Shenyang FC-31 / J-31 Fighter Demonstrator

latenlazy

Brigadier
Long legs can be transferred into more capacity. But more fighters can not translate to long legs. Longer legs also means more load, longer hangtime, per jet. And to achieve the same capacity, less sorties and longer life for the jets and less intensity for the carrier.
Aerial refueling and drop tanks can translate to longer legs. Long legs can be converted to more capacity, but at what penalties to peformance? Is it really wise to lean on your naval fighters as your primary bomb trucks as well?
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Whatever PLAN and PLAAF decides to do re FC-31, China will have the absolute strongest navy and air force in all of Asia. Whatever they do, they will be nowhere near the naval and air strength of the US. So perhaps the most practical thing for them to do is consider the economics of their procurement decisions. A single LO platform shared and slightly modified between PLAAF and PLAN will save lots of money for other things. FC-31 can and should be exported widely for Shenyang. I don't doubt they can bring out a decent finished product in a few years. This could give them the funds to keep and expand high cost R&D projects even when flanker variant orders slow and stop.
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Aerial refueling and drop tanks can translate to longer legs. Long legs can be converted to more capacity, but at what penalties to peformance? Is it really wise to lean on your naval fighters as your primary bomb trucks as well?

That works for many cases but relying on tankers to stick closer to combat zones is not always going to be tactically the same as not needing tankers at all, or having them further away from combat zones. Especially against an opponent with very capable LO platforms which Japan and US both have. In saying this, I hope no war ever happens between these countries, but those are the likeliest opponents in the case of a war. India won't be getting real LO for decades (by then, LO is probably negated in sensor advances). Rest like Vietnam can be taken care of by J-7s and drones.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
Whatever PLAN and PLAAF decides to do re FC-31, China will have the absolute strongest navy and air force in all of Asia. Whatever they do, they will be nowhere near the naval and air strength of the US. So perhaps the most practical thing for them to do is consider the economics of their procurement decisions. A single LO platform shared and slightly modified between PLAAF and PLAN will save lots of money for other things. FC-31 can and should be exported widely for Shenyang. I don't doubt they can bring out a decent finished product in a few years. This could give them the funds to keep and expand high cost R&D projects even when flanker variant orders slow and stop.
Do we expect an economy larger than the US to have a smaller Air Force and Navy?
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Do we expect an economy larger than the US to have a smaller Air Force and Navy?

Eventually to have one greater. Not immediately after overtaking in PPP. Large and advanced militaries are not built up overnight. It will take China two or three decades at least to match the level of technology, infrastructure, and maturity of the US in every single area. It will hopefully happen sooner though.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
Eventually to have one greater. Not immediately after overtaking in PPP. Large and advanced militaries are not built up overnight. It will take China two or three decades at least to match the level of technology, infrastructure, and maturity of the US in every single area. It will hopefully happen sooner though.
When we're talking about J-31 procurement we're not talking about the next year, but the next 2-3 decades.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Financial means depends a lot on how the economy does. A China with middle OECD levels of economic productivity would have an economy two to three times the size of the US. That said, China does not necessarily need to match the US in the number of stealth fighters it fields. The USN is unlikely to deploy all of their F-35s in the Pacific Theater, even in a conflict with China, nor will every F-35 be used for an air superiority role. Furthermore a stealth fighter is not the only or best counter to another stealth fighter. If you can get a lock at range on a stealth fighter with radar or EOS you don't need another stealth fighter to interdict. In addition, China, by function of being native to the theater, can depend on other anti-air defenses to deal with those fighters.

future force structure is going to be a big issue for the Chinese air force to contend with in the next few years.

imo, I see two overall potential "paths".

A: a USAF style, traditional major "fighter" fleet with a combination of high end J-20 variant stealth fighters, with a larger number of medium F-35/FC-31 sized stealth fighters, and a further larger number of modernizing/modernized 4+ generation fighter holdovers, with some stealthy strike and isr ucavs and some H-20 stealth bombers.

B: a more radical structure, where the only 5th generation stealth fighter is J-20 which will be procured in larger numbers than the number of J-20s in path A (but less than the number of total 5th generation fighters in path A which would've included J-20s+medium sized stealth fighter), but where stealthy strike and ISR UCAVs make up a much larger proportion of the fleet than in path A, and also with a much larger fleet of H-20 stealth bombers as well where H-20 will have the role of not only being a traditional bomber but also an ew + isr + uav controller + a2a missile launch platform, supplemented by a large number of modernizing/modernized 4+ generation fighter holdovers.


In path B, the air to air combat capability will be more distributed among the combination of 5th generation J-20s, stealthy ucavs, and stealth bombers (and 4+ fighters), whereas in A it will be made up of almost all 5th generation fighters like J-20 and a medium weight stealth fighter.


