Future PLAN naval and carrier operations
- Thread starter Tam
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LOL all the circumstances are much changed, except you taking things out of context.
vesicles
Colonel
Keep in mind that the first island chain is literally at the door step for China. With the opposing forces stationed so close to home, China is currently defending its own homeland. China should use its most effective tools to do the job. When your opponent is at your face, you punch them with all you’ve got. And for virtually all military in the world, the hardest punch happens to be the land-based systems.
Pushing to the second island chain is pushing further out towards their opponents and moving closer to the concept of establishing a deterrence.
Just to expand, you want the "biggest punch for a set budget".
That generally comes from land-based systems which are cheap, mobile and can easily hide in ground clutter.
Except hiding in that ground clutter means there will either be collateral damage or deliberate damage of your homeland at the same time. My point is land based forces on your homeland means having your homeland targeted for attack giving your opponent the convenience of killing two birds with one stone: hit your offensive power and hit your homeland while they are at it. This is ultimately more costly for you than paying for expeditionary forces to take the fight away from your homeland, preferably to your opponent's homeland, and in order for your opponent to protect their homeland they must divert resources to target your expeditionary forces where they do not have the opportunity to also hit your homeland at the same time.
So once the set budget is big enough to allow for choice, it pays to have expeditionary forces as well as for lack of a better term, garrison forces.
China's 1st island chain opponents' land based forces are analogous to the Maginot Line, except of course they have their own naval and air expeditionary forces i.e. carriers/LHAs/LHDs to take the fight to China's mainland rather than have the fight over the waters within the 1st island chain. Therefore once China can afford it, it pays for it to have its own naval and air expeditionary forces to take the fight to the 1st island chain "mainlands" including flanking just east of it. In the case of overlapping range homeland based and expeditionary forces work together to enhance each other's effectiveness. This is not taking the fight to the 2nd island chain but fighting over the 1st. This conventional MAD with the 1st island chain "mainlands" is China's improved deterrence of any conventional action against it within the 1st island chain.
D
Deleted member 13312
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I don't think that there is any opponent who would be sane enough to attempt to bring a fight to China's main land proper. The amount of troops, ground to cover and opposition to contend with to achieve a strategic victory of such magnitude that even nations like the US or Russia will find themselves exhausted long before they achieve even the halfway point.
Therefore the PLAN's main job is not to prevent an invasion from the ocean, ground based artillery and air assets will make any attempt a living nightmare, but to ensure that China's sea line of communications are not cut off. Thing is, such lines of communication need not be directly connected to China's shores in order to work. A line established from Gwadar to China's Xinjiang, while it might cost more, at least will be out of the way of any significant conflict in the immediate area.
I would expect the bulk of its naval assets to be concentrated in the SCS, more specifically around the Malacca Straits in any event of hostilities.
Therefore the PLAN's main job is not to prevent an invasion from the ocean, ground based artillery and air assets will make any attempt a living nightmare, but to ensure that China's sea line of communications are not cut off. Thing is, such lines of communication need not be directly connected to China's shores in order to work. A line established from Gwadar to China's Xinjiang, while it might cost more, at least will be out of the way of any significant conflict in the immediate area.
I would expect the bulk of its naval assets to be concentrated in the SCS, more specifically around the Malacca Straits in any event of hostilities.
Bolded part is relevant.
Part of the issue is about budget, part of it is about sustained budget and dividing that between cost effectiveness given the bounds of existing geography and geopolitical alliances.
In time, if/when the geopolitical landscape in the region changes and when the budget begins to reach a certain size it will make more sense to put more of the budget into expeditionary forces overall. Until then, China will have to balance having systems oriented for regional/homeland defense as well as building an emerging core of expeditionary forces.
There isn't anything that China can really do about coastal China being attacked.
The 1st island chain is that close to coastal China and vice-versa. And both sides would have enough land area to hide lots of cheap cruise missiles. if they choose to.
In the event of Chinese naval expeditionary forces operating at the 1st Island chain, the majority of Chinese air and missile assets might as well be located on the Chinese mainland given the short distances. There "garrison forces" will always have a huge power projection role, given the numerous available targets along the 1st Island Chain that surrounds the Chinese coast.
That calculation won't change for a long time yet.
But in the long-run, we will probably see China build a carrier fleet that could isolate the Western Pacific from outside forces, which is the ideal situation for China.
You are correct that no sane opponent would ever want to fight China proper on land.
But that opponent may have no choice.
If the US and China get into a naval-air war, how long will it be until we see the Chinese Army pouring into the Korean Peninsula?
The US 2nd Infantry Division based in Seoul will be forced to fight the Chinese Army, and the US will be dragged into that land war in which it cannot achieve a strategic victory.
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With the current balance of military power, I agree that the main purpose of the PLAN will be to keep the trade routes open.
But realistically, Gwadar is too isolated to support and is there actually any need for a PLAN presence there, if Chinese/Pakistani/Iranian/Afghan trade is completely intermingled at Pakistani ports?
On the other hand, it is feasible for the PLAN to keep the South China Seas open, given the new bases and how close it is to the Chinese mainland. China is the world's largest trading nation with most of that trade flowing through the SCS, and China does sit at the centre of the Asian trade network.
So China will be trying to keep the SCS open for everyone in order to intermingle its trade and break a US blockade.
In comparison, the US will be trying to shut down that shipping. Given how dependent Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia are on SCS/China trade, those countries will be aligned with China against a US blockade.