Issues/Problems the PLA needs to address

nemo

Junior Member
Funny, I just finished reading that.

I think it is a very good analysis on the part of all the authors, and generally well researched.

There are some capabilities which they get wrong for the PLA: for instance, at present there something like 11 KJ-200s in service at present, rather than "4+" as listed in one part of their paper, and they do not acknowledge the existence of KJ-500 in meaningful numbers either (at present there are likely at least 3 KJ-500s in service). They've also gotten the ranges of a few missiles wrong (YJ-62 and YJ-18 in particular). Nor do they consider the role of PLA EW and SIGINT aircraft in their 2010 and 2017 analyses, nor MPAs in their 2017 analysis. I'm also not sure if their documentation of Chinese ISR satellites are accurate.

They also don't bring up DF-26 as the "new conventional IRBM" but I expect the paper was written quite a while ago before the parade unveiled DF-26, so that is understandable.

Also missing is air bases and long range sensors on the buildup islands in the Spratleys.
Amphibious operations can be launched straight from those islands as well using amphibious vehicles, landing crafts, and supported by field artillery and MRLs based on those islands -- will hence not require exposing amphibious ships to USN. Also not mentioned is the network of underwater sensors around major harbors and naval bases -- supposedly in operation in late 90s and covering up to 40nm out. I would expect there will be underwater sensors around South China Sea bases as well.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Also missing is air bases and long range sensors on the buildup islands in the Spratleys.
Amphibious operations can be launched straight from those islands as well using amphibious vehicles, landing crafts, and supported by field artillery and MRLs based on those islands -- will hence not require exposing amphibious ships to USN. Also not mentioned is the network of underwater sensors around major harbors and naval bases -- supposedly in operation in late 90s and covering up to 40nm out. I would expect there will be underwater sensors around South China Sea bases as well.

I haven't read the entire document too thoroughly, however I think in any true high intensity contingency, those SCS islands will be very vulnerable and easily neutralized.

The Chinese SOSUS is also secret enough that we don't know how effective it is and is very difficult to quantify vis-a-vis USN SSNs
 

nemo

Junior Member
I haven't read the entire document too thoroughly, however I think in any true high intensity contingency, those SCS islands will be very vulnerable and easily neutralized.

The Chinese SOSUS is also secret enough that we don't know how effective it is and is very difficult to quantify vis-a-vis USN SSNs

Really? Even if those are defended with SAM and point defense weapons? US land attack weapons are subsonic, which make it easier to engage. The fact that those islands are relatively small make them easier to defend against land attack weapons, paradoxically.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
I haven't read the entire document too thoroughly, however I think in any true high intensity contingency, those SCS islands will be very vulnerable and easily neutralized.

I think that given their size, and the fact that they are so close together as to be able to offer effective mutual support, as well as the PLA strengths that could assist them from the mainland and Hainan bases, once fully operational, those bases will not be that vulnerable, and most certainly will not be easy to neutralize, even by the USN.

I expect these islands to eventually have as extensive underground facilities and bunkers as they will have surface installations, if not more so.

The PLA pretty much design these islands from the ground up to be hard nuts to crack, and short of launching amphibious assaults to storm them, I don't think anyone will be able to neutralize them from long range bombardment.

The airstrip will be the most vulnerable, and will probably not be able to remain operational consistently for long under heave saturation attack (which, incidentally, might be one of the reasons the PLA has developed a keen interest in VTOL fighter aircraft in recent years).

However, if they build as comprehensive a set of underground facilities as I expect, the PLA garrison would be able to hide and protect enough long range SAMs and AShMs to make it extremely hazardous for any hostile naval and air forces to operate close to them while they remain in Chinese hands.

In effect, these islands would form a bastion in the SCS as China's first line of defence.

No hostile naval or air power can operate with any degree of safety within the SCS while the remain operational, in effect shielding bases and facilities on the mainland from attack.

Taiwan would serve a similar purpose for all of Southern China, which is one of the main reasons the US military is not at all keen to see it ever return to Chinese hands, but that's a different discussion.

