Modern Carrier Battle Group..Strategies and Tactics

313230

New Member
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is not the penetrator, but the carrier of it in the barrel, and is discarded after firing.

I guess you meant the long rod penetrator. 120mm penetrator has 20-30mm in diamter, and 20mm canon has 5mm penetrator.

One problem I could see is that using many small penetrators increase drag. Normally, tank round loses IIRC, 70m/s per km, at Mach 10 the loss will be much higher, and if using 5mm rod, then the loss in velocity will be extremely high. This applies for air at ground, air at 10km may be lower, but I fear if you disperse you rods at long range (to prevent interception) then the loss in velocity and trajectory will still be very high. I guess interception of ICBM will be at high altitude, e.g. +20km
 

Sczepan

Senior Member
VIP Professional
This is what some military fan think 002 might look like. (from CD wen98)
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some People (like me) don't prefer the big sticks
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The aircraft carrier inventory question has always been up for debate, but it has largely centered on the number of hulls and not the physical size of each carrier. In an age of shrinking defense budgets, smaller wars, and the Pacific Pivot, the U.S. should ditch its supercarrier-only policy and build smaller, less expensive aircraft carriers.
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Smaller is still really freakin' huge...

The harsh fiscal realty is that America's military footprint is about to shrink while others continue to grow. When it comes to "blue water" navies, mainly India and China are of great interest as both are in the process of expanding their carrier fleets. A recently resurgent Russia is also working at totally overhauling its Naval capabilities in the coming decades, which includes revamping and expanding their fixed-wing carrier force.
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It's time to learn to do more missions with less dollars. Taking a good look at procuring smaller, 55,000-65,000 ton
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configured carriers may be a great place to start.
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also China could think this way
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
some People (like me) don't prefer the big sticks
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also China could think this way
We've gone over this time and again.

That post is not really about the Chinese program...it should really be in the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group Strategy pagehttps://www.sinodefenceforum.com/mo...tegies-and-tactics.t4918/page-232#post-263034https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/mo...tegies-and-tactics.t4918/page-232#post-263034...where this notion has been discussed numerous times.

The Chinese are clearly not subscribing to it. They are building their first indigenous large carrier, and I am about 99.999% sure they will build more.

The US certainly is not...though the US is indeed building a couple of the air centric America class which are smaller and less capable than the Nimitz or Ford...but they are really to give the Marines a carrier for ground support. But they are just a variant of the LHD/LHA designs and not the 60,000 tons CATOBAR design that Foxtrot Alpha's article calls for.

So, before we go into this type of discussion again, let's move it over to the

Aricraft Carrier Strategy pagehttps://www.sinodefenceforum.com/mo...tegies-and-tactics.t4918/page-232#post-263034https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/mo...tegies-and-tactics.t4918/page-232#post-263034
 

Sczepan

Senior Member
VIP Professional
crawl - walk - run ... if you wanna have both types - start with the smaller step;
if you only need small carriers, it should be enough to build small carriers;
if you wanna have the big sticks, you also need small steps before.
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
We've gone over this time and again.

That post is not really about the Chinese program...it should really be in the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group Strategy page...where this notion has been discussed numerous times.

The Chinese are clearly not subscribing to it. They are building their first indigenous large carrier, and I am about 99.999% sure they will build more.

The US certainly is not...though the US is indeed building a couple of the air centric America class which are smaller and less capable than the Nimitz or Ford...but they are really to give the Marines a carrier for ground support. But they are just a variant of the LHD/LHA designs and not the 60,000 tons CATOBAR design that Foxtrot Alpha's article calls for.

So, before we go into this type of discussion again, let's move it over to the

Aricraft Carrier Strategy page
Thing is, smaller escort carriers are enough for SCS operations and would outclass any other potential adversaries in the region. CVEBGs can't stand up to the USN, but neither could any CVBGs PLAN might field in the next two or three decades anyway.

