Battle of Shanghai, 1937

[solarz]

Chiang Kai-shek avoided direct resistance to Japan from 1931-1937 because he feared it would trigger a full scale invasion of China, which China was in very poor shape to fight. Moreover, he feared the Communists were a greater long-term threat than Japan. Do you think that if Chiang had committed his full army to fighting Japan in 1931 that Japan would not have invaded China?

The balance of forces between China and Japan was just as imbalanced if not more so in 1931 than 1937. Nobody knew that Japan planned a full invasion and colonization of all China in 1931. There was a huge risk to launching a full scale defense war against a more powerful enemy if that enemy has limited goals that could be enlarged. In the Korean War: the Communists almost lost the whole peninsula when they gambled and bet everything on conquering the South. The South had no desire to conquer the North, but when Kim Il-Sung tried to change the status quo, he nearly lost everything. That was Chiang's mindset: the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was bad but starting an all-out war could make things a lot worse.

The Japanese considered Chinese (and all other non-Japanese Asians) to be lesser races long before 1937. In fact it was the stiff Chinese resistance at Shanghai that shocked them. I've read that the Nanjing Massacre was partly a desire for revenge at taking so many casualties in Shanghai and partly to shock China into surrendering since Nanjing was the capital. Racism was a big contributor, but as you said the Nanjing massacre was unique even for the long, brutal war.

I would say Jiang's biggest mistake was not recognizing the extent of Japanese ambitions. Had he committed to full out war against Japan in 1931, the Japanese military would not have gained as much momentum as it did later on.

After all, let's examine the historical facts. Due to Jiang's decision to all but abandon Northern China to the Japanese, the Japanese gained a vast human and material resource pool from which to fuel its war machine. In exchange, Jiang gained the time to train a few elite divisions which he lost in the battle of Shanghai. I would say that is a very poor trade-off.

I completely disagree with your assertion that "nobody knew Japan planned a full invasion of China in 1931". Many people knew, from intellectuals to military officers, though it is also true that many others (including Jiang) chose to bury their heads in the sand.

As for the Nanjing Massacre, you need to understand that Imperial Japan had wholeheartedly embraced its samurai culture. It respected those who were strong and despised those who were weak. Like I said, why did the Japanese leave Shanghai relatively untouched while conducting wholesale slaughter in Nanjing? My opinion is that Shanghai resisted fiercely, while Nanjing capitulated without a fight.

 

[montyp165]

I would say Jiang's biggest mistake was not recognizing the extent of Japanese ambitions. Had he committed to full out war against Japan in 1931, the Japanese military would not have gained as much momentum as it did later on.

After all, let's examine the historical facts. Due to Jiang's decision to all but abandon Northern China to the Japanese, the Japanese gained a vast human and material resource pool from which to fuel its war machine. In exchange, Jiang gained the time to train a few elite divisions which he lost in the battle of Shanghai. I would say that is a very poor trade-off.

I completely disagree with your assertion that "nobody knew Japan planned a full invasion of China in 1931". Many people knew, from intellectuals to military officers, though it is also true that many others (including Jiang) chose to bury their heads in the sand.

As for the Nanjing Massacre, you need to understand that Imperial Japan had wholeheartedly embraced its samurai culture. It respected those who were strong and despised those who were weak. Like I said, why did the Japanese leave Shanghai relatively untouched while conducting wholesale slaughter in Nanjing? My opinion is that Shanghai resisted fiercely, while Nanjing capitulated without a fight.

Indeed, Mao even wrote in one of his writings that had China as a whole had fought the Japanese in 1931, even with materiel deficiencies the Japanese would be in a much more difficult situation than in 1937, when they had time to absorb Manchurian resources and industry to their war machine.

 

[lightspeed]

China was too weak to fight the Japanese in 1931. The central and provincial armies were significantly weakened, and the central government was nearly bankrupt from the 1930 Central Plains War. Manchuria was Zhang Xueliang’s responsibility, and he concluded that his army was too weak to effectively fight the Japanese.

the Japanese did not profit from Manchuria to the great expected degree, and that strengthened their resolve to annex North China too. the resources and industries of Manchuria did not seem that significant to the Japanese, especially when compared to the 80% of the United States and the West’s imported raw materials and military goods that Japan used in the early years of the war.

