Chinese SAM

I know there is a missile thread, but that's more of LACM and BM thread than SAM thread. Anyhow, I'm inspired by the sukhoi thread to post this:

Kuala Lumpur Tempur in English 01 Jan 03 pp 60, 61

Article by Prasun K. Sengupta: "China's KS-1A and FT-2000A air defence systems unveiled"


For a ground-based air defence system to be effective, it must be layered, redundant, robust and operate as an integrated battlespace air defence network. In recent years, countries have been acquiring new-generation, ground-based high- and medium-range air defence systems (HIMADS) that still leave a significant gap in the air defence envelope where 'leakers' can attack manoeuvre forces or vital assets by taking advantage of barrage electronic jamming tactics. Though current HIMADS systems are one of the best thought out and most capable mobile air defence systems yet to come out, they, are extremely expensive and are vulnerable to disruption from S- and C-Band airborne noise and deception jammers, used for the temporary suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) with lethal effect.

A novel solution to this operational handicap is the integration of ground-launched passive anti-radiation missiles (ARM) with the deployed HIMADS assets that will provide hardened air defence. Such ARMs must target and successfully neutralise airborne standoff jammers. Thus, in addition to homing on to radar frequencies, the ground-launched ARM must also incorporate a 'home-on-jam' capability, including the option to home on airborne or land-based jammers which try to disrupt the ever more important GPS navigation system (used by many of the latest precision-guided weapons). This allows the ARMs to be used in three different operational modes, known as Pre-Briefed (PB), Target Of Opportunity (TOO), and Self-Protect (SP). In PB mode, the long range (up to 100km) of ARMs like China's latest and unique surface-launched FT-2000A can be used to launch the missile on a lofted trajectory toward a known threat.

One such ARM is the FT-2000A, developed by the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEQ. Its existence was first revealed in mid-1998. The ground-launched ARM can engage airborne jammer aircraft and airborne early warning and control (AEW & Q aircraft. The FT-2000A is transported by and launched from an 8 x 8 cross-country truck, which has four canisters. The launch vehicle is the WS-2400, made by the China Sanjiang Space Group. Its design was influenced by the MAZ series of Russian ballistic missile transporters. In 1997 China obtained those MAZ transporters that were produced in Belarus and formerly used by Soviet SS-20 IRBMs. The China Sanjiang Space Group notes that "it has introduced foreign capital and technology to establish joint ventures with some famous enterprises from ... Belarus". The WS-2400 also forms the basis of the family of transporters that will be used to make China's future DF-31 A and DF-41 land-mobile ICBMs.

An unknown number of the FT-200OAs have already been deployed by the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) air defence forces in Zhangzhou city in Fujian province, where the FT200OAs are co-located along with Russia-made AImazS-300PMU1 SAMs. Both SAM types were mobilised from areas surrounding Beijing to Zhangzhou and Fuzhou, also in Fujian, during major PLA manoeuvres in 1995-1996 and 2001. From the Zhangzhou base, the SAMs are capable of attacking aircraft above Taiwan's Penghu island group and from Fuzhou, they can reach Taiwan's western Hsinchu coast.

The FT-200OKs three-stage missile is derived from CPMIECs proven HQ-2.1 SAM design and is cold-launched. When the missile detects and locks on to the radar or jammer, it can home on the target autonomously at 1,200 metres/second while sustaining a 14 G overload. If the target radar or jammer has been switched off before any lock-on could be acquired, the missile self-destructs. In SP mode, a friendly combat aircrafts radar warning receiver is used to detect enemy emissions. The FT-200OKs Command Launch Computer (CLC) then decides which target to attack, transmits the data to the missile, and then launches the missile. TOO mode means that the seeker of the FT-2000A itself has detected a target, and the missile can be fired manually if the radar or jammer operating between 2 and 8GHZ bandwidth is identified as a threat. The FT-2000A missile has a built-in inertial navigation system, so that whenever it has acquired a lock-on, it will continue towards the target even if the emitter is shut down (although the CEP is larger in this case). When fired in a salvo of two missiles, the FT-2000A has a kill probability of 0.95. The FT-200OKs proximity fuze has an effective range of 35 metres, which goes active when the missile is 5km away from its target.

The FT-2000A has a slant range of 12km to 100km up to an altitude of 18km. It weighs 1,300kg at launch. For the detection and localisation of hostile radar emissions and jammers the FT-2000A makes use of four ground-based Electronic Support Measures (ESM) sensor posts, each of which is mounted on wheeled vehicles and can together track 50 targets simultaneously. The ESM sensor posts are deployed at a distance 30km from each other. The missile launchers are deployed near the central ESM sensor station at a distance of 150 metres. The FT-2000A can also be used in conjunction with surveillance and target acquisition radars of the 3-D non-phased-array type. CPMIEC is now developing an active phased-array radar will be used for fire-control of future variants of the FT2000A. [sentence as published] A complete FT-2000A Battalion consists of a Command Platoon and three Batteries, each equipped with one central ESM sensor station and three auxiliary ESM stations, two power supply vehicles, 12 mobile launchers equipped with missiles in three motorised vehicles (with four launchers each), and 12 transportation and loading vehicles. The FT-2000A can also be deployed as a stand-alone air defence system or deployed as part of another SAM system like CPMIECs KS-1 A medium-range SAM, or MBDA's Jernas E-SHORADS.

