranking PLA officer, I would understand. I might have surprise for you if you tell me which part of the world you live in. You could be invited for our interractions. If you are not a authority, please escuse....
 

FreeAsia2000

Junior Member
PiSigma said:
i don't think a personal opinion can be considered as fact. and a general's opinion is equally as a grunt's, they are just opinions after all..

think of it this way. if the chinese commander wanted the indians to think they are using human wave and didn't actually use it, and the indians fell for the trap and believed in the chinese commander, their opinion of the war will automatically be that chinese used human wave when in reality they didn't.

mate you haven't been on this forum long enough to know my background.. i have an uncle that is a colonel in the PLA. he is in the chengdu MR working under the logistics department (this is from experience and not personal opinion since he doesn't run the department, and if you ask around you'll know chengdu gets some very good funding). from what he told me, chengdu region have some of the best logistics in the MRs. this reason was because of the sino-indian war. you see during the war, china used lessons they learned in korea about logistics, so they were able to make sure that all soldiers got warm clothing (in korea they didn't) and sufficient food and munition (and of course guns, without guns morale drops). as a result their logistics for the war was very good, and only when they couldn't support a longer supply route did the chinese pull back. and with more experience from the sino-indian war, chengdu MR still have some excellent logistics.

my uncle drive up to Lhasa every spring and fall with the troops and inspect the guards along the way, and trust me they definitly know what they are doing. i'm not entitled to tell you more information as i'm not even allowed to know it, so i'll stop here.


'mate' a lot of people in here have relations in the military and some of us
having friends and relatives in more than one military. Therefore showing us the biased opinions of a general from one side isn't really going to convince
anybody is it ?

secondly d'souza seems to be quite anti-chinese and believes that China
will undertake a military offensive against India in 2007 !

MUMBAI, DEC. 3. Some of the most distinguished former military men are highly apprehensive about the capability and intent of China and have warned that India should be on its guard and not lulled by the present tranquillity and peace on the border and Line of Control.

China has been building new roads in Tibet leading to the Indian territory and improving the existing one, even while laying a railway line to facilitate movement of large number of troops and their maintenance in the forward areas.

The Chinese, working for total supremacy in Asia, had found India to be their only rival in the race, though they are already leading in many areas. But now they want time so that their economic development progressed and their military strengthened.

The view emerged at a seminar organised by the Leslie Sawhny Programme in Mumbai on Sunday, that addressed itself to: ``India's Security Strategy - Historical Lessons and Future Responses.'' The former Chief of Army Staff, Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao (retd.), who presided over the deliberations, endorsed the views put forth by Maj. Gen. Eustace D'Souza who thought that the Chinese might wait till 2007 when they were hosting the

Olympics. Gen. Rao said that it could be even earlier.

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I mean this bit REALLY made me laugh

Major General (Retd) Eustace D'Souza broke the ice by presenting the Indian case. D'Souza studied the defence and security issues of India vis-a-vis China-Tibet. Narrating his experiences of facing Chinese at the border when he served the Indian army, he said "with the Chinese, one should maintain one's position and they won't move an inch"

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Mate

New Member
Sure, Those are the things he mentioned to me too. But we are talking the concept of Human Wave attacks. Lets not digress here. Maj gen D' is actaully refered in many a literature (I haven't seen in Chinese Journals though)wrt actual combat description and not opinions. Human Wave attacks is actual occurance in 1962 war. He also happens to be one of the highest decorated officers in the Indian army. He was also stationed in Japan for long time. when Singapore asked India to help organise their armed forces, he was deputed. But the Chinese protested and he was sent back. Subsequently, Uk/US stepped in to set up Armed forces for Singapore. But, he is not all, I have interacted with many of the 1962 batches. Unfrtunately, I am not able to name them for some reason or the other. Your Chinese mil reps are in touch with them too.

China used "human wave" attacks against American soldiers in Korea as well as the Vietnamese.

Its well recorded by India, US and Vietnam.

Note: Please understand, I am not willing to discuss the integrity of mil officers of that era with non-mil personnel.
 