So IMO, the Air Force likely has a projected budget for developing + building a large number of medium weight stealth fighters (and it is likely to be a big budget), and if it is used for a medium weight stealth fighter they will be going largely the way of path A, but if they decide to scrap a medium weight stealth fighter, I expect that budget to be divided up towards buying and developing more of other projects -- namely more J-20s, more stealth bombers, more stealth ucavs, all potentially with more developed capability for each of those types as well, versus if a medium weight stealth fighter had been developed and purchased in large numbers.



Of course there are a whole host of compounding factors and assumptions I'm making, namely the cost of developing and building a new medium weight fighter.... and one big assumption this relies on will be the idea that path A will develop the same platforms (J-20, H-20, stealth ucavs) as path B, but the difference being that path B will be buying more of them and with more refined capabilities, with the understanding that the larger production run of those platforms will result in a unit cost in path B than in path A because development costs can be spread across a larger production run. OTOH in path A, a lot of the same development costs will already have been plowed into those platforms but will be produced in smaller numbers.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
future force structure is going to be a big issue for the Chinese air force to contend with in the next few years.

imo, I see two overall potential "paths".

A: a USAF style, traditional major "fighter" fleet with a combination of high end J-20 variant stealth fighters, with a larger number of medium F-35/FC-31 sized stealth fighters, and a further larger number of modernizing/modernized 4+ generation fighter holdovers, with some stealthy strike and isr ucavs and some H-20 stealth bombers.

B: a more radical structure, where the only 5th generation stealth fighter is J-20 which will be procured in larger numbers than the number of J-20s in path A (but less than the number of total 5th generation fighters in path A which would've included J-20s+medium sized stealth fighter), but where stealthy strike and ISR UCAVs make up a much larger proportion of the fleet than in path A, and also with a much larger fleet of H-20 stealth bombers as well where H-20 will have the role of not only being a traditional bomber but also an ew + isr + uav controller + a2a missile launch platform, supplemented by a large number of modernizing/modernized 4+ generation fighter holdovers.


In path B, the air to air combat capability will be more distributed among the combination of 5th generation J-20s, stealthy ucavs, and stealth bombers (and 4+ fighters), whereas in A it will be made up of almost all 5th generation fighters like J-20 and a medium weight stealth fighter.


So IMO, the Air Force likely has a projected budget for developing + building a large number of medium weight stealth fighters (and it is likely to be a big budget), and if it is used for a medium weight stealth fighter they will be going largely the way of path A, but if they decide to scrap a medium weight stealth fighter, I expect that budget to be divided up towards buying and developing more of other projects -- namely more J-20s, more stealth bombers, more stealth ucavs, all potentially with more developed capability for each of those types as well, versus if a medium weight stealth fighter had been developed and purchased in large numbers.



Of course there are a whole host of compounding factors and assumptions I'm making, namely the cost of developing and building a new medium weight fighter.... and one big assumption this relies on will be the idea that path A will develop the same platforms (J-20, H-20, stealth ucavs) as path B, but the difference being that path B will be buying more of them and with more refined capabilities, with the understanding that the larger production run of those platforms will result in a unit cost in path B than in path A because development costs can be spread across a larger production run. OTOH in path A, a lot of the same development costs will already have been plowed into those platforms but will be produced in smaller numbers.
Pretty much what the scenarios Sinosoldier and I were debating look like in fleshed out form, though I think we're already seeing some indication that they intend to go closer to path B than path A based on some of the systems they've been developing.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Pretty much what the scenarios Sinosoldier and I were debating look like in fleshed out form, though I think we're already seeing some indication that they intend to go closer to path B than path A based on some of the systems they've been developing.

that is possible but I think it is too early to call.

that's because path A can allow an air force to transition to path B as well.


the fact that they are developing ucavs, stealth bomber, and autonomy and networking, does not mean they will be moving closer to path B than A, because imo the difference between paths A and B, can be condensed to a few points, that we have yet to be able to see:
1: the presence of a mass produced medium weight stealth fighter in path A vs lack of a medium weight stealth fighter for path B
2: the differing number of J-20s, H-20s and stealthy ucavs that will be built in path A vs path B, with the latter featuring far more of them (larger scale etc)
3: the level of autonomy and networking maturity of stealthy ucavs in path A vs path B, with the latter having a much superior and reliable level of capability


At this stage, for each of the points...
1: it is too early to say that the air force has abandoned a medium weight stealth fighter. with every year, it seems less and less likely that they will be developing one, but for all we know maybe the air force is just being late and taking its time with a design that ticks their boxes
2: it will be many years until we know just how many J-20s and H-20s and ucavs are actually built (and the latter two of course have yet to be revealed in any meaningful capacity either)
3: and of course, this is something which we will not really get any glimpse of even in the more distant future, and we will likely have to indirectly infer it from points 1 and 2.



The problem with path B is that if one chooses to skip to path B without adopting path A, it means they leave themselves at a risk of adopting less mature, less proven technologies and subsystems that may not be ready, if a conflict with an opfor that has chosen path A, occurs, because that may mean path B's stealthy ucavs and networked forces might not be reliable and mature enough to adequately combat the less technologically radical but more mature path A.
 
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