Naval Strategic and Operational Discussion

shen

Senior Member
Let's continue the OT discussion from the Type 055 thread here.

I propose that China doesn't need to worry about a distant blockade of its SLOCs.

Let's look at a recent proposal of blockade of Chinese SLOC.
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The context of the Offshore Control concept is that it is an alternative to the AirSea Battle concept. Offshore Control proponents consider AirSea battle a dangerous plan because it includes attacks of Chinese mainland targets. Offshore Control propose a distant blockade of Chinese SLOCs to slowly strangle China economically. It must also be considered AirSea Battle will be much expensive for US military to implement. Many new and undeveloped weapon systems are needed to penetrate Chinese airspace and attack mainland target. Without an overall increase of US defense budget, which is highly unlikely, significant budgets would have to be shifted from the US Army and Marine Corp to USN and USAF. Unsuprisely, the author of Offshore Control is a Marine officers.

Distant blockade is the most difficult form of blockade to implement historically. Even when it works, it works very slowly.
note the proposal calls from the interception, boarding and diversion of Chinese container ships. not mining of choke points such as Malacca Strait, because that's unworkable as it would affect friendly and neutral shipping as well. not against China bound tankers, presumably because tankers are more difficult to track or because China is not really vulnerable in terms of energy.

Interception, boarding, inspecting every suspect container ships would take considerable naval resource. every warship on the distant blockade is one warship unavailable at the center of dispute, presumably around Taiwan or ECS or SCS.

China doesn't need to divert many warships to counter the blockade. At most, a couple of SSNs to pick off vulnerable warships on blockade duty. and some civilian container ships with converted to Q-ships with hidden weapons to sink as many opposition warships as possible, tie down any much opposition strength as possible for as long as possible and to cause the rest of the blockaders to to more wary of every innocent looking container ships.

In the mean time, PLAN should concentrate to all major combat assets to achieve the objective close to home. Whether it is reunification of Taiwan, landing in Diaoyutao or SCS islands.

Distant blockade takes long time to work. Given the importance of Chinese economy regionally as well as internationally, how many countries are dependent on trade with China for their economic well-being. A prolong economic blockade of China would be painful for almost every countries in the world and difficult to hold together for long over Taiwan or some tiny islands in ECS or SCS which means little to most countries in the world. In the mean time, China should make the blockade as painful for everybody as possible. First, declare the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean region a war zone and every merchant ship bound for a belligerent countries liable to be sunk without warning. That would raise the shipping insurance rate dramatically and disrupt global trade even without a single ship attacked. PLAN should mine choke points such as Malacca Strait, and all approaches to East Asia, defend minefields within land based air-cover with 022 boats, disrupt trade as much as possible. Once the immediate Chinese objectives are achieve, China should unilaterally declare conflict over and call for international peace conference and return of normal international trade as soon as possible. Face with a fait accomplis, and the alternative of a long war or a return to peace and normal trade, how many countries in the world would back a prolong blockade? How sustainable would a distant blockade be if many countries economically dependent on trade with China doesn't back it anymore?

I think it is telling that AirSea Battle seems to be ascendent. That alone should tell you how viable a distant blockade of Chinese SLOCs is.
 
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latenlazy

Brigadier
Let's continue the OT discussion from the Type 055 thread here.

I propose that China doesn't need to worry about a distant blockade of its SLOCs.

Let's look at a recent proposal of blockade of Chinese SLOC.
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

The context of the Offshore Control concept is that it is an alternative to the AirSea Battle concept. Offshore Control proponents consider AirSea battle a dangerous plan because it includes attacks of Chinese mainland targets. Offshore Control propose a distant blockade of Chinese SLOCs to slowly strangle China economically. It must also be considered AirSea Battle will be much expensive for US military to implement. Many new and undeveloped weapon systems are needed to penetrate Chinese airspace and attack mainland target. Without an overall increase of US defense budget, which is highly unlikely, significant budgets would have to be shifted from the US Army and Marine Corp to USN and USAF. Unsuprisely, the author of Offshore Control is a Marine officers.

Distant blockade is the most difficult form of blockade to implement historically. Even when it works, it works very slowly.
note the proposal calls from the interception, boarding and diversion of Chinese container ships. not mining of choke points such as Malacca Strait, because that's unworkable as it would affect friendly and neutral shipping as well. not against China bound tankers, presumably because tankers are more difficult to track or because China is not really vulnerable in terms of energy.

Interception, boarding, inspecting every suspect container ships would take considerable naval resource. every warship on the distant blockade is one warship unavailable at the center of dispute, presumably around Taiwan or ECS or SCS.

China doesn't need to divert many warships to counter the blockade. At most, a couple of SSNs to pick off vulnerable warships on blockade duty. and some civilian container ships with converted to Q-ships with hidden weapons to sink as many opposition warships as possible, tie down any much opposition strength as possible for as long as possible and to cause the rest of the blockaders to to more wary of every innocent looking container ships.

In the mean time, PLAN should concentrate to all major combat assets to achieve the objective close to home. Whether it is reunification of Taiwan, landing in Diaoyutao or SCS islands.

