Chinese diplomacy

delft

Brigadier
I couldn't find a suitable thread to put this blog by Ambassador Bhadrakumar, so ....
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China, US take hip hop class for APEC


The Chinese account on State Councilor Yang Jiechi’s weekend consultations with US Secretary of State John Kerry at Boston to prepare the agenda of President Barack Obama’s visit to Beijing early November presents a study in contrast with the effusive media briefing given by the US officials. Pared to the bone, two things can be spotted.
First, Yang stressed the importance of the two countries increasing “mutual cooperation in Asia-Pacific affairs and promote regional stability and prosperity.” Whereas, the US officials simply held back and kept mum, implying there could be a problem here.
Before going in for the meeting with Yang, interestingly, Kerry failed to list Asia-Pacific security as an agenda item and, to be sure, Yang didn’t let that pass unnoticed, either.
Yang said: “I think the Asia-Pacific region is a very important region. We need to work together to build up even more cooperation between China and the United States in the area because this is the area which has experienced robust economic development, and I’m sure that the APEC meeting will go further to bring about more connectivity, innovative development, and to shape a greater future for the region.” (here).
Continuing with the consultations in Washington on Monday with NSA Susan Rice, Yang ”urged the two sides to conduct active interaction and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region”, but the Xinhua report failed to convey Rice’s response or whether she had a response at all.
On the other hand, the shoe is on the other foot when it came to the Middle East issues on which both sides acknowledge that Yang held “in-depth” discussions. The US side bent over backward to suggest, in particular, that China is getting on board its strategy to fight the Islamic State, which the Obama administration sees as a cancerous growth of e of international terrorism.
The Chinese version, on the contrary, makes it clear that Beijing has a serious problem with the US’ strategies in the Middle East, which bypass the United Nations Security Council and violate UN Charter and international law.
Significantly, even as Yang wound up his consultations in Washington on Monday, Xinhua came out with a Beijing-datelined commentary blasting the US policies in the Middle East in idiom and content that are exceptionally strong even for polemics.
The Xinhua commentary sidesteps the IS as such but takes an overview of the US’ regional policies in the Middle East against the backdrop of the anarchy in Libya.
The commentary says: the US’s “unilateral use of forces without UN mandate has severely demolished the world order after the Second World war”; the US, “without showing respect for the sovereignty of the Middle East countries, has intervened in the internal affairs of other countries or even overthrown their governments, breaking regional balance of power”; “Besides, ideologically arrogant US policymakers thought the West still was the center of the world and imposed American-style democracy on the Middle East countries”; :”the hegemonism and egocentrism of the Western powers are important factors leading to the Libya crisis.” (Xinhua)
Not exactly the ‘curtain-raiser’ for Obama’s forthcoming visit? Beijing appears to have lost hope after a last-ditch effort by Yang to persuade the US to play a constructive role at the APEC summit where latent passions of the US-China rivalry are set to play out.
President Xi Jinping is expected to unveil at the summit (November 10-11) the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (as the underpinning of the Maritime Silk Road strategy), which is a major Chinese regional initiative that meets with support in Asia (including Singapore) despite American diplomacy striving hard to strangle it in the cradle.

Posted in Diplomacy, Politics.

Tagged with APEC, Arab spring, Asia-Pacific, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, ISIL, Libya, Maritime Silk Road strategy.

By M K Bhadrakumar – October 21, 2014
 

shen

Senior Member
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U.S. Resistance to China’s Regional Bank Is Futile

Hugh White

Hugh White, a professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University, is the author of “The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power.”

October 20, 2014


America is right to worry about Beijing’s proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank because it is about much more than economics. Beijing naturally hopes that this massive fund will enhance its claims to regional leadership.

Just as Washington has tried to use the Trans Pacific Partnership trade pact to block China’s political ambitions in Asia, China is hoping to use the investment bank to push back. The difference is that the investment bank, unlike the trade pact, will probably work.



The U.S. has been pushing for a Pacific trade pact. China has countered with a regional bank. China will probably have more success.

The economic case is hard to fault. Asia needs huge investments in infrastructure, and existing institutions like the Asian Development Bank have neither the capital nor the management capacity to deliver them. China has plenty of money and enormous expertise, having delivered in recent years perhaps the most remarkable infrastructure-development program in history.