PiSigma

"the engineer"
human wave in korea have already been proven to be COMPLETELY FALSE, and please read my previous post again and think about it. how can a officer use human wave when he have very limited troops. chinese tactics is never to rush in, the CCP tactic have pretty much been separate enemy and when outnumber them (outnumber them in a small area, not the whole battle) then crush them. that's how they can defeat a larger enemy. and remember, even with good logistics, tibet is hard to transport supplies, so only very limited troops can be send.

just because someone has been in a lot of literature doesn't mean this guy knows anything. the best example would be our favorite president george bush, he says a lot of crap, but does he know anything?? of course not..
 

darth sidious

Banned Idiot
Mate said:
I am sorry to hear the such arrogance.
You seem to have understanding problem too. I have already mentioned that the person in Q was deployed on Chinese border in 1960's and he is an officer rank. I have already mentioned that the Chinese attaches know him. I am sure i have done it in best of english even if its not my native language.
The question will be what is your background to question such issues? What is more important what is your background to understand these issues. If you are a high ranking PLA officer, I would understand. I might have surprise for you if you tell me which part of the world you live in. You could be invited for our interractions. If you are not a authority, please escuse....

your arrogance blinds you 'mate'

so far you have claim the pla
1 uses humen wave
2 has 2/3 rifle per solider
3 vastly outnumber indian forces
4 scarfices mass of its soliders for tiny outposts

unless you can porovide some evidance to support ( indian crap dont count)
you are just a troll looking for flaming war

in order to end the spread of disinformation by a certain nembers whos only intrest is flaming here are some accurate info regarding chinese equipment and organization

to those who cant read chinese use translation software

发生在60年代初的中印边境自卫反击战以印度军队的惨败而告终。此战发生在中国与美苏交恶,国家经济情况极度困难,台湾国民党残匪疯狂反扑,西藏农奴主叛乱和新疆暴乱时期。虽然反击作战仅改善了西段边境态势,没有乘胜收复全部争议地区,但是粉碎了印度的“北进政策”,维持了中印边境近四十年的和平局面,超过当时“一场胜仗管30年”的估计。更粉碎了超级大国利用印度牵制中国的美梦。

  中印边境的战区地处青藏高原边缘地带,海拔一般在4500—5000米以上;高寒,零下30度以下;缺氧,人的体能仅相当于平地的40-50%,行军速度和负重能力要低一半,登山速度每小时100米左右;道路稀少;气候恶劣,多雪崩、泥石流,对作战行动和后勤保障有很大影响。每年仅9月—11月间适合进行大规模作战行动。

  由于战区特殊的地理环境和其他因素限制(印度空军因顾虑中国空军轰炸印度城市而没有出动,中国心脏地区离战区在印度空军打击范围之外,这是中国地理上的优势)作战任务主要由步兵担任,因此轻武器的作用就显得特别突出。本文着重从轻武器和直接配属步兵分队的武器的角度,回顾当时的历史,总结双方的经验和教训。


  武器性能对比

  弹药

  中方步兵连主要使用56式7.62*39mm口径弹(仿前苏联M43弹),是前苏联参考了德国的突击步枪弹,于二战末期研制成功的。配用56系列半自动步枪、冲锋枪、班用机枪。有普通弹,穿甲燃烧弹,燃烧曳光弹,曳光弹等弹种。

  印军步兵连主要使用英国0.303in步枪弹 ,又名 7.7*56mm R步枪弹或MK VII式7.7mm弹。此弹1889年研制成功,是英联邦制式弹,20世纪60年代被北约弹代替。配用李·恩菲尔德步枪,布伦轻机枪和维克斯重机枪。有普通、重弹、穿甲、曳光、燃烧、爆炸等弹种,最早的达姆弹就是用这种弹改进的。其普通弹采用尖头,铅铝复合结构,瓶型铜壳,有凸缘。其B6燃烧弹装有硝酸钡,RTS1爆炸弹装有硝化甘油和黄磷。

  步枪

  中国军队主要使用新换装不久的56式半自动步枪(仿苏联的西蒙诺夫半自动卡宾枪),经实战检验,我军对56半自动步枪的性能是满意的,此枪动作可靠,轻便灵活,400米内精度良好,而且节省子弹。一个当时参战的老同志评价说:“定在常用表尺(表尺3),指哪里打哪里。”。

