Miragedriver
Brigadier
Carter guidelines for the new export fighter called for an aircraft having cost and performance characteristics which lie generally between the F-5E and F-16A fighters then in production. The aircraft was to be capable of defending recipients from projected air threats into the 1990s; have a secondary air-to-ground capability in close air support of ground forces but yet be sufficiently limited in offensive range-payload capability so as to be clearly out of the class of US advanced, fighter aircraft; and was to have lower cost and easier maintainability than current first-line US fighters. Unlike its predecessors in the export fighter arena, the F-X would receive no government funding for its development. Manufacturers were to assume all financial and marketing risks; however, the aircraft was to be sold on a strict government-to-government basis, in accordance with the provisions of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act.
On 29 July 1982, in a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy, Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci observed that: "There are several friends and allies that are . . . modernizing their tactical aircraft forces. Only a few can afford first—line fighters, and because of fiscal and other restraints, it is important that the United States have alternatives to first—line aircraft available for export." This indication of policy reflected some of the change in approach to fighter sales during the Reagan Administration's first year. In 1981, for example, the government decided to sell the F—16 to both Pakistan and Venezuela.
By the late 1990s, military planners in the air forces and procurement departments in the MoDs of many countries could only select between two alternatives: either they can look into a magnitude of existing, affordable but elderly designs of combat aircraft such as the F-16, Mirage 2000, MiG-29 etc. or they could cast an eye on those fighters which were due to enter service within the next few years, like the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale or the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor. Seemingly there was almost nothing for them on the market fitting into their mostly tight budgets and giving them the security to buy a weapon system with a substantially long and effective service-life.
By 2000, based upon in-house surveys and assured by independent market studies, EADS was convinced that there would be a clear potential for 2.500 modern light fighters/advanced trainer aircraft between the years 2005 and 2025 within the accessible export market. By that time, fielded combat aircraft and high-end jet trainers were at the far end of their life-cycle with almost no potential for economically viable upgrades, while the modern systems may be not available for some customers for either know-how or cost constraints.
In the 21st Century, a change in the trainer segment with high-performance turbo-prop aircraft covering even more capabilities in advanced training is obvious. At the same time, next-generation fighter aircraft such as the Eurofighter Typhoon provide for a major performance leap, leading to a training gap between contemporary jet trainers or their derivatives now under development and the future front-line fighters. New lightweight fighters may cover this gap by having excellent capabilities as a companion trainer. This would save training hours on the high-performance fighter aircraft and thus give the air forces cost reductions. In the fighter segment, the advent of the next-generation combat aircraft l shifted performance into higher dimensions. Below this high-end aircraft category there are few new dedicated fighters. The market here is characterised by used third-generation fighter aircraft, which have low unit costs at first glance, but will punish their new customers with tremendous life-cycle costs in operation. New aircraft in this class that provide air forces with a modern flying weapon system at low cost of ownership featuring modern avionics, high agility, low signatures thanks to a stealthy design, and a broad stores compendium.
Back to bottling my Grenache
On 29 July 1982, in a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy, Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci observed that: "There are several friends and allies that are . . . modernizing their tactical aircraft forces. Only a few can afford first—line fighters, and because of fiscal and other restraints, it is important that the United States have alternatives to first—line aircraft available for export." This indication of policy reflected some of the change in approach to fighter sales during the Reagan Administration's first year. In 1981, for example, the government decided to sell the F—16 to both Pakistan and Venezuela.
By the late 1990s, military planners in the air forces and procurement departments in the MoDs of many countries could only select between two alternatives: either they can look into a magnitude of existing, affordable but elderly designs of combat aircraft such as the F-16, Mirage 2000, MiG-29 etc. or they could cast an eye on those fighters which were due to enter service within the next few years, like the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale or the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor. Seemingly there was almost nothing for them on the market fitting into their mostly tight budgets and giving them the security to buy a weapon system with a substantially long and effective service-life.
By 2000, based upon in-house surveys and assured by independent market studies, EADS was convinced that there would be a clear potential for 2.500 modern light fighters/advanced trainer aircraft between the years 2005 and 2025 within the accessible export market. By that time, fielded combat aircraft and high-end jet trainers were at the far end of their life-cycle with almost no potential for economically viable upgrades, while the modern systems may be not available for some customers for either know-how or cost constraints.
In the 21st Century, a change in the trainer segment with high-performance turbo-prop aircraft covering even more capabilities in advanced training is obvious. At the same time, next-generation fighter aircraft such as the Eurofighter Typhoon provide for a major performance leap, leading to a training gap between contemporary jet trainers or their derivatives now under development and the future front-line fighters. New lightweight fighters may cover this gap by having excellent capabilities as a companion trainer. This would save training hours on the high-performance fighter aircraft and thus give the air forces cost reductions. In the fighter segment, the advent of the next-generation combat aircraft l shifted performance into higher dimensions. Below this high-end aircraft category there are few new dedicated fighters. The market here is characterised by used third-generation fighter aircraft, which have low unit costs at first glance, but will punish their new customers with tremendous life-cycle costs in operation. New aircraft in this class that provide air forces with a modern flying weapon system at low cost of ownership featuring modern avionics, high agility, low signatures thanks to a stealthy design, and a broad stores compendium.
Back to bottling my Grenache