Future variants of the FT2000A will incorporate a GPS receivers to greatly increase hit accuracy when radar lock on is lost after emitter switch-off, because GPS guidance will keep the missile within a narrow box towards the last known emitter position. The operational benefits of a combination of the FT-2000A can thus be summarised as follows:

-- It can be integrated with existing E-SHORADS and HIMADS assets like the MBDA Jernas and CPMIEC's KS-1A.

-- It becomes a lethal force multiplier by extending the KS-1A's effective engagement envelope to a distance of 110km.

-- Its completely passive guidance mode and ground-launched capability enable it to successfully engage standoff airborne noise and deception jammers operating in the Cand S-Bands, which until now was impossible.

-- There are no known active or hard-kill countermeasures systems or techniques to the FT-2000A, with the only option being to shut down the radars and jammers that will severely degrade hostile offensive air warfare and SEAD operations.

-- It increases the redundancy of deployed E-SHORADS and HIMADS systems by offering a combination of semi-active and fully passive means of guiding the SAMs to their targets. Its 100% passive target detection and acquisition system can accurately measure the angle, bearing and range coordinates of hostile airborne targets and gives the enemy no early warning at all of an impending interception. Being housed in wheeled all-terrain vehicles, the entire FT-2000A system is highly mobile and can be easily transported and deployed on short notice.

The Kai Shan 1A HIMADS

The KS-11A, presently being offered by CPMIEC to Malaysia and Pakistan, includes a Brigade-level command and control system (BCC) that can handle automatic command and control of three subordinate KS-1A Regiments. In addition, the BCC can also simultaneously control three E-SHORADS launchers and up to 27 air defence artillery gun units. The BCC has two-way secure voice and data communications with the command and control centre at a higher level through a radio communications system. Through the BCC, a kill probability of not less than 90% of small-formation airborne targets (less than four aircraft whose airspeed is not greater than 700metres/second) can be achieved, and more than 90% when the target speed is not greater than 560 metres/second and the intruding airborne target density is not greater than four aircraft a minute. The BCC, including an Air Situation Display console and Tracking Display console, adopts customised BITE technologies, and has embedded simulated training software for engaging more than 100 airborne targets in various flight profiles, all of which can be used for operational training in peacetime.

The KS-1A's HT-233 3-D C band monopulse planar phased array radar, operating in the 300MHz bandwidth, has a detection range of 120km and tracking range of 90km. It can detect targets in azimuth (360 degrees) and elevation (0 to 65 degrees). Coupled to the BCC, it can track some 100 airborne targets and can simultaneously engage more than 50 targets. One KS-1A firing unit can simultaneously engage three targets with six semi-active missiles, and comprises 24 missiles, one HT-233 radar, three power supply vehicles, six wheeled dual-missile launcher vehicles, six missile transporter-loading vehicles, one tractor, one missile test vehicle, three missile transport vehicles, one electronics maintenance vehicle, two tools vehicles, and one power supply vehicle. The single-chamber dual thrust, solid-fuelled missile, weighing 886kg, can engage targets flying as low as 0.5km and as high as 25km, has a slant range of 7km to 50km and a maximum speed of 1,200 metres/second.



Confirmation of these claims came even earlier than the authors expected. Look at the following report.

New York-based Shijie Ribao (World Journal) newspaper, June 24, 2002, p.A7 – "China Serially Produces Hongqi-15 Missile [System] – the King of Air Defense" (with insignificant omissions):

(Information from the newspaper's correspondent in Hong Kong): China earlier imported from Russia the S-300 ADM system, which received the Chinese name Hongqi (HQ)-15. These systems are deployed mostly near the Taiwan Strait and turned into the factor of psychological pressure on Taiwanese military pilots. According to reliable sources, China has already started serial production of the HQ-15, which has become the "king weapon" of Chinese air defense.

Russia's "Military survey" (probably the authoritative "Independent Military Survey" weekly newspaper) recently published the following report: In 1992 China imported from Russia three systems (battalions) of S-300 PMU missile launchers and 144 missiles for them. Later (in 1992-93) seven more improved S-300 systems were imported.

Very rapidly, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) mastered these systems and began missile-launching training. After several training-maneuvers of this kind, in 1994, the PLA became satisfied [with the S-300's performance] and decided to import the production line for S-300 "guochanhua" (serial production from Chinese components).

