China's SCS Strategy Thread

[Insignius]

@solarz
Stop deflecting.
I'm not Google. Especially not for common knowledge that everyone, even casual PLA watchers, should know by now.

 

[solarz]

@solarz
Stop deflecting.
I'm not Google. Especially not for common knowledge that everyone, even casual PLA watchers, should know by now.

Do you mean this article?

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BOTTOM LINES

• A renewed U.S. threat to China's nuclear deterrent. Chinese analysts worry that advances in U.S. strategic capabilities could undermine China's ability to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear attack.
• Continuation of China's strategy of assured retaliation. China is unlikely to dramatically increase its relatively small nuclear force or abandon its second-strike posture. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity over its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first.
• Potential pitfalls of limited ambiguity over no-first-use. Limited ambiguity over no-first-use allows China to avoid an arms race, but it could increase risks of nuclear escalation in a U.S.-China crisis. Limited ambiguity might also energize U.S. pursuit of strategic superiority, if the United States sees it as a broad exception to China's no-first-use policy.

Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in U.S.-China strategic stability. In recent years, the United States has been developing strategic capabilities such as missile defenses and conventional long-range strike capabilities that could reduce the effectiveness of China's deterrent. Writings by Chinese strategists and analysts, however, indicate that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy.

A RENEWED U.S. THREAT TO CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL

China's strategists perceive missile defense as the most serious future threat to China's nuclear arsenal. They worry that the current, limited U.S. development and deployment of a missile defense system could be expanded in scope and effectiveness to give the United States an effective shield against Chinese nuclear missiles. Even if the system cannot reliably intercept ballistic missiles after they are launched, Chinese analysts are concerned that missile defense deployments could trigger a regional arms race if other countries see the U.S. commitment to the system as a proof of concept that it may be effective.

Chinese assessments of the threat posed by conventional long-range strike capabilities are more mixed. Some Chinese analysts do not think that a U.S. conventional attack on China's nuclear arsenal would be very likely or effective. They believe that China's efforts to protect its arsenal from a nuclear attack, including hardening, dispersal, and mobility, would be sufficient to protect China from a conventional attack as well. At the same time, analysts worry that the United States may be more likely to use conventional weapons than nuclear weapons against China's nuclear arsenal. Further, some analysts are concerned that U.S. conventional long-range strike capabilities, if paired with improvements in U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, could reduce the amount of strategic warning that China would receive of an incoming attack. These capabilities could, therefore, undermine China's deterrent.

CONTINUATION OF CHINA'S STRATEGY OF ASSURED RETALIATION

China will not abandon its nuclear strategy of assured retaliation in response to an increasingly clear U.S. commitment to strategic primacy. Instead, to avoid Cold War–style nuclear competition and the risk of arms racing, China is altering how it implements assured retaliation.

First, China is allowing limited ambiguity over the application of its no-first-use policy. Debate among Chinese strategists over the definition of "first use" has created uncertainty over how China would respond to attacks with conventional weapons on its nuclear forces and infrastructure. The main purpose of such limited ambiguity is to deter the United States from conducting such conventional counterforce attacks. Chinese strategists are also debating whether a launch-on-warning posture would be desirable and consistent with China's no-first-use policy.

Second, China seeks to maintain the smallest nuclear arsenal capable of assuring retaliation against a nucleararmed adversary. In response to U.S. capabilities developments, the Chinese are making qualitative and limited quantitative improvements in the country's force structure. China is modestly increasing the size and survivability of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force as well as its ability to penetrate missile defenses. It is equipping some of its ICBMs with multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicles, developing glide technology, and improving its strategic warning and command and control systems. To counter future advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, China is researching and developing missile defenses and hypersonic weapons technology, as well as continuing to improve its ballistic missile submarine force.

POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF AMBIGUITY OVER NO-FIRST-USE

Limited ambiguity over how China may define a "nuclear attack" for its no-first-use policy allows it to maintain a smaller arsenal than it would need if it adhered to a strict no-first-use policy. Yet limited ambiguity also raises the risk of nuclear escalation in a crisis, as it increases the likelihood that the United States could mistake Chinese nuclear signaling for preparations to use nuclear weapons. China's decision implies that it views the economic, diplomatic, and strategic costs of arms racing as a bigger threat to its national security than the risk of nuclear escalation in a crisis.