But of course the new bank would reflect and promote China’s priorities and values, not America’s. It would enhance China’s role as the leading power in Asia, and therefore diminish U.S. regional leadership. This is exactly why Washington has been lobbying so hard against it.

Those efforts seem destined to fail. Not even Australia, America’s warmest ally in Asia, will oppose it, because the economic logic is too strong. Meanwhile the trade pact is struggling. And this should make U.S. policymakers ask a deeper question: can the pivot toward Asia really work? Does it make sense to keep trying to compel China to accept a subordinate role as a "responsible stakeholder" in a U.S.-led system?

Or is it time for the United States to accept that China’s economic growth is inevitably transforming Asia’s political balance, too? Perhaps Washington needs to stop trying to preserve the old Asian order, and try instead to maximize its role, alongside China, in the new one. That would mean supporting China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.



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Blackstone

Brigadier
I couldn't find a suitable thread to put this blog by Ambassador Bhadrakumar, so ....
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We're seeing acts 2-4 of the five-act US/China Kabuki dance. In act 1, the major and minor players are introduced, acts 2-4 involve lots of action, drama, tragedy, and a few fights (hopefully only political ones), ending with a satisfying conclusion in act 5. In other words, the existing great power and the reemerging great power are learning to deal with each other. We expect lots of shouting, and we hope for no fisticulffs.
 

delft

Brigadier
Ambassador Bhadrakumaron China's role in Afghanistan as well as that of others:
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China fosters Afghan reconciliation

This is not the first time that high hopes have been raised about a new beginning in Afghan-Pakistani relations, but the visit by the Pakistani foreign and security advisor Sartaj Aziz to Kabul on Sunday does look like a landmark event.
The upbeat tone of a Xinhua commentary captures the new mood of optimism tin the regional capitals that Aziz had a successful visit. The commentary makes an extraordinary observation: “The leaders of both countries [Afghanistan and Pakistan] realize that without enhanced cooperation they cannot hope to finally end the terrorist activities of the Taliban that have become a scourge in both countries.” It packs a lot of meaning.
Interestingly, Aziz’s visit to Kabul took place within days of the reported detention of two key leaders of the Haqqani network by the Afghanistan intelligence (with the help of the Americans) but the issue didn’t cast a shadow on the talks in Kabul on Sunday.
As I had noted earlier, this Haqqani operation very likely involved back-to-back coordination between the Pakistani, US and Afghan intelligence. Equally, Kabul would be drawing satisfaction over the Pakistani military operations directed against the Haqqani network in Waziristan.
Indeed, among the new factors at work, it must be noted that a major factor devolves upon the active role China has begun playing lately to moderate the Pakistani policies. Washington has been encouraging Beijing to become a ’stakeholder’ in the Afghan reconciliation process and China’s influence on the Pakistani establishment is considerable.
Significantly, Aziz openly acknowledged this during a major speech in Islamabad on Monday at a “Track 1.5 conference” (read ‘demi-official’) and pledged that Pakistan hoped to work closely with China in the period ahead.
To be sure, Afghan president Ashraf Ghani’s visit to Beijing next week will be keenly watched. Broadly, Ghani visualizes — and Washington seems to be promoting — a trlpartite entente or friendly understanding between China, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
To quote the former US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad (who remains an influential opinion maker on Afghan developments), “President Ghani calculates that China’s interest in Afghanistan’s mineral resources, its broader geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia, the Middle East and the use of Pakistan’s Gwadar port will lead Beijing to invest in Afghan roads, railways and pipelines, actualizing the vision of Afghanistan as a regional land-bridge or roundabout. To initiate a discussion of this issue as a high Afghan priority, Ghani’s first state visit will be to China at the end of October. Such a Chinese investment in Afghanistan’s economic progress is consistent with American interest in Afghanistan…. As with infrastructure investment, Afghanistan is hoping that China will facilitate reconciliation talks between the Afghan government, the Taliban and the insurgency’s brokers in islamabad. Given the strategic nature of Chinese-Pakistani relations, Beijing is in a strong position to influence the policies of the Pakistani security establishment. In the past, Islamabad has played the China card in response to US pressure — a tactic that could be blunted by a US-Chinese understanding on reconciliation.”
Partly at least, by encouraging China to play an active role in Afghanistan, the US hopes to keep Russia at arm’s length from the Hindu Kush and there is bound to be some frustration in Moscow on this account, as evident from Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s caustic remarks in a recent interview. But then, Russia’s influence in Kabul has vastly diminished. Far more important for Washington will be Iran’s role.
All in all, Tehran has taken a helpful attitude. It muted the earlier criticism about the US-Afghan security pact and has welcomed the formation of the national unity government under American tutelage as a sensible development conducive for the stabilization of Afghanistan.
From the Iranian perspective, what matters are: i) preventing a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan; ii) curbing the spread of extremist ideologies; iii) ensuring the welfare and security of the Shi’ite communities in Afghanistan; iv) working for improvement of the security situation (which has a direct impact on drug trafficking and cross-border terrorism); v) fostering trade and economic links, especially communication links; and, vi) harmonizing Iranian regional policies in sync with the overall progress of the US-Iranian engagement.
India needs to position itself on the ‘right side of history’. The apocalyptic view of the post-2014 scenario in Afghanistan among our pundits is unwarranted. The changing regional alignments constitute a factor of stability.
However, there has to be a far better understanding on the part of India regarding the motivations that drive Pakistan’s Afghan policies today. They cannot be viewed in zero-sum terms. Put differently, the current Indian approach to Pakistan — giving a ‘free hand’ to the Indian army and inflicting ‘unaffordable cost’ and ‘pain’ on Pakistan, etc — does not make sense.
Of course, an uninterrupted dialogue with Pakistan would have been a major confidence-building measure in the recent years enabling India to adjust to the new geopolitical realities. At the end of the day, as Khalilzad wrote, Gwadar might become a key outpost in the Silk Road leading from Central Asia. It calls for new thinking on India’s part regarding China’s Maritime Silk Road strategy. In fact, India could have a congruence of interests with China.

