Joint-Arms Combat Operation ability, is China up tio date ??

King_Comm

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At a tactical and operational level, Soviet doctrine does not call for the taking and holding of ground in offensive operations except for the purpose of facilitating movement and logistics.

Deep battle, as Tukhachevsky originally envisioned, a commander is to impose his will upon his enemy, constantly forcing the enemy to react to him, and if he's good enough, he will give the enemy very limited choices on how to react, forcing them to react in manners that can be easily predicted, thus creating an artificial ability see ahead.

And, that's the idea behind the operational maneouvre group (OMG), it is unsuitable for close combat, it's job is to penetrate deep in to the enemy rear, and that's all it does, it forces the enemy to react to its presence, and one of the most common thing to do when one's rear is compromised is to retreat, the enemy defence is thus unhinged, then the infantry heavy force facing the enemy will apply frontal pressure, while the OMG will continue to advance beside the the enemy's route of retreat, forming a combined pursuit, the commander will be able to control the direction and the pace of the enemy retreat. This is only a small part of an extremely watered down version of Soviet armoured warfare concept, if you want more details, you can refer to Richard E Simpkin's Red Armour: An Examination of the Soviet Mobile Force Concept

The point is, if the PLA indeed intend to follow this path, then the new motor-rifle brigades resemblance to Stryker brigades might be superficial--the Chinese are merely using the netcentric concept to enhance the capability of units that perform very different roles to the Stryker brigades.
 

Norfolk

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At a tactical and operational level, Soviet doctrine does not call for the taking and holding of ground in offensive operations except for the purpose of facilitating movement and logistics.

And, that's the idea behind the operational maneouvre group (OMG), it is unsuitable for close combat, it's job is to penetrate deep in to the enemy rear, and that's all it does, it forces the enemy to react to its presence, and one of the most common thing to do when one's rear is compromised is to retreat, the enemy defence is thus unhinged, then the infantry heavy force facing the enemy will apply frontal pressure, while the OMG will continue to advance beside the the enemy's route of retreat, forming a combined pursuit, the commander will be able to control the direction and the pace of the enemy retreat. This is only a small part of an extremely watered down version of Soviet armoured warfare concept, if you want more details, you can refer to Richard E Simpkin's Red Armour: An Examination of the Soviet Mobile Force Concept

The point is, if the PLA indeed intend to follow this path, then the new motor-rifle brigades resemblance to Stryker brigades might be superficial--the Chinese are merely using the netcentric concept to enhance the capability of units that perform very different roles to the Stryker brigades.

If the PLA has indeed converted at least two army corps/Group Armies from traditional armoured/mechanized corps into Unified Army Corps/OMGs, why do they think that they need them, given that such formations are purely offensive? It is one thing to form Soviet-style ad hoc Forward Detachments based upon a battalion or even a regiment (or whatever is needed at the time), but at least two permanently organized, (Western) division-sized forces? The US Army only has 2 Armoured Divisions. As for UACs/OMGs, they do not have the stamina (due to their relative lack of infantry) to take and hold ground, so it is unclear that Group Armies organized along such lines are of much use in defensive operations. As far as I know, the two Group Armies in question are stationed in the Beijing and Shenyang Military Regions, respectively.

As I wrote in my last post (#20) on this thread, if the PLA intends to use these as the Soviets did, then there will have to be several conventionally-organized Group Armies for each UAC/OMG-organized Group Army for the concept to work, especially in offensive operations. Someone, somewhere, has to close with and destroy the enemy, and that requires forces that can take and hold ground. The German panzerkorps of WWII were usually able to defeat their opponents (especially in the early years), but because of their lack of infantry, they were unable to close with and destroy the enemy. On the Eastern Front, hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were able to escape capture or destruction, though ostensibly surrounded by the Germans, even with the main heavy-marching infantry holding the Soviets to their front while the Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions of the Panzer Corps took the Soviets by their flanks and rear, tearing up their rear areas as they went.