According to reports available, presently China managed to increase the "guochanhua level" (share of Chinese components) up to 70 percent in the Chinese-made HQ-15 system, i.e., a copy of the S-300 PMU-1. These systems are capable of launching a missile every three seconds and of attacking six different targets at once; the response time of this system is as little as 15 seconds.

The reports of Rosoboronexport corp. (the Russian state-owned weapon export monopoly) indicate that China is producing a renovated variety of the S-300, with improved space characteristics and software; moreover, the modular principle of S-300 design allows the Chinese side to upgrade these systems significantly by substituting a small number of key components.

Presently, S-300 systems (both Russian-made and Chinese-made) deployed near the Taiwan Strait are engaged in tracking Taiwanese Mirage (Mirage-2000) fighters. According to the insiders' information, the introduction of S-300 systems greatly increases China's air defense safety.

After the Kosovo War, the PLA did its best to upgrade its air defense. PLA experts believe that if the Yugoslav army had had S-300 systems, it would have been capable of hitting U.S. military aircraft.

Presently, China and Russia are jointly developing several new ADM systems, particularly the HQ-16. Researchers on both sides jointly worked out the tactical-technological characteristics of this system and are moving ahead with its development.

(end of summary from Russian "military survey" and Shijie Ribao article)

The most evident conclusions

They are as follows:

1) China is now capable of annually producing at least 10 battalions of HQ-15 or S-300 PMU1 ADM systems or maybe an even greater number. Each battalion includes 12 mobile launching platforms with four mobile launchers on a single platform and is capable of launching 48 missiles simultaneously. It also includes several mobile platforms with radars and controlling devices.

Each battalion of this kind effectively protects an airspace inside a circle with about 120-km radius, with an altitude of up to 25 km. The cost of such a battalion, for the PLA, evidently has fallen to about $30 million, while the Russian export price for an S-300 battalion reaches $300 million.

The PLA will be capable, in 2002-2004, of obtaining several dozen HQ-15/S-300 battalions and, consequently, of protecting the entire highly developed eastern coastal zone (which produces up to 60 percent of China's GDP) plus the most important eastern regions of the country.

According to several unconfirmed reports, in 2001 the PLA acquired from Russia several Triumph S-400 ADM launchers, with a range up to 250 km. Evidently, it won't be very difficult for the Chinese side to upgrade the HQ-15/S-300 systems to the S-400 level ("by substituting a small number of key components"), thus greatly expanding the combat potential of the already constructed multi-level air defense network.

An item of particular importance: China is acquiring some components for HQ-15/S-300 systems through the "back door" – the same as components for J-11/SU-27 fighters – from Russian defense plants and army units. For example, at the end of 2001, some sophisticated parts of S-300 systems were stolen in Birobidzhan garrison (about 150 km east of Khabarovsk city), very close to the Chinese border.

So, if necessary, China will upgrade its HQ-15/S-300 systems or increase their production volume even without an official agreement with Moscow.

2) Now one can claim that, very probably, China – by mid-2002 – also started serial production of Tor-M1/HQ-17 systems – very effective mid-range, mid-altitude ADM systems, although their technological level doesn't surpass that of the HQ-15 systems.

Each company of these systems includes four mobile platforms with two missile launchers on a single platform plus an additional radar/command and control platform. How many such companies could the PLA obtain in 2002-2004? Probably hundreds, taking into account their comparatively low cost.

Mid-range, mid-altitude HQ-17 systems are supplementing long-range high-altitude HQ-15 systems and supporting them on the lower level. If an enemy's fighter or cruise missile escapes the HQ-15 missile, then – almost certainly – an HQ-17 missile will hit it.

As mentioned in an earlier article, the "super Tor-M1"/HQ-16 is under joint Chinese-Russian development, probably a rapid one. When this system's development is completed, it would be comparatively easy to upgrade HQ-17 systems in the PLA inventory up to the HQ-16 level. That's because the Tor-M1 design – just like the S-300 one – is based on a modular principle, so the change of a small number of key components will provide a high rise in combat capacity.

3) Finally, let's look to the grimmest part of the picture (after Sept. 11, there is no way to "hide one's head in the sand" and ignore unpleasant realities). In the case of "high-tech limited conflict" around Taiwan – and the PLA during the last several years has actively prepared specifically for this – the losses of U.S. tactical aviation (F-15, F-16, F-18 fighters) could be very high. This would be the result of joint actions of long-range HQ-15/S-300 ADM systems, mid-range HQ-17/Tor-M1 ADM systems and low range missile-artillery Feimeng/Tunguska systems etc.

HQ-15

The Hongqi-15 (HQ-15) is a long-range, high-altitude, upgraded version of the Russian-made S-300PMU-1 (SA-10D Grumble). Currently manufactured and deployed by China, the system is designed to detect, track, and destroy incoming ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft.

