Hitler made many spectacularly bad calls as commander in chief of the German army. He probably cost Germany's ability to take Moscow before the winter by diverting army group center's panzer south and holding army group center static from mid July to October, while wearing out the panzer through back and forth road marchs. He probably created the situation in Stalingrad by splitting army group south and making the two parts go for two widely divergent objectives. He probably cost Germany the battle of Kursk by repeatedly postponing it and then calling the operation off while the bulk of soviet stavka mobile armored reserve remains unengaged. He dissipated Germany's inadequate forces by creating festungs which made it much easier for the resurgent red army to isolate and encircle large bodies of German forces in 1944-1945. But my question is what did hitler do right, against the wishes of his officers, that have been overlooked in postwar accounts where surviving German officers tried to pin the blame of German defeat all on Hitler so as to divert attention from the errors and inadaquacies of the German army? Some examples I can think of are: 1. The order to hold fast during the days after failing to take Moscow, when prevailing opinion of German officer corp was to conduct a fighting retreat. In the prevailing situation, where German units were worn out, the men in terrible physical condition, separated from each other, and have no real cohesive front, fighting retreat was likely to fail and turn into a rout. But given the technical inferiority of soviet army and its grave deficits in coordination, holding fast was the right thing to do and probably saved the German army from suffering its 1944 experience in early 1942. 2. Holding onto Stalingrad and not breaking out. Many books have been written about how hitlr doomed the 6th army by preventing it from breaking out when menstein came within a few dozen kilometers of relieving it. This overlooks the fact that another entire German army, the first panzer army, was at the same time busy retreating from the Caucasus. If the 6th army succeeeded in breaking out of soviet encirclement, it was still no fit fighting force, while a million well equipped and mobile soviet troops tasked with keeping the ring around Stalingrad would suddenly be freed up to move to block the retreat of the 1st panzer army, and probably destroyed that formation as well. Any others?