Issues/Problems the PLA needs to address

vesicles

Colonel
It is also notable the Chinese Communist Party- one that you say is answerable to the Chinese people- will not allow its citizens free access to this forum or to other non-Gstapoed information and discussion forums.

Uhhh... Last time I heard, the Chinese had full access to our forum... We have many Chinese members who live in China now. I went to China for a conference last September and I could access our forum perfectly fine while I was there... Just like to correct the fact...

I also suggest that it is time to stop all the politics... It's going nowhere and no one can persuade anyone else, not in a million years...
 

solarz

Brigadier
Yes and no. Yes in that all politi are ultimately answerable to the people, since the masses always have the option to eject regimes through violent insurrections and revolutions. But, if we consider less extreme means to change ruling bodies, then Communist Party of China isn't truly answerable to the people, since there are no elections to retain or replace it with other political parties. The CCP has made it clear it will not allow multi-party elections, and one might be forgiven to think it's because the Red Dynasty is afraid the people would vote them out.


Of course what I and everyone else opin here are irrelevant to some or all readers. It is, after all, an online marketplace for the free exchange of information, ideas, opinions, and speculations. A good way to describe it is from an old army sergeant I met: "opinions are like assholes, everyone has one and they all stink."

It is also notable the Chinese Communist Party- one that you say is answerable to the Chinese people- will not allow its citizens free access to this forum or to other non-Gstapoed information and discussion forums. But hey! I get it. I mean if I was a CCP leader, I'd do a lot to limit the people's choices so I could stay in power too.

Again, no. Pretty much everything you imagined with regards to your conjured scenario is wrong. There are mechanism that ensure the CPC answers to the people, it just has nothing to do with elections.

Anyone that pays attention to domestic Chinese affairs, as opposed to those who simply regurgitate western media reports, will quickly realize that the Chinese government responds far more quickly to the people's concerns than any western government.

When was the last time a western government took measures to make housing more affordable for the average family? When was the last time a western government restricted car usage in a major metropolis? How about building billions of dollars of infrastructure to better serve the people?

The Chinese society is one of the most dynamic societies in the world. Things are changing so fast over there that if the CPC did not have its hand on the pulse of the society, and did not respond to changes quickly, it would either have collapsed a long time ago, or China would be like North Korea today. Can you think of any other government in the world that can manage HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS of migrant workers in their country? Do you seriously believe that is achievable simply through Internet censorship?
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
Uhhh... Last time I heard, the Chinese had full access to our forum... We have many Chinese members who live in China now. I went to China for a conference last September and I could access our forum perfectly fine while I was there... Just like to correct the fact...

I also suggest that it is time to stop all the politics... It's going nowhere and no one can persuade anyone else, not in a million years...
When I go to China for business, I have to use a VPN for unrestricted Internet access. There is no free access to information in China, because the CCP only allows people to see what it wants them to see. You know very well there are events you can't mention in China.

Agreed on putting a fork in this topic and move on.
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
Again, no. Pretty much everything you imagined with regards to your conjured scenario is wrong. There are mechanism that ensure the CPC answers to the people, it just has nothing to do with elections.

Anyone that pays attention to domestic Chinese affairs, as opposed to those who simply regurgitate western media reports, will quickly realize that the Chinese government responds far more quickly to the people's concerns than any western government.

When was the last time a western government took measures to make housing more affordable for the average family? When was the last time a western government restricted car usage in a major metropolis? How about building billions of dollars of infrastructure to better serve the people?

The Chinese society is one of the most dynamic societies in the world. Things are changing so fast over there that if the CPC did not have its hand on the pulse of the society, and did not respond to changes quickly, it would either have collapsed a long time ago, or China would be like North Korea today. Can you think of any other government in the world that can manage HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS of migrant workers in their country? Do you seriously believe that is achievable simply through Internet censorship?
Solarz, I'm not unsympathetic to some of your points vis-a-vis CCP response to some Internet complaints (I've made them in other threads myself), because you're right, but as Vesicles said let's agree to disagree on the rest and move on.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
When I go to China for business, I have to use a VPN for unrestricted Internet access. There is no free access to information in China, because the CCP only allows people to see what it wants them to see. You know very well there are events you can't mention in China.

Agreed on putting a fork in this topic and move on.

You know, through the last page or so of posts, you still have yet to actually acknowledge that what you've originally put forward under the guise of "suggestions" are not actually relevant to the thread.

If you actually want to cease this discussion, maybe first admit that your original assertions were not about the actual PLA's deficiencies (aka relevant to the thread title) but were about politics, then you can suggest a cessation of the present discussion or suggest it move elsewhere.

Otherwise it looks a bit hypocritical that you're making it seem like the burden of the current OT posts are evenly distributed among everyone, even though you posted the original loaded remarks and have not stopped despite it being repeatedly explained to you over the last few pages why your posts are not relevant and that you should either stop or move them elsewhere.