  印度军队使用的步枪种类较多,主要装备7.7*56mm(0.303in)李·恩菲尔德III型和NO.4等老式步枪。这种枪有效射程远,但是由于是手动枪机,射速慢,已经不适合现代战争的需要。印军一般要求随枪携带90发子弹,后备40发;实战中,印军士兵不堪重负,往往减少携弹量,最低时只带一条装50发的空投子弹袋。在正式开战前的巡逻队冲突中,多次出现半小时交火就打光弹药的情况。印度从1953年起就开始了研制自动步枪的计划,1956年出了样枪,后来印度生产的叫伊莎普尔半自动步枪(仿英国L1A1)。这也是梅农出任国防部长后确定的重点武器计划之一。但是直到1962年,还没有大量装备部队。

  我军第一次反击之后,印度立即放弃不结盟的伪装,向美英寻求军事援助,英国援助的武器是在印度公开发出请求的当天到达的,美国也很快用运输机运来了大量自动武器和轻型火炮,但是这些美英新式自动武器不但性能不及中国的56系列班用武器,而且还带来了后勤供应的混乱,文化水平较低的印军士兵也没有时间熟悉这些新式武器。我军缴获了大批根本没有开箱的美国自动步枪,但是我军战士根本看不上眼。

  冲锋枪

  中方使用的是56式冲锋枪(仿著名的AK47突击步枪,我军习惯称冲锋枪),在步兵班一级,装备给正副班长。实战中,由于56式冲锋枪火力猛,但精度稍差,和半自动步枪配合使用效果很好,常常有少数兵力击溃比自己多几倍印军的情况。比如西山口——邦迪拉战役中,某部9连副班长庞国兴,在和主力失散的情况下,和另外3名战士自动组成战斗小组,使用2支56式冲锋枪和2支56式半自动步枪,深入印军纵深7.5公里,多次主动向敌人优势兵力发起冲击,占领两个炮兵阵地,缴获7门87.6毫米加农榴弹炮。后又配合主力部队缴获另外8门(此炮英军称为25磅炮,在著名的阿拉曼战役中发挥很大作用,是印军对我军威胁最大的武器,部署在西山口的印军野炮团共24门炮,大部在此战中被我军缴获,余下几门炮逃跑时翻车掉进山沟,团长夏马尔中校只身逃回印度)。在我军遭到印军伏击的时候,重火器来不及展开,分队中的冲锋枪手常常要担负起迅速压制敌人火力,掩护其他战友的重任,这时冲锋枪的作用非常关键,但是冲锋枪手的伤亡也很大。

  印军主要装备司登II、III、V式冲锋枪。除射程近外,由于发射手枪弹,弹药不能与步机枪通用。印军冲锋枪一般装备一线部队,和步枪混编,但数量较少。一般要求随枪270发,后备90发弹药。由于印军害怕近战,所以冲锋枪作用不大。

  轻机枪

  中方56式班用机枪(仿苏联捷格佳廖夫班用机枪),100发弹链供弹,缺点是不能速换枪管。战斗中通常携带500-900发弹药,因此可以充分地发扬火力,连续作战。56式班用机枪火力持续性好,在进攻中通常用来封锁敌地堡枪眼,掩护火箭筒和无后坐力炮攻击。

  印军主要装备英式7.7mm布伦MK1式轻机枪,是著名的捷克ZB26的改型,是二战中最出色的轻机枪之一,但在1962年,已经落后了。此枪可靠性好,结构简单,射击精度好,射程远。缺点是火力弱,枪和弹都比较重,一挺布伦式加7个30发实弹匣的重量大致相当于一挺56式加5个100发实弹盒。印军一般要求随枪带1200发弹药,后备600发。但野战中很难做到。在战前的对峙时期,印军有时派出携带布伦式的机枪班,主动出击,潜伏到主阵地侧翼,和主阵地形成交叉火力,对我军巡逻队进行侧射。布伦式轻机枪也是前线印军地堡的火力骨干,每个地堡都有2-3个射孔,只是大多朝向阵地正面,死角太大。因此在我军攻击印军阵地时缴获了很多布伦式。印军大概是对布伦式过分偏爱,第7旅旅长达尔维准将逃跑时也没忘记带一挺布伦式保命,达尔维将军等9个人被我军俘获时带有1挺布伦式,8支步枪。印军步兵至今还装备着改为北约口径的布伦式轻机枪(L4系列)。

