No, the point is that the networked battlespace will solve these problems; i.e, multiple systems can function as a system of systems. You are playing up the difficulty of intercepting interception missiles. Likewise, your use of general statements suggests you have no experience in this yourself.
Operational use of LR-AAMs in aerial combat - Interceptor role
- Thread starter Air Force Brat
- Start date
Again, you just assume that the technology works like magic. All systems have limits. Yes networked sensors give you better awareness of the battle space, but that doesn't mean you can see everything or track everything in an effective and timely manner. Unless you know what the actual specific limitations and capabilities of those systems are you don't have any grounds to claim how viable or likely an idea is, or how long it will take to mature and develop.
Whether I have personal experience working on engineering problems or not (and fyi I do, but for software) is besides the point. I'm not the one pushing strong and certain claims.
Honestly, I think both sides of the argument are making some rather general statements -- but I think your side is making general statements which needs quite a bit more suspension of disbelief to consider plausible IMO.
Well, let me put it this way, technology is like magic. Flick a light switch? Light comes on. Open your tap? Water comes out. Functional technology is almost a form of magic, paraphrasing Clarke.
The key problem with your critique is that you don't acknowledge how 160 seconds is more than enough time for detection, tracking, and cueing to occur. On a detection and tracking level, electromagnetic waves propagate at the speed of light, on a processing level, you have modern microprocessors able to perform the calculations needed for this to work. So focusing on the detection and tracking delay is NOT a valid argument for why intercepting interceptor missiles is difficult; as long as the datalink works, the interceptor missile will be tracked.
Moreover, at the speed interceptor missiles travel at, they'll end up lighting themselves up on EODAS / EOTS / IR. Atmospheric friction is sufficient to light them up, so tracking is not an issue.
If you do want to argue for a major roadblock, argue about how it's Mach 6, or it's hard to hit a missile with a missile if they're both maneuvering. But Mach 6 anti-missiles have been able to intercept Mach 10 ballistic missiles.
The key problem with your critique is that you don't acknowledge how 160 seconds is more than enough time for detection, tracking, and cueing to occur. On a detection and tracking level, electromagnetic waves propagate at the speed of light, on a processing level, you have modern microprocessors able to perform the calculations needed for this to work. So focusing on the detection and tracking delay is NOT a valid argument for why intercepting interceptor missiles is difficult; as long as the datalink works, the interceptor missile will be tracked.
Moreover, at the speed interceptor missiles travel at, they'll end up lighting themselves up on EODAS / EOTS / IR. Atmospheric friction is sufficient to light them up, so tracking is not an issue.
If you do want to argue for a major roadblock, argue about how it's Mach 6, or it's hard to hit a missile with a missile if they're both maneuvering. But Mach 6 anti-missiles have been able to intercept Mach 10 ballistic missiles.
Your description of technology being like magic is a perfect reason for why there is this doubt.
Because when technology is mature enough, then yes it is like magic.
But when the technology is not mature enough or impractical, then it doesn't work. Your argument about datalinks and processing and tracking all being able to fulfill the task of making up a solid and reliable network/kill chain to defend against the incoming missile basically depends on the necessity for all those technologies and systems being able to successfully work together.
And your conclusion takes up the premise that all of the sensors/processing/networking/tracking will all work together smoothly and perfectly, just like magic.
But is that a reasonable assumption to make at this stage?
I personally don't think so.
There are too many instances over the years of debate over on CDF where you write phrases similar to "XYZ isn't an issue" because of "ABC technology" or "ABC advancement" or something of that sort.
In some arguments such broad claims can be reasonable especially if the technologies or capabilities are very mature and proven systems, but considering many of the arguments you put forward are for emerging technologies and projects and capabilities which have yet to be developed, I think the sheer ease to which you assume that certain systems will turn out to work perfectly, is quite concerning when attempting to have these sort of conversations about conflict scenarios involving future technologies.
MSDM may be a future technology, but datalinks are not. The F-22, the F-35, and the E-2D are equipped with datalinks, so this type of datalinked tracking is not an issue.
A more tangible objection is whether these datalinks can work under jamming conditions. However, other issues emerge: if you jam, you're now trackable by radar, losing your stealth advantage and allowing escorts to engage you from a distance.
Even if datalinked missile tracking does not work, the question is now whether Chinese interceptor missiles are stealth. We know they're not stealth, and that their high speed makes them obvious from an IR standpoint. Upgraded F-15s have IRST installed, so the missiles will be tracked from long distances.
A more tenable objection is the range of the MSDM system. Likely, given the MSDM's size, it will be rather short-ranged, and will only get one salvo before the interceptor missile impacts. However, if it is tracked from long-range, escorts can move to intercept it away from its primary target.
