Future PLAN orbat discussion

AndrewS said:

Yes, I know all this.

But realistically, you have to accept that US aircraft carriers will dominate the oceans past the 2nd Island Chain.
To challenge this, the Chinese Navy would have to build a larger fleet of aircraft carriers and obtain blue-water maritime superiority.
That is simply not achievable in the next 15+ years

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They don't consider it a problem. They consider it a challenge. They are certainly trying to achieve this.

Until this happens, you're just going to accept the harsh reality that i wartime, the Chinese merchant fleet will have to stay in protected waters.
And geography means the merchant fleet will hug the Chinese coastline for the main part, but also reach down into the South China Seas and intermingle with ASEAN trade.

But the key thing to remember is that China's theory of victory only requires the 1st Island Chain.

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If the Chinese merchant fleet cannot go anywhere, such as Australia and Africa for grain and ore, it is effectively crippled and great damage to the Chinese economy. They have tankers going to the Middle East and to Russia, to Brazil for grain and soy. Even Canada and the US remain vital suppliers.

The end goal of the Chinese Navy is prevent a war, by showing they cannot be bullied around without serious payback. If you are already fighting a war, you have effectively already lost your strategic goals.

Tam said:

You cannot rely on a few destroyers with powerful radar providing the detection bubble for the fleet. The problem lies with the boundaries of the bubbles and the earth's curvature. Smaller ships with advanced sensors can fill these gaps, and provide a better margin of their own self protection.

You seem to be arguing going against the grain where the rest of the world's navies are going. They are equipping smaller ships with advanced sensors. The US is doing this with the LCS and with FFG(X). Look at all these smaller ships. Why are they all equipped with advanced sensors? Do they know something you don't?

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You have to be clearer about the scenarios you are referring to.

A fleet in the high-risk waters past the 1st Island Chain will be under EMCON and not using their radars for the vast majority of the time.
Ships using their radars only provide a DEFENSIVE detection bubble which is limited by the radar horizon, but at the risk of being detected.

It is better to use fast airborne assets that use radars to create an OFFENSIVE detection bubble, and which can cover so much more area.

I said that the trend is larger numbers of platforms with *good enough* sensors.
There is a different definition of *good enough* depending on whether you are operating in low-risk areas next to mainland China versus the high-risk areas past the 1st Island Chain.

Tam said:

They don't consider it a problem. They consider it a challenge. They are certainly trying to achieve this.

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Yes, that doesn't change the fact that the US Navy will dominate the oceans past the 2nd Island Chain for the next 20 years.

If the Chinese merchant fleet cannot go anywhere, such as Australia and Africa for grain and ore, it is effectively crippled and great damage to the Chinese economy. They have tankers going to the Middle East and to Russia, to Brazil for grain and soy. Even Canada and the US remain vital suppliers.

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Yes, in wartime, the Chinese merchant cannot go past even the 1st Island Chain.
But this will not cripple the Chinese economy, because they have this scenario in mind.
At the end of the day, China is a continental-sized country which can be broadly self-sufficient.

The end goal of the Chinese Navy is prevent a war, by showing they cannot be bullied around without serious payback. If you are already fighting a war, you have effectively already lost your strategic goals.

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So please list out China's strategic goals as you see them.

AndrewS said:

You have to be clearer about the scenarios you are referring to.

A fleet in the high-risk waters past the 1st Island Chain will be under EMCON and not using their radars for the vast majority of the time.
Ships using their radars only provide a DEFENSIVE detection bubble which is limited by the radar horizon, but at the risk of being detected.

It is better to use fast airborne assets that use radars to create an OFFENSIVE detection bubble.

I said that the trend is larger numbers of platforms with *good enough* sensors.
There is a different definition of *good enough* depending on whether you are operating in low-risk areas next to mainland China versus the high-risk areas past the 1st Island Chain.

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Fleet in high risk waters should be using AESA in LPI mode which means they are scanning but these scans are difficult to detect and if detected, hard to tell from background static.

It won't be expensive to equip 056 and 054A with AESA considering the export versions already are sold with them. That means if Bangladesh can afford them, China certainly can.

Adding AESA on 056 and 054A would extend the bubble. Based on the new radar seen on the Type 075, even a smallish AESA like that has a range of up to 350 km. Compared to the previous Type 382 radar, the new radar might give earlier warning and detection against stealthier targets, giving the ship a more advance warning margin for defensive reaction. It can potentially bring the ship much closer in sensor performance with European frigates and destroyers that currently rely on smaller, rotating AESAs and PESAs but are set on top of the mast.

Furthermore, this AESA is situated on top of the mast giving it an extended radar horizon so it can peer down farther than the Type 346 radars on the 052D and 055 can.

So if you modify the ship there is still some potential there for improving its air defense posture. It gets better if the HQ-16 has a more advanced version or is replaced by something else. Then replace YJ-83 with a newer antiship missile. At least a YJ-12 maybe, or a Chinese copy of LRASM or a NSM style successor to the YJ-83, long range subsonic antiship missiles with stealthier characteristics. These are armament changes and do not requires changes to the ship per se other than new software added to their combat management systems.