  重机枪

  中方使用53式重机枪(仿自苏联郭留诺夫机枪),战斗性能和印军重机枪相近,只是枪管不需要水冷。此枪采用笨重的轮式枪架,重量太大,且不利于山地作战。有时为了在山坡上架枪,不得不由其他战士用肩膀架起一个架轮。重机枪一般是编在步兵团机枪连和步兵营机炮连里,支援步兵连作战,也有加强给主攻连队1-2挺的。在阻击印军溃逃时,重机枪火力发挥了重大作用,曾经有机枪连加入步兵连战斗队形向印军冲锋的战例。战斗经验证明,重机枪不宜过分前出,否则一旦出现伤亡,就会削弱支援火力。

  印军装备有英式7.7mm维克斯重机枪(水冷)和美式勃郎宁重机枪(气冷),印军习惯称为中型机枪。前沿连级支撑点用的不多,大部分集中在二线阵地的营级据点里,备弹(6000+3000发)。比如卡龙据点,拉加普特联队第2营营部和第4连,共140余人,加强有81mm迫击炮4门,重机枪一个排(2挺)。本来重机枪是用于支援一线作战的,但在一线阵地被攻击时,二线阵地往往因为害怕我军迫击炮轰击而不敢开火。一个典型的战例是在扯东,第9旁遮普联队的一个巡逻队遭到攻击时,乔杜里少校向他的旅长达尔维将军请求火力支援,结果在距离1300米以外二线阵地上的达尔维拒绝开火,一个奇怪的理由是看不清目标和事先未曾标定距离,其实对于重机枪和迫击炮来说,对1300米外的目标进行拦阻射击是完全胜任的,尤其是维克斯机枪,配用MKVIIIZ重弹可以对4000米外的目标射击。印军114步兵旅下属有重机枪营,这是基于印军在二战时期在平原和北非沙漠作战的经验,但不适合极度分散的山地战,实战中重机枪营在后方未及展开,前线的步兵营已被击溃,未能发挥应有作用。西山口主阵地上印军的3挺重机枪配置很内行,曾把某团前指压制在一个巨石后面(幸亏印军没有用迫击炮打几下),又给我军一个连造成很大杀伤。

  无后坐力炮和火箭筒

  我军步兵团编有无后坐力炮连,主要是57mm和75mm线膛无后坐力炮,线膛无后坐力炮的优点是射击精度高,但是由于装填时要把炮弹上的刻槽对准膛线,所以射速较低。战斗中无后坐力炮一般加强给担任主攻的步兵连,每连2-4门炮。主要用来打击印军的地堡。我军在攻击前都是精心选择打击目标,特别注重先打击敌弹药库和指挥所。75mm无后坐力炮射程远,威力大,除直接支援步兵作战外,还参加步兵团炮兵群,进行炮火准备。75mm无后坐力炮在远距离射击时,准确测距非常关键,尤其是山地,很容易误判,某团一个平时号称“十发十中”的75炮班在1000米外对西山口敌重机枪射击,三发不中,结果班长爬上去用手榴弹炸掉了那挺重机枪。57mm无后坐力炮主要伴随步兵作战。由于气候恶劣,发起攻击前有的火炮炮膛和瞄准镜结冰不能射击,炮手们把瞄准镜捂在怀里化冰,继续战斗。由于地形复杂,灌木太高,我军炮手还创造了用背包带把无后坐力炮绑在树上发射,摧毁敌人4个地堡的战例。57炮一般推进到200-300米距离上占领射击阵地(最近40米),所以实战中射击精度很高,如:进攻“阿印8号”据点的战斗中,骑兵某团无后坐力炮排的2门57炮,发炮28发,命中25发,摧毁9个地堡,自己无一伤亡。参战很多分队都克服体力困难,尽量增大携弹量,人均负重35KG,一般上级要求带20发弹,上述炮排带了29发。

  我军步兵连编有火箭筒班,使用56式40mm火箭筒(仿自苏联RPG-2火箭筒,最早的原型是二战中德国的铁拳100型火箭筒。),体积小,重量轻,100米内可以打中胸环靶大小的目标,曾经有9发火箭弹消灭10个地堡的战例。40火箭筒发射超口径弹,地堡被击中后,往往被炸得碎石、残肢、机枪零件满天飞。由于火箭筒比无后坐力炮机动性好,野战中能跟上步兵猛打猛冲,及时进行火力支援。如某连火箭筒班班长黄绪林,冲击时在50米距离上击毁拦阻我步兵的机枪一挺,后又击毁正准备逃跑的106.7mm迫击炮一门,牵引车一辆。但是40火箭筒的后喷火对在复杂地形上使用影响较大,有时为了消灭敌人,射手宁可自己腿部被烧伤,也坚持向敌人开火。

