Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)

a question: how big is the part of the South China Sea "shallow" in the sense "a fifteen foot draft" mentioned in
LCS to Boost U.S. Presence in Disputed South China Sea
? (an answer could be the percentage of the SCS area, which is shallower than 15 ft)
The speed, maneuverability and shallow draft of the Navy’s
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makes the platform well suited for the South China Sea, Pentagon leaders said while releasing a new Asia-Pacific maritime strategy document.

“The LCS is ideally suited for a role in the South China Sea. It is fast, light and flexible and it has a fifteen foot draft so it can go places other vessels cannot go. We plan to have four LCS ships in Singapore on a rotational basis by 2018,” David Shear, assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, told reporters on Friday.

The service has long planned to rotate the ships through Singapore as part of the Pentagon’s shift to the Pacific. However, the increasing LCS fleet size underscores the potential value of the platform in the South China Sea region, where there are many shallow ports inaccessible to larger-draft ships.

The Navy is preparing to receive four more of its shallow-water Littoral Combat Ships between now and February, effectively
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and paving the way for more deployments.

On Aug. 11, the Navy formally accepted delivery of LCS 6, the USS Jackson, during a ceremony at the Austal USA shipyard in Mobile, Ala.

Following this delivery, the service is preparing to accept delivery of LCS 5, the USS Milwaukee, in October of this year and the USS Montgomery, LCS 8, in December of this year, Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Chris Johnson recently said.

On the heels of these deliveries, the Navy plans to receive the USS Detroit, LCS 7, in February of next year, he added.

“By early next year, the Navy will be operating eight littoral combat ships and we’ll be accepting four more by the end of 2016. The Navy will continue to accept ships at that rate for the next several years making the LCS class the second largest surface combatant class in the fleet and the key to our ability to operate in shallow, coastal waterways around the world,” Johnson recently told Military.com.

Shear explained that stepping up LCS missions in the South China Sea is part of a broader strategic effort to maintain presence and patrol the area in light of China’s recent efforts to build artificial land structures in the contested Spratly Islands.

China’s island building, referred to by Pentagon officials as land reclamation, has been ongoing effort to further fortify their territorial claims in the region. Pentagon officials have said the China has reclaimed over 2,000 acres of area over the last 18 months, more than all other claimants in the region combined.

In June, Pentagon officials publicly acknowledged that
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.

“Our approach to the South China Sea has been robust. We have engaged China repeatedly at the highest levels to implement a permanent halt to reclamation. We of course have a very strong and persistent military presence designed to maintain peace and stability,” he said.

The Spratly Islands includes an area of more than 750 reefs, small islands and atolls in the South China Sea off the coasts of the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. Highly disputed for centuries, the area is rich in oil and natural gas. Countries claiming rights to territory in the Spratly Islands include China, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, and Brunei.

Shear referenced an ongoing congressional effort to
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slated for arming and training U.S. allies in the Pacific.

The South China Sea includes strategically vital waterways, important to international trade. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter has criticized China’s artificial island-building and said the U.S. would not be deterred by China’s moves.

“China has said it has stopped reclamation but it is not clear to us if they have stopped or are just finishing up. There is the potential for militarization of these features. We call for a permanent halt to all of these activities. The U.S. does not recognize the sovereignty claims of these artificial islands,” Shear said.

Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, negotiated in the 1980s and updated in the 1990s, an island is defined as a “naturally formed area of land above the water at high tide.” Also, article 60 of the U.N. Convention says “artificial islands are not entitled to territorial seas.”

Shear added that the U.S. would continue to step up its military presence in the area and work closely with allies in the region. He cited the deployment of
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tilt-rotor aircraft and two new missile-defense capable destroyers to Japan. Furthermore, the Navy’s new high-tech
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is slated for the Pacific.

“US forces currently present in the South China Sea conduct a variety of presence operations. We are in the South China Sea on a regular basis,” Shear said.

Shear also added the Navy’s new
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surveillance plane will also continue to help military efforts in the Pacific. “We have a vested interest in ensuring that territorial claims are resolved peacefully,” he explained.
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steve_rolfe

Junior Member
What do our American friends here really think (truthfully) about the 'LCS' class of warships.
I mean the US Navy has some truly excellent, well conceived classes of warships, such as their Carriers, Arleigh Burke Destroyers, and Virginia class nuclear subs..........but what the hell were military planners thinking (or not), when they came up with the LCS.
It sort of stands out like a sore thumb, against the rest of the fleet.