The half dozen or so J-31-like multirole fighters plus around a dozen helicopters on any CVE surface action groups would shift the balance of power against current SCS claimants. It's not clear the Japan Navy would or even could push into the SCS en mass, especially if relations with China is tense but stable, and ECS is relatively quite. And while the Indian Navy could project power into the SCS in the next decade or so, it's not clear that is, on balance, in India's interests to upset the apple cart for dubious gains. I think CVEs are worth serious considerations as part of high-low power projection mixes.
 

suby68

New Member
Registered Member
The discussion today in China is about building the first two aircraft carriers in the 70'000 or 80'000 ton range. One proposal is to build one each and see which one is the better option. In any case once they start building number three and four, the US Navy will be in a position where they have not been since the battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944 and the run of the Jeep carriers :)

To think about how in just around 5 years’ time all the carrier plans of the US Navy will have to be rearranged makes a good story. What some people don't consider is if the US Navy has theoretical 11 carriers as at present, only 3 are actually available at any time for use near Taiwan. And also the 3 are most likely not near Taiwan when for example something happens there.

Having two or more smaller carriers in Guam or even Australia would change the entire calculation for the US Navy. What is also remarkable is the location. The geographical areas are the same as in 1941 when there was no US carrier in the Far East and none would be deployed to help with the defense of the Philippines.

It will be interesting to watch if politicians this time around react before something happens or only after it happens.
 

Brumby

Major
To think about how in just around 5 years’ time all the carrier plans of the US Navy will have to be rearranged makes a good story. What some people don't consider is if the US Navy has theoretical 11 carriers as at present, only 3 are actually available at any time for use near Taiwan. And also the 3 are most likely not near Taiwan when for example something happens there.

On the contrary, the sizing and availability is well understood.
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In the 2007 Defense Authorization bill, Congress wrote into law that we must not go below eleven. Since December 2012, this has been lowered to ten so that USS Enterprise could be retired before USS Ford’s 2016 commissioning. The law was passed alongside development of the 2007 Maritime Strategy, which codified the need for combat power in two regions, the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. The strategy made certain key assumptions to arrive at eleven carriers operating out of two combat hubs.

First, the hubs would be occupied by a carrier continuously and indefinitely. This means no gaps in coverage, with coverage provided far into the future. Second, it does not matter specifically where the hubs are. Carriers could move to conduct operations outside of one of the hubs. The final assumption is that only one carrier at a time is required to “fill” a hub. With these assumptions, the math works like this:

To provide carriers in two regions, two must be in place. One will have recently arrived home. One will be on the way, with another in training. Thus, eight are necessary. However, eight carriers can provide continuous, but not indefinite coverage. Carriers require maintenance, like a three-and-a-half year midlife refueling process. Extended maintenance levies a requirement for a ninth carrier.

But ships need regular maintenance, too. Maintenance periods occur between regular deployments, lasting three to six months. So two additional carriers are required, one in maintenance for each hub, bringing us to eleven total.

The fleet has been at ten carriers since December 2012. This fall, Navy officials announced a gap of several months in the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean hub. After four years of lengthening deployments and preserving coverage from operationally strained geographic distances, ten proved insufficient to cover two hubs.

Keep in mind, eleven carriers are required for two hubs each requiring one carrier. If U.S. leadership determines a third carrier is required to supplement an existing hub (as was the case in the Middle East from 2010-2013) or to establish a temporary hub elsewhere, eleven carriers instantly become insufficient.

A new 2015 Navy strategy does not repeat the “two hub” construct, though combat power continues to be called for in the Western Pacific and the Middle East. Additionally, there has been no discussion of reducing naval presence in these two hubs.

The two hub concept was an artifact of the “War on Terror” and the Navy’s desire for a compelling planning narrative. China’s concerning behavior had yet to emerge, and Russia’s invasion of Georgia was a year away. Eleven carriers were deemed sufficient to meet the requirements of a world without today’s “near peer” power competition. This won’t be sufficient to preserve American naval superiority beyond 2015.
 

TerraN_EmpirE

Tyrant King
farther more It fails to consider the LHA and LHD ships which can function as virtual CVE's especially as we move forward in time and F35B and V22 continue to evolve.
 

Brumby

Major
farther more It fails to consider the LHA and LHD ships which can function as virtual CVE's especially as we move forward in time and F35B and V22 continue to evolve.

I agree the F-35B's and V22 ( and extended family of mid-air refuelers; and eventual AEW) will provide flexibility in force structure composition especially in surge like operations but nevertheless will be constrained by aviation fuel because of design.
 
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