  美制M20式88.9mm火箭筒在印军中使用非常普遍,各前沿支撑点都有,本打算用于攻击我方哨所,但由于我军先发制人,使印军处于被动防御地位,火箭筒用处不大,多被我军缴获。这种武器缺点是太长,太笨重,尤其是弹药重,优点是威力大,射程比56式40火箭筒远,有效射程200米,最大射程1200米。反击作战第二阶段还缴获了一些美英援助的57mm和106mm无后坐力炮。

  迫击炮

  我军步兵连炮排编有60迫击炮班,有时上级还加强82迫击炮。对迫击炮来说,最大的问题是弹药,除步兵帮助炮兵携带弹药外,战前连团里的干部都得去背弹药。

  印军的51mm迫击炮紧随步兵,连冲锋时都带着。印军81mm迫击炮通常布置在据点里。印军的炮手训练比较好,射击准确,但缺乏和重机枪火力的协同。

  火焰喷射器

  我军使用的仿苏的58式火焰喷射器,因为58式不用压缩空气而采用火药燃气喷射,所以火力猛,射程远,但只能喷三次,使用灵活性差些。在攻击印军地堡地战斗中,火焰喷射器还是发挥了很大作用。比如某师,战前临时编组了喷火连,57人,28具喷火器。担任主攻任务的连队一般可以得到2—6具喷火器得加强。在零下30度地严寒条件下,经常出现冷喷(就是只喷油不发火)现象。经战后统计冷喷竟达50%。比如某次战斗,对一个地堡前两次喷火都是冷喷,第三次才喷出火消灭了里面的印度兵。

  印度军队在向我国领土蚕食的时候,曾经打算给每个排装备一具喷火器用来攻击我军阵地,但是后来因故不了了之。当然,即使有了,在被动防御的条件下也没有什么用处。

  手榴弹、爆破筒、炸药包、地雷

  由于印军地堡数量很多,我军携带的炮弹数量有限,因此步兵不能完全依赖配属的轻型火炮来消灭全部地堡,有很大一部分攻坚任务最终是靠爆破筒和手榴弹完成的,这是我军的传统战法,但是伤亡也很大,作战中曾经涌现过一批黄继光式的烈士。攻坚作战时我军常常组织投弹组与喷火器配合作战。我军使用的手榴弹是1950年定为我军统一装备的4号小型木柄手榴弹,这是在国民党时期“巩式木柄手榴弹”基础上改进的,性能比较落后。由于我方手榴弹使用延期引信,在攻击印军碉堡时,常有投出的手榴弹被印军反投掷的情况,如果能当时能选择碰炸引信,那么战果会大得多。用爆破筒炸碉堡也有类似的问题,如能在爆破筒外附加一个伞状支架,那么一旦塞进地堡,印军就推不出来了。爆破筒的另一个用处就是对付印军雷场,但是步兵携带的爆破筒数量有限,如果事先侦察不清,炮火准备不利,突击路线选择不好,就会使突击部队受到重大损失。比如攻击阿印16号据点的战斗中,由于在敌阵地前600米遇到三道封锁区和雷场,拖延了突击时间,此战仅消灭印军29人,10多名印军逃跑,我军伤亡81人。

  印军62旅在西山口布设了1300颗英式压发地雷,印军雷场主要布设在阵地前和道路两侧,成小群交错布设,有障碍和地堡火力掩护,而且很注意伪装。实战中给我军突击部队造成了较大伤亡。但是由于印军地雷种类单一,很少用诡计装置,对工兵来说很容易排除,著名的排雷英雄何来发小组排除了430颗地雷。印军也曾经把烈性炸药包列入自己的补给计划中。

  手枪

  我军用的是7.62*25mm 54式手枪,除可靠性、侵彻力好些外,其他性能都不及勃朗宁。

  印军装备的手枪种类较多,除老式的威伯勒转轮手枪外,还有著名的9mmPB勃郎宁大威力手枪,13发双排弹匣,火力强,指向性极佳。


  总结

  可靠性

  如果在一般条件下,双方使用的武器可靠性都不错,在高原特殊环境里,中方的苏式武器可靠性更好。但也有因缺乏恶劣条件下的使用经验而产生的故障发生,如不采取有效防冻措施,就会出现枪炮打不响,机枪不连发,手榴弹不炸,等等严重后果。