In 1992, China began negotiating with Russia for the purchase of a series of S-300PMU-1 missiles. At the time, the S-300PMU1 was the most advanced Russian surface-to-air missile in existence, the latest version in the S-300P lineage that dates back to the 1960s. Still in service today, the S-300PMU1 is armed with single-stage, solid-fuel propelled 48N6 missiles, and has the capability to shoot down tactical ballistic missiles in addition to cruise missiles and aircraft, at ranges of 5-150 kilometers and altitudes between 10-27,000 meters.(1)

The 1,900-kilogram missile carries a 143 kilogram high-explosive fragmentation warhead. A typical S-300PMU-1 battery contains 48 missiles on 12 mobile launchers. Each battery is capable of launching one 48N6 missile every three seconds. The missiles are guided by the 36N85 vehicle-mounted engagement radar, which is capable of detecting incoming ballistic missiles at 40 kilometers, and aircraft between 3 and 150 kilometers. The 36N85 can guide up to twelve 48N6 missiles, while simultaneously tracking up to six targets.(2)

In 1993, China bought “dozens” of S-300PMU-1 missiles, and quickly deployed them around Beijing.(3) China’s interest in the Russian missile stemmed from (1) its quest for “great power status” by way of military modernization and (2) the very real possibility of a high-tech conflict with Taiwan. Two years later, Russia gave China clearance to begin manufacturing its own S-300s under the nomenclature Hongqi-10 (HQ-10).(4)

In addition to the HQ-10, China developed and manufactured its own upgraded version of the S-300PMU-1 known as the Hongqi-15 (HQ-15). The HQ-15 is similar to the HQ-10 in most ways, the main difference being its longer range: while the HQ-10 can engage targets up to 150 kilometers away, the upgraded HQ-15 has a range of 200 kilometers.(5) This extended range makes the HQ-10 the “king weapon” of China’s air defense, and a key element of its ballistic missile defense. According to the Shijie Ribao newspaper, the HQ-15 is manufactured with approximately 70 percent Chinese-made parts, an indication of China’s decreasing reliance on Russian hardware.(6)

China is currently deploying the HQ-15 along its eastern coastal zone—a highly developed region which produces up to 60 percent of its gross domestic product—and around the most important military bases, industrial complexes, and population centers in its eastern regions.(7) The deployment of the HQ-15 near the Taiwan Strait—as well as the S-300PMU-1/HQ-10, the HQ-16, the HQ-17, and the HQ-18—is primarily intended to counter threats from Taiwan, in particular Mirage (Mirage-2000) fighters but also ballistic missiles.(8)

China might be attempting to upgrade the HQ-15 to the level of the Russian S-400 (SA-20 Triumf), a next-generation missile with a reported range of 400 kilometers, giving it increased capability against aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. Missile defense experts Alexandr Nemets and Thomas Torda suggest that China could achieve the S-400 upgrade merely “by substituting a small number of key components.”(9) The deployment of a Chinese S-400-like missile system would further expand China’s air and missile defenses, which are already quite robust.


FT-2000

In a report to Congress on May 28, 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense highlighted the major improvements that China has made to its air and missile defense systems over the past few years, including “[the] development of an antiradiation SAM [surface-to-air missile], most likely intended to target AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] aircraft and standoff jamming platforms.”(1)

The report was referring specifically to the FT-2000, a Chinese anti-radiation surface-to-air missile system designed to counter electronic jamming aircraft, AWACS aircraft, and other air radiation wave targets. Developed and manufactured by the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) during the late 1990s, the FT-2000 is also believed to be capable of destroying tactical ballistic missiles, similar to the U.S. Patriot and the Russian S-300P systems on which it is based.(2) At present, two versions exist, the mobile FT-2000 and the fixed-based FT-2000A.(3)

The FT-2000 is the direct result of a concerted effort by China to eliminate an inherent vulnerability in medium- and long-range surface-to-air missiles: jamming. For decades, air and missile defense systems like the Patriot and the S-300P have been susceptible to advanced techniques designed to confuse or immobile their interceptor missiles and keep them from reaching their targets. One of the most common jamming devices is S- and C-band airborne noise. If used properly, this and other deception mechanisms lead to what is known as the “suppression of enemy air defenses” and allows attacking aircraft and missiles to proceed to their targets without challenge.(4)

The FT-2000 was designed to neutralize and counter these airborne jamming devices. It contains a passive radar target seeker programmed to detect the specific electromagnetic signals emanating from its target. Essentially, the FT-2000 uses its target’s own jamming frequencies against it. In addition, the FT-2000 has a passive homing system that does not transmit electromagnetic waves, thus minimizing the chances that its enemies will detect it in time.(5) The system is equipped with modified HQ-9 interceptor missiles, each of which is 6.8 meters long, 0.47 meters in diameter, and has a launch weight of 1,300 kilograms. The HQ-9 missiles give the FT-2000 a range of 12 to 100 kilometers and an operating altitude of 3 to 20 kilometers. The mobile system is transported and launched on an 8 X 8 cross-country launcher with four canisters that resemble those used by the S-300P.(6)

