Isn't T-90M still using Sosna-U FCS or that's only the export variant?
As far as I am aware, it has a derivative of the Irbis-K fitted on the T-14's
Isn't T-90M still using Sosna-U FCS or that's only the export variant?
Holy crap that is surprisingly effective. Any information about the sensor??![]()
two M1 MBTs, 250m, IR coating and no coating.
So thermal insulation? What happens if it gets wet. Also I note half the tank is uncovered. It doesn't take much to get a IR lock and 1,400 bhp tank engines put out a lot of heat.Is not a paintjob but a full cover filled with a material that reduces the thermal signature of the tank
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Hard to see what I'm looking at there. Is that white block to the left not the tank? How long has the tank engine been running?![]()
two M1 MBTs, 250m, IR coating and no coating.
So thermal insulation? What happens if it gets wet. Also I note half the tank is uncovered. It doesn't take much to get a IR lock and 1,400 bhp tank engines put out a lot of heat.
Hard to see what I'm looking at there. Is that white block to the left not the tank? How long has the tank engine been running?
Military suppliers are clearly overpriced for a lot of attritable systems and are also a lot more susceptibles of political decisions. Civilian hardwares are clearly good for cheap assets.More Chinese gear in Russian service - Lenovo, Baofeng, DJI...
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The savagery and confusion of Russia’s forces in Ukraine is consistent with their recent conduct in Syria. Their bombing of Ukrainian hospitals echoes their bombardment of Syrian health facilities. By the same token, Israeli military officers who watched the Russian air force in Syria closely came away surprised by its struggles with air defence, target acquisition and high-tempo sorties. At one stage they thought Syrian involvement in air operations was the only plausible explanation for such a low level of professionalism.
In the end they concluded that Russia lacked the training, doctrine and experience to make the most of its advanced warplanes. Israeli military pilots were struck, both on combat tours and during their day jobs as airline pilots, by Russia’s crude approach to electronic warfare, which involved blocking GPS signals over vast swathes of the eastern Mediterranean, sometimes for weeks at a time. When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine became bogged down, Israeli analysts realised that Russian ground forces were afflicted by many of the same problems.