Questions:-

1/ OK 2 variants of LCS were designed, but to actually continue with a production run of 2 classes........just adds huge extra costs for various reasons.

2/ Why was the LCS not designed to full Navy standards?

3/ Why was the original armament fit, so obviously weak, which would render the vessel incapable of fighting in a conflict.

4/ Whats so special about building a vessel that can do 40 knots?........oh its ok for chasing around offshore waters looking for any small enemy vessels, but that's about it. No good for evading aircraft, helicopters or long range missiles.

5/ How come, no one envisaged all these points, before committing billions of dollars to the project?

In a nutshell, i look at it from a viewpoint of a serviceman, if they were to be assigned to this class of vessel................and the question would be.......'Do you feel safe, serving on this vessel, if you were asked to go into a dangerous situation?'.......My answer would be 'No'.
 

strehl

Junior Member
Registered Member
What do our American friends here really think (truthfully) about the 'LCS' class of warships.
I mean the US Navy has some truly excellent, well conceived classes of warships, such as their Carriers, Arleigh Burke Destroyers, and Virginia class nuclear subs..........but what the hell were military planners thinking (or not), when they came up with the LCS.
It sort of stands out like a sore thumb, against the rest of the fleet.

Questions:-

1/ OK 2 variants of LCS were designed, but to actually continue with a production run of 2 classes........just adds huge extra costs for various reasons.

2/ Why was the LCS not designed to full Navy standards?

3/ Why was the original armament fit, so obviously weak, which would render the vessel incapable of fighting in a conflict.

4/ Whats so special about building a vessel that can do 40 knots?........oh its ok for chasing around offshore waters looking for any small enemy vessels, but that's about it. No good for evading aircraft, helicopters or long range missiles.

5/ How come, no one envisaged all these points, before committing billions of dollars to the project?

In a nutshell, i look at it from a viewpoint of a serviceman, if they were to be assigned to this class of vessel................and the question would be.......'Do you feel safe, serving on this vessel, if you were asked to go into a dangerous situation?'.......My answer would be 'No'.

Weapons design begins with a "Concept Of Operations" (Conops) to meet specific threat scenarios. Those scenarios centered on mines, submarines, and littoral policing each of which are traditionally handled by relatively small platforms. The Conops entails the operational architecture and the way it is employed. The LCS was conceived as a general purpose mothership employing varying suites of remotely operated vehicles to consolidate three operational roles into one platform. Most of the ROVs were unmanned although manned elements (RIBs and helicopters) can be included. Employment tactics involve the mothership remaining away from the forward edge of battle and directing the ROVs remotely. The littoral policing role is the only one where the LCS itself is the principal platform prosecuting the mission and even here, the RIBs are intended to be forward deployed. The specific threats centered on piracy, drug smuggling, illegal fishing, etc. By their nature, these threats do not possess significant combat power.


At the current state of technology, the concept of an ROV mothership as an architecture for combat operations is unproven. On the other hand, given the advancement of electronics and software, it will probably succeed albeit with a lot of heartburn and redesign.


The criticism of the LCS as regards its' damage tolerance is partially based on the notion that the vessel will be in the thick of battle against significant enemy naval and air forces. I would guess any forces on that level would be tracked and countered by DDGs or CVNs. The function of the LCS in such an encounter would be to run away and hide inside the screening force of the wider fleet.


The advent of swarm attack by high speed boats is the current focus of concern. The LCS will probably operate in situations where it may not have carrier protection (but that would not include operations in the Persian Gulf where Iran is known to be amassing swarm boats). The need for a short range missile has been identified and will almost certainly be integrated into the platform. I do not see a practical use for a long range missile. There is no organic means to locate and track targets at long range unless an AEW type helicopter is embarked. However, that would expand the LCS into a distinctly new role.
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
[
What do our American friends here really think (truthfully) about the 'LCS' class of warships.

...but what the hell were military planners thinking (or not), when they came up with the LCS.
It sort of stands out like a sore thumb, against the rest of the fleet.

Questions:-

1)...

In a nutshell, i look at it from a viewpoint of a serviceman, if they were to be assigned to this class of vessel................and the question would be.......'Do you feel safe, serving on this vessel, if you were asked to go into a dangerous situation?'.......My answer would be 'No'.
Steve, we could go through all of at, but they have been answered over and over again on this thread. They have been discussed, brought up, pointed out, etc., etc.

