Chinese Economics Thread

SamuraiBlue

Captain
With reports like this I doubt it.

As China’s Leader Fights Graft, His Relatives Shed Assets

HONG KONG — As President Xi Jinping of China prepares to tackle what may be the biggest cases of official corruption in more than six decades of Communist Party rule, new evidence suggests that he has been pushing his own family to sell hundreds of millions of dollars in investments, reducing his own political vulnerability.

In January of last year,
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, his older sister and brother-in-law finalized the sale of their 50 percent stake in a Beijing investment company they had set up in partnership with a state-owned bank. According to the billionaire financier Xiao Jianhua, who co-founded the company that bought the stake, the move was part of a continuing effort by the family to exit investments.

They did it “for the family,” Mr. Xiao’s spokeswoman said in a statement.

A review of Chinese records shows that there is evidence to back up Mr. Xiao’s claim. From 2012 until this year, Mr. Xi’s sister Qi Qiaoqiao and brother-in-law Deng Jiagui sold investments in at least 10 companies, mostly focused on mining and real estate. In all, the companies the couple sold, liquidated or, in one case, transferred to a close business associate, are worth hundreds of millions of dollars, part of a fortune documented in a June 2012
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by Bloomberg News..... to read more
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They aren't shredding assets their just liquidating them into money.

With in this article it states;

The subject remains politically charged in China. Even while Mr. Xi’s relatives were selling off assets, those calling publicly for more disclosure have been punished, including the lawyer
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, who was given a four-year jail sentence for gathering crowds to disturb public order. The websites of The Times and Bloomberg, which have both reported on elite shareholdings,
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for many months.
 
With reports like this I doubt it.

They aren't shredding assets their just liquidating them into money.

With in this article it states;

What do you doubt? The report is about a single case of a political leader's relatives liquidating assets once the political leader got the top job, it does not indicate whether the wealth and opportunity of regular people will continue to improve or not.

China is facing the same problems every growing economy and changing society faces, some people will be more financially successful than others, some people will have a hard time adapting, some people will play fair enough, and some people will not.

Clearly the Chinese government knows that these are issues they need to tackle, are doing things to address them, and the jury is still out, otherwise we wouldn't be hearing so much about it in Chinese media.

Just like how the Occupy Wall Street movement faded away in the US because for most people the system had better things available for them to do than protest, the same thing happened in Hong Kong with Occupy Central despite active attempts to confuse economic and political issues, and China will need to be able to provide the same better things to do in the rest of the country.
 

broadsword

Brigadier
With reports like this I doubt it.



They aren't shredding assets their just liquidating them into money.

With in this article it states;


The Chinese people have been living under autocratic rule for centuries and they can put with some self-enrichment of their top leaders if they can improve the lives of the common folks materially. It is not a big deal to them so long as this sort of practice is not pervasive otherwise the people will suffer as seen in countries like the Philippines and Indonesia. Even democratic countries like Taiwan, Thailand and famously Malaysia are rife with corruption, but the countries as their respective whole are thriving economically.

What matters most to the Chinese people is that Xi nips corruption in the bud so that the problem is contained.

The amount involved has to be seen in the context of a population of something like 1380 million.
 

solarz

Brigadier
Because of the age difference. In 2015, these people are in their 40+, while in 2030, they will be in their 60+.

No, what am asking is how are workers who are due to retire in 2030 different from workers who are due to retire in 2015? I'm not talking about workers retiring in their 40's. I'm talking about workers who are 60+ years old in 2015.

So far there's no humanitarian disaster happening, so why would it be different in 2030?


If you don't believe this is a problem, I suggest you go to the hospital and see the long line of elderly waiting for doctors to treat their long lists of health problems, now imagine there are far fewer newer generation to support these people as they are paralysed.

Never said this wasn't a problem, but it's an ONGOING problem. It's not a ticking timebomb, it's happening right now, and though it is certainly difficult, people manage.


I hope you don't mind me asking... but have you been to China lately?
One thing that shocked me when I visited Guangzhou is how expensive it is.