Tam said:

If it was mature and cheap enough for the export market, then its no longer an issue of technology, but specification.

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Just because one example of said technology is offered for export does not mean the whatever kind of radar the PLAN would have wanted would've been sufficiently mature and low cost for them to field it on a frigate of their own.
It's not the first time that a nation or even China has offered something for export initially that was seemingly more capable than what they had in service at the exact time.

I would say that if they wanted to make the ship, they can have the budget for it. What's a few billion for an 11 trillion dollar economy? Remember that this is not a democracy.

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We are operating under the assumption here that the PLAN has a finite budget and are making procurement decisions based on balancing costs, requirements, technologies and capabilities.

The idea of giving ASHMs to the Coast Guard isn't a bad idea. The US toyed with it at one time.

The idea of patrolling your coast lines with ASW corvettes is not an invalid idea. The Soviet Union has tons of it. They also have a lot more coastline. The question is why do you need 70 corvettes?

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Because East Asia is brimming with a large number of capable and modern submarines?

The US has given their Hamilton cutters AShMs in the past, for a period in the Cold War, yes. But for the CCG to give their cutters weapons that in the present day are reserved for AShMs is a far bigger call than what can just be mused upon as an easy possibility.

There was nothing wrong with the way the 054A was procured during that time and situation.

But at some point, the conservatives within the PLAN was realizing that the domestic technology was advancing much faster and better than they had expected. Its truly a unique and rare situation where the naval planners themselves may have greatly underestimated what their own industry was capable of. None of these would matter in a theoretical battlespace in 2030, however. This would still be okay unless you are realizing your nation might be falling into the Thucydides Trap.

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Well, my overall argument is that I don't think we have any reason to think that the 054A procurement in the context of the PLAN's overall procurement during the 2010s was problematic.

I think it is fine to wonder "what if they went for a 2017 054B" -- but I think you are significantly overreaching if trying to suggest that it was somehow a significantly missed opportunity. I think you can't really make that kind of argument, given we wouldn't know how it could have altered the funding for development and procurement of other ships like 052D, 055, 056/A and overall fleet structure.

Bltizo said:

Just because one example of said technology is offered for export does not mean the whatever kind of radar the PLAN would have wanted would've been sufficiently mature and low cost for them to field it on a frigate of their own.
It's not the first time that a nation or even China has offered something for export initially that was seemingly more capable than what they had in service at the exact time.

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I don't think its about maturity, more like specification.

We are operating under the assumption here that the PLAN has a finite budget and are making procurement decisions based on balancing costs, requirements, technologies and capabilities.

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We are also talking of the smaller, less costly element of the PLAN.

Because East Asia is brimming with a large number of capable and modern submarines?

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How big is that number? Can that still be handled by fewer, but more advanced corvettes or frigates?

Well, my overall argument is that I don't think we have any reason to think that the 054A procurement in the context of the PLAN's overall procurement during the 2010s was problematic.

I think it is fine to wonder "what if they went for a 2017 054B" -- but I think you are significantly overreaching if trying to suggest that it was somehow a significantly missed opportunity. I think you can't really make that kind of argument, given we wouldn't know how it could have altered the funding for development and procurement of other ships like 052D, 055, 056/A and overall fleet structure.

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I think its still a missed opportunity, the effects are more apparent in the longer term than it is right now.

Tam said:

And how do you expect these destroyers are defended from submarines? Or frigates? Or LCS armed with NSM? The very idea why you have small warships is that they are giant killers, and you need small warships to counter small warships.

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You don't need small warships to counter small warships.
Within the 1st Island Chain and 2nd Island Chain, you use airplanes and missiles to counter other ships.
It doesn't matter where those airplanes and missiles come from.

I expect the corvettes to help protect the destroyers all the way to the 1st Island chain (Ryukus, Miyako Straits) and the frigates to accompany the destroyers in full surface task groups. In fact PLAN's destroyer divisions are organized with combined destroyer/frigate formations, not with dedicated frigate formations. If you follow the idiom you train like you fight, Type 054A follow the 052C/D in task groups as they venture out through the Miyako Straits into the Philippine Sea.

The way the PLAN trains and exercises on record do not follow the way you depict how they fight.

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Why do you expect a Corvette to accompany a surface fleet to the 1st Island Chain?

For ASW, it doesn't have a helicopter, and there would be multiple towed arrays and VDS on other ships anyway.
For AAW, it only has short-range air defence, and would rely on other ships to defend it.
For ASuW, it only has 4 small antiship missiles.

At the moment, I would expect PLAN doctrine to have Type-54A frigates performing ASW screening for fleets past the 1st Island Chain.
But equally, the Destroyers would provide an air defence screen for the Type-54A Frigate.