Now, the US Navy has recognized some of the issues and is addressing them with the FF program and the upgrade to the LCS.

Read through this thread and you will see what most of us think. I know it is a lng read...but you will learn a lot about the LCS in so doing.

As to the two classes? Well, in the end, both bring some very unique capabilities that the US Navy decided they wanted. Technically it is as simple as that. And added benefit (which I have no doubt factored into it) is that it keeps two naval shipyards very busy for a long time to come).

So, we will end up with something like 27 vessels of each (either lCS or FF) and they will be very much able to bring those capabilities to bear).
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
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New-LCS-Will-be-Named-USS-Oakland-1024x698.jpg

Naval Today said:
US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced Aug. 19 that the next Independence variant Littoral Combat Ship will be named USS Oakland (LCS 24).

The ship will be named to honor the long-standing history its namesake city has had with the Navy.

The future USS Oakland will be the third naval ship to bear the name. The first, commissioned in 1918, was largely used to transport cargo; the second, commissioned in 1942 during the height of World War II, was only in service for seven years, but was key in many antiaircraft missions in places such as Pearl Harbor, Marshall Islands, Pagan, Guam, Iwo Jima, Rota, Peleliu and Okinawa. After the war, Oakland performed two duty patrols off the coast of China before being decommissioned.

A fast, agile surface combatant, the LCS provides the required war fighting capabilities and operational flexibility to execute a variety of missions in areas such as mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare.

The ship will be built with modular design incorporating mission packages that can be changed out quickly as combat needs change in a region. These mission packages are supported by detachments that deploy both manned and unmanned vehicles, and sensors, in support of mine, undersea, and surface warfare missions.

Oakland will be built by Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama. It will be 419 feet long and be capable of operating at speeds in excess of 40 knots.
So, this is getting us to the end of the naming for the first twelve vessels of each class already on contract.

Soon we will see with what vessel they actually start the FF vessels. I would be just as happy f they started it with numbers 25 and 26. But it is may be numbers 33 and 34.
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
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USS-Fort-Worth-Concludes-CARAT-Drills-1024x688.jpg

Naval Today said:
The littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) wrapped up its participation in Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises with both Indonesia and Malaysia following an Aug. 21 closing ceremony held in Sandakan, Malaysia.

In deepening navy-to-navy relationships, Fort Worth visited Surabaya, Indonesia, for the first time in her 16-month rotational deployment to U.S. 7th Fleet. This port visit is particularly significant for Fort Worth, as she was part of the Indonesian-led Air Asia search efforts in the Java Sea.

CARAT is a model of how the TNI-AL and U.S. Navies can cooperate and work together to enhance interoperability, develop relationships and address shared maritime security priorities, as in the visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) exercises. TNI Sailors conducted their first VBSS boarding of Fort Worth during this year’s CARAT.

U.S. units participating in the exercise included the littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42), a P-3C Orion, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 5, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) 5, Coastal Riverine Group (CRG) 1, and U.S. Marines assigned to the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (III MEB).
Whatever else may be said, he US Navy has the initial LCS vessels out there exercising them, and gaining valuable experience with them that will only improve the vessels in the future.

...particularly as they roll out the already planned upgrades to the LCS, and eventual enhancements for the FF vessels.
 
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now DefenseNews.com noticed:
Official: Minehunting System Shows No Improvement
Despite years of development, constant effort and numerous official pronouncements of progress, the minehunting system at the heart of a new family of US Navy mine countermeasures gear shows no signs of improvement and poses a significant risk to the planned deployment of the system aboard littoral combat ships (LCS), according to the Pentagon’s top test and evaluation officer.

“Recent developmental testing provides no statistical evidence that the system is demonstrating improved reliability, and instead indicates that reliability plateaued nearly a decade ago,” Michael Gilmore, director of the Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), wrote in an Aug. 3 memo to Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall.

A copy of the memo was obtained by Defense News.

“The reliability of existing systems is so poor that it poses a significant risk to both the upcoming operational test of the LCS Independence-variant equipped with the first increment of the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mission package, and to the Navy’s plan to field and sustain a viable LCS-based minehunting and mine clearance capability prior to fiscal year 2020,” Gilmore wrote.

The mission package is called the remote minehunting system (RMS), which uses the remote multimission vehicle (RMMV), a large, diesel-powered submersible that carries the detachable AQS-20A minehunting sonar.