 

[Geographer]

Indeed, Mao even wrote in one of his writings that had China as a whole had fought the Japanese in 1931, even with materiel deficiencies the Japanese would be in a much more difficult situation than in 1937, when they had time to absorb Manchurian resources and industry to their war machine.

When did Mao write that? It's easy for to second guess decisions when the results of history are known, but historians have to look at what leaders knew at the time. Besides, was Mao ready to support Chiang in an all-out war against Japan?

What are some data that could shed light on the solarz's assertion that the balance of power was more favorable to China in 1931 than 1937? How many aircraft, tanks, and soldiers did each country have in 1931 and 1937? What was the industrial base of China and Japan in 1931 and 1937?

As for the Nanjing Massacre, you need to understand that Imperial Japan had wholeheartedly embraced its samurai culture. It respected those who were strong and despised those who were weak. Like I said, why did the Japanese leave Shanghai relatively untouched while conducting wholesale slaughter in Nanjing? My opinion is that Shanghai resisted fiercely, while Nanjing capitulated without a fight.

If quick surrender induced the Japanese to commit mass slaghter, why didn't they do that for Beijing, Harbin, Hong Kong, Singapore or any of the other cities they captured easily? The Japanese army frequently executed and tortured prisoners but no other city in Asia saw the kind of mass rape and killing that Nanjing saw.

My opinion is that that the Nanjing Massacre was the result of Japanese anger at China for having inflicted, for the firs time, heavy casualties during their surprise resistance at Shanghai, coupled with the desire to humiliate and intimidate China into surrendering. After all, Nanjing was the capital of China. The Japanese army didn't use Shanghai as their target because 1) the city was mostly destroyed in the fighting and 2) they were quickly ordered to advance up the Yangtze River toward Nanjing and didn't have time to enjoy their spoils of war in Shanghai.

 

[lightspeed]

When did Mao write that? It's easy for to second guess decisions when the results of history are known, but historians have to look at what leaders knew at the time. Besides, was Mao ready to support Chiang in an all-out war against Japan?

What are some data that could shed light on the solarz's assertion that the balance of power was more favorable to China in 1931 than 1937? How many aircraft, tanks, and soldiers did each country have in 1931 and 1937? What was the industrial base of China and Japan in 1931 and 1937?

in 1931, China's armies were seriously weakened as a result of the 1930 Central Plains War. China had less than 150 planes, few tanks, and no navy, heavy debts owned to the West, etc...

in 1937, Chiang Kai Shek and the provincial military leaders were united against the Japanese aggression. if the war happened in 1931, it was unknown whether the Yunnan and Sichuan leaders would support the war. China had around 700 planes, 3 armored tank battalions, around 100 tanks, and a navy. the central army was modernized to a large degree, vast improvements made to the railways and roads system, general electrification of the country, no known inflation, repaid the majority of the heavy debts owned to the West, etc...

China was definitely stronger and in a better position to resist the Japanese invasion in 1937 than 1931.

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talk is cheap. Mao Zedong's words was the epitome of that kind of maybe patriotic ( assuming no ulterior motive ) but regrettable simply unrealistic or gullible opinion then. he wasn't the one leading the war against the Japanese invasion.

 

[solarz]

If quick surrender induced the Japanese to commit mass slaghter, why didn't they do that for Beijing, Harbin, Hong Kong, Singapore or any of the other cities they captured easily? The Japanese army frequently executed and tortured prisoners but no other city in Asia saw the kind of mass rape and killing that Nanjing saw.

No, not quick surrender, but the abandonment of a Capital City without even a fight, and the mass desertions of the NRA soldiers. Both Beijing and Singapore fought back, while Harbin and HK were little more than towns at the time.