Guangzhou is a tier 1 city. Living costs in rural areas, where the migrant workers are from, and where they plan to retire, are far, far lower.
 

Ultra

Junior Member
No, what am asking is how are workers who are due to retire in 2030 different from workers who are due to retire in 2015? I'm not talking about workers retiring in their 40's. I'm talking about workers who are 60+ years old in 2015.

So far there's no humanitarian disaster happening, so why would it be different in 2030?


Because workers who retires in 2015 are supported by the 40+ baby boomers - there are MORE of them then there is before - China was in a growth phase and population was booming as generation before was less than the generation after (due to WWII, a lot less people remember?) - that is until the ONE CHILD POLICY hits. Suddenly there is a rapid and dramatic shift and population growth plunges - now there are FAR LESS people in the subsequent generation compare to the baby boomer generation.

In the real world scenerio - the baby boomer generation will have the most kids - 6~10 and these kids are now in their 40+, so 6~10 kids to support the parents and maybe grandparents. After the one child policy, most families have only just 1 kids - and now this kids has to support not only himself, but his own kid, his wife, and both sides of the parents and maybe even grandparents! That's 9 people he has to support! So the person who retires in 2015 will have several kids to look after him, while he only has one sets of parents (if they are still alive) to look after amongs his many many siblings. The person who retires in 2030 will have only 1 kid (and his wife) to look after him and his elderly wife (and maybe his parents and his wife's parents). The burden will be massive for the kid if he is a low wage earner.



Never said this wasn't a problem, but it's an ONGOING problem. It's not a ticking timebomb, it's happening right now, and though it is certainly difficult, people manage.


Like I explained previously, the demographic is different for the retiree of current generation compare to the 2030 generation. You can manage right now because the situation is different. It will not be the same when 2030 comes.

Not to mention the side effect of a massive generation retiring with far less workforce to support the economy - China's economy is shrink massively and may even implode. Japan is one example and Japanese are handling this far better than Chinese will ever be because their population wasn't artifically capped - their change is very gradual and natural - it didn't just suddenly stopped people from procreating overnight - they went through gradual change as family slowly going from the baby boomer of 6~10 down to 2, so their society has time develop policies and technology to adapt. The average japanese are moderately well off with GDP per capita of $40,000 per year. China on the other hand will probably never be as rich as Japanese now when that baby boomer generation retires in 2030 and the economy will contract massively just like the Japanese did as workforce disappears and the demands evaporates.



Guangzhou is a tier 1 city. Living costs in rural areas, where the migrant workers are from, and where they plan to retire, are far, far lower.



The CPI will continue to rise even in rural area as China continue towards the path of developing/developed country. The problem is the money these migrant workers saved will probably be not enough to keep up with the CPI increases. So by 2030, while it will still be cheaper to live in the rural area compare to the city, the price of everyday items will be inline like the first world country, and the healthcare cost will also skyrocket to the point of being unaffordable for these people as there will be far less people after them to go into the medical profession which creates a dramatic shortage.
 

solarz

Brigadier
Because workers who retires in 2015 are supported by the 40+ baby boomers - there are MORE of them then there is before - China was in a growth phase and population was booming as generation before was less than the generation after (due to WWII, a lot less people remember?) - that is until the ONE CHILD POLICY hits. Suddenly there is a rapid and dramatic shift and population growth plunges - now there are FAR LESS people in the subsequent generation compare to the baby boomer generation.

Except that is not true at all. Current 60-year-olds are already affected by the family planning policy, which came into effect in the 1980's. The "baby boomer" generation are the ones retiring *TODAY*, not in 15+ years!

Not to mention the side effect of a massive generation retiring with far less workforce to support the economy - China's economy is shrink massively and may even implode. Japan is one example and Japanese are handling this far better than Chinese will ever be because their population wasn't artifically capped - their change is very gradual and natural - it didn't just suddenly stopped people from procreating overnight - they went through gradual change as family slowly going from the baby boomer of 6~10 down to 2, so their society has time develop policies and technology to adapt. The average japanese are moderately well off with GDP per capita of $40,000 per year. China on the other hand will probably never be as rich as Japanese now when that baby boomer generation retires in 2030 and the economy will contract massively just like the Japanese did as workforce disappears and the demands evaporates.