But anyways, these island bastions would in effect help to create a "safe zone" (as safe as could be managed in a war zone between near peer superpowers) behind them, giving the PLAAF and PLAN an operating theatre largely safe from heavy enemy attack. The PLAN and PLAAF forces able to operate inside that "safe zone" would offer the islands massive logistical and direct arms support to make them even more formidable.

They will, of course not be able to categorically stop hostile assets from breaking through into the SCS waters behind them, but any naval or air forces seeking to do that while the islands are still in Chinese control and operational would face huge risks and almost certainly come under heavy, sustained attack on the way through.

If they can break through, they will be largely cut off from other friendly support, and run a high risk of being forced into a position where they are caught between the anvil of those island bases and the hammer of the full might of the PLAN and PLAAF.

China's coastal areas contain the lion share of its industrial and financial assets as well as the bulk of its population. Its leaders have long fretted about the ability of foreign powers to put those core regions of Chinese wealth and power under direct threat of military attack.

These island bases are part of China's long-term strategy to deny any hostile power the ability to launch first strikes against those areas.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
I'll address both posts in a single reply

Really? Even if those are defended with SAM and point defense weapons? US land attack weapons are subsonic, which make it easier to engage. The fact that those islands are relatively small make them easier to defend against land attack weapons, paradoxically.

I think that given their size, and the fact that they are so close together as to be able to offer effective mutual support, as well as the PLA strengths that could assist them from the mainland and Hainan bases, once fully operational, those bases will not be that vulnerable, and most certainly will not be easy to neutralize, even by the USN.

I expect these islands to eventually have as extensive underground facilities and bunkers as they will have surface installations, if not more so.

The PLA pretty much design these islands from the ground up to be hard nuts to crack, and short of launching amphibious assaults to storm them, I don't think anyone will be able to neutralize them from long range bombardment.

The airstrip will be the most vulnerable, and will probably not be able to remain operational consistently for long under heave saturation attack (which, incidentally, might be one of the reasons the PLA has developed a keen interest in VTOL fighter aircraft in recent years).

However, if they build as comprehensive a set of underground facilities as I expect, the PLA garrison would be able to hide and protect enough long range SAMs and AShMs to make it extremely hazardous for any hostile naval and air forces to operate close to them while they remain in Chinese hands.

In effect, these islands would form a bastion in the SCS as China's first line of defence.

No hostile naval or air power can operate with any degree of safety within the SCS while the remain operational, in effect shielding bases and facilities on the mainland from attack.

Taiwan would serve a similar purpose for all of Southern China, which is one of the main reasons the US military is not at all keen to see it ever return to Chinese hands, but that's a different discussion.

But anyways, these island bastions would in effect help to create a "safe zone" (as safe as could be managed in a war zone between near peer superpowers) behind them, giving the PLAAF and PLAN an operating theatre largely safe from heavy enemy attack. The PLAN and PLAAF forces able to operate inside that "safe zone" would offer the islands massive logistical and direct arms support to make them even more formidable.

They will, of course not be able to categorically stop hostile assets from breaking through into the SCS waters behind them, but any naval or air forces seeking to do that while the islands are still in Chinese control and operational would face huge risks and almost certainly come under heavy, sustained attack on the way through.

If they can break through, they will be largely cut off from other friendly support, and run a high risk of being forced into a position where they are caught between the anvil of those island bases and the hammer of the full might of the PLAN and PLAAF.

China's coastal areas contain the lion share of its industrial and financial assets as well as the bulk of its population. Its leaders have long fretted about the ability of foreign powers to put those core regions of Chinese wealth and power under direct threat of military attack.

These island bases are part of China's long-term strategy to deny any hostile power the ability to launch first strikes against those areas.

If during peacetime, the islands consistently host a significant contingent of fighter aircraft, and associated aircraft (AEW&C, MPAs etc) as well as feature their own organic defensive infrastructure (a SAM unit or battalion even), and if they regularly train with the navy and air force so they all provide support for each other where the mobile naval ships and mainland based air force units are able to operate in an integrated manner with the islands, then what you suggest could definitely be viable.