China is also relatively optimistic about the risk of nuclear escalation in any future U.S.-China crisis. A U.S.-China crisis would most likely arise because of a dispute between a U.S. ally and China. Few Chinese strategists believe that the stakes in any U.S.- China crisis would be sufficient for either China or the United States to risk nuclear escalation. Chinese analysts also regard China's no-first-use policy as contributing to a clear firebreak between nuclear and conventional conflict. They believe that the United States would not be tempted to cross that threshold by attacking China's nuclear arsenal with conventional capabilities, given the limited ambiguity over China's no-first-use policy. Most Chinese strategists do not acknowledge the risk of unintentional escalation in a U.S.-China crisis.

The United States does not share China's relative optimism about the risk of nuclear escalation in a future U.S.-China crisis. Western experts worry that escalation could occur if the United States were to implement an AirSea Battle Concept–style campaign to destroy China's conventional capabilities that simultaneously degraded Chinese nuclear capabilities and their supporting infrastructure. One reason for this divergence of opinion may be that Western analysts believe that China's nuclear and conventional missile forces are colocated, increasing the likelihood that a U.S. attack on Chinese conventional land-based missiles could degrade China's nuclear capabilities. Many Chinese analysts dismiss this risk, however, arguing that China's conventional and nuclear capabilities are not colocated.

Open-source information about China's strategic missile forces, the Second Artillery, indicates that China's nuclear missiles are, in fact, not colocated with conventional ones. Within the Second Artillery, missile launch brigades are organized based on either conventional or nuclear armaments. Conventional and nuclear missile brigades do share some infrastructure, but Chinese military texts describe steps that have been taken to ensure redundancy in China's command and control structures. Thus, any U.S. conventional attack on a Chinese conventional missile brigade would probably not substantially degrade China's nuclear capabilities. It could still significantly escalate a crisis, however, because of the message such an attack would communicate about U.S. willingness and capabilities to conduct a similar attack on a Chinese nuclear brigade. China would likely respond by signaling its resolve to retaliate if its nuclear weapons were attacked, which could be misread by the United States as preparations for use.

China's decision to pair limited ambiguity over no-first-use with an otherwise restrained nuclear posture could backfire. China likely underestimates U.S. willingness to run the risk of nuclear escalation in a crisis. In addition, if the United States views China's limited ambiguity as a bluff because China otherwise adheres to its no-first-use policy, it might ignore the risk of nuclear escalation in conventional campaign planning, resulting in a deterrence failure in a conventional conflict. Alternatively, if the United States views China's limited ambiguity as a sign that China may abandon its no-first-use policy in circumstances other than a conventional attack on its nuclear forces and infrastructure or nonnuclear strategic targets, it may pursue strategic primacy more energetically, drawing China into the very arms race it seeks to avoid.

China's continuing commitment to a nuclear strategy of assured retaliation indicates that it will prioritize avoiding a nuclear arms race with the United States. Nevertheless, leaders and militaries in both countries will need to be exceptionally careful to avoid nuclear escalation in a crisis.

 

[AndrewS]

So what do you call NATO massing troops near Russian borders? Maybe Russia doesn't have enough nukes?

NATO is not massing troops. They are putting in a few battalions as a deterrence and tripwire force to demonstrate that Russian advances into the Baltics and Poland will result in a full-scale war, which would inevitably escalate into the nuclear realm.

But yes, NATO could amass troops for an invasion of Russia, but then it ends up as a full-scale war again.

 

[tidalwave]

So what do you call NATO massing troops near Russian borders? Maybe Russia doesn't have enough nukes?

SCS==Crimea, right now it's different fight for NATO.

NATO and US already conceded Crimea to Russia.

Now only US won't concede islands in SCS it also go back to challenge China's holding of Paracel from 1974.

You see any US Carrier strike groups 1 or 2 of them doing FON at black Sea or Mediterrean Sea? DO you?

Oh yeah, USS Gravely, a single ship at eastern Med sea.

haha. Ah-Q Spirit.

You must an awefully very nice guy, in real life, someone spit on your shoes and you are probably the one to say "excuse me" Way to go!