A more tangible objection is whether these datalinks can work under jamming conditions. However, other issues emerge: if you jam, you're now trackable by radar, losing your stealth advantage and allowing escorts to engage you from a distance.
Even if datalinked missile tracking does not work, the question is now whether Chinese interceptor missiles are stealth. We know they're not stealth, and that their high speed makes them obvious from an IR standpoint. Upgraded F-15s have IRST installed, so the missiles will be tracked from long distances.
A more tenable objection is the range of the MSDM system. Likely, given the MSDM's size, it will be rather short-ranged, and will only get one salvo before the interceptor missile impacts. However, if it is tracked from long-range, escorts can move to intercept it away from its primary target.
The fundamental issue with you two is that you don't like the idea that this novel Chinese capability can be countered by the United States. But that's the nature of the game, capabilities, countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures will constantly emerge, and as long as the US has about 3.5x the military budget that China does, US countermeasures will arrive faster than the Chinese would prefer.
It's impossible to have any sort of discussion with you about emerging hypothetical technologies because you tend to assume any emerging technology or capability will have the complete and reliable capability to perform the specific task that you envision it to.
For example, not all datalinks are made equal. The datalinking that was considered state of the art in the 1990s is quite different to the state of the art today, and datalinking in the 1990s would've been unable to conduct many of the missions that state of the art datalinking today can do. Assuming that datalinking capability demonstrated by today's aircraft means they will be able to fulfill the sort of practical requirement that you require for quite a different threat and defense mechanism to existing capabilities is rather concerning.
And in this latest reply, you even say that F-15 IRSTs will be able to track missiles from long distances. I would've considered such a statement to be rather concerning if you even said "may be able to" instead of "will be able to," but being so blase in assuming such a degree of specific capability is a little bit concerning as well, isn't it?
Now, don't get me wrong -- I think that much of what you're suggesting has potential and I wouldn't be surprised if counter missile type systems are developed, with the datalinking and sensor and tracking capabilities to go with it.
But it makes for very frustrating conversation when you assume that such things will definitely be developed in the exact way you want, and that it will definitely be a complete and all encompassing "hard counter" to whatever system that exists today or may exist in future.
Let's put it this way, the F-35's EODAS can track ballistic missile launches from over 800 miles away. This is a statement of general, not specific capability, ballistic missile launches are extremely hot, but the long range demonstrates considerable ability. The IRST on the F-15s are a new upgrade, so they should have some comparable capability for Mach 6 missiles being .
Your point about obsolete datalinks is correct, except that there are no obsolete datalinks involved here. Both the E-2D and F-35 are new craft, as is the electronics package on the upgraded F-15.
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In general, there's five different levels of countermeasures an interceptor missile has to bypass. First, long-range general jamming. We know the US has that capability; it can be placed onto the E-2D as well as the F-15s via pods. Second, targeted jamming; a powerful radar like the one on the E-2D is powerful enough to burn out an opponent's seeker head. Third, MSDM on forward F-35s. Fourth, MSDM on escorting F-15s, which may engage close to the AEW&C or far from the AEW&C, depending on time to detect. Fifth, MSDM on the E-2D itself, since the MSDM is being designed as a sort of active chaff.
My point is that while I see the PL-15 / other interceptor missiles as a nice capability to have, they're not the most productive line of research. If engaging US aircraft before countermeasures are mature, they could do some appreciable damage, but once they become mature, their main value is instead forcing the US to throw escorts onto their soft targets, decreasing total sortie rate. As a way to defeat the USAF, they are outclassed by having better WVR AAMs, Chinese active chaff, and techniques focusing on the F-35s and F-15s instead of their E-2D.
Your point about obsolete datalinks is correct, except that there are no obsolete datalinks involved here. Both the E-2D and F-35 are new craft, as is the electronics package on the upgraded F-15.
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In general, there's five different levels of countermeasures an interceptor missile has to bypass. First, long-range general jamming. We know the US has that capability; it can be placed onto the E-2D as well as the F-15s via pods. Second, targeted jamming; a powerful radar like the one on the E-2D is powerful enough to burn out an opponent's seeker head. Third, MSDM on forward F-35s. Fourth, MSDM on escorting F-15s, which may engage close to the AEW&C or far from the AEW&C, depending on time to detect. Fifth, MSDM on the E-2D itself, since the MSDM is being designed as a sort of active chaff.
My point is that while I see the PL-15 / other interceptor missiles as a nice capability to have, they're not the most productive line of research. If engaging US aircraft before countermeasures are mature, they could do some appreciable damage, but once they become mature, their main value is instead forcing the US to throw escorts onto their soft targets, decreasing total sortie rate. As a way to defeat the USAF, they are outclassed by having better WVR AAMs, Chinese active chaff, and techniques focusing on the F-35s and F-15s instead of their E-2D.