Human Wave/Peasant Army attack discussion (Closed)
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wtlh
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solarz
Brigadier
wtlh
Junior Member
BTW, this 李大安 was mentioned in many of the repatriated POW's accounts, and their descriptions of him are consistent.
There is not much information about this guy, and it is not known if "李大安" was his real name. From the former POW accounts, 李大安 was not really a POW, but a defector who defected across the frontline with his track. 李大安 was sent to the POW camp to do grass-root "persuasion" work. From the former POW accounts, he claimed was a policeman in a KMT controlled region in North-East China, and joined PLA in 1949. Because he already knew how to drive, became a track driver. His unit entered Korea in 51.
There is not much information about this guy, and it is not known if "李大安" was his real name. From the former POW accounts, 李大安 was not really a POW, but a defector who defected across the frontline with his track. 李大安 was sent to the POW camp to do grass-root "persuasion" work. From the former POW accounts, he claimed was a policeman in a KMT controlled region in North-East China, and joined PLA in 1949. Because he already knew how to drive, became a track driver. His unit entered Korea in 51.
Then do not post or source them here. The forum has a specific rule about providing English translations. Read the rules.
shen
Senior Member
here is what the official historian of the US Army says about the subject. from:
CCF IN ATTACK
Toward a clearer understanding of what shall be said hereinafter as to weapons effects and tactical arrangements within the Eighth Army, one particular point concerning CCF characteristics in the attack and on defense requires clarification.
The word "mass" has been used quite loosely in descriptions of enemy operations circulated in this country. Press accounts have given the impression that the Chinese attack in great numbers closely concentrated. Some official documents have also used the term rather indiscriminately, thus furthering the belief that broad targets are frequently presented to all weapons. There have been some targets of this character. For example, in the assault against 23rd Infantry Regiment positions in Chipyong-ni in early February, CCF pressed forward in fairly solid ranks, and were cut down in large numbers within small areas.
But intense concentrations are the exception. The Chinese do not characteristically employ mass, for example, in the way that the Red Army used it against the Germans in operations in the Ukraine during World War II, coming on in such numbers that the human sea absorbed and ultimately smothered the fire volume. Rather, in the attack, CCF tend to move against our works in multiple, thin lines, well spaced each from the other, after having deployed out of column in the last phase of the approach.
The approach column may be single file, or even a regiment moving four abreast, depending on the situation and the size of the attack force.
The nature of the ground also compounds the fire problem, since it induces greater dispersion. The ridges are not evenly bottomed or sided. There are frequent bulges,
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outcroppings, draws, and small ravines. In consequence, even when the attacking line advances quite uniformly, no defending weapon is likely to have a clear field of fire against any significant number of the enemy. When brought in check by the counter fire of various weapons, the enemy gradually presses forward against the position, but still does not tend to bunch excessively.
On defense, CCF make efficient employment of ground cover, eschew use of long intrenchments and tight formations, and in general so dispose themselves that our fires, in any type, rarely have a large killing opportunity. The chief effects are therefore achieved through the systematic employment of fires in combination, with no one weapon or group of weapons (such as mortars, artillery, or small arms) predominating in the delivery of decisive fire."
CCF IN ATTACK
Toward a clearer understanding of what shall be said hereinafter as to weapons effects and tactical arrangements within the Eighth Army, one particular point concerning CCF characteristics in the attack and on defense requires clarification.
The word "mass" has been used quite loosely in descriptions of enemy operations circulated in this country. Press accounts have given the impression that the Chinese attack in great numbers closely concentrated. Some official documents have also used the term rather indiscriminately, thus furthering the belief that broad targets are frequently presented to all weapons. There have been some targets of this character. For example, in the assault against 23rd Infantry Regiment positions in Chipyong-ni in early February, CCF pressed forward in fairly solid ranks, and were cut down in large numbers within small areas.
But intense concentrations are the exception. The Chinese do not characteristically employ mass, for example, in the way that the Red Army used it against the Germans in operations in the Ukraine during World War II, coming on in such numbers that the human sea absorbed and ultimately smothered the fire volume. Rather, in the attack, CCF tend to move against our works in multiple, thin lines, well spaced each from the other, after having deployed out of column in the last phase of the approach.
The approach column may be single file, or even a regiment moving four abreast, depending on the situation and the size of the attack force.
The nature of the ground also compounds the fire problem, since it induces greater dispersion. The ridges are not evenly bottomed or sided. There are frequent bulges,
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outcroppings, draws, and small ravines. In consequence, even when the attacking line advances quite uniformly, no defending weapon is likely to have a clear field of fire against any significant number of the enemy. When brought in check by the counter fire of various weapons, the enemy gradually presses forward against the position, but still does not tend to bunch excessively.
On defense, CCF make efficient employment of ground cover, eschew use of long intrenchments and tight formations, and in general so dispose themselves that our fires, in any type, rarely have a large killing opportunity. The chief effects are therefore achieved through the systematic employment of fires in combination, with no one weapon or group of weapons (such as mortars, artillery, or small arms) predominating in the delivery of decisive fire."
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Shen, when you quote in this manner, please provide a link to the source.
There is no doubt...even according to this...that there were some mass wave attacks, but he says that they were the exception.
I believe that.
But I also personally know people who experienced some of those exceptions.
There is no doubt...even according to this...that there were some mass wave attacks, but he says that they were the exception.
I believe that.
But I also personally know people who experienced some of those exceptions.
Popeye, my Uncle Barney was in the 1st Marine Division at Yudam-ni on Chosin reservoir.
He said the same thing...and talked about it until he passed away.
He was no rookie or green Marine either. He had also fought on Tarawa with the 2nd Marine Division in World War II, a part of the second wave there.
He said the same thing...and talked about it until he passed away.
He was no rookie or green Marine either. He had also fought on Tarawa with the 2nd Marine Division in World War II, a part of the second wave there.
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