 

[AndrewS]

We can see from public pronouncements from PACOM that he is confident about winning a conventional war and that the US could win in a nuclear exchange with minimal casualties.

It's part of the reason why he is so gung-ho about using military force to posture in the Western Pacific.

Hence the surest way to stop this is to create a moderately sized nuclear deterrent which would be able to inflict sufficient casualties as a deterrent. It doesn't have to be the thousands of warheads that Russia and the USA operate, but it does have to be credible enough to hit say 100 targets in a retaliatory second strike.

Increasing the nuclear arsenal would theoretically allow China to spend LESS money overall on the military, as there wouldn't be as much need to spend as much on conventional weapons.

 

[AndrewS]

For the reasons above, I'm now confident in predicting that US involvement in the SCS over the past year will definitely result in the deployment in the coming years of at least 100 nuclear warheads which are capable of reaching the USA.

 

[solarz]

SCS==Crimea, right now it's different fight for NATO.

NATO and US already conceded Crimea to Russia.

Now only US won't concede islands in SCS it also go back to challenge China's holding of Paracel from 1974.

You see any US Carrier strike groups 1 or 2 of them doing FON at black Sea or Mediterrean Sea? DO you?

Oh yeah, USS Gravely, a single ship at eastern Med sea.

haha. Ah-Q Spirit.

Again, are you serious?

Do you understand the purpose of those FON missions in the SCS? You seem to be under the mistaken impressions that those are supposed to intimidate China in any way.

Do you see China stopping, or even slowing, its reclamation work?

The purpose of those FON missions is not make China back down on its claims. It is to rally US-friendly nations in the region so that the US can build a new containment belt.

In comparison, the US does have a presence in the Black Sea, but more importantly, NATO has a strong presence. The US already has Russia encircled, and is steadily eroding Russian influence.

Russian's annexation of Crimea was basically damage control. Before the Ukrainian coup, Crimean was already a secure and vital Russian asset. Russia sending in troops and officially annexing the region was their only way to keep from losing that asset!

In contrast, China is developing *NEW* assets and new capabilities in the SCS. It is the US that is forced to react to Chinese initiatives, and it is finding itself incapable of directly challenging those initiatives.

 

[tidalwave]

Again, are you serious?


Do you understand the purpose of those FON missions in the SCS? You seem to be under the mistaken impressions that those are supposed to intimidate China in any way.

Oooooh, really? not to be meant intimidation. Oh, I learn something new. OK , Okkie Dokkieeeee.

They could use a Cruise line to do FON . why , not 1, not 2 possibly 3 Carrier strike group together FON ? no1 but 3 destroyers within 15 miles of certain island.
any clues?
You are very nice guy. So nice that,even guys looking at your GF closely you still smiling.
I want to sign up to your friend in real life. lol.

 

[solarz]

Oooooh, really? not to be meant intimidation. Oh, I learn something new. OK , Okkie Dokkieeeee.

They could use a Cruise line to do FON . why , not 1, not 2 possibly 3 Carrier strike group together FON ? no1 but 3 destroyers within 15 miles of certain island.
any clues?
You are very nice guy. So nice that,even guys looking at your GF closely you still smiling.
I want to sign up to your friend in real life. lol.

You know, when I first started dating my wife, then girlfriend, I was 25 and pretty insecure. I imagined all sorts of things when she went out with her friends, and we even had fights when I felt she paid more attention to her friends than to me.

Now, 10 years later, after 7 years of marriage, a 3-year-old in the house and a couple more on the way, I couldn't care less if she wants to go out with friends. Guys checking her out? Hell, I take that as a compliment!

That's what growing up is about.

 

[Blackstone]

For the reasons above, I'm now confident in predicting that US involvement in the SCS over the past year will definitely result in the deployment in the coming years of at least 100 nuclear warheads which are capable of reaching the USA.

That's the kind of stuff I'm talking about; if Washington makes Beijing nervous about its ability to deter first-strikes, then China might feel the need to increase its nuclear stockpile to where it feels confidant of removing first-strike considerations. And if China increases its stockpile, there's no doubt India would consider doing the same, and the stuff rolls down the hill from there. How that's in anyone's best interest, especially the US, isn't clear to me.