What we would knowadays refer to as "Manoeuvre Warfare" was not possible to put fully into practice. "Attrition Warfare", for all sides in WII (and many other wars since) proved impossible to completely escape from. In any case, the physical destruction of the enemy is necesary, and should be the objective; only if the enemy otherwise gives in beforehand or simply collapses can his physical destruction be dispensed with. And so, traditionally-organized heavy ground forces capable of such are completely necessary. The PLA needs to reaffirm this if it is finding itself tempted (Western-style) to change its mind on this matter.

If the PLA ultimately converts most or all of its armoured/mechanized army corps/Group Armies to a UAC/OMG organization (it is not clear what their intentions are here), then they will end up with formations incapable of defensive operations and lacking the requisite heavy forces to fight the main-force battle in order to engage in offensive operations. I think the two main questions at this stage are, is the PLA going to convert either just a few, or most/all of its Heavy forces to this UAC/OMG organization? And given either choice, do they grasp the implications of either result? The answer to the latter question: the first means that they are assuming a Soviet-style offensive posture, and intend to possibly strike first if they deem war to be inevitable; the second means that they have a main-force incapable of sustainable offensive as well as defensive operations. The answer to the former question: only time will tell whether only a few or many Group Armies will be reorganized along UAC/OMG lines with Stryker Brigade Netcentric capabilities.

I suppose that latter point (Stryker Brigade-type Netcentricity) raises another question: does the PLA believe that Netcentricity will allow it to dispense with traditionally organized Army corps/group armies and fight the main-force battle with UAC/OMG type Group Armies instead?:confused: I guess we'll find out if the PLA converts several more formations to this organization. If the PLA knows what it is doing, at least at the operational level, it will not pursue this course.
 

King_Comm

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There is no sign to suggest that the PLA is converting all of its forces formations that are unsuitable for close combat, from what I have seen, the Chinese have only converted 2 out of the 18 armies into some sort of high mobility groups, and from what I have seen so far, most infantry units that were downgraded to brigades had this happened to them because of there low manning and readiness rather than anything else, most high readiness units have retained their division structure, saving a few elite units that are experimenting with net-centric warfare.
 

Norfolk

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There is great uncertainty and ambiguity concerning the reogranization of the PLA, especially in the area of Combined-Arms Warfare. crobato recently started a thread in the other forum called Right Sizing the PLA, based upon the USAWC SSI publication called "Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army":

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This document covers practically the entire Chinese Armed Forces; however, the part that is applicable to this thread concerns the reorganization of its land forces, and for the purposes of this post, those that pertain espeically to its Heavy Formations. According this document, the PLA has or is in the midst of converting 2 of its 18 Group Armies into a Soviet-style UAC/OMG organization - 2 Armoured Brigades, 2 Mechanized Infantry Brigades, a Brigade each of Artillery, Air Defence, Engineers, Aviation, etc., with a further 3 Group Armies either also undergoing or planned to undergo said conversion. Thus a total of 5 of the PLA's 18 existing Group Armies may possess this organization within a few to several years. Martin Andrew provides a description of this Group Army organization, pointing out that it would be useful to secure Chinese access to petroleum reserves in Central Asia in the event of war there:

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However, the PLA seems also to be retaining more traditional organization for some of its Heavy Formation Group Armies. The same Martin Andrew describes a modernization of the traditional PLA Mechanized Infantry Division, noting that it too, is well suited for operations in China's Far West, particularly in desert and mountainous regions:

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The new Mechanized Infantry Division organization is not a dramatic departure from the earlier organization; neverthless, there are some innovations. One of them is the adoption of 4 IFVs per infantry platoon instead of the traditional 3, affording the Platoon HQ its own vehicle. Furthermore, the Type 86 (BMP-1) IFV has been modified by the removal of its 73mm gun and ATGM, replaced by a 30mm Chain Gun. Each Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Division has 18 ATGM and 12 portable SAM. Each Mechanized Infantry Battalion possesses a Support Company with 5 100mm mortars, 3 ATGM, and 4 Automatic Grenade Launchers.

