Hi Obi Wan, I wonder, what's your opinion what's the smallest and cheapest practical CATOBAR carrier? Let's take Italian Cavour-class carrier- could they have made it as CATOBAR, able to operate say F-18 and E-2, without significantly higher costs or enlargement of the ship?
Falklands War, 1982, Thread
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I dabbled with this very thought myself a few years ago, there are two sides to the question I believe. Could a ship of that size successfully launch and recover CATOBAR aircraft? And would it be able to carry enough aircraft to make the job worthwhile. On the second point it is worth noting that nations that built the smallest carriers they could in the 70s and 80s are building bigger now, for exactly this reason.
Back to the first point, my own gut feeling is to bottom line for a viable CATOBAR Carrier is probably around 30,000 tonnes, and about 800ft long, which would equate to an angled deck of around 550-600ft:
In these two illustrations the first being the basic Cavour design and the second being my own take on a CTOL variant, consequences of the change are immediately apparent: in order to accommodate the angled deck, the island superstructure had to be shortened somewhat, but this is compensated for by building a starboard sponson beneath the 'Alaska Highway' outboard of the island (as was done with HMS Hermes in 64-66), so that compartments lost with a smaller island are simply relocated lower down. This starboard extension also helps to balance out the new portside sponson for the angled deck itself. If the Cats are steam powered, then a dedicated steam generating plant is needed as this design like most modern warships is Gas Turbine powered. If EMALS are used, then extra electricity generating capacity will be needed, which means more demand for internal space somewhere in the ship (possible answered as in the CVFs, by putting GTs in the Sponsons under the flight deck level. More engines require more crew and... well now you see the beginning of the growth spiral.And we haven't even got to the size of the air group yet. When planning any warship, the requirements start with the mission, not the size. Define your mission, define the types and numbers of aircraft needed to execute that mission (eg how many fighters are needed to maintain CAP over the fleet, Do you want dedicated strike aircraft of a separate type or will their mission be amalgamated into the same type as your AD). AEW is a must, fixed wing or rotary? ASW is a minimum requirement, so six to nine helos at least even on CATOBAR Carriers. That 30,000tonne hull is starting to feel very cramped now isn't it?
If all you want is a basic capability, say 12 fighter bombers, 3-4 AEW and six ASW then you're probably still ok at this size. For a relatively small extra outlay you can buy a much bigger hull though (assuming the same weapon and sensor fit, and mostly the same power plant) as the ship steel is probably the cheapest part of the design. This is why the CVFs are pushing 70,000tonnes even though their basic air group is about the size I outlined above. They can soak up a lot more aircraft when needed and still be run economically in peacetime. There are many more factors that influence the design, but my bottom line is yes, a 30,000 tonne CATOBAR Carrier is feasible. If you can afford one, you can afford something a bit bigger too...
This discussion really belongs in the Aircraft Carriers III thread, I'd be grateful if one of the Mods could move it over.
You could certainly build one smaller, but it wouldn't be practical. With Carriers, bigger is always better.
Miragedriver
Brigadier
I'm in agreement TerraN:
The Argentine fleet was hardly large enough to go toe to toe with the Royal Navy, but it had plenty of time to escort merchant shipping to the islands without any possible opposition. Further, even after RN subs arrived on station, the modern Type 42 destroyers, and the anti-submarine assets of the ARA could have given respectable defense to convoys dashing back and forth. It would have been high risk, but no more high risk than having three World War II era ships blindly sailing around to the South Atlantic with virtually no defense against modern submarines.
The Argentine fleet was hardly large enough to go toe to toe with the Royal Navy, but it had plenty of time to escort merchant shipping to the islands without any possible opposition. Further, even after RN subs arrived on station, the modern Type 42 destroyers, and the anti-submarine assets of the ARA could have given respectable defense to convoys dashing back and forth. It would have been high risk, but no more high risk than having three World War II era ships blindly sailing around to the South Atlantic with virtually no defense against modern submarines.
