The US is just using Xinjiang as an excuse to sabotage the Chinese government attempt to elevate Uighurs living standard.
Chinese factories have typically preferred to hire Han Chinese, often explicitly discriminating against Tibetans and Uyghurs in job advertisements, as many assume ethnic minority workers aren’t proficient in Mandarin or come with additional management and security risks, according to labor-rights groups.
State-run labor transfer programs have attracted interest from factories by not only offering a stable supply of workers—appealing to places with high turnover—but also providing subsidies for each worker hired. Xinjiang governments typically transfer minority workers en masse to factories, usually with accompanying security personnel and cadres from the region, according to online job advertisements and labor transfer guidelines.
China’s exit in October 1949, from the sphere of US control, was perhaps the heaviest blow to strike American post-World War II global hegemony. China’s successful drive for independence had been anticipated in Washington for many months.
In September 1948, the far-sighted American diplomat GEORGE KENNAN noted that
“there are considerable limitations on what we can do to affect the course of events in China”. Over the elapsing seven decades since, the scale of American influence in China’s domestic affairs has been restricted at best, but continues apace nonetheless.
Washington has implemented a range of policies in the hope of DESTABILISING and SPLINTERING China.
The Pentagon’s strategies towards China have somewhat mirrored those they directed against the USSR: Utilisation of proxy groups, extremists and ethnic minorities, along with client states.
High profile Uyghur separatists, like the Xinjiang-born
Anwar Yusuf Turani, founder of the
East Turkestan Government in exile, is himself living in the state of
Virginia, on America’s east coast. Turani has been a willing tool in Washington’s power game with China; in June 1999, he met with president Bill Clinton and asked him to back political movements seeking independence for Xinjiang; and Turani later enjoyed dialogue with Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, who promised to support the “fundamental human rights” of “Uyghurs and others living in China”.
Further prominent Uyghur exiles living in America have called for Xinjiang’s independence from China, such as
Rebiya Kadeer, a five-time Nobel Peace Prize nominee, born in Xinjiang, and who also resides in the US state of
Virginia.
For 11 years until November 2017, she was the leader of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), headquartered in Munich, and which is
partly funded by the National Endowment For Democracy (NED). The NED, partially subsidised by the United States Congress, has a long history of “soft power” interference in sovereign states around the world.
The World Uyghur Congress was established in April 2004 by Erkin Alptekin, a former adviser to the CIA.
Kadeer’s husband has previously worked as a commentator for the US government-run broadcaster,
Radio Free Asia. Like Turani, Kadeer is something of a pawn for Washington in the growing US-China geopolitical rivalry. In the past, she accepted invitations to meet president George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, so as to seek backing for Uyghur independence from China. During a June 2019 visit to US ally Japan, she called on Tokyo to provide more political support for Xinjiang.
One of the central reasons for Beijing’s strong focus on Xinjiang, is because this region is
rich in both oil (21 billion tonnes) and coal deposits (40% of China’s entire reserves). Some Uyghur natives have complained that Beijing simply dispatches the raw materials from Xinjiang directly towards the Chinese capital, and to other relatively affluent cities like Shanghai, without providing adequate compensation in response. Even a small surtax could be enough to significantly improve the living conditions of Uyghurs.
The experienced Brazilian historian, Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, wrote that Beijing’s vested concerns in Xinjiang are also partly due to its position as
a pipeline hub; a territory through which natural resources pour into China from Central Asia, and which Bandeira states “was one of the factors behind the ethnic tensions that erupted over the course of the 1990s, and the beginning of the 21st century, with China investing $15 billion in the region’s infrastructure and development until 2001, including petrochemical plants and gas transports to Shanghai”.
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a state-owned company based in Beijing, “sought to transform Xinjiang into the country’s largest oil and gas production base until 2020”. Unsurprisingly, Beijing’s exploitation of Xinjiang’s resources has been increasing, while the province is a focal point too for China’s vast Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) industrial project.
Furthermore, Xi Jinping’s government retains strong ambitions in
linking Xinjiang to Gwadar, a strategic port situated in southern Pakistan and
which rests on the Arabian Sea. For a number of years, Beijing have been investing heavily in Pakistan, also reaching south to Gwadar, which could provide China’s administration with a field of scope into some of the planet’s most vital oil shipping lanes; with the
Gulf of Oman and
Persian Gulf waters positioned tantalisingly close to Gwadar.
China is Pakistan’s largest trading partner, and Beijing views its neighbour as an important ally, borne out by the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – an infrastructural program between these two nations valued at tens of billions of dollars.
Focusing on the Pentagon’s efforts again to destabilise China, we turn our attention to Tibet: A glorious region in south-western China whose landscapes are dominated by towering, snow-filled Himalayan mountain tops, vast uninhabited plains, while in
size Tibet is almost twice as large as France.
(...)