The RMMV vehicles were produced by Lockheed Martin, while Raytheon makes the AQS-20As. The Navy’s Naval Undersea Warfare Division and LCS program executive office oversee development, test and evaluation of the system.

The RMS system has been in development since the 1990s, and 11 RMMV vehicles have been produced. The Navy plans to restart production next year, and in February hopes to choose a producer for the next round of low-rate initial production RMMVs.

A request for proposals was issued earlier this year but, while the Navy won’t confirm the number of respondents, numerous sources indicate only Lockheed responded. Two new developmental vehicles are to be ordered in fiscal 2016 following source selection, at a cost of about $31 million each.

The problem-plagued program has routinely failed or delayed test and evaluation programs and encountered a Nunn-McCurdy breech in 2010. Gilmore noted that reliability has improved since then, but continues to fall far short of the threshold of 75 hours’ mean time between operational mission failure (MTBOMF).

But despite all the efforts to improve reliability, Gilmore assessed the RMS system’s current overall reliability at 18.8 hours between failure, and the RMMV vehicle at 25.0 hours. He took consistent issue with Navy reliability data, pointing out that in some instances, “the Navy inflated operating time estimates for the MTBOMF calculations by assuming that post-mission analysis time (when the vehicle is not in the water and not operating) could be counted.”

Gilmore detailed 41 RMS and RMMV failures from technical evaluation tests that began in September aboard the LCS Independence, mostly while operating in the Gulf of Mexico. The tests were conducted using four RMMVs, vehicles 1, 7, 9 and 10. He noted that failures occurred on all four vehicles in numerous areas, including equipment failures and software problems.

A sampling of failures from the 2015 tests includes faulty depth sensors; throttle failures; alignment issues; inertial navigation unit failures; problems with recovery equipment; bad operator consoles; numerous computer and software connectivity problems; variable depth sonar failures; power failures; offboard communications failures; problems with maintaining line-of-sight communications between the ship and the vehicle; and repeated problems with the vehicle’s emergency recovery system, designed to float the craft to the surface should it begin to sink.

In many cases and for a variety of reasons, the LCS was unable to recover the RMMV and it was towed back to base by support craft — an option, Gilmore pointed out, unlikely to be available to an operational LCS using the system in a real minefield. On several occasions, the ship requested support personnel to come aboard to fix an RMS problem.

Gilmore, in his memo to Kendall, urged against relying on Navy reliability data.

“I continue to recommend strongly that the Navy’s estimates of RMMV/RMS reliability not be reported to the Congress or used for any other purpose,” Gilmore wrote. “To do otherwise could lead many observers to incorrectly conclude that all significant RMS development and fielding challenges have been conquered.”

For now, the Navy remains committed to the program.

“In order to ensure better results for upcoming test runs, the Navy is implementing a more robust ready-for-use inspection, procuring additional spares, and providing additional training, additional technicians, better tools, and updated procedures,” Chris Johnson, a spokesman for the Naval Sea Systems Command, said Aug. 28.

“While all four RMMVs being utilized in the ongoing TECHEVAL have received a number of upgrades approved through rigorous Reliability Growth Program analysis, there are a number of further upgrades we have identified that could not be installed, such as improved hydraulic actuators, fuel systems, and sensors,” the Navy added.

“These upgrades will be incorporated as part of a more thorough design update that will accompany vehicles in the next low-rate initial production procurement. We will also continually look for the means of inserting these and any other reliability upgrades into the existing systems.”

Because of ongoing reliability issues, the LCS mission module office recently requested permission from Congress to continue tests into the next fiscal year, which begins Oct. 1. Over the next few weeks, the Navy will evaluate the system and, in October or November, is to decide whether or not to proceed to the initial operational test and evaluation phase.
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I believe my rant about "concurrency" (among other things) is relevant here:
https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/littoral-combat-ships-lcs.t3993/page-83#post-353949
 

Brumby

Major
now DefenseNews.com noticed:
Official: Minehunting System Shows No Improvement

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I believe my rant about "concurrency" (among other things) is relevant here:
https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/littoral-combat-ships-lcs.t3993/page-83#post-353949
Concurrency as a development strategy is one area that I don't understand why it is being pursued with such vigour considering the significant amount of risk it brings to the program in terms of timeline and cost. The history and track record that we have seen with the F-35, LCS, and the Ford class would be lessons worth noting but it seems to be just business as usual and it gets repeated.

I don't think it is a rant - just something that we cannot comprehend from a distance.
 
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