In addition to the mobile FT-2000, China has developed a fixed-based variant, the FT-2000A. According to a recent Chinese sales brochure, the FT-2000A uses a highly-modified HQ-2 missile that has been equipped with passive radio frequency homing seekers. Each HQ-2 is armed with a 60-kilogram fragmentation warhead and has a range of 60 kilometers and a maximum altitude of 18 kilometers. Reports indicate that each FT-2000A battery consists of 12 missile launchers, each containing one missile, and a central control station. The central control station has one master passive sensor and three auxiliary passive sensors. The four sensors are capable of triangulating on electromagnetic signals in the 2- and 6-GHz frequency range, which covers most AWACS aircraft and other air radiation wave targets, thus earning it the nickname “AWACS killer.”(7)

In addition to its role as an anti-radiation missile system, the FT-2000 also has advanced capability against tactical ballistic missiles, although this point is seldom mentioned. As Richard D. Fisher, Jr. has pointed out, Chinese officials at the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show—shortly after plans for the FT-2000 had been unveiled—stated that the FT-2000 was being developed into an active-guided missile that eventually would have the ability to shoot down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.(8) Since the FT-2000 is based on comprehensive systems such as the U.S. Patriot and the S-300P, it is no surprise that it too has anti-missile capabilities.

In October 2003, it was reported that China had closed a deal with its neighbor, Pakistan, to supply the latter with an unspecified number of FT-2000 missiles to counter India’s early warning capabilities. The China-Pakistan deal followed India’s own arrangement with Israel and Russia to install three Israeli Phalcon AWACS on Ilyushin Il-76 freighter aircraft, thus giving it an airborne early warning system.(9) According to various news sources, shortly after India announced its acquisition of the Phalcon radars, Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat, the head of Pakistan’s air force, visited China and conveyed Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s wish to purchase an unspecified number of FT-2000s.(10)

The recent China-Pakistan arrangement may just be an attempt to maintain the delicate balance of power between India and Pakistan, both of which possess nuclear weapons. Yet according to an article published in Malaysia in January 2003, the People’s Liberation Army is eager to export the FT-2000 around the globe.(11) It is entirely possible that “AWACS killer” air and missile defense systems like the FT-2000 will soon proliferate throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, a development that would introduce a multitude of strategic problems for the U.S. and its allies.


HQ-9
The Hongqi-9 (HQ-9) is a long-range, high-altitude, surface-to-air missile system developed and manufactured by China, designed to track and destroy aircraft, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. It incorporates technology from the Russian S-300P (NATO: SA-10 Grumble), the U.S. Patriot missile, and preexisting Chinese systems. (1) At present, China is outfitting its Type 052C destroyers with a naval variant of the HQ-9.(2)

China’s decision to develop and manufacture its own anti-missile system is a manifestation of its twenty-first century goal of achieving what political scientists refer to as “great power status”—the buildup of political, economic, and military strength. A key ingredient of “great power status” is military modernization, in China’s case the renovation of certain outdated aspects of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).(3) In particular, China has concentrated its recent efforts on boosting its offensive and defensive missile capabilities in order to compete with the U.S. and other Western powers.

Beijing’s specific emphasis on air and missile defense has its roots in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, during which China observed the complete supremacy of U.S. and Coalition air power in Iraq. The ability of the U.S. to decimate Iraq’s ground-based military with cruise missiles and smart bombs served to highlight China’s relative inability to defend its major cities, military assets, industrial complexes, and other high-value assets against such an attack. The development of China’s HQ-9 surface-to-air missile, therefore, is rooted in its observation and understanding of U.S. military power.(4)

Ironically, Beijing has ranked among the most vociferous opponents of U.S. missile defense, having denounced various U.S. initiatives during the Clinton administration, and more recently, the Bush administration’s decision in 2002 to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty.(5) Yet in recent years, China has followed a comprehensive two-track plan to bolster its own air and missile defenses: (1) the purchase of Russian surface-to-air missiles and (2) the development of its own missile defense systems.(6)

An example of this “redundant” acquisition and development program is China’s purchase of S-300P missiles from Russia, and the manufacturing of its own HQ-9 system.(7) The HQ-9, in particular, demonstrates China’s end goal of a comprehensive air and missile defense shield.(8) In a report to Congress on May 28, 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense emphasized this very point:

Significant developments over the past few years to improve China’s integrated air defense system include . . . [the] development of a land-based version of the long-range HQ-9, to precede a naval version, designed to be a long-range counter to high-performance aircraft, cruise missiles, ASMs, and tactical ballistic missiles.(9)

It is important to note, however, that the HQ-9 has been in development since the mid-1990s. In 1993, China purchased a large batch of S-300P missiles from Russia, and allegedly obtained a copy of the U.S. Patriot missile from Israel (although Israel denies that such a transfer took place).(10) The Chinese immediately began incorporating the S-300P and Patriot technology into their own air and missile defense system, the HQ-9. In 1997, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence suggested that “technology from advanced Western systems may be incorporated into the HQ-9.”(11) That same year, an official at a Russian missile design bureau acknowledged that the HQ-9 would incorporate the Patriot guidance and propulsion systems, thus confirming U.S. suspicions.(12)