As I have mentioned before, the transition you are talking about started 5 years ago, and so far, there has been no sign of an "implosion". You cannot compare the situation in China with Japan as China has access to a far larger population, and has far more room for economic growth.


The CPI will continue to rise even in rural area as China continue towards the path of developing/developed country. The problem is the money these migrant workers saved will probably be not enough to keep up with the CPI increases. So by 2030, while it will still be cheaper to live in the rural area compare to the city, the price of everyday items will be inline like the first world country, and the healthcare cost will also skyrocket to the point of being unaffordable for these people as there will be far less people after them to go into the medical profession which creates a dramatic shortage.

Now you are just speculating. Rural folks have been going to cities for work for over 20 years now, and it has lifted tens of millions out of poverty. If anything, the CPI rose much faster in the 90's and 2000's compared to 2010 onwards. None of the things you are predicting has happened.

Again, if the concern is the family planning policy, then we are ALREADY seeing it's effects! In 15 years, what we will be seeing is the effects of the LOOSENING of the policy!
 

broadsword

Brigadier
With reports like this I doubt it.



They aren't shredding assets their just liquidating them into money.

With in this article it states;


This is in keeping with Xi's own family policies. Hiving off the past and forward moving.
Shanghai bans leaders' family members from business


r

Chinese President Xi Jinping waits to welcome French Prime Minister Manuel Valls at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing January 30, 2015.
Reuters/Fred Dufour/Pool

(Reuters) - The Shanghai government has introduced rules to restrain the families of senior city officials from running private businesses, in a pilot measure that will eventually go nationwide in China's sweeping campaign against corruption.

The rules are among the most direct attempts to short-circuit the cycle of graft in China since President Xi Jinping launched an anti-corruption drive after coming to power more than two years ago.
Xi gave his blessing to the new rules in March during the annual session of parliament, "requiring that

Shanghai run the pilot and lead from the front," state media reported late on Monday.
The rules cover officials at the level of deputy bureau director and above in government, the ruling Communist Party, the judiciary, the local parliament as well as state-owned enterprises, the city government announced on its website.

"You can't have your cake and eat it too," an article on the website quoted Han Zheng, party chief of the city of more than 24 million, as saying. "If you choose to be an official, you can't go into business and strike it rich."

Reports in Chinese and foreign media about families of officials who have leveraged relationships to enrich themselves have ignited public anger.
Officials have come under fire for the behavior of family members before. The party and government have ejected thousands of so-called "naked officials", whose spouses and children have emigrated abroad.

Spouses and children of senior officials in Shanghai cannot register individual businesses or partnerships, invest in non-listed enterprises or register a business overseas and do business back in China, the new rules say.

Spouses of senior officials are banned from holding top positions in private companies or senior appointed positions in foreign-invested enterprises, the city government said.
Their children and the children's spouses may engage in business, but not in the locality where the official works, it added.

Senior city officials need to report the business activities of families, but punishments for not doing so were not stated.

In a bid to end corruption, Shanghai authorities on April 23 adopted a regulation banning spouses and children of public prosecutors and judges from serving as lawyers or in other jobs linked to the judiciary, state media have reported.
 

Ultra

Junior Member
Except that is not true at all. Current 60-year-olds are already affected by the family planning policy, which came into effect in the 1980's. The "baby boomer" generation are the ones retiring *TODAY*, not in 15+ years!

As I have mentioned before, the transition you are talking about started 5 years ago, and so far, there has been no sign of an "implosion". You cannot compare the situation in China with Japan as China has access to a far larger population, and has far more room for economic growth.

Again, if the concern is the family planning policy, then we are ALREADY seeing it's effects! In 15 years, what we will be seeing is the effects of the LOOSENING of the policy!




