joshuatree
Captain
So a rough translation puts the ship committing the act within territorial waters but that is not the CCG.
PLAN SCS Bases/Islands/Vessels (Not a Strategy Page)
- Thread starter lilzz
- Start date
So a rough translation puts the ship committing the act within territorial waters but that is not the CCG.
Brumby
Major
In my view you are by passing a key component of any rule based order. There is a framework in which the rules are set out pertaining to economic rights and delimitation (UNCLOS). There is then a due process to address some practical issues and vested interest between countries like with an MOU.
An argument of traditional fishing ground is not a legitimate argument but a convenient one if there is no respect for a rule based order.
Brumby
Major
Based on Indonesian sources, the illegal fishing incident is clearly inside the 12 nm territorial sea but the location of the ramming incident is around the edge of the 12nm. In any case, EEZ rules dictate that Indonesian Coast Guard has jurisdiction. The question is why is Chinese Coast Guard operating in Indonesian EEZ? There is no overlap of Chinese EEZ into that vicinity even taking into account the disputed nature of the Spratly islands. It is just too far away.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
It is all come back to infamous nine dash line. Sofar China does not clarify if it include the water or the island inside the cow tongue. Here is what she submit back in 2009
In its Note Verbale dated 7 May 2009 China included one sentence which has created considerable controversy. It reads as follows:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map)
The attached map which was referred to was the nine dashed line map. By attaching that map to a communication sent to the UN Secretary
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General and asking that it be circulated to UN members, China had for the first time indicated that its claim in the South China Sea was based in part on the map. Because the wording of the note was ambiguous and the map was attached, it raised old suspicions in ASEAN countries
about the nature of China‟s claim in the South China Sea.
Brumby
Major
I just self terminated a conversation on this issue in another thread due to its circular nature because of a refusal to acknowledge the ambiguity arising from the nine-dash line. It is a half pregnant reasoning depending on when it suits the argument.
https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/so...es-for-other-nations-not-china.t7302/page-123
In my understanding of the geographical location of the Natuna island, there is no overlap in EEZ with China because the Spratly islands are too far away as a land source to generate EEZ that would overlap with the EEZ of Natuna/Indonesia. China has carefully avoided the issue of the Natuna island itself as being in dispute (which is not) but in reality the issue is with the waters that overlap into the nine dash line. Since the nine dash has no basis in international law to claim any waters without adjacent land mass, China is once again stretching the ambiguity by introducing the traditional fishing ground reasoning as a cover for its actions. In effect it is just double talk and lacks any good will to perform.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
No there is such thing as historic water. UNCLOS is very complicated document due to compromise and many sub article. I believe this is what China is aiming. Delineation is not just based on geography but also on historic water read this
The Concept of Historic Rights
The term ‘historic waters’ should not be confused with ‘historic rights.’ Both are legal concepts that exist under customary international law, but with different scope and legal application. A claim of historic right means that a state is claiming to exercise a certain right in relation to other states by effectively exercising those rights with the acquiescence of the states concerned. The requirements that must be satisfied in order to successfully establish a claim of historic rights are the same as those required to establish historic waters – in terms of proof of long-established activities and the continuous exercise of these activities with the acquiescence of other states. Having said that, although the jurisprudence from international courts and tribunals reflects a reluctance to recognize a state’s claim of historic rights, a state will have a better chance of successfully making a claim to historic rights than to historic waters. This is because even though the elements for establishing historic rights are the same as those required for establishing historic waters, there are a few significant differences between the two concepts.
First, historic rights claims do not amount to a sovereignty claim. Historic rights merely give the claiming state the right to conduct a specific activity – like fishing – due to long usage. As the ICJ stated in the Qatar/Bahrain case, the historic pearling activities of Bahrain have never led to the recognition of a ‘quasi-territorial right’ to the fishing ground itself. This means that even if the historic pearling rights of Bahrain were recognized, it would not have amounted to sovereignty or any form of ‘quasi-sovereignty’ over the pearling banks or to the superjacent waters. It is surely easier for a state to provide evidence of prolonged fishing activities in an area of water than to try to establish a prolonged exercise of sovereignty over the area. As noted above, it is important to remember that a state’s claim to historic rights does not mean that this right gives the claiming state sovereignty over the relevant body of waters.
Second, a historic rights claim is not exclusive. Since the existence of historic rights in one area does not amount to sovereignty, it is possible for certain rights of other states to exist concurrently in the same body of water. For example, in the Tunisia/Libya case, Libya recognized Tunisia’s right to fish for sedentary species in the Gulf of Tunis, but claimed that such right was never purported to exclude foreigners from the exploitation of these fisheries. In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the Tribunal declared that the recognition of Eritrea’s historic fishing right within Yemen’s territorial sea around the islands of Hanis and Zuqar, as well as around the islands of Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr group, did not exclude Yemen’s enjoyment of the same right, either based on history or on UNCLOS.
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China, on the other hand, is surrounded by great powers
Surrounded? That would require South Korea, Japan, Laos, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and so on to have greater militaries than China. Only Russia has a comparable military. The USA is 9200 kms away.
They do not. But your position is that they are.
Surrounded by the great power of Laos and Mongolia.
The year is not 221BC. There are other nations, powers and economies than China on this planet now. It is time you upgraded your mindset to share this planet with the rest of humanity instead of dictating to others and taking what you want because you believe were first.
You do not get to force your way upon others because your culture has been around longer.
I think you misunderstand the definition of the word "great power".
It does not refer to one nation being more "powerful" than another, but rather the absolute and relative degree of military and economic and political power they have that can exert power and influence in its own region of the world as well as beyond.
Depending on how loosely one defines great powers, I think Japan, South Korea, India, and also Vietnam could be counted as great powers (definitely strong regional powers) as well as Russia and Pakistan (though their relationship with China is relatively positive), while the likes of Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan (their sovereignty status notwithstanding) are also very strong regional powers. The forward deployment of US forces in the western pacific also brings the equivalent military forces of an entire strong great power to China's doorstep as well, despite only being part of the actual military capability of a superpower.
I don't necessarily agree with Blackstone's original point entirely, but he is definitely quite correct in saying that China's immediate regional security situation is quite different to that of the US, as it faces a larger array of nations whose economic, military and political capabilities can rival it.
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More than that, colonial powers including "the West" but most often and egregiously the US behaves badly while claiming to be a saint at the same time flouting whatever rules and norms there are then turning around and using these to accuse and oppress others.