Re: How Do You Sink A Carrier?
That is 4 missiles per aircraft. What range and what type of missile are you carrying. Missiles like the Moskit and Brahmos are Heavy and BULKY. No way you can carry 4.
For example; take a section of four aircraft each with four hardpoints (two under each wing) trying to penetrate an air defense system equipped with missiles and deliver 16 bombs to target. To do so, it needs a jamming pod. That takes up one hardpoint per aircraft. The warload on each bird is now reduced from four to three, meaning we have to add an extra aircraft to maintain the weight of attack. That extra aircraft is virtual attrition - if it wasn't here it would be doing something else. If the ADS now has fighters (even MiG-21s), those bombers may now have to carry an AIM-9 for self defense, cumulatively reducing their hardpoints from four to two. We now have to use eight aircraft where four were previously necessary. Looked at another way we can only hit half as many targets as previously.
Nope but they have been simulations (Cheaper alternative than putting a billion dollar ship and spending hundreds of millions of dollars of arsenal to prove a point).
Aegis ships are data link to an E-2 C hawkeye in real time, which has detection AND tracking range of over 600 miles of more 2,000 objects. The Lockheed Martin AN/APS-145 radar is capable of tracking more than 2,000 targets and controlling the interception of 40 hostile targets.
Furthermore, E-2 C can provide mid-course guidance to Standard missiles to intercept bogeys that are below the radar horizon.
That is not putting into account the carrier airwing intercepts.
Yes it has. USN continually trained on network centric warfare. It is called information superiority. The USN will more likely know where your forces are deployed better than you will.
About a minute.
Yes in simulation. The question to ask is, have the threat force actually tested their command and control to accomplished such an attack involving many disperse forces to arrive just in the correct sequence. Do you know how easy it is to disrupt that sequence?
Amateurs talk tactics and weapon system, experts talk logistics.
Let me educate you about air defence:
To the air defence system, the objective is to stop the aircraft getting through to damage a critical target. Whether the aircraft in question is shot down, forced to abort or has to spend its time on defending other planes from the ADS is of no great consequence. The important thing is that the aircraft in question isn't going to be attacking something valuable today.
Looked at another way, the attacker has still made an investment in fuel, warload, pilot flying time, airframe life, whatever in getting that plane out. It got no return on (inflicted no damage with) that investment, therefore the attacker lost.
The way we assess these things in my end of the business is to designated aircraft actually shot down or so badly damaged that they are beyond economical repair as being "real attrition". These are assets that are gone and will have to be replaced. Sorties that are lost for any other reason, whether by being aborted or diverted to non-critical tasks, are "virtual attrition". Now, the value relationship between real and virtual attrition is variable and depends on circumstances. As you point out, to the USAF, there is a world of difference, to the air defense system crews, there is almost none.
Virtual attrition can result from quite subtle interplays. For example, the Iraqi SCUD missile attacks on Israel and Saudi during the Second Gulf War caused literally hundreds of aircraft sorties to be spent in chasing around looking for missile TELs rather than pounding on the Republican Guard. Those strikes that didn't happen were all virtual attrition attributable to the missile attacks.
Virtual attrition doesn't even have to be caused by an airstrike being diverted or aborted. For example; take a section of four aircraft each with four hardpoints (two under each wing) trying to penetrate an air defense system equipped with missiles and deliver 16 bombs to target. To do so, it needs a jamming pod. That takes up one hardpoint per aircraft. The warload on each bird is now reduced from four to three, meaning we have to add an extra aircraft to maintain the weight of attack. That extra aircraft is virtual attrition - if it wasn't here it would be doing something else. If the ADS now has fighters (even MiG-21s), those bombers may now have to carry an AIM-9 for self defense, cumulatively reducing their hardpoints from four to two. We now have to use eight aircraft where four were previously necessary. Looked at another way we can only hit half as many targets as previously.
The USAF is fortunate in that it has so many assets that it can accept a high level of virtual attrition without flinching. Other air forces are not so lucky. If they have only limited assets to begin with, virtual attrition can neutralize the air force almost without firing a shot. The ADS wins simply by being there. By the time the assets needed to protect the bombers are allocated, there aren't any bombers left to protect.
by Stuart Slade
I ask what preparation would actually be needed? 24 strike aircraft can carry 96 missiles.
That is 4 missiles per aircraft. What range and what type of missile are you carrying. Missiles like the Moskit and Brahmos are Heavy and BULKY. No way you can carry 4.