According to missile defense expert David A. Fulghum, “[the HQ-9] uses a seeker-aided ground guidance system. The seeker on the missile sends target data back to the ground, which then correlates the target data for an intercept.”(13) It is assumed that the HQ-9’s seeker is similar to the Patriot’s “Track-via-Missile” guidance system.(14) Such a system, if actually used by the Chinese, would allow the HQ-9 interceptor missile to fly straight toward its target and explode at the point of nearest approach, thus completely destroying the incoming ballistic missile (or aircraft) or knocking it far enough off course so that it misses its intended target. During the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability-2 system, which employs “Track-via-Missile,” destroyed its targets between 40 and 70 percent of the time.

In addition to its land-based deployments, the HQ-9 has been recently modified to complement China’s burgeoning naval forces. Over the past few months, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) hasoutfitted two Type 052C destroyers with naval variants of the HQ-9, estimated to have a range of 65 nautical miles. Each Type 052C destroyer (similar to the U.S. Aegis destroyer) has six vertical launchers carrying approximately 36 missiles, as well as a phased-array radar system.(15) Initial reports indicate that the naval HQ-9 has a range of 65 nautical miles. The Type 052C destroyers will most likely be based at either Guangzhou or Zhanjiang.(16)

In October 2003, it was announced that China had sold its FT-2000 anti-radiation system, which uses HQ-9 missiles, to Pakistan as part of the latter’s military buildup against India. Many U.S. defense analysts predict that, over the next few years, the HQ-9 and its variants will be aggressively exported throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.


More
In mid-2000, the authors compiled a comprehensive report on China's construction – based on Russian technology – of a multi-level air defense network covering most of China's coast. The essence of this report – which did not attract the attention of U.S. officials – was used in the book "Chinese-Russian Alliance" (compiled in July 2001, to be published by NewsMax in September 2002).

Much has changed in this area – just as in other PLA sectors – in a year, however; this article is an attempt to track the most significant changes.

In 2000-2001, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) adopted the concept of "offensive and defensive character" for the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) instead of the purely "defensive Air Force" concept used for many years – and began implementing it. This immediately resulted in an acceleration of PLA air defense troop development; most of these troops, and almost all long-range and mid-range air defense missile systems, are subordinate to the PLAAF.

What is even more important, in 2001, both the PLAAF and PLA ground forces (focusing on anti-aircraft artillery and air defense missile (ADM) systems of short range and low altitude) concentrated efforts on the improvement of "san da" (three strikes) capabilities, which meant "strike at the enemy's stealth fighters, cruise missiles and attack helicopters."

Development of PLA air defense troops – more precisely, an air defense multi-level network – became even more accelerated. By the end of 2001, this network effectively covered the coastal, most-developed regions of the country as well as the most important areas in the internal regions, and generally included four major levels:

* Long-range, high-altitude ADM systems, represented by Russian-made S-300 systems as well as their Chinese-made copies and "derivatives" (given below). They are subordinate to the PLAAF.

* Mid-range, mid-altitude ADM systems, represented mostly by Russian-made TOR-M1 systems, their Chinese-made derivatives (given below) and "original Chinese" KS-1 systems. They are mostly subordinate to the PLAAF.

* Short-range, low-altitude systems, represented primarily by Chinese-made copies of the Russian Tunguska missile-artillery system (mostly subordinate to PLA ground forces).

-
* Shoulder-launched missiles of Russian and Chinese origin and Chinese-made anti-aircraft artillery (almost entirely concentrated in PLA ground forces).

At this point it would be proper to quote the article "[Major] Developments in China in the Military Area in 2001," published by the Taiwan-based journal Chung-Kung Yen-chiu (PRC [People's Republic of China] Research) in February 2002:

Presently the PLA is equipped with Russian-made S-300 PMU1 long-range ADM systems, [Russian-made] Tor-M1 field ADM [systems], "Feimeng" improved ADMs for ultra-low altitude, KS-1 mid-range ADMs, and QW-1 shoulder-launched ADMs; they form an all-range road-mobile ADM network.

In addition, the PLA acquired the FT-2000 "anti-radar missile system," to be used against the enemy's electronic warfare aircraft of various kinds and AWACS aircraft. The FT-2000, 6.8 m in length, 0.466 m in diameter, 1.3 tons in weight, has a range between 12 km and 100 km and an effective altitude between 3 km and 20 km. Each FT-2000 launcher has four missile-launching vertical tubes on the mobile platform; the FT-2000 system in its outer appearance is extremely close to the Russian S-300 system." (end of excerpt)

They forgot to mention the Chinese-made (reverse engineered) version of Russia's Tunguska system, known as GPZ-954. (Perhaps Feimeng is just the new name for it?)