  有效射程和精度

  在步兵班一级,印军武器射程远,威力大。300米外射击,印方占优势,300米内中方占优势。特别是高原空气稀薄、透明,观察距离远,印军预先占据高地,并依托阵地。加之印军士兵服役时间长,受英军重视射击精度的传统观念影响,射击训练水平比较高。在战前几年中经常发生的巡逻队交火事件中,印方武器射程远的优势更明显些。但是在我军开始反击作战后,由于战役主动权掌握在我军手中,一般我军进攻时,阵地上的印军往往受到炮火压制,其远射能力无从发挥,等到我军步兵在火力掩护下接敌运动到百米之内发起冲击后,胜负就由火力决定了。印军使用的英美武器大多采用觇孔瞄准具,射击精度好,但不利于射击运动目标。最致命弱点是在光线较弱的夜晚、黎明和黄昏根本无法瞄准,而这些时候,恰恰是我军作战最活跃的时候。

  我军炮手实战中射击精度较高,一定程度弥补了在高原地区,后勤供应的困难,很好地支援了步兵攻坚作战。这一经验,对于未来战争也是有重大意义的。

  火力

  无论是哪一级,火力优势无疑在中国一边,因为中国军队的56系列班用武器,使用的是中间型弹药,在当时是一个先进的概念,比反击战前的印军使用的非自动武器先进两代,比英美援助印度的发射全尺寸枪弹的自动武器先进一代。又由于印军处处设防,分散了火力,而中方战役主动权在握,可以在关键地点集中兵力和火力。由于我军火力强于印军,给作战带来极大的灵活性,特别是在追击阶段,往往可以以少胜多,曾经有2个连攻歼印军2个营,5个排打垮印军一个营,还有边防部队36人截击印军一个营,歼灭241人的战例。在我军以往的战史中,多数情况是以劣势火力对抗强敌,随着我国国力军力的提高,在某些情况下,如何更高效的利用自己的优势,是一个新的课题。

  机动

  中方军队的机动能力占优势,不但因为我军装备重量轻,体积小。当时对武器装备的要求是:“连级背着跑”“营级驮着走”“团级挽着走”。还因为我军是从游击队成长起来的,经历了各种不利和险恶的作战环境,特别善于运动战。

  印度军队来源于前英国统治下的殖民军,印度人只有作中下级军官的经验,所以他们对战争的理解是极其浅薄的。战术上,印军认为防御优于进攻,因此印军根本就不想机动。在战前的几年时间里,印度利用边界地区的军事优势,采取“北进政策”,不断派出小分队越过“麦克马洪线”向前推进,逐步蚕食我国领土,每到一处就修筑大量堡垒,以图巩固既得利益。一般每2-3人就有一个土木发射点,一个连有50甚至100个真假地堡,表面上看,这样确实很保险,实际是画地为牢,丧失了机动能力。尤其在高原地带,由于运动困难,阵地间难以相互支援,很容易遭分割包围,陷入被动挨打的境地。印军的武器装备笨重,也影响其机动能力。

  后勤

  总体上印方后勤能力占优势,因为印军前线距离自己的大后方提斯普尔(有机场、铁路和水运)只有100公里左右。卡车可以开到德让宗——邦迪拉,吉普车可以开到达旺,战前还修建了简易机场。从达旺到伦坡可以用骡马运输。从伦坡到克节朗河的印军前沿阵地只有靠脚夫、直升机和固定翼飞机空投,除一般的弹药、粮食外,有的地方还空投饮用水,有时还空投轻型火炮。广泛地空中补给是印军的优势,也是未来山地战的趋势。印军第四军军长考尔中将到克节朗河前线视察时,上山骑着一个为印军做间谍兼脚夫的门巴族人,下山坐了一架直升机。印军由于混合使用英美武器,口径繁多,不但保障困难,实战中还出现过使用美国枪的部队得到大量英国弹药的错误。

