At a tactical and operational level, Soviet doctrine does not call for the taking and holding of ground in offensive operations except for the purpose of facilitating movement and logistics.
Deep battle, as Tukhachevsky originally envisioned, a commander is to impose his will upon his enemy, constantly forcing the enemy to react to him, and if he's good enough, he will give the enemy very limited choices on how to react, forcing them to react in manners that can be easily predicted, thus creating an artificial ability see ahead.
And, that's the idea behind the operational maneouvre group (OMG), it is unsuitable for close combat, it's job is to penetrate deep in to the enemy rear, and that's all it does, it forces the enemy to react to its presence, and one of the most common thing to do when one's rear is compromised is to retreat, the enemy defence is thus unhinged, then the infantry heavy force facing the enemy will apply frontal pressure, while the OMG will continue to advance beside the the enemy's route of retreat, forming a combined pursuit, the commander will be able to control the direction and the pace of the enemy retreat. This is only a small part of an extremely watered down version of Soviet armoured warfare concept, if you want more details, you can refer to Richard E Simpkin's Red Armour: An Examination of the Soviet Mobile Force Concept
The point is, if the PLA indeed intend to follow this path, then the new motor-rifle brigades resemblance to Stryker brigades might be superficial--the Chinese are merely using the netcentric concept to enhance the capability of units that perform very different roles to the Stryker brigades.
Deep battle, as Tukhachevsky originally envisioned, a commander is to impose his will upon his enemy, constantly forcing the enemy to react to him, and if he's good enough, he will give the enemy very limited choices on how to react, forcing them to react in manners that can be easily predicted, thus creating an artificial ability see ahead.
And, that's the idea behind the operational maneouvre group (OMG), it is unsuitable for close combat, it's job is to penetrate deep in to the enemy rear, and that's all it does, it forces the enemy to react to its presence, and one of the most common thing to do when one's rear is compromised is to retreat, the enemy defence is thus unhinged, then the infantry heavy force facing the enemy will apply frontal pressure, while the OMG will continue to advance beside the the enemy's route of retreat, forming a combined pursuit, the commander will be able to control the direction and the pace of the enemy retreat. This is only a small part of an extremely watered down version of Soviet armoured warfare concept, if you want more details, you can refer to Richard E Simpkin's Red Armour: An Examination of the Soviet Mobile Force Concept
The point is, if the PLA indeed intend to follow this path, then the new motor-rifle brigades resemblance to Stryker brigades might be superficial--the Chinese are merely using the netcentric concept to enhance the capability of units that perform very different roles to the Stryker brigades.