One can claim that, by the end of 2001, PLA inventories included many hundreds of road-mobile systems of three upper levels and many thousands of weapons for the lowest level.

Situation in 2002

During the first half of 2002, this air defense network continued its quantitative expansion and qualitative upgrading. The following report characterizes this trend:

(Moscow-based Vedomosti newspaper, April 30, 2002, briefly):

In early April (April 4, by some data), Rosoboronexport (the Russian weapons export monopoly) signed a contract to sell two S-300F ship-borne anti-aircraft complexes to China for $200 million. The contract has increased the newly established (by President Putin's order signed in mid-April) Almaz-Antei Corp. parcel of orders by 50 percent. The Altair Enterprise is the company that produces the S-300F complex. Altair and 20 other designers and producers have become parts of Almaz-Antei.

The S-300F complex is a ship-borne replica of the S-300 anti-aircraft complexes. Beijing plans to install the RIF complexes (the name of the export version of the S-300F) on two warships that will be built in China by 2005. An expert from the Russian Air Force said that the S-300F complexes would be installed by China on cruisers designed by Chinese specialists.

In addition to this contract, Almaz-Antei will receive a contract to build the S-300 anti-aircraft complexes for China ($400 million). As a result, the total sum of its contracts will increase to $600 million. (end of report)

This report was confirmed by publications in the Taiwan and Hong Kong media on June 12-13, 2002, which specified that China is building, with Russian assistance, two "super-Sovremenny" destroyers, to be equipped by RIF ADM systems with a range up to 120 km.

Remarkably, the Chinese air defense network could spread to the sea, as a result of RIF installation on naval vessels, for at least 200 km. Earlier, Chinese frigates and destroyers could barely defend themselves from air strikes. However, Chinese destroyers of the new generation will become "outposts" of a coast-based air defense network.

Just as in the case of weapon platforms of other kinds, China's defense industry does it best for "guochanhua" (reverse engineering) of Russian-made ADM systems.

In 2002-2003, China very probably will master – or has already mastered – serial production of

the following systems, whose development has been under way, based on Russian technology, since 1999-2000:

1. HQ-15. This is the slightly improved version of Russia's long-range high-altitude S-300 PMU1/PMU2 system, with a range up to 120 km and an altitude up to 25 km.

2. HQ-16 or "super-Tor-M1." This is an all-new ADM system, jointly under development with Russia. It is a mid-range system, effective against low- to medium-altitude (100 m to 20 km) targets. The system's reaction time (time between target detection and missile launch) is 6-8 seconds.

A single missile system can simultaneously attack eight aircraft or missile targets, with a target-hit probability of 90 percent for any of these targets. The system uses the currently most-advanced vertical launching technology, a phased-array radar, and a composite-guidance warhead. Plans call for the HQ-16 to widely enter PLA service about 2005.

3. HQ-17. This is a slightly improved version of the Russian Tor-M1 system with a range up to 30 km and altitude up to 15 km. In 2000, the PLA decided to construct, by 2002-2003, between 10 and 12 air defense brigades equipped with hundreds of Tor-M1s and HQ-17s, as well as Chinese original KS-1 and KS-1A ADM systems.

4. HQ-18. This is a slightly improved version of the Russian S-300 V system. Its major characteristics somewhat surpass those of the HQ-15.

All the listed systems are road-mobile, just like the original S-300 and Tor-M1.

5. Feimeng (?) PGZ-95, having its prototype in the Russian Tunguska missile artillery system. It combines one ADM launcher and four 25 mm anti-aircraft guns on a single mobile platform. The system, with an altitude up to 3.5 km and a range up to 6 km, provides high-density fire and reportedly is extremely effective against cruise missiles and fighters of the fourth generation (F-15s, F-16s and F-18s). Serial production was mastered in 1999.

6. Shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles. This includes hundreds of Russian-made Igla missiles and their Chinese derivatives. This is in addition to China's original HQ-1, HQ-2 and HN-5 missiles.

Indeed, the PLA is constructing – and has constructed already, to some degree – an almost impenetrable multi-level network covering the entire seacoast of China, as well as a 100-to 200-km-wide airspace over the adjacent seas.

China is still dependent on Russia for some air defense technologies. That's why large-scale purchases of long-range ADM systems for installation both on the ground and on naval vessels are still going on. However, production technology transfer is intensive, and by 2005 or earlier, Russian ADM technology reservoirs will be pretty much exhausted (this doesn't exclude the new joint developments of ADM systems of the new generation).

Without doubt, the corresponding agreements on this account were discussed and signed during the recent visit of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov to Beijing.

On June 16-17, one of the Taiwan newspapers published the report "Beijing to Construct Its Own Missile Defense System," based on an article in the authoritative Beijing magazine Guoji zhanwang (International prospects). The major theses of this article are as follows:

1. America has abandoned the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty and is actively engaged in NMD (national missile defense) development.