However, in the foreseeable future I can't see China would be willing to militarize those islands to that extent, which in my mind would make them very vulnerable (by design) in a high intensity conflict.

If China eventually did decide to militarize the islands significantly, then they could stand a fighting chance in a high intensity conflict, if supported by mobile naval forces and mainland air force units.


The fundamental limitations I see with the islands as fortifications, are that they are fixed, they are relatively small, and they're far away.
-They are fixed, meaning the opfor already knows where they are, which drastically shortens their necessary kill chain. Being fixed in itself isn't necessarily a significant limitation, but if paired with other detrimental factors (below) it can increase the difficulty of defending the islands.
-Their small size means they have less space for supplies, armaments, spare parts, equipment, and soldiers to man defensive units, and little to no space to hide defensive units such as TELs. The small size of the islands not only makes them reliant on resupply to perform their roles, but it also concentrates their vital structures close to each other, allowing the enemy to "concentrate" their firepower in a way where they know they will be likely be hitting something within the box. (Also, I'm not sure if those islands are able to host bunkers. The islands are reclaimed, so I'm not sure if their soil composition(?) and what not allow bunkers to be viable. I suppose they could build hardened shelters, but regardless of whether bunkers are present or not, I do not believe that can make up for the limitation of their relatively small size of the overall islands)
-They are very far away, and isolated from the Chinese mainland which would be the main source of resupply and support forces during conflict. If a reliable supply chain cannot be established, then the efficacy of the islands drastically falls, even if they may be able to support each other independently in the region for a while.


I think the above limitations can only be mitigated through a more consistent highly militarized presence on the islands during peacetime, as well as greater Chinese air and naval capability to allow the islands to be supplied and to provide mutual support for each other. I cannot see China stationing a major military presence on the islands in the near term, which is the basis of my position.

If, in the preceding stages of conflict, there is only a minor military presence on each of the islands (say a couple of MPAs, and a point defense unit), then that makes them very vulnerable.
If, in the preceding stages of a conflict, China manages to ship major defensive units onto the islands and also to send a large contingent of aircraft to the islands before any shooting starts, while also being able to send in a major naval task group near the islands with a persistent, enduring air force presence over the SCS in support, all working with each other, then there is more of a fighting chance.

So, I'd say that the big, first hurdle to viably defend the islands lies in whether China is able to station a major military force on the islands prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and the second hurdle is whether China's air and naval power will be sufficient to reliably resupply the islands and whether China's air and naval power has the reach and the endurance to remain around the SCS in a way where their presence helps to support the defense of the islands in the first place.
 

Equation

Lieutenant General
So, I'd say that the big, first hurdle to viably defend the islands lies in whether China is able to station a major military force on the islands prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and the second hurdle is whether China's air and naval power will be sufficient to reliably resupply the islands and whether China's air and naval power has the reach and the endurance to remain around the SCS in a way where their presence helps to support the defense of the islands in the first place.

That's why China's A2/AD is so important. Having long and medium range missile will keep the majority of any enemy surface combatant forces at bay to alert the rest of China's Naval and Air Force units to scramble and take action, including the submarines.
 

Yvrch

Junior Member
Registered Member
I'll address both posts in a single reply

If during peacetime, the islands consistently host a significant contingent of fighter aircraft, and associated aircraft (AEW&C, MPAs etc) as well as feature their own organic defensive infrastructure (a SAM unit or battalion even), and if they regularly train with the navy and air force so they all provide support for each other where the mobile naval ships and mainland based air force units are able to operate in an integrated manner with the islands, then what you suggest could definitely be viable.

However, in the foreseeable future I can't see China would be willing to militarize those islands to that extent, which in my mind would make them very vulnerable (by design) in a high intensity conflict.

If China eventually did decide to militarize the islands significantly, then they could stand a fighting chance in a high intensity conflict, if supported by mobile naval forces and mainland air force units.