Distant blockade takes long time to work. Given the importance of Chinese economy regionally as well as internationally, how many countries are dependent on trade with China for their economic well-being. A prolong economic blockade of China would be painful for almost every countries in the world and difficult to hold together for long over Taiwan or some tiny islands in ECS or SCS which means little to most countries in the world. In the mean time, China should make the blockade as painful for everybody as possible. First, declare the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean region a war zone and every merchant ship bound for a belligerent countries liable to be sunk without warning. That would raise the shipping insurance rate dramatically and disrupt global trade even without a single ship attacked. PLAN should mine choke points such as Malacca Strait, and all approaches to East Asia, defend minefields within land based air-cover with 022 boats, disrupt trade as much as possible. Once the immediate Chinese objectives are achieve, China should unilaterally declare conflict over and call for international peace conference and return of normal international trade as soon as possible. Face with a fait accomplis, and the alternative of a long war or a return to peace and normal trade, how many countries in the world would back a prolong blockade? How sustainable would a distant blockade be if many countries economically dependent on trade with China doesn't back it anymore?

I think it is telling that AirSea Battle seems to be ascendent. That alone should tell you how viable a distant blockade of Chinese SLOCs is.

Blitzo and I had a discussion knocking the offshore control concept on keypub quite a while back, so there's no real disagreement about the effectiveness of such an "offshore control" strategy. HOWEVER, in that discussion we pointed out that China's ability to contest such a blockade and render it ineffective greatly depends on building a navy that can project power and has some degree of forward deployment (but I, and I think Blitzo, believe that is the kind of Navy China is building). Offshore control is only ineffective if the PLAN has the ability to contest it, and the PLAN will have no ability to contest it without establishing a presence in foreign countries both for logistical support and a pivot point for operations. The only reason why the offshore control concept would be ineffective is if the possibility is deterred by the opponent's force composition and deployment.

To emphasize that point, it should be noted that countering a blockade would not be as simple as diverting a few of your SSNs to pick off enforcers. Those enforcers will be defended by their own subs, as well as other forward deployed assets that are acting as both support and relief. Keep in mind that even after China has achieved a satisfactory level of modernization, the USN will probably still be the bigger force. This puts pressure on China to scale its commitments to breaking a blockade with the USN's commitments to enforcing one.

Your hypothetical strategy is also rather untenable, in part because "making the blockade as painful for everyone as possible" could in fact end up turning more countries against China, worsening its strategic position. In fact, this is exactly what happened to Germany in WWI. The biggest problem with the strategy is that ships that are delivering goods to your enemies aren't necessarily owned by your enemies, but neutral parties, and friends of your enemies that you have no quarrel with. If history reveals anything, it is that this kind of aggressive pressure often escalates a conflict against the executor of that strategy.

Anyways, I think the the point of contention in the Type 055 topic fundamentally hinges on what kind of conflict you envision China preparing for. In a small scale war between two powers, I'm inclined to agree with you that attacking a country's SLOC may simply not be feasible or proportional to the interests involved in that war, given the high economic and political costs not just to China and the US, but to the international community at large. Unfortunately, the PLA's job (or at least its mentality) is to prepare for the absolute worse case scenario, which would automatically ignore scenarios that are made unlikely by various economic and political pressures.
 
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delft

Brigadier
The first assumption in "Strategy for an Unthinkable Conflict | The Diplomat" is pretty unrealistic. And without that the blockader won't have the support of the UN Security Council ( of course ) nor General Assembly.
 
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shen

Senior Member
Chinese first strike is the common assumption (at least openly) of both AirSea Battle and Offshore Patrol. A joke I've read is that China can defeat AirSea Battle by just showing up in a fishery patrol vessel.
As for lacking UN backing, that's never stopped the Superpower before.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
Chinese first strike is the common assumption (at least openly) of both AirSea Battle and Offshore Patrol. A joke I've read is that China can defeat AirSea Battle by just showing up in a fishery patrol vessel.
As for lacking UN backing, that's never stopped the Superpower before.

While American first strike is a common assumption made by China. Let's hope that both keep thinking this. It will at the very least buy time for the two sides to continue building trust.
 

shen

Senior Member
Blitzo and I had a discussion knocking the offshore control concept on keypub quite a while back, so there's no real disagreement about the effectiveness of such an "offshore control" strategy. HOWEVER, in that discussion we pointed out that China's ability to contest such a blockade and render it ineffective greatly depends on building a navy that can project power and has some degree of forward deployment (but I, and I think Blitzo, believe that is the kind of Navy China is building). Offshore control is only ineffective if the PLAN has the ability to contest it, and the PLAN will have no ability to contest it without establishing a presence in foreign countries both for logistical support and a pivot point for operations. The only reason why the offshore control concept would be ineffective is if the possibility is deterred by the opponent's force composition and deployment.

To emphasize that point, it should be noted that countering a blockade would not be as simple as diverting a few of your SSNs to pick off enforcers. Those enforcers will be defended by their own subs, as well as other forward deployed assets that are acting as both support and relief. Keep in mind that even after China has achieved a satisfactory level of modernization, the USN will probably still be the bigger force. This puts pressure on China to scale its commitments to breaking a blockade with the USN's commitments to enforcing one.