Unless Chinese retire in their 50s I think your calculation is wrong (mine too!).

The One-child policy was introduced in 1978 and enacted and come into force on September 18th, 1980.

Around the same time - on September 10, 1980 the Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted as the modified law code from the 1950 Marriage Law. The 1980 law states that the age requirement for marriage is 22 years of age for men and 20 years of age for women, “late marriage and late childbirth should be encouraged.” This provision in the law shows a change from the 1950 law which set the age requirements at 18 and 20 for women and men respectively, showing state support of marriage at a later age.

That means, the last generation before the one-child policy comes into effect would have gave birth to their kids roughly one year after September 1980 at the earliest.

Now, at the age of 20 (22 for men) in 1980, they would be 55 (57 for men) this year. So they are still a few years from the retirement age of 60, but you said this should happened already 5 years ago! That makes your assumption of retirement age to be 50 (and 52 for men)!?

So the actual fall off point should be around 2018 at the earliest, and 2020 to see the full effect of it (when both sexes of pre-one-child policy generation retiring enmass and the balance is tip the other way).

As I stated before, I think this problem will intensify - they actually have a name for it too in China: it is called "Four-two-one" problem".

"The 4-2-1 phenomenon (Chinese: “421”
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) or 421 generation (421时代) is an effect of China's
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in which an employed grandchild is responsible for the care of both parents and four grandparents.
"

"As the first generation of law-enforced only-children came of age for becoming parents themselves, one adult child was left with having to provide support for his or her two parents and four grandparents. Called the "4-2-1 Problem", this leaves the older generations with increased chances of dependency on retirement funds or charity in order to receive support. If personal savings, pensions, or state welfare fail, most senior citizens would be left entirely dependent upon their very small family or neighbours for assistance. If, for any reason, the single child is unable to care for their older adult relatives, the oldest generations would face a lack of resources and necessities."



References:
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Ultra

Junior Member
This is an article from last year:

China's Self-Created Demographic Disaster Is Coming
blog_092514.jpg

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September 25, 2014
China is missing out on its biggest economic asset: its people.

Economist Nicholas Eberstadt estimates that, even if Beijing were to eliminate its one-child policy today, Chinese economic growth would still decline in the 2020s, because the next generation’s working-age population is already so markedly small.

Since implementation in 1979, the one-child policy has reduced China’s population by an estimated 400 million people. In addition to creating a gender imbalance, numerically favoring men over women, the policy also skewed the age demographic.

Economists estimate that China’s elderly population will increase
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by 2020, even as the working-age population decreases by nearly 35 percent. This type of demographic shift is unprecedented and presents serious challenges to the economic health of the nation. Studies suggest that as a direct result of the one-child policy, China’s annual projected GDP growth rate will likely to decline from
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by 2020.

Projected GDP growth rate is driven by three factors: labor, capital and total factor productivity. The one-child policy has directly impacted two of these three factors by reducing the labor supply and inadvertently decreasing the ratio of working-age population to the elderly population. As the population ages, and there are no able-bodied replacements, total factor productivity will undeniably decline.

Economic tumult in China is, at this point, inevitable—even if the Chinese government reverses the one-child policy today. Why? Because those who will constitute the working-age population of the 2020s and the 2030s have already been born; the size of this particular subset of the population cannot increase.

Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a relaxation in the one-child policy (allowing some families where only one parent is an only child to have more than one child, as opposed to previous policy that required both parents to be only children),
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that this will allow for only 1 million additional births, a meager increase in the context of China’s typical experience of 16 million births per year.

Declining birth rates also plague many others nations, including South Korea and Japan—two neighboring countries experiencing birth rates even lower than China’s mere 1.55 children per woman.

However, unlike other countries with low birth rates, China cannot rely on immigration to bridge the gap. (The United States, for instance, makes up for its below-replacement-level birth rate through immigration.) China’s decision to implement a closed immigration system and closely monitor freedom of movement (even within the country) makes solutions to the associated economic challenges extremely difficult.