The fundamental limitations I see with the islands as fortifications, are that they are fixed, they are relatively small, and they're far away.
-They are fixed, meaning the opfor already knows where they are, which drastically shortens their necessary kill chain. Being fixed in itself isn't necessarily a significant limitation, but if paired with other detrimental factors (below) it can increase the difficulty of defending the islands.
-Their small size means they have less space for supplies, armaments, spare parts, equipment, and soldiers to man defensive units, and little to no space to hide defensive units such as TELs. The small size of the islands not only makes them reliant on resupply to perform their roles, but it also concentrates their vital structures close to each other, allowing the enemy to "concentrate" their firepower in a way where they know they will be likely be hitting something within the box. (Also, I'm not sure if those islands are able to host bunkers. The islands are reclaimed, so I'm not sure if their soil composition(?) and what not allow bunkers to be viable. I suppose they could build hardened shelters, but regardless of whether bunkers are present or not, I do not believe that can make up for the limitation of their relatively small size of the overall islands)
-They are very far away, and isolated from the Chinese mainland which would be the main source of resupply and support forces during conflict. If a reliable supply chain cannot be established, then the efficacy of the islands drastically falls, even if they may be able to support each other independently in the region for a while.


I think the above limitations can only be mitigated through a more consistent highly militarized presence on the islands during peacetime, as well as greater Chinese air and naval capability to allow the islands to be supplied and to provide mutual support for each other. I cannot see China stationing a major military presence on the islands in the near term, which is the basis of my position.

If, in the preceding stages of conflict, there is only a minor military presence on each of the islands (say a couple of MPAs, and a point defense unit), then that makes them very vulnerable.
If, in the preceding stages of a conflict, China manages to ship major defensive units onto the islands and also to send a large contingent of aircraft to the islands before any shooting starts, while also being able to send in a major naval task group near the islands with a persistent, enduring air force presence over the SCS in support, all working with each other, then there is more of a fighting chance.

So, I'd say that the big, first hurdle to viably defend the islands lies in whether China is able to station a major military force on the islands prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and the second hurdle is whether China's air and naval power will be sufficient to reliably resupply the islands and whether China's air and naval power has the reach and the endurance to remain around the SCS in a way where their presence helps to support the defense of the islands in the first place.

Very good points Bltizo. I agreed these small bases on their own are dominated.
But what if they are a subset of a much bigger plan.
So let's play a few more rounds of strategizing.
What if this bastion in SCS is supposed to be a second defense line in China's 2000 miles defense perimeter of her eastern seaboard, out to Guam and Japan, where MRBM,SRBM , some underwater and surface assets will do the first meet and greet skirmishes/standoff beyond the first island chain. Far seas defense?
What if China has in her pipeline a new purpose built regional bomber, more purpose built air craft carriers, more surface combatants to overwhelmingly fill up the whole of SCS? These small bases will be well defended, well pre-supplied as a springboard to bear down more firepower to the payout matrix? Chinese air and naval assets have to operate around some bases, regardless of big or small, to sustain or pick up tempo. Of course these will be in medium terms.
All they need to do is complicate the situation more for the opponent and drawing more unfriendly assets away from China's eastern seaboard which otherwise would bear the full brunt. This offers China to reach out and hurt more if necessary so it won't be walk in the park for any opponents. It would soften the blow of seaborne attack to the mainland before declaring ceasefire.
Still they good for listening, monitoring and tracking in peace time.
Hopefully any SCS scenario should be short and quick, not that anybody wishes it.
 

suby68

New Member
Registered Member
Most “experts” who write about the supposed shortcomings of the PLA don’t understand how different it is compared to an organization like the US Army. To defend the borders of China neither many ICBMs nor many aircraft carriers are required. This is exactly why China doesn’t have them. The PLA is mainly there to defend the actual borders of China and not to fight in places like Iraq.

Imagine for a moment how the US Army would be organized and equipped if its main duty was to defend the border with Mexico and Canada? Also remember how far-away territories like Alaska were badly defended in 1941 and how with such a big effort the Alaska Highway was built as late as 1942.