  中方一侧没有铁路,大后方在2000公里外,物资和部队主要靠汽车运输,如果向前线运一车油料,路上就得烧掉半车。如果常年在前线驻扎一个步兵团,后方就需要一个汽车团不停的运输。反击战前和作战中我军组织铁道兵和民工临时开辟了急造军路,并一直接通了到达旺的公路。印军原来认为我军在大雪封山之前不可能修成这条路。向最前沿输送物资只能靠动员的支前民工和牦牛。虽然后勤保障非常困难,但是由于中方战役主动权在握,作战时间巧妙地控制在战场上主要河流洪水期之后与大雪封山之前。战前准备较充分,后勤人员与战斗兵力接近1:1,所以有力的支援了前方的作战行动。由于我方统一了步兵班用武器的口径,简化了后勤保障,提高了携弹量,持续作战能力较强。对我军的后勤保障能力,印军严重估计不足,印军第四师师长尼兰詹·普兰沙德将军回忆道:“我简直不能理解色拉是怎么会陷落。中国人没有时间组织一次强大的师级规模的协同一致的进攻,他们是如何突破色拉和申隔宗防线的——我所计划的两个强大而新近到达的旅,驻在显然是不可攻破的山岳上,当时又有充足的弹药和口粮。再说邦迪拉,中国人怎么能从色拉如此迅速前进而发动另一次进攻?这完全是不解之迷——很多个星期,对于这可耻的但是铁一般的事实,我解答不了。”

  经验

  这次作战对我军后来的轻武器发展有很大影响,特别是对武器减轻重量的认识,后来我军轻武器就开始向轻量化发展了,至今,轻量化是我国轻武器最明显的特点。

  由于我军及时完成了武器装备的换代工作,实现了国产化,整个的56系列仿苏武器战斗性能都是很出色的,虽然不能完全适应我军需要,但使我军轻武器总体水平实现了跨越式发展。假如战前我军因为苛求武器的性能指标,过分强调我军的特殊需要而拖延了武器换代工作的大局,在无休止的等待中继续使用陈旧的装备。虽然我军同样能够在反击战中取胜,但是我们的战士在战场上会为此付出更多血的代价。可见,即使进步中存在某些缺陷和遗憾,也比什么都不做强。

equipment returned to india by china after the war

苏制米—4直升机1架(堪用)mi-4
英制水獭式运输机1架(严重损坏)
美制M—3A3坦克2辆(缺少零件)M3a3 tank*2
汽车117台(50台完好、67台缺少零件)truck*117
英制88mm加农炮3门(2门缺少零件、1门严重损坏)english 88mm cannon*3
英制88mm榴弹炮18门(14门缺少零件、4门严重损坏)
英制75mm山炮6门(2门缺少零件、4门严重损坏)
英制106.7mm迫击炮7门(缺少零件)
英制81mm迫击炮54门(15门完好、36门缺少零件、3门严重损坏)
英制51mm迫击炮75门(58门完好、17门缺少零件)
重机枪22挺(7挺完好、13挺缺少零件、2挺严重损坏)
美制7.62mm坦克机枪6挺(缺少零件)
英制7.7mm轻机枪261挺(223挺完好、26挺缺少零件、12挺严重损坏)
英制7.7mm轻机枪预备枪管208支(全部完好)
加拿大制9mm冲锋枪552支(488支完好、41支缺少零件、23支严重损坏)
美制7.62mm半自动步枪30支(全部完好)
英制7.7mm步枪2,105支(1,750支完好、306支缺少零件、49支严重损坏)
手枪57支(40支完好、12支缺少零件、4支严重损坏)
信号枪79支?1支完好、4支缺少零件、4支严重损坏)
美制90mm火箭筒37具(26具完好、8具缺少零件、3具严重损坏)
掷弹筒、枪榴弹发射器12具(11具完好、1具缺少零件)
炮弹22,400余发(全部完好)
枪弹2,139,000余发(全部完好)
英制7.7mm轻机枪弹匣2,181个(全部完好)
加拿大制9mm冲锋枪弹匣950个(全部完好)
90mm火箭筒弹137发(全部完好)
手榴弹19,357枚(全部完好)
信号弹500发(全部完好)
地雷1,895枚(全部完好)
美制空压机4台(3台完好、1台缺少零件)
推土机7台(6台完好、1台缺少零件)
英制压路机1台(缺少零件)
发电机4部(1部缺少零件、3部严重损坏)
油机2部(全部完好)
电台6部(1部完好、5部严重损坏)
步话机10部(8部完好、2部严重损坏)
电话机7部(1部完好、6部严重损坏)
电池10箱(全部完好)
望远镜30具(全部完好)
降落伞400顶(全部完好)
铁丝网280余捆(全部完好)
园锹、十字镐350把(全部完好)
油桶757个(497个完好、260个破损)
电线5,600m(部分完好)
其他军用器材(包括钢盔、降落伞绳、观察、通信、工兵器材等各一部)
军用大衣、毛毯1,973件(全部完好)
军服2,760余件(2,410余件完好、350余件破旧)
蚊帐、被子、床单等720余件(全部完好)。