For example; take a section of four aircraft each with four hardpoints (two under each wing) trying to penetrate an air defense system equipped with missiles and deliver 16 bombs to target. To do so, it needs a jamming pod. That takes up one hardpoint per aircraft. The warload on each bird is now reduced from four to three, meaning we have to add an extra aircraft to maintain the weight of attack. That extra aircraft is virtual attrition - if it wasn't here it would be doing something else. If the ADS now has fighters (even MiG-21s), those bombers may now have to carry an AIM-9 for self defense, cumulatively reducing their hardpoints from four to two. We now have to use eight aircraft where four were previously necessary. Looked at another way we can only hit half as many targets as previously.
Oh really, because they've actually conducted tests resembling the exact scenario right? Hundreds of missiles or drones tested against AEGIS. Some flying high and very fast, some flying low and very fast, and some flying low and slow. This has actually been test-proven? Not to mention this coming without any effective warning. At what altitude and distance can AEGIS detect a threat over-the-horiozon? How many targets can it detect at that distance, can it track any and if so how many?
Nope but they have been simulations (Cheaper alternative than putting a billion dollar ship and spending hundreds of millions of dollars of arsenal to prove a point).
Aegis ships are data link to an E-2 C hawkeye in real time, which has detection AND tracking range of over 600 miles of more 2,000 objects. The Lockheed Martin AN/APS-145 radar is capable of tracking more than 2,000 targets and controlling the interception of 40 hostile targets.
Furthermore, E-2 C can provide mid-course guidance to Standard missiles to intercept bogeys that are below the radar horizon.
That is not putting into account the carrier airwing intercepts.
Has this all been conclusively found in training exercises showing that a varied mass attack would not be effective if conducted without warning?
Yes it has. USN continually trained on network centric warfare. It is called information superiority. The USN will more likely know where your forces are deployed better than you will.
How long does it take to get all those aircraft in the air now?
About a minute.
Again, I ask how well this has actually been tested. I'm pretty sure plenty has come within that envelope undetected.
Yes in simulation. The question to ask is, have the threat force actually tested their command and control to accomplished such an attack involving many disperse forces to arrive just in the correct sequence. Do you know how easy it is to disrupt that sequence?
Amateurs talk tactics and weapon system, experts talk logistics.
Let me educate you about air defence:
To the air defence system, the objective is to stop the aircraft getting through to damage a critical target. Whether the aircraft in question is shot down, forced to abort or has to spend its time on defending other planes from the ADS is of no great consequence. The important thing is that the aircraft in question isn't going to be attacking something valuable today.
Looked at another way, the attacker has still made an investment in fuel, warload, pilot flying time, airframe life, whatever in getting that plane out. It got no return on (inflicted no damage with) that investment, therefore the attacker lost.
The way we assess these things in my end of the business is to designated aircraft actually shot down or so badly damaged that they are beyond economical repair as being "real attrition". These are assets that are gone and will have to be replaced. Sorties that are lost for any other reason, whether by being aborted or diverted to non-critical tasks, are "virtual attrition". Now, the value relationship between real and virtual attrition is variable and depends on circumstances. As you point out, to the USAF, there is a world of difference, to the air defense system crews, there is almost none.
Virtual attrition can result from quite subtle interplays. For example, the Iraqi SCUD missile attacks on Israel and Saudi during the Second Gulf War caused literally hundreds of aircraft sorties to be spent in chasing around looking for missile TELs rather than pounding on the Republican Guard. Those strikes that didn't happen were all virtual attrition attributable to the missile attacks.
Virtual attrition doesn't even have to be caused by an airstrike being diverted or aborted. For example; take a section of four aircraft each with four hardpoints (two under each wing) trying to penetrate an air defense system equipped with missiles and deliver 16 bombs to target. To do so, it needs a jamming pod. That takes up one hardpoint per aircraft. The warload on each bird is now reduced from four to three, meaning we have to add an extra aircraft to maintain the weight of attack. That extra aircraft is virtual attrition - if it wasn't here it would be doing something else. If the ADS now has fighters (even MiG-21s), those bombers may now have to carry an AIM-9 for self defense, cumulatively reducing their hardpoints from four to two. We now have to use eight aircraft where four were previously necessary. Looked at another way we can only hit half as many targets as previously.
The USAF is fortunate in that it has so many assets that it can accept a high level of virtual attrition without flinching. Other air forces are not so lucky. If they have only limited assets to begin with, virtual attrition can neutralize the air force almost without firing a shot. The ADS wins simply by being there. By the time the assets needed to protect the bombers are allocated, there aren't any bombers left to protect.
by Stuart Slade