The construction of Chinese military infrastructure in for example the South China Sea is a similar effort to enhance the defense of those far-away territories. The Japanese invasion of Kiska Island and Attu Island in the Aleutians in June 1942 was possible just because the US had no soldiers and no military infrastructure on such far-away islands.

China didn’t have the infrastructure 20 or 30 years ago but builds them now on islands in the South China Sea. It’s not yet completed but if you’ll look back in 5 or 10 years you can see why they did it the way they do it now.
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
Most “experts” who write about the supposed shortcomings of the PLA don’t understand how different it is compared to an organization like the US Army. To defend the borders of China neither many ICBMs nor many aircraft carriers are required. This is exactly why China doesn’t have them. The PLA is mainly there to defend the actual borders of China and not to fight in places like Iraq.
But the PLA does indeed has ICBMS. They are in the hands of the Second Artillery. And while the PLA doesn't have carriers, PLAN has one and is building more.

Imagine for a moment how the US Army would be organized and equipped if its main duty was to defend the border with Mexico and Canada? Also remember how far-away territories like Alaska were badly defended in 1941 and how with such a big effort the Alaska Highway was built as late as 1942.
US Army probably wouldn't be much different than it is now, if it had to defend against large Mexican and Canadian forces. There would be more troops in US Continental Command and less elsewhere to be sure, but its about it. Now, if you mean US would be less free to roam around the world knocking over governments it doesn't like, and foment regime changes disguised as "democracy promotion" because it has to defend against powerful neighbors instead of weak ones, then I agree with you.

The construction of Chinese military infrastructure in for example the South China Sea is a similar effort to enhance the defense of those far-away territories. The Japanese invasion of Kiska Island and Attu Island in the Aleutians in June 1942 was possible just because the US had no soldiers and no military infrastructure on such far-away islands.

China didn’t have the infrastructure 20 or 30 years ago but builds them now on islands in the South China Sea. It’s not yet completed but if you’ll look back in 5 or 10 years you can see why they did it the way they do it now.
The artificial islands and military bases are tools to enable China to project power into the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. If China could dominate the South China Sea, it would link the WP with the Indian Ocean and become a true global maritime power. The SCS islands and bases are less about protecting China's territory and more to secure its sea lines of communication and establishing a de facto sphere of influence. In other words, it's a gambit to establish China's version of the Monroe Doctrine.
 
Last edited:

Totoro

Major
VIP Professional
Importance of air power has been rising for decades, that much is clear. And with the end of the Cold war many nations cut their air forces in half or even more. Chinese air forces included. Sure, quality of training and planes skyrocketed in the last 20 or so years but it seems chinese air forces are happy with the current 1800-ish to 2000-ish tactical combat aircraft. The number of j-7 and other older planes left to be replaced is such that the production levels of the last decade can't really be counted upon to increase the inventories further than the mentioned figure.

And yet... should the chinese air forces be larger? Of course, it depends on long term strategic requirements and possible/probable threats. But I believe some long term goal should be a considerably larger figure than today's inventories and today's orbat. Specifically, some notional 2040 roster might be well advised to have as many as 3000 tactical combat planes. That figure is not taken out of thin air. It is a product of projected combined enemy fleets. Several countries in China's neighborhood can plausibly make an alliance in a future war. And even one country that's not technically a neighbor but can project considerable power abroad. Looking at the number of possible bases and aircraft availability over the long distances (half the world away) i would say China needs to counter a possible combined force of some 2800 (700+1000+300+350+450) enemy planes, most of which are projected to be technologically as capable as then-year average chinese combat plane.

It is not just about defence. If it was just about that, a smaller figure would suffice. Once a country is only defending it usually means the war is lost. Active defense, including regular offensive action is required, which requires larger number of planes to make up for more complex strike packages and longer distances involved, less sorties per plane achieved and so on.

Realistically though, even if an increase is on the cards, a 50% increase in mere quarter of a century seems impossible, short of a cold war style arms race, which would then surely mean the opponents would be increasing their fleets as well.
 
Top