Overall, the modernized Mechanized Infantry Division will consist, as before (except for the change from Regiments to Brigades), of 3 Mechanized Infantry Brigades, an Armoured Brigade, an Artillery Brigade with 72 122mm SPGs, an Anti-Aircraft Battalion, and an Engineer Battalion, etc.

Andrew also mentioned a modernization of the Armoured Division, and the article indicated that the reoganization would include 105 MBTs for each Armoured Brigade (35 Type 88B or Type 99 per Tank Battalion), 72 152mm or 155mm SPGs (Model 83 or PLZ-45), an anti-Tank Regiment with 6 PTZ-89 120mm SPATGs and 18 Red Arrow 8 ATGM.

Andrew's articles do not mention how many Mechanized Infantry and Armoured Divisions were being so modernized, nor how many of the "Heavy" Group Armies would likewise be retained and modernized. However, given that 5 of the 18 Group Armies will have a more-or-less strictly offensive configuration (those being reorganized along Soviet UAC/OMG lines), there should be perhaps twice that many (at least) conventional Heavy Group Armies to fight the main force battle as the former conduct break-outs and then tear up the enemy rear echelons, permitting the main force Group Armies to roll up and destroy the enemy main battle forces.

As a total of 13 Group Armies will not have a UAC/OMG type configuration, there may be some operational strain in a general war situation (unforeseeable as that may be), particularly as at least a few Group Armies will either be rquired on other frontiers, or necessarily possess a "Light" or "Medium" configuration for other necessary tasks. Nevertheless, the PLA is aggressively reorganizing and modernizing for Combined Arms Warfare; if the PLA is ever required to engage in said, it would be interesting to see how its innovations work out.

Lastly, Martin Andrew has also written an article about the PLA's reorganization of its Logistical system; some of this appears dated, particularly with regards to feeding and messing (SampanViking's thread and its accompanying article on the feeding of PLA troops seems to demonstrate that some of Andrew's information in this regard is rather obsolete). Nevertheless, the information, in the absence of anything better, is useful, and it covers Combat Support (Engineers particularly) as well as, of course, Combat Service Support. "Modernizing PLA Logistics":

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Norfolk

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Modest news blurb from PLA Daily about how a Division has been able to both economize on training resources while at the same time improving Combined-Arms training:

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, By Wang Jun and Zhang Picong, PLA Daily (English Version), 2 February, 2008 -


Division Commander Rao went on to say that the previous decentralized training and independent training between the officers and men practiced by units of all levels are likely to decentralize the training resources and lead to low efficiency. To address this issue, the Party committee of the division decided on three types of training foci, i.e. long-distance maneuver, command and control, and combination of personnel with armaments, and decided on organizing a minor training of combat readiness monthly, a comprehensive camping and field training quarterly, and an all-member, all-element and full-course targeted exercise with actual troops annually.

More, including how this was achieved and what the savings were determined to amount to, at the link.

This is a recurring issue for Armies; do you concentrate your time and money on training from the individual through sub-unit to minor-unit levels, or skimp on those and devote your time and resources to major-unit and formation-level training? There is often not enough money to do both, and sometimes there is not enough time anyway, depending upon personnel rotations or training courses, operational taskings, and of course the competence of commanders and staff, amongst other things.

This Division has apparently achieved something remarkable in that it has apparently been able to do both the lower-level and the higher-level training, and with substantially fewer resources to top it off. Simulators certainly have their place, and substantially reducing the number of staff officers involved in running things is, in all too many Armies, a major improvement in and of itself, never mind the other benefits that accrue to placing key functions back into the hands of commanders themselves.