If you refuse to acknowledge the above, then that's fine as well but at least then we know where you stand.
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
You know, through the last page or so of posts, you still have yet to actually acknowledge that what you've originally put forward under the guise of "suggestions" are not actually relevant to the thread.

If you actually want to cease this discussion, maybe first admit that your original assertions were not about the actual PLA's deficiencies (aka relevant to the thread title) but were about politics, then you can suggest a cessation of the present discussion or suggest it move elsewhere.

Otherwise it looks a bit hypocritical that you're making it seem like the burden of the current OT posts are evenly distributed among everyone, even though you posted the original loaded remarks and have not stopped despite it being repeatedly explained to you over the last few pages why your posts are not relevant and that you should either stop or move them elsewhere.

If you refuse to acknowledge the above, then that's fine as well but at least then we know where you stand.
I standby what I said: the PLA political officer is a issues/problem that needs resolution, and that resolution is purging them from the military, when the time is right. Money saved could go to improve China's armed services and make it a force that serves the nation instead of keeping a tiny minority of cadre (80 million vs. 1.3 billion) in power. The problem part of the equation is a private army paid for by public money, designed to keep a small group of autocrats in power, with or without the consent of the governed. If the people consents, then all is well, but if they don't, then it's a problem. How does a governing body get consent from the people? Well, free, fair, and open elections (when the time is right) are a good start.

You may agree or disagree, you have the right to it.
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member

What's this?

Hmmm...it smells like several ducks. It also looks like several ducks...and they are even walking like ducks.

...that is, political ducks.

Come on guys...you know better...and you had to know this was coming.

As long as this ends now, I will leave these posts up. But if it continues, there WILL BE warnings, then suspensions, and all of these political posts will be deleted.

Your call.

DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS MODERATION.


WalkingTall3.jpg
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Okay, now that moderator intervention has finally put a stop to the fruitless political discussion that never should have began in the first place...

Here's a nice article by the jamestown foundation about reform of the military regions. This will try to address any issues surrounding organization, logistics, readiness of the PLA as a whole, and hopefully increase the capability of the air force, navy, 2nd Arty and build the foundation for more effective joint operations.

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PLA Transformation: Difficult Military Reforms Begin
Publication: China Brief Volume: 15 Issue: 18
September 9, 2015 01:58 PM Age: 8 days

By:
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President Xi announced a 300,000-personnel reduction at the 70th anniversary military parade (
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, September 3). The reduction represents the most significant element of the current military reforms so far made public. Less contentious elements of the reform plan regarding training, rules and regulations, and military education are already underway, with the major organizational restructuring represented by the establishment of theater joint commands yet to be announced (
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, August 24;
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, March 25;
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, January 6). This new round of reforms initially announced in November 2013 will be much more extensive than previous efforts. It is certain that theater joint commands will be formed, probably resulting in some reduction in the number of regional commands, though the lack of announcement on this most significant area could indicate that issues remain unresolved, or was merely delayed for a future announcement. The creation of Chinese theater regional commands would represent a transition to a much more lean and effective military command structure.

Rumors in the press both before and after the parade announcement have speculated on a number of possible reform measures including the command reorganization. The ground forces will lose their preeminence to as the aerospace, maritime and cyber domains gain in prominence. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) academics have long-debated plans for establishing joint commands, but a reduction in Military Regions could be meeting resistance even among President Xi’s handpicked supporters in the military due to the number of officer billets that would be eliminated. The PLA press has noted some confusion within the ranks, calling for loyalty to the leadership and support for the military reforms. Building consensus for a force reduction was likely easy. Agreeing on a joint command system was likely more contentious.

Modernization Background

PLA theorists view the PLA as undergoing three stages of modernization since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. In 1949, the PLA’s strength stood at 6.27 million personnel. China’s military has subsequently undergone eleven reductions, including the current reform. The first modernization stage (1949–1980s), which encompassed the end of the Chinese civil war and the revolutionary era, focused on building a large, conventional military capable of countering an invasion and a large-scale mechanized war, with nuclear warfare as a secondary focus. This kept the ground forces predominant, supported by the air force, navy and Second Artillery. [1]

The second modernization stage lasted from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Peace and development, improved relations with the Soviet Union, and the removal of the threat of large-scale war were now the main themes resulting in a strategic shift in military modernization. The focus became preparing for a local war under modern technology, especially high-tech conditions. Economic construction, along with scientific and technological progress, took precedence over military modernization. Military modernization, while benefiting from China’s economic and technological growth, focused on developing elite troops and combined-arms warfare. [2] New technology, a focus on quality, and organizational reforms followed. In the mid-1980s, the PLA reduced the force by one million troops, accompanying the formation of combined-arms Group Armies. A further reduction from 3.23 to 3.19 million occurred by 1990 (
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, September 3).
The end of the Cold War and the advent of the information-centric Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has helped drive the third and current stage of modernization (mid-1990s–present). PLA modernization focused on winning a local war under informationized conditions. Modernization driven by emerging scientific and technological developments focused on building an informationized military to support national strategic interests and comprehensive national strength. This entails a new type of mechanization of the force, with integration of networked command information systems and joint force groupings down to the tactical level as a main feature. [3] Beginning in 1997, a 500,000-troop reduction occurred. Low-strength units were either demobilized or transferred to form a new national-level People’s Armed Police (PAP) force to respond to internal emergencies. Another reduction took place between 2003 and 2005, with 200,000 troops cut, drawing down the PLA from 2.5 to 2.3 million. Many of these troops were non-combat personnel, redundant staff and administrative billets (
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, September 3).