 

[solarz]

in 1931, China's armies were seriously weakened as a result of the 1930 Central Plains War. China had less than 150 planes, few tanks, and no navy, heavy debts owned to the West, etc...

in 1937, Chiang Kai Shek and the provincial military leaders were united against the Japanese aggression. if the war happened in 1931, it was unknown whether the Yunnan and Sichuan leaders would support the war. China had around 700 planes, 3 armored tank battalions, around 100 tanks, and a navy. the central army was modernized to a large degree, vast improvements made to the railways and roads system, general electrification of the country, no known inflation, repaid the majority of the heavy debts owned to the West, etc...

China was definitely stronger and in a better position to resist the Japanese invasion in 1937 than 1931.

And what did Jiang have *after* the battle of Shanghai?

Meanwhile, the Japanese gained hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the form of collaborator troops, a vast area of resources and industrial centers.

Yet, history proved that the most important thing Jiang lost was the hearts and minds of the people. His decision to appease the Japanese sowed the seed that would result in his removal from power.

 

[montyp165]

When did Mao write that? It's easy for to second guess decisions when the results of history are known, but historians have to look at what leaders knew at the time. Besides, was Mao ready to support Chiang in an all-out war against Japan?

What are some data that could shed light on the solarz's assertion that the balance of power was more favorable to China in 1931 than 1937? How many aircraft, tanks, and soldiers did each country have in 1931 and 1937? What was the industrial base of China and Japan in 1931 and 1937?


If quick surrender induced the Japanese to commit mass slaghter, why didn't they do that for Beijing, Harbin, Hong Kong, Singapore or any of the other cities they captured easily? The Japanese army frequently executed and tortured prisoners but no other city in Asia saw the kind of mass rape and killing that Nanjing saw.

My opinion is that that the Nanjing Massacre was the result of Japanese anger at China for having inflicted, for the firs time, heavy casualties during their surprise resistance at Shanghai, coupled with the desire to humiliate and intimidate China into surrendering. After all, Nanjing was the capital of China. The Japanese army didn't use Shanghai as their target because 1) the city was mostly destroyed in the fighting and 2) they were quickly ordered to advance up the Yangtze River toward Nanjing and didn't have time to enjoy their spoils of war in Shanghai.

This is the letter that cover's Mao's discussion, written August 10, 1936:

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[lightspeed]

And what did Jiang have *after* the battle of Shanghai?

Meanwhile, the Japanese gained hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the form of collaborator troops, a vast area of resources and industrial centers.

Yet, history proved that the most important thing Jiang lost was the hearts and minds of the people. His decision to appease the Japanese sowed the seed that would result in his removal from power.

Chiang’s strategy of trading space for time was right. China would certainly be conquered by Japan if the full-scale war happened in the early 1930s. the average Chinese was driven by single-minded patriotism to advocate an all-out war against Japan. Chiang had to consider the big picture in the grand scheme of things.

from China’s point of view, the Shanghai battle was staged for the right reasons. from Chiang’s angle, he should have fought the large battle against the Japanese in the North even if it suited the Japanese’s strategy to attack from North to South because he shouldn’t have risked his and the KMT’s strong power base in Shanghai and proximity at the onset. nevertheless, the Shanghai losses were not in vain because they achieved certain military and political objectives then.

 

[solarz]

Chiang’s strategy of trading space for time was right. China would certainly be conquered by Japan if the full-scale war happened in the early 1930s. the average Chinese was driven by single-minded patriotism to advocate an all-out war against Japan. Chiang had to consider the big picture in the grand scheme of things.

from China’s point of view, the Shanghai battle was staged for the right reasons. from Chiang’s angle, he should have fought the large battle against the Japanese in the North even if it suited the Japanese’s strategy to attack from North to South because he shouldn’t have risked his and the KMT’s strong power base in Shanghai and proximity at the onset. nevertheless, the Shanghai losses were not in vain because they achieved certain military and political objectives then.

The 29th Army fought with swords against Japanese rifles and artillery, and held out for 3 months.

You claim that China would have been a pushover for the Japanese in the early 1930's, but the historical facts simply do not support it. I have no doubt that Jiang thought as you did, and history has shown that Jiang ended in failure.