Miragedriver
Brigadier
I'm in agreement with you Jeff. Below is a quote from one of my previous posts that basically sums up this fiasco of a war:
The Argentine decision to occupy the islands with large numbers of infantry, at the expense of a smaller, balanced combined arms force showed a fundamental lack of understanding of modern warfare by the Argentine leadership. Had the Argentine government studied MacArthur’s campaign in the Pacific at all, they would have realized that MacArthur only landed infantry, not to destroy Japanese forces, but instead to seize airfields. The failure of the junta to improve Stanley Airfield to take strike aircraft is stunning, especially given the aggressiveness and skill of the aviators. Basing the strike elements of the FAA there may not have prevented the British from retaking the islands, but failure to do so virtually guaranteed that the British eventually would.
Additionally, strategically and operationally, the war shows the critical importance of having clear political and military goals. The Argentine invasion was conceived and executed almost without any strategic though of the implications. The Military junta saw it more as a political move than a military one. The Argentine forces had long played a central role in domestic politics, and had never fought a modern external enemy. This blinded the junta to the likelihood that Britain, led by a Thatcher government that could not be seen as “appeasing” an opponent, would not only fight, but make every possible exertion to regain the islands. Further, the junta was stunned that the Reagan administration sided with Britain. South America was a hotbed of Communist activity in those days, and the Reagan White House had made a concerted effort to assist South and Central American governments and strengthen diplomatic and military ties throughout the region. How the junta managed to convince itself this would outweigh 70 years of the “special relationship” and an alliance through two world wars as well as the ties of NATO is an open question. The junta thought they were going to negotiate a solution to the standoff, and just possibly had to fight. The British, on the other hand, assumed they would have to fight, and if there was a diplomatic breakthrough, so be it. This mindset clearly gave the British the upper hand in preparation for the coming battle.
Miragedriver
Brigadier
The Argentine forces had long played a central role in domestic politics, and had never fought a modern external enemy. This blinded the junta to the likelihood that Britain, led by a Thatcher government that could not be seen as “appeasing” an opponent, would not only fight, but make every possible exertion to regain the islands. Further, the junta was stunned that the Reagan administration sided with Britain. South America was a hotbed of Communist activity in those days, and the Reagan White House had made a concerted effort to assist South and Central American governments and strengthen diplomatic and military ties throughout the region. How the junta managed to convince itself this would outweigh 70 years of the “special relationship” and an alliance through two world wars as well as the ties of NATO is an open question. The junta thought they were going to negotiate a solution to the standoff, and just possibly had to fight. The British, on the other hand, assumed they would have to fight, and if there was a diplomatic breakthrough, so be it. This mindset clearly gave the British the upper hand in preparation for the coming battle.
Miragedriver
Brigadier
Some interesting statistics:
British Naval losses in the campaign
(The flowing is taken word for word from Wikepedia)
British Naval losses in the campaign
(The flowing is taken word for word from Wikepedia)
- - set on fire by an launched from a May 4, (†20) - Fatal Damage (sank on May 10)
- - sunk on May 25 by three bombs from a Douglas A-4B Skyhawk (†19+1) - Sunk
- - hit by unexploded bomb from a May 12, withdrawn from war - Moderate Damage
- - hit by an on June 11 (†14) - Major Damage, withdrawn from war
- - hit by unexploded bomb from an - Major Damage, withdrawn from war
- - hit by cannon fire - Minor Damage
- - hit by cannon fire, later damaged by bomb from - Moderate Damage
- - sank Argentine transport ship . Slightly damaged by bomb. Lynx helicopter damaged by return fire from armed coaster ARA Monsunen.
- - sank May 24 due to unsuccessful defusing attempt of unexploded bombs from (†2) - Sunk
- - sank May 21 by bombs from and (†22) - Sunk
- - hit by cannon fire - Minor Damage
- - hit by cannon/rocket and unexploded bombs from (†2) - Major Damage, withdrawn from war
- - unexploded bombs from - Major Damage, withdrawn from war
- - ran aground - Moderate Damage
- - Argentine fighters returning from an aborted mission jettisoned bombs in attack on submarine- Minor Damage
Miragedriver
Brigadier
Mirage V gun camera video
Miragedriver
Brigadier
A-4’s and Mirage aircraft attacking Royal Navy vessels in San Carlos bay. Brave airmen attacking and brave sailors defending.
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