Chinese Hypersonic Developments (HGVs/HCMs)

[sferrin]

A better indicator would be whether PLAN/PLAAF jump on the stealth missile bandwagon and procure their own LRASM, so far it looks like they favor the Bruce Lee philosophy (speed) and not the ninja philosophy (stealth)

40km against LRASM nose-on is fantasy.

The USN has been demonstrating it's capability against high speed targets for decades. They've been shooting down everything from supersonic sea-skimmers (Vandal and Coyote targets) as well as Mach 5 AGM-37Cs high-divers. SM-3 has shot down many ballistic missile types and even a satellite. SM-3 Block II has shot down an ICBM. Things like DF-21 & 26 will be hit before their RVs enter the atmosphere (they're just regular ballistic targets while in space).

 

[ougoah]

40km against LRASM nose-on is fantasy.

The USN has been demonstrating it's capability against high speed targets for decades. They've been shooting down everything from supersonic sea-skimmers (Vandal and Coyote targets) as well as Mach 5 AGM-37Cs high-divers. SM-3 has shot down many ballistic missile types and even a satellite. SM-3 Block II has shot down an ICBM. Things like DF-21 & 26 will be hit before their RVs enter the atmosphere (they're just regular ballistic targets while in space).

Depends on the trajectory. SM-3 has only shot down (and supposedly can only shoot down) targets in space in mid course intercepts. DF-21 and DF-26 (former less so than latter) can be fired FAR inside China for targets well within first island chain. Of course to hit beyond first island chain require DF-26 launchers to be placed closer to the coast but in any case, SM-3 launch platform would have to be relative close to ASBM launch site to perform mid course intercept which it is designed for.

In western Pacific scenarios involving CBGs and ASBMs, the ASBMs would have MaRVed and re-entered atmosphere before mid course interceptors have the horizontal range to engage. Let's say the engagement range is at first island chain area. DF-26 would have been launched in Xinjiang and Tibet and DF-21 launched in the middle of China to eastern provinces and their MaRVs re-entered atmosphere just around China's coast or a bit further east. SM-3 launched from first island chains cannot engage those ASBMs while they are still in space. It would require SM-3 to be at least nearly as large as the ballistic missiles themselves to have that sort of energy.

If you want to imagine it as SM-3 warhead stages simply "orbiting" to reach their targets, it would require them to be launched extremely quickly in response to ASBM launches which is doable, but it really depends on the specifics of when and where the ASBM's MaRVs are deployed and begin re-entering atmosphere. USN's main defences against ASBMs from China would be SM-6s for intercepting MaRVs rather than SM-3s for midcourse intercept. SM-3s are far more ideal for intercepting ICBMs.

 

[Jason_]

40km against LRASM nose-on is fantasy.

The USN has been demonstrating it's capability against high speed targets for decades. They've been shooting down everything from supersonic sea-skimmers (Vandal and Coyote targets) as well as Mach 5 AGM-37Cs high-divers. SM-3 has shot down many ballistic missile types and even a satellite. SM-3 Block II has shot down an ICBM. Things like DF-21 & 26 will be hit before their RVs enter the atmosphere (they're just regular ballistic targets while in space).

This is true but there are several caveats that stack the missile defense equations against the defender.

First is decoys. We do not know the sophistication of decoys on the DF-21/26. The presence of highly realistic decoys would drastically decrease exoatmospheric interception probability.

Second is the limited engagement opportunities. Due to the long SM-3 missile engine burn time relative to the speed of the ballistic missile target, there will be only one engagement opportunity. This means the defender cannot employ shoot-look-shoot and must expend multiple interceptors per target to achieve high probability of kill.

Third is magazine capacity. Aegis ships cannot reload at sea. TELs can reload on land. A CBG with 5 Arleigh Burkes where 10% of all VLS cells are SM-3 nets you 48 interceptors. A DF-21/26 brigade has 24 TELs. It is entirely viable for the attacker to exhaust all interceptors by salvoing ASBM.

Fourth is economics.

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We don't know what DF-21/26 costs but its unlikely to be $30M.

Finally there is opportunity cost. Even if no DF-21/26 is ever fired, it imposes an opportunity cost for the CBG. SM-3 is a single-purpose missile and every VLS cell occupied by an SM-3 is one/four fewer TLAM/LRASM/SM-6/ESSM.

 

[tphuang]

Can we keep our anti-ship missile related discussions here PLAN Anti-ship/surface missiles I feel like discussing LRASM is just way too off topic and distracting from hypersonic development.

 

[SEAD]

40km against LRASM nose-on is fantasy.

The USN has been demonstrating it's capability against high speed targets for decades. They've been shooting down everything from supersonic sea-skimmers (Vandal and Coyote targets) as well as Mach 5 AGM-37Cs high-divers.

Technically it's not true(or not even close, IMO) because the most recent test against (perhaps the most precise imitation of) DF-26 fails. The only test against BM salvo also seems

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. Although DF-17 has been in service for at least 3 years, Aegis hasn't ever been ready for such targets, the most immediate test will be in 2023 and no reliable capability would be in service until 2028. No doubt PLARF will have more complicated HGV and HCM then.

SM-3 has shot down many ballistic missile types and even a satellite. SM-3 Block II has shot down an ICBM. Things like DF-21 & 26 will be hit before their RVs enter the atmosphere (they're just regular ballistic targets while in space).

There are many things influence BMD, even out of atmosphere. ECM, decoys, or even warning receiver and anti-ABM-missile mounted on warheads need to be taken into consideration. It deserves a whole thread to discuss about ASBM vs. BMD but the basic fact is that you always need to spend much more $ to defend a BM threaten from any enemies with same level of technology.

 

[ougoah]

This is true but there are several caveats that stack the missile defense equations against the defender.