Posted in Diplomacy, Politics.

Tagged with Gwadar, New Silk Road, Post-2014 Afghanistan, Taliban reconciliation.

By M K Bhadrakumar – October 22, 2014
I think the congruence of Indian and Chinese interest interesting. And there is the possibility of a railway from Iran to China and Northern Pakistan through Northern Afghanistan.
 

shen

Senior Member
Merkel looks to China to mediate with Russia
By Tom Mitchell in Beijing and Stefan Wagstyl in Berlin

Chinese premier Li Keqiang arrived in Berlin with his entire cabinet in tow, in a high-profile display of bilateral harmony that contrasts sharply with Beijing’s much more rocky relationships with the US and the UK.

Sino-German relations are a far cry from Angela Merkel’s early days in power when, in 2007, the chancellor prompted Beijing’s wrath by receiving the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan leader. After her diplomats calmed the situation by concentrating on the two country’s growing economic ties, Ms Merkel has focused almost entirely on business issues, with German government criticism of China’s human rights record raised only in private.

Ms Merkel also hopes that Mr Li can help mediate with Russian president Vladimir Putin over the crisis in Ukraine, in an unusual departure for a country that normally shies away from shuttle diplomacy. The second stop on the Chinese premier’s European tour will be Moscow.

“Germany’s top priority is the Ukraine and stabilising relations with Russia,” says Sebastian Heilmann, president of the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. “For Berlin, China has become a very important partner because Russia will listen to it. It’s a new diplomatic configuration that we are seeing here.”

“This huge delegation of several hundred decision makers is also an indicator of how important China sees its relationship with Germany,” Prof Heilmann adds. “There must be one gateway open for China to communicate with the west. Right now that gateway is Germany.”

This week’s “joint cabinet session” between the two countries marks the third time in just six months that Ms Merkel has met with China’s top leaders. President Xi Jinping toured Germany in March and the German chancellor made a reciprocal visit to Beijing in July.

The visit is expected to focus heavily on economic issues, including boosting trade, investment and innovation. With Germany’s export-dependent economy slowing – partly because of its reliance on China where growth is also decelerating – the mutual interest in promoting bilateral economic activity is clear.

“Merkel will be under pressure to prioritise the economic relationship even more than before because of the slowdown in Germany,” says Hans Kundnani at the European Council on Foreign Relations, a foreign policy think-tank based in London.
The EU is China’s largest trading partner, with Germany accounting for about one-third of total Sino-EU trade.

German exports to China last year totalled €67bn, while imports from China were €73.4bn. Cumulative German direct investment in China totalled €44.8bn at the end of 2012, compared to just €1.3bn of Chinese investment in Germany.
Despite this solid economic foundation, strains are appearing. While China wants German companies to share more technology, German business leaders are increasingly concerned about pressure from Chinese regulators and alleged industrial espionage.