2. Some of China's other neighboring countries have ballistic and/or cruise missiles of significant range, or intend to get them in the near future.

3. Under these circumstances, construction of the developed missile defense system has become an urgent task for China. This network should cover Taiwan and effectively protect the developed coastal regions as well as the most important facilities, such as the Three Gorges Hydropower Station inside the country. (end of theses)

This, undoubtedly, means that the PLA intends to add a fifth, highest level to the already existing four-level air defense network. The new level would be capable of hitting the enemy's ICBMs.

At this stage it is possible only to speculate about what components will be used for this fifth-level construction: Russia's Triumf S-400 ADM systems (with a range surpassing 200 km), which are reportedly at the PLA's disposal since mid-2001; the even more powerful S-500 system presently under development in Russia; and space-deployed anti-missile weapons?

What is known for sure: China wants to construct the most advanced, impenetrable air defense network, which would include an NMD system not inferior to the U.S. NMD system.

After this article was finished, the authors acquired some new documents, providing a frightening confirmation of the aforementioned conclusions regarding the HQ-15 and HQ-18 systems development and production in China. This will be material for a future article.

very nice typhuang!!! i could never have imagined china had such intricater defences.

one thing, can u provide some information on the equipment and deployment of AAA units in china? they are needed to provide a second layer of defence.

Thank you for your threads, TPHuang. I made some editing to make them easier to read. I hope you do not mind.

This is very comprehensive information about Chinese SAM. However, information from newmax is not always accurate. I can some information is based on reports of some Taiwanese, Hong Kong and overseas Chinese newspaper, for example, the so-called HQ-15, HQ-16, HQ-17 and HQ-18 programme. No concrete evidence exists to support these claims. There are lots of errors too. So use newsmax as a reference but never take it too seriously.

MIGleader said:

very nice typhuang!!! i could never have imagined china had such intricater defences.

one thing, can u provide some information on the equipment and deployment of AAA units in china? they are needed to provide a second layer of defence.

Click to expand...

I think China has one of the better air defenses around the world. It would be interesting to see when China will get s-400 from the Russians. Actually, I'm still waiting for all the HQ series (15 to 18) to reveal themselves. It seems to me they should be ready by now, but it still seems like it's all about the S-300 and tor-m1s.

Possible shields:
outer level: S-300 + FT-2000
medium level: KS-1a + HQ-2?
inner level: To1-M1+HQ-7+HQ-16
mobile level: manpads + FB-6A + yitian

I do know the newsmax articles are a little off. Nemets does seem to overestimate the Chinese capabilities a lot of times.

If true, it would be great step forward for China's defenses.

Newsmax is notorious for perpetuating lies. They still publish and promote a book that states China was actually behind 9/11.

That is good news indeed? It looks like the modern manifestation of the Great Wall. :china:

I have some questions:

I noticed that these new systems were supposed to counter stealth aircraft. How would they perform against the various types of stealth aircraft: B-2? JSF? F-22?

I was under the impression that modern radars can detect (but not track) even an F-22. It cannot locate it precisely, but can give a rough location. Is the underlying idea then , to send a barrage of missiles to that rough location and have them explode into shraple/flak that will damage the stealth and pave way for a kill?

It appears that these ground systems are on par with the best of American and Russian equipment in this field. Can China put these same technologies into AWACS, fighter, cruisers, etc. to create a holistic integrated EW system that is on-par with America? I can understand if the technology is too bulky for a fighter, but it seems that the ground system shouldn't be too different from one designed for ships or maybe an AWACS.

you're gonna be spending quite a lot of missiles for that. The general approach, if it can be called that since no one has ever done it, is to vector fighters into the vicinity for a visual confirmation.

realistically, nothing counters the F-22 and the B-2. JSF is NOT all aspect stealthy, so theoretically you can track and engage, until it turns around that is.

If we look at things realistically, China is improving, but still far behind the Americans and behind the Russians in SAM. Overall, it is still one of China's more developed fields. Looking at the export of KS-1A, and possible export of FT-2000 to Pakistan, it's a sign that the indigenous systems are really taking off. However, I'd still like to se HQ-15 coming out. It's been talked about in a lot of website, but it seems the S-300 systems we have are all still imported from the Russians rather than license produced. As for China's capability vs stealth aircraft, it's probably not as bad as many people would think. Recently, the Chinese "stealth detecting" radar was able to detect ShenZhou 6 as it was landing. This shows that B-2 should not be out of the maximum altitude off the Chinese radar. Also, we can guess that the anti-stealth radar by China (I will post a few picture in aviation forum later) got help from Vera and probably Kolchuga.

leme guess...shengzhou 6 was stealthy because it was a small object, and had a coat of plasma around it?

even if china;s anti stealth ability can see a b-2 or f-22, it would kinda suck to see something and not be able to do anything. china needs to integrate a missle guiding ability to the radar.

btw, how does this radar work? cell phone or tv broadcast waves combines with radar?