Your hypothetical strategy is also rather untenable, in part because "making the blockade as painful for everyone as possible" could in fact end up turning more countries against China, worsening its strategic position. In fact, this is exactly what happened to Germany in WWI. The biggest problem with the strategy is that ships that are delivering goods to your enemies aren't necessarily owned by your enemies, but neutral parties, and friends of your enemies that you have no quarrel with. If history reveals anything, it is that this kind of aggressive pressure often escalates a conflict against the executor of that strategy.

Anyways, I think the the point of contention in the Type 055 topic fundamentally hinges on what kind of conflict you envision China preparing for. In a small scale war between two powers, I'm inclined to agree with you that attacking a country's SLOC may simply not be feasible or proportional to the interests involved in that war, given the high economic and political costs not just to China and the US, but to the international community at large. Unfortunately, the PLA's job (or at least its mentality) is to prepare for the absolute worse case scenario, which would automatically ignore scenarios that are made unlikely by various economic and political pressures.

My point is that PLAN doesn't need to aggressively break a distant blockade. An USN enforced blockade essentially forces other countries not to do business with China. It would be like a modern Continental System when Napoleon forced European countries to stop trading with England. And just like the reaction to the Continental System, resentment would quickly grow in countries whose economies are heavily dependent on trade with China. It is simply politically and economically impossible to hold together a blockade that would take years to have any effect. Trying to solve a regional conflict in East Asia by bring down the global economic system is non-workable idea from the beginning.

I'm curious what were the conclusions reached in the discussion between you and Blitzo.
 
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latenlazy

Brigadier
My point is that PLAN doesn't need to aggressively break a distant blockade. An USN enforced blockade essentially forces other countries not to do business with China. It would be like a modern Continental System when Napoleon forced European countries to stop trading with England. And just like the reaction to the Continental System, resentment would quickly grow in countries whose economies are heavily dependent on trade with China. It is simply politically and economically impossible to hold together a blockade that would take years to have any effect. Trying to solve a regional conflict in East Asia by bring down the global economic system is non-workable idea from the beginning.

I'm curious what were the conclusions reached in the discussion between you and Blitzo.

The word regional is the key point of contention, I think. It's unlikely that the PLA would only prepare itself for regional conflict when it has global interests. Keep in mind that last paragraph of my first reply.

"I'm inclined to agree with you that attacking a country's SLOC may simply not be feasible or proportional to the interests involved in that war, given the high economic and political costs not just to China and the US, but to the international community at large. Unfortunately, the PLA's job (or at least its mentality) is to prepare for the absolute worse case scenario, which would automatically ignore scenarios that are made unlikely by various economic and political pressures."
 

shen

Senior Member
The word regional is the key point of contention, I think. It's unlikely that the PLA would only prepare itself for regional conflict when it has global interests. Keep in mind that last paragraph of my first reply.

"I'm inclined to agree with you that attacking a country's SLOC may simply not be feasible or proportional to the interests involved in that war, given the high economic and political costs not just to China and the US, but to the international community at large. Unfortunately, the PLA's job (or at least its mentality) is to prepare for the absolute worse case scenario, which would automatically ignore scenarios that are made unlikely by various economic and political pressures."

What specific "global interests" do you have in mind that would justify disruption of global trade?
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
What specific "global interests" do you have in mind that would justify disruption of global trade?

I think you misunderstood what I was trying to get at. I'm not suggesting that China's global interests could trigger a conflict, but that it is vulnerable globally so long as it has global interests. Other conflicts that may be more regional could result in China's global assets being targeted in the right circumstances (such as a stalemated or prolonged conflict), which would then expand the conflict globally. Conflicts don't always remain in the domain of their origin.

There are instances in history where war becomes the justification for itself and all other things drop to the wayside. Nothing technically justified all the disruptions that came with World War I, but it happened anyways. I think we all agree that rationally speaking there is no foreseeable conflict between China and any other power where the disruption of global trade is justified, but that does not preclude the possibility or even probability of that event.

One should not treat global trade as some absolute preventative factor. If the US were to try to impose a blockade on China, that would not spell absolute doom for the global economy. Trade flows would adjust around it, especially since most countries that absolutely depend on China for trade are developing countries. The developed countries have other, though less optimal, options.

Also, keep in mind that part of what you're suggesting, that imposing a blockade would take a long time and be too disruptive to global trade, ultimately hinges on how prepared China is to contest that blockade. If it cannot contest it, then such a blockade would be relatively short and its disruption would be minimal. As I also suggested in my first entry:

"countering a blockade would not be as simple as diverting a few of your SSNs to pick off enforcers. Those enforcers will be defended by their own subs, as well as other forward deployed assets that are acting as both support and relief. Keep in mind that even after China has achieved a satisfactory level of modernization, the USN will probably still be the bigger force. This puts pressure on China to scale its commitments to breaking a blockade with the USN's commitments to enforcing one."
 
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