The one-child policy has had several unintended consequences, including a dearth of workers, a reduced female population due to gendercide, and fewer young people to take care of a quickly aging population. Moreover, the policy has created conditions conducive to a severe regional human-trafficking and human-smuggling epidemic to compensate for the lack of Chinese women. It has already facilitated the practice of mail-order brides and created a burgeoning illegal-adoption market.

Failure to recognize the benefits of human capital—the value that each individual brings to the table, inherent and otherwise—will damn China to long-term economic stagnation, and possibly even decline.

On the 35th anniversary of the one-child policy, Beijing would do well to rethink all of its government-instituted population-control measures. Small-ball, patchwork reforms, such as the minor tweak to the one-child policy made earlier this year, are wholly inadequate for repairing the demographic train wreck they have created.

China must revamp its population-control policy, if not for the well-being of its people, then at least for the promise of a brighter economic future.


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Ultra

Junior Member
This one is more detailed and written by a Chinese researcher (so not as bias and alarmist).


Racing Towards the Precipice
By:
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China Economic Quarterly
June 2012

China’s demographic bullet train is racing into the unknown. Its carriages are already full, but more passengers squeeze in every minute. Most are not young, productive workers, but older travelers who cannot pay for their ride. No one knows where the train will stop, nor whether it will arrive safely.

Profound demographic changes in China are redrawing the parameters of the country’s future. These changes include a substantial decline in the supply of young labor, the escalating financial burden of caring for the elderly, and an aging society with Chinese characteristics—namely a severely weakened family support system, caused in large part by China’s three-decade one-child policy. These changes have already begun to exert a powerful impact on the Chinese economy, and pose a serious risk to future economic growth, social harmony and political stability.

Old before its time

In most countries, demographic changes are easily anticipated. Fertility and mortality, two major factors driving changes in population size and age structure, do not change abruptly (except when altered by pandemic, war or famine). But this is not true for China, where the 2010 census showed that population growth has slowed far more quickly than most observers expected. From 2001-10, China’s population inched up at just 0.57% annually—only about half the level of the previous decade, and only one-fifth of the level in 1970, when controlling population growth first became a priority. The census also showed that there are fewer young people and more old people than forecast. By 2010, nearly 14% of Chinese citizens were over 60, and nearly one in 10 were over 65. China is already an aging society.

The driving force of China’s slowing population growth rate is its low fertility rate, which has languished well below the replacement level of 2.1 for two decades. The census confirms that China’s total fertility rate—the average number of children born to each woman—is among the lowest in the world, at only 1.4. This number puts China below the developed-world average of 1.7. At purchasing power parity, China’s per-capita income is just a fifth or less of other large economies’. But China’s fertility level is far below that of the United States, the United Kingdom or France (all around 2.0), and is on par with those of Russia, Japan, Germany and Italy—all countries with declining populations.

For more than a decade, China has repeatedly failed to reach population targets supposedly put in place to control growth—undershooting by a huge margin. For the 10th Five-Year Plan, the National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) set a population growth target of 62.6m, but China recorded an actual population gain of just 40.1m. For the 11th Five Year Plan, the population gain of 34.2m was far below the 52.4m target. In both cases, the margin of error was greater than 50%! The 12th Five Year Plan (2011-15) projects an annual growth rate of 0.72% and sets a population target of 1.39 bn, way above the forecasts of independent demographers. Unrealistic targets are easily met, and can therefore serve a political function. But inflated numbers also reflect real thinking among some of those in charge of birth control. NPFPC’s skewed data have misled the public as well as top policy makers.

Lost youth

As society ages faster than expected, China’s future demographics need to be reassessed. Sustained low fertility means that the number of young workers will decline more sharply than projected. In 2010, there were 116m people aged 20 to 24; by 2020, the number will fall by 20% to 94m. But the actual number of workers will be considerably lower than 94m, thanks to rising participation in higher education. Annual higher-education enrollments tripled from 2.2m to 6.6m in 2001-10, while the number of college students (mostly aged 18 to 21) rose from 5.6m to 22.3m. Declining fertility levels reduced the availability of young workers, but this was exacerbated by the expansion of higher education. Sustained low fertility and rising college enrollments mean that the supply of young workers will continue to decline beyond 2020. The size of the young population aged 20-24 will only be 67m by 2030, less than 60% of the figure in 2010.