First is decoys. We do not know the sophistication of decoys on the DF-21/26. The presence of highly realistic decoys would drastically decrease exoatmospheric interception probability.

Second is the limited engagement opportunities. Due to the long SM-3 missile engine burn time relative to the speed of the ballistic missile target, there will be only one engagement opportunity. This means the defender cannot employ shoot-look-shoot and must expend multiple interceptors per target to achieve high probability of kill.

Third is magazine capacity. Aegis ships cannot reload at sea. TELs can reload on land. A CBG with 5 Arleigh Burkes where 10% of all VLS cells are SM-3 nets you 48 interceptors. A DF-21/26 brigade has 24 TELs. It is entirely viable for the attacker to exhaust all interceptors by salvoing ASBM.

Fourth is economics.

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We don't know what DF-21/26 costs but its unlikely to be $30M.

Finally there is opportunity cost. Even if no DF-21/26 is ever fired, it imposes an opportunity cost for the CBG. SM-3 is a single-purpose missile and every VLS cell occupied by an SM-3 is one/four fewer TLAM/LRASM/SM-6/ESSM.

In all honesty, USN defence against ASBM is more SM-6 than SM-3. I really doubt they'd be carrying many SM-3 in a fight anticipating defending against ASBMs. SM-6 is the primary high tier interceptor. It wasn't designed for intercepting ASBMs or waveriding/gliding hypersonics but they are the most capable interceptors the USN has at the moment and they are endoatmospheric ... where ASBM interception is. The midcourse interceptors are useful against low orbit satellites and ICBMs which maintain exoatmospheric flight well before, during, and past (too late) where SM-3 launchers are.

By the time the SM-3s are boosted to near space, the ASBM MaRVs should have long re-entered atmosphere. MRBM and IRBM warheads that are designed to be for anti-shipping and hence are maneuverable (and now possibly another generation of ASBM using double conical HGV design... so no longer "ballistic as if MaRV ever was anyway) do not behave like ICBMs. SM-3 is designed to kinetic impact on ICBM warheads in space of the entire payload section in space ... during the relatively long miscourse flight of ICBMs. MRBMs and IRBMs do not have anywhere near the same midcourse flight time and don't present themselves quite as much as targets (although of course they do and the specifics matters ... specifics we don't know). If China's upgraded these ASBM to take on HGVs instead, then even less point to waste space and money carrying SM-3s.

 

[SEAD]

40km against LRASM nose-on is fantasy.

The USN has been demonstrating it's capability against high speed targets for decades. They've been shooting down everything from supersonic sea-skimmers (Vandal and Coyote targets) as well as Mach 5 AGM-37Cs high-divers. SM-3 has shot down many ballistic missile types and even a satellite. SM-3 Block II has shot down an ICBM. Things like DF-21 & 26 will be hit before their RVs enter the atmosphere (they're just regular ballistic targets while in space).

BMD test may be politically important but any serious reviewer should keep in mind that there's a long distance between 'I can shoot something down sometimes' and 'I have an ideal defense system'.

 

[enroger]

40km against LRASM nose-on is fantasy.

The USN has been demonstrating it's capability against high speed targets for decades. They've been shooting down everything from supersonic sea-skimmers (Vandal and Coyote targets) as well as Mach 5 AGM-37Cs high-divers. SM-3 has shot down many ballistic missile types and even a satellite. SM-3 Block II has shot down an ICBM. Things like DF-21 & 26 will be hit before their RVs enter the atmosphere (they're just regular ballistic targets while in space).

Quick Math, a radar capable of spotting 1m^2 rcs target at 400km range is also capable of spotting 1/10^4 = 0.0001m^2 rcs at 40km range. Is lrasm's rcs below 0.0001m^2? Not impossible, but color me extremely skeptical. Also lrasm's dimension fit right into S-band resonance range so it will have a tough time lowering it's rcs against S-band radar.

I hope LRASM has other tricks up it's sleeve, stealth alone is not gonna cut it, it will get burnt through like a tissue paper by raw radar output.

Other's have already pointed out, those tests are highly idealized tests, none of us know how they'll stack up against real threats.

 

[enroger]

In all honesty, USN defence against ASBM is more SM-6 than SM-3. I really doubt they'd be carrying many SM-3 in a fight anticipating defending against ASBMs. SM-6 is the primary high tier interceptor. It wasn't designed for intercepting ASBMs or waveriding/gliding hypersonics but they are the most capable interceptors the USN has at the moment and they are endoatmospheric ... where ASBM interception is. The midcourse interceptors are useful against low orbit satellites and ICBMs which maintain exoatmospheric flight well before, during, and past (too late) where SM-3 launchers are.

By the time the SM-3s are boosted to near space, the ASBM MaRVs should have long re-entered atmosphere. MRBM and IRBM warheads that are designed to be for anti-shipping and hence are maneuverable (and now possibly another generation of ASBM using double conical HGV design... so no longer "ballistic as if MaRV ever was anyway) do not behave like ICBMs. SM-3 is designed to kinetic impact on ICBM warheads in space of the entire payload section in space ... during the relatively long miscourse flight of ICBMs. MRBMs and IRBMs do not have anywhere near the same midcourse flight time and don't present themselves quite as much as targets (although of course they do and the specifics matters ... specifics we don't know). If China's upgraded these ASBM to take on HGVs instead, then even less point to waste space and money carrying SM-3s.

HGV is one thing, good old decoy is another. I still haven't seen a convincing technology that can deal with inflatable decoy

 

[SEAD]

HGV is one thing, good old decoy is another. I still haven't seen a convincing technology that can deal with inflatable decoy

Good enough radars can detect micro-motion of decoys and warheads to classify them but I don’t know how well it works.

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but obviously not available for now.