During this latter period, the PLA began a three phase modernization plan. This included strategic plans for national defense and military modernization to lay a solid foundation by 2010; accomplish mechanization and make major progress toward informationization by 2020; and largely reach the goal of building a modern armed forces by mid-century (
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, January 20, 2009). There is some evidence that this modernization plan might have been supplemented or supplanted by an accelerated plan focusing on developing an integrated joint operations capability (
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, July 17, 2014).

According to China’s 2013 White Paper, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, current PLA troop strength is made up of: ground force units, including 18 Group Armies and independent units with 850,000 officers and enlisted personnel; PLA Navy (PLAN), total strength of 235,000 personnel; and PLA Air Force (PLAAF), with a total strength of 398,000 officers and enlisted personnel (
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, April 16, 2013). No numbers were given for the Second Artillery Force (SAF), but Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense stated in a recent report to the Legislative Yuan that the SAF has increased from 140,000 to 150,000 personnel (
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, August 31).

(full paper can be accessed through the link at the top)

3NcGFBF.jpg
 

nemo

Junior Member
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The U.S.-China Military Scorecard
Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017

by Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey G. Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, Lyle J. Morris


Abstract

Over the past two decades, China's People's Liberation Army has transformed itself from a large but antiquated force into a capable, modern military. Its technology and operational proficiency still lag behind those of the United States, but it has rapidly narrowed the gap. Moreover, China enjoys the advantage of proximity in most plausible conflict scenarios, and geographical advantage would likely neutralize many U.S. military strengths. A sound understanding of regional military issues — including forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power — will be essential for establishing appropriate U.S. political and military policies in Asia. This RAND study analyzes the development of respective Chinese and U.S. military capabilities in ten categories of military operations across two scenarios, one centered on Taiwan and one on the Spratly Islands. The analysis is presented in ten scorecards that assess military capabilities as they have evolved over four snapshot years: 1996, 2003, 2010, and 2017. The results show that China is not close to catching up to the United States in terms of aggregate capabilities, but also that it does not need to catch up to challenge the United States on its immediate periphery. Furthermore, although China's ability to project power to more distant locations remains limited, its reach is growing, and in the future U.S. military dominance is likely to be challenged at greater distances from China's coast. To maintain robust defense and deterrence capabilities in an era of fiscal constraints, the United States will need to ensure that its own operational concepts, procurement, and diplomacy anticipate future developments in Chinese military capabilities.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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The U.S.-China Military Scorecard
Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017

by Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey G. Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, Lyle J. Morris

Funny, I just finished reading that.

I think it is a very good analysis on the part of all the authors, and generally well researched.

There are some capabilities which they get wrong for the PLA: for instance, at present there something like 11 KJ-200s in service at present, rather than "4+" as listed in one part of their paper, and they do not acknowledge the existence of KJ-500 in meaningful numbers either (at present there are likely at least 3 KJ-500s in service). They've also gotten the ranges of a few missiles wrong (YJ-62 and YJ-18 in particular). Nor do they consider the role of PLA EW and SIGINT aircraft in their 2010 and 2017 analyses, nor MPAs in their 2017 analysis. I'm also not sure if their documentation of Chinese ISR satellites are accurate.

They also don't bring up DF-26 as the "new conventional IRBM" but I expect the paper was written quite a while ago before the parade unveiled DF-26, so that is understandable.

But all in all it's a very good attempt and their modelling from 1996 to projecting 2017 capabilities does the job of showing the trend in capabilities.

The lessons the PLA would take from the paper would include:
-increase their IADS and point defence capabilities to increase the survivability of their airbases against penetrating aircraft or penetrating stand off weapons
-make their maritime C4ISR system more robust to support longer range strikes against surface vessels as well as airbases in the region
-develop and commission more tanker aircraft to be able to project power in SCS contingencies more effectively
-continue producing AEW&C and EW aircraft for use in air campaigns for both offensive and defensive missions
-ASW ASW ASW
-training in general
-jointness between services
-improve survivability of their nuclear deterrent

Other things that they are doing well on, include:
-development and proliferation of long range land attack cruise and ballistic missiles (arguably the most important capability for the PLA in any westpac contingency)
-modernizing their fighter inventory
-modernizing their IADS (relative to 1996 levels), including SAMs and AEW&C
-modernizing their SSK force
-better training (relative to 1996), especially air force and navy
 
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