As the share of young people falls and the share of elderly people rises, Chinese society will age rapidly. China already has 180m people aged over 60, and this is set to reach around 240m by 2020 and 360m by 2030. These are minimum numbers, which will only increase with rising life expectancy. Less certain are how fertility rates will affect the population age structure. Should China’s currently low fertility of 1.4 children per couple be sustained, the population share of people aged over 60 could reach 20% by 2020 and 27% by 2030. Using the more conservative international definition of elderly—people aged 65 plus—one in five Chinese citizens will be elderly by 2030.

China’s aging process is happening far more quickly than in most other countries, largely thanks to the speed of its demographic transition from high death and birth rates to low death and birth rates. It took China only 50 years to increase life expectancy from 40 to 70 years, compared to 100 years in Western industrialized countries. China reduced its fertility level from five to two children per couple in just 25 years, just one-third of the time taken in the West. The impact on China’s future age structure is clear: it will take less than 30 years for the share of the population aged over 65 to rise from the current 9% to 25%. In other aging countries like Italy, Germany, and Russia, it will take the best part of a century.

This compression of demographic change into such a short period of time means that China will be the first major economy to grow old before it grows rich. At China’s current level of population aging, with 9% of the total population over the age of 65, other societies had already achieved a much higher level of standard of living. Measured by per-capita purchasing power parity, income levels in Japan were twice as high, and those in South Korea nearly three times higher. Moreover, China’s social infrastructure—especially its pension and health care system—is much weaker than those in most other aging societies. And no other countries must cope with such a large share of families supported by single children.

Slower, lower, weaker

China’s rapidly aging population will have enormous economic and social implications. The demographic dividend China enjoyed over the past 30 years—especially in 1980-2000—is now largely exhausted. In 1980-2010, the effect of a favorable population age structure accounted for between 15% and 25% of per-capita GDP growth. As China’s demographic fortunes reverse, the economy will slow down regardless of other factors driving growth. Since China’s economic and political governance model is premised on near double-digit growth, this will require substantial policy change.

For decades, China’s economy has been driven by high inputs of cheap capital and labor. This cannot continue. First, private savings—the most important source of capital for investment—will decline as a share of GDP over the coming decades. Currently, China has many more net savers than net consumers. But the population share of people aged 30 to 50—typically the highest savers—will drop from 50% in 2010 to around 46% in 2020, and fall to 40% by 2030. As the current cohort of high savers move towards retirement, the national rate of savings growth should decline and spending accelerate. This is the experience both in Japan, where the savings rate declined from 34% in 1990 to 28% in 2007, and in South Korea, where the savings rate dropped from 39% in 1988 to 31% in 2008.

Second, cheap labor will no longer be as plentiful as it was over the past 20 years. As the supply of young workers shrinks—a process that has already begun—increased labor mobility will be essential to create a more efficient labor market. Mitigating the negative impact of this will require reforming China’s hukou system, which links social security and public welfare entitlements to citizens’ place of registration. China’s “floating population” of rural migrants now stands in excess of 220m, but the hukou system remains a significant barrier to migration. If rural migrants were given access to urban education, health care and other welfare services, more rural residents would move to the cities on a permanent basis.

The shrinking labor force will also require education reforms to boost productivity. Indigenous innovation is not just an empty slogan; it is a necessity to ensure that the Chinese economy gets more bang for its buck. The “Made in China” model will not provide sufficient economic returns to support an aging society. China’s labor force must become better educated, more skilled, and produce graduates with a greater ability to innovate. The current higher education system, which focuses on training technicians rather than nurturing individual thinkers, suffocates creativity. It is better at producing bureaucrats than managers. Greater investment must also be directed at the nursery and primary level, especially in poor areas where basic nutrition and educational facilities are still lacking.
 
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