  

Chinese losses

中国边防部队阵亡722人(其中军官82名、士兵640名),负伤1,697人(其中军官173名、士兵1,524名)消耗:炮弹22,976发、枪弹701,342发、手榴弹7,080枚、爆破筒64节、炸药2,050k9,喷火油料677L,损坏122mm榴弹炮1门、机枪18挺、长短枪81支、40mm火箭筒2具、电台(步话机)5部、汽车12台

722 kia 82 officer rest soliders

wounded 1697

artilery shell used 22976

bullets used 701342

grenade used 7080

explosive used 2050 KG

flam thrower fuel used 677 L

truck lost 12

122mm cannon damaged 1

light machine gun destroyed 18

carbines/rifles lost 81

RPG-2 lost 2

radio lost 5
 

Finn McCool

Captain
Registered Member
This is my first post in this thread, so I'm sorry if it is a little random, but the Himilayas is an area I'm interested in so I'll go right ahead.

India has a big advantage in deploying troops in this area or in any sort of arms buildup on the border because they have the advantage of havin the border be right next to their heartland, and a superior road network. The Chinese are operating at the periphery of their country and transportation network/supply lines but the Indians are at the heart of theirs. The Indians also have a lot of infrastructure that would be necessary to facilitate something like this because of all the stuff they have in Kashmir.
 

crazyinsane105

Junior Member
VIP Professional
Finn McCool said:
This is my first post in this thread, so I'm sorry if it is a little random, but the Himilayas is an area I'm interested in so I'll go right ahead.

India has a big advantage in deploying troops in this area or in any sort of arms buildup on the border because they have the advantage of havin the border be right next to their heartland, and a superior road network. The Chinese are operating at the periphery of their country and transportation network/supply lines but the Indians are at the heart of theirs. The Indians also have a lot of infrastructure that would be necessary to facilitate something like this because of all the stuff they have in Kashmir.

Not quite. The Chinese hold the high ground. In any event the PLA would be able to monitor ALL Indian movement along the border. That itself is a pretty big advantage. As for the Indian army in Kashmir, they do have nearly over half a million troops in that region, but most of them are paramilitary units being used to supress an armed rebellion. Any tensions between India and China will encourage Pakistan to flare the freedom movement and thus the Indian troops in Kashmir will be bogged down (during the Kargil incident, Indian troops were bogged down as Pakistan had capture several peaks; the Indians moved troops away from the Chinese border towards the Pakistani border but the problem erupted as the guerilla fighting flared and Indian troops became bogged down).
 

monitor

New Member
Registered Member
Indianfighter said:
India lost the 1962 war because Indian troops were outnumbered almost 1:30 in most theaters. The overall ratio was heavily against India.

Chinese troops suffered many more casualties than Indian troops. One lone Indian soldier manning a post killed 50 Chinese soldiers (when they attempted to climb up to his post), before he was martyred.

Today that numerical inferiority does not exist, and hence China cannot launch an attack on India on the same scale/strategy as 1962.

if you saw so, you should give us references to suppot you claims. Or you are just abreacting and it is useless to the discussion.

to this tapic, at least one thing is ture that a rail track has been build up to connect the tibet area more tightly with other provinces.from logistics point of view china is working step by step. that is not aimming at india as she is also a great nation but to booming the poor area as the tibet people and other poor area people area our relatives.
 

JSRIDHAR

New Member
i find it sad that people are still fixated on something that happened when we were not even born(many of us). :(
 

bd popeye

The Last Jedi
VIP Professional
JSRIDHAR, I agree with you. However over the years of this forum we have found that the India Vs China discussion leads down the road of perdition. So that discussion is not allowed. I invite you to read the rules before you proceed.

FORUM RULES: Things to Remember Before Posting, important, please read!

This thread is closed.

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