That said, there is no substitute for the hard and nitty-gritty of the field, and when the PLA Daily reports that a 40% reduction in "equipment exercises" has been achieved, I get nervous. Cutting Field time by perhaps up to 40% will certainly reduce peacetime training costs, but it seems doubtful that replacing that amount of field time with simulation is really an improvement, efficient though it is. The use of simulators to replace field training has become very popular over the last decade or so in many militaries, and will continue to do so. Unfortunately, the only way to know if this approach really works is to get into a major war and win it more or les handily; conversely, if things don't turn out so well on the battlefield, it is a pretty good presumption that something in the training system went wrong. Hopefully we'll never know one way or the other.
 

SampanViking

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To me, the training issue sounds more like a response to modernisation than anything else. It works on the premise that a more modern army is a more expensive army and that what used to work fine, when everything was a lot of guys with AK's RPG7's and light mortars, is no longer fine when its Heavy Armour and State of Art guided weaponry.

It also suggests that more time in the classroom is needed to become familiar with modern equipment, rather than just being fit and keen eyed.

On that basis, less can be more, if time is spent improving efficiency and knowledge which is then put to use in larger less frequent field operations (which presumably is the only way to practise joint operations).

Going back to formations, I hope that the PLA retains a large number of more traditional formations but geared to modern Light Infantry work. I see this as a Sword and Shield approach with the Light Units holding territory, moving forward and reconnoitring and probing, with the Heavy Units coming out and hitting hard and then withdrawing just as quickly behind the shield. It makes little sense to simply choose from one formation over the other, as the great thing with being China is that you should be able to have plenty of all the possible variations you might want to use.
 

Norfolk

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I largely agree with you SampanViking; the only place that I would substantially disagree with you is on the matter of using simulators to replace field work. Simulators should really be used to replace much of the classroom time that goes some way to making up the 2/3rds of the training cycle that troops normally spend in Garrison. There can be a lot of useless "information" flung at the troops while in Garrison, with 1-hour's worth of instruction shoe-horned into 3 or 4 hours by mediocre or even incompetent lesson plans and teaching points. The nonsense that often passes for "instruction" in Garrison is often grossly wasteful, and worse, often utterly ineffectual. Simulation used in lieu of padded and pedantic classroom lessons would go a long way to improving training and readiness. The 1/3rd of the time that troops spend in the Field is necessary.
 

Norfolk

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Very good article on our parent site, SinoDefence.com on the PLA's experience with the new Brigade structure. It turns out that combined-arms at Battalion-level has yet to really take off, and that the Battle Group concept is only now being fully and formally pursued in place of leaving combined-arms to be handle mainly at the old Regimental or the new Brigade levels:

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", at SinoDefence.com, 27 April, 2008.
 
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Gollevainen

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And what is important is that this article only descripes the "joint arms" operations inside the normal land force divisional spectrum of arms. I would assume that the joint-branch operational ability is even more in the level "good to have in the future".

That article in SD mainsite pretty much reveals what I've been saying a long time now, PLA is no way near ready in its land forces modernisation program. The proplem is that in these forums, many members tends to focus solely on the weapons and equipment and their off-the-context performance datas. Most of them have no idea of even the basics of how land force organisations works and how some weaponsystem fits on to it.

Having fancy toys is one thing, having the ability, knowledge and organisational structure to operate them is another. The latter is IMO more cruisal than the first one in some extent. Altough PLA has made considerable effort in fielding some very potential new weaponsystems, it still rely too much of the old, stiff and inferior-prooven operational doctrines. Sadly many member in these forums just sees the guns and think they are ready to be used just like that.
 

King_Comm

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I think the traditional structure of the PLA has made this transition some what more difficult, PLA's units are usually significantly smaller than their western counterparts, and commanded by some one of lower rank, basically, a Chinese regiment is like a slightly larger battalion.

Then is it possible for the Chinese to build this modular combat groups based on regiments rather than battalion? Each brigade can have one such combat group, and each division can have 2 to 3.
 
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