But eventually, the Type-54A will be replaced by a successor ASW Frigate or ASW destroyer.
Which leaves the Type-54A to operate in low-risk rear areas.

AndrewS said:

You don't need small warships to counter small warships.
Within the 1st Island Chain and 2nd Island Chain, you use airplanes and missiles to counter other ships.
It doesn't matter where those airplanes and missiles come from.

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You do actually for the same reason why tanks are the best counters to tanks, not airplanes and helicopters. The reason is that aircraft do not have the surface persistence that a ship have.

Why do you expect a Corvette to accompany a surface fleet to the 1st Island Chain?

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To help protect the fleet from submarines.

For ASW, it doesn't have a helicopter, and there would be multiple towed arrays and VDS on other ships anyway.
For AAW, it only has short-range air defence, and would rely on other ships to defend it.
For ASuW, it only has 4 small antiship missiles.

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For ASW, the corvettes can work as an advance screen searching for targets and threats. As a screen, they can detect and engage other frigates and corvettes (LCS and so on) ahead.

At the moment, I would expect PLAN doctrine to have Type-54A frigates performing ASW screening for fleets past the 1st Island Chain.
But equally, the Destroyers would provide an air defence screen for the Type-54A Frigate.

But eventually, the Type-54A will be replaced by a successor ASW Frigate or ASW destroyer.
Which leaves the Type-54A to operate in low-risk rear areas.

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I would expect the Type 054A to be upgraded, to allow it to operate on high risk area. If they have already had this in mind such as among the later batches, the infrastructure to allow such upgrades would already be built into the ship internally even if it is not apparent from the outside. The fact that the Bangladesh C13B corvettes have an AESA radar shows the ships have the infrastructure in place. The Pakistan 054A/P also has the same AESA, which shows the ship also having the infrastructure already added and anticipated for such upgrades. I don't anticipate that all the ships can be upgraded, only later batches made with this foresight in mind. If you remember the Arleigh Burke as an example, only the ships that belong to the Flight IIA batch can be upgraded to an AESA, as the ship was built in anticipation for future upgrades, but earlier ships belonging to the Flight I and II batches cannot.

You do note that both the 056A and the 054A, in their later batches also have visible changes in their ESM, based on sharper higher resolution pictures. Even if they don't operate their radars, the ESM will enable them to detect threats passively. This is by coincidence (or not) that the ships are also getting the possible high speed data array on top of the 056A's deckhouse and on top of the 054A's hanger. If the ships move into threat territory with active sensors off, passive sensors on, they would be able to communicate any findings across their network. At this point, if the other side doesn't have or use LPI mode on their radar, or if they are not in EMCON, they will get detected.

Tam said:

You do actually for the same reason why tanks are the best counters to tanks, not airplanes and helicopters. The reason is that aircraft do not have the surface persistence that a ship have.

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It's a different tactical environment.

Tanks aren't always the best counters to other tanks.
In urban areas, you don't use tanks against tanks. You use infantry and portable anti-tank weapons.

Mainland China is basically one huge urbanised environment where you can hide your anti-ship missiles or safely base your aircraft from.
But these systems can range out to 1500km-2000km offshore.

Manned surveillance aircraft have a persistence of up to 12hours.
Unmanned aircraft potentially even longer.
You simply do not need many aircraft to cover the entire Western Pacific, because ships are slow.

The aircraft basically act as missile/artillery spotters, to use a land-based analogy.

It is ships that have difficulty hiding against what is essentially a flat featureless ocean surface.

Tam said:

I would expect the Type 054A to be upgraded, to allow it to operate on high risk area. If they have already had this in mind such as among the later batches, the infrastructure to allow such upgrades would already be built into the ship internally even if it is not apparent from the outside. The fact that the Bangladesh C13B corvettes have an AESA radar shows the ships have the infrastructure in place. The Pakistan 054A/P also has the same AESA, which shows the ship also having the infrastructure already added and anticipated for such upgrades. I don't anticipate that all the ships can be upgraded, only later batches made with this foresight in mind. If you remember the Arleigh Burke as an example, only the ships that belong to the Flight IIA batch can be upgraded to an AESA, as the ship was built in anticipation for future upgrades, but earlier ships belonging to the Flight I and II batches cannot.

You do note that both the 056A and the 054A, in their later batches also have visible changes in their ESM, based on sharper higher resolution pictures. Even if they don't operate their radars, the ESM will enable them to detect threats passively. This is by coincidence (or not) that the ships are also getting the possible high speed data array on top of the 056A's deckhouse and on top of the 054A's hanger. If the ships move into threat territory with active sensors off, passive sensors on, they would be able to communicate any findings across their network. At this point, if the other side doesn't have or use LPI mode on their radar, or if they are not in EMCON, they will get detected.

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So now you're saying that the later batches of Type-54A are actually fine, because they can be upgraded?

So where does the fear of premature block obsolescence of the Type-54A come from?