“Before our co-operation has mainly focused on trade,” says Gu Junli, a German affairs expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. “We need to push for more technological co-operation. But Germany has been beating around the bush and is not very willing to co-operate with us in that regard.”

For Beijing, the quid pro quo is “markets for technology”. BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen all operate highly successful joint ventures in China, the world’s largest auto market, but are under constant pressure from both their partners and government policy makers to share more technology. VW, for example, would like to increase its 40 per cent stake in a joint venture with state-owned First Auto Works to the maximum 50 per cent allowed under Chinese law.
German executives, meanwhile, fret about the increasing assertiveness of Chinese regulators.

“We are still optimistic when it comes to Beijing’s reform agenda,” says one German lawyer. “But we haven’t seen enough implementation. The [anti-monopoly] investigations have added to our concerns. Are we really receiving equal treatment?

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asif iqbal

Lieutenant General
I think Russia needs China much much more for a lot of technology's which have been embargoed by the West

Not only that they need the capital and political support too

Good time for China to also get what they need from Russia and I am not talking about natural resources but also technology's
 

Hytenxic

New Member
China can never eclipse the US
CHINA will never become the dominant power in Asia and its strategic rise should not determine the future structure of the Australian Defence Force, *according to a major Kokoda Foundation report.

The strategic think tank’s *report, to be released today, is *likely to ease fears of an expansionist China following President Xi Jinping’s pledge in Canberra that China would never inflict war upon nations in the region.

The provocative report challenges the popular assumption that China’s strategic clout and economic growth will continue unabated and argues that Beijing may already be approaching the zenith of its global power.

It rejects claims that the US is in decline as a Pacific power and says the fashionable belief that China will eventually challenge the US in the region is improbable.

The report delivers a withering assessment of China’s military capabilities, saying the country does not have the equipment, training or experience to pose a significant threat to the region and that Chinese warships would be easily picked off by their US or Japanese counterparts.

“Presently China is a regional military power entirely without any modern combat experience and with major deficiencies in doctrine, human capital and training,” it says.

The report, written by defence experts Paul Dibb and John Lee, will trigger fresh debate in Canberra about Australia’s strategic response to a rising China at a time when commercial links *between the two countries have never been stronger.

Assessments of China’s military ambitions will be central to the new defence white paper to be released next year.

In an address to parliament on Monday, Mr Xi promised that China would uphold peace as its economy and strategic clout continued to grow. Mr Xi and Tony Abbott signed a historic free-trade agreement that promises to redefine trade links between the two nations as part of a new strategic alliance with Australia.

The Kokoda report says the popular belief that China will soon become the dominant power in Asia is not supported by the facts.

“Such arguments ignore the implications of China’s economic, social and national fragilities, its lack of major friends or allies in the region as well as the considerable military deficiencies and challenges faced by the People’s Liberation Army,” the report says.

“With the defence white paper due for release in 2015, the government should bear in mind that planning for an era of Chinese dominance in the region — or even its emergence as an American strategic peer in Asia — would be premature, if not improbable.

“Australia should not design its defence force for war with China, but should be able to counter *Chinese coercion and contribute to allied military operations if necessary.”

The report, to be published in Kokoda’s Security Challenges journal, rejects the view held by analysts such as former defence official Hugh White that the US should cede “strategic space” to a rising China in the Pacific.

“Any suggestion that the United States should move to one side in Asia to make strategic space for China should be rejected,” the report says.

“China is not now or foreseeably a strategic peer of America’s and any move by Washington to concede China’s so-called legitimate strategic interests would smack of appeasement; and offered unnecessarily and for little conceivable gain.”

The report argues that domestic challenges such as an ageing population, income inequality and political unrest will undermine China’s ability to emerge as a major military and strategic force.

“In our view, China may soon be approaching the zenith of its power as its economy encounters serious structural impediments and demographic barriers to growth,” it says.

The report says it would be decades before China could hope to challenge the US militarily in the Pacific.

“China’s forces still lag considerably behind those of the United States in overall resources, technology and experience,” it says.

“In our view, China is 20 years behind the United States in high-technology weapons and sensor development.”

The report describes China as a lonely power with few friends in Asia and says any attempted expansion of its strategic weight in the South China Sea or elsewhere will only encourage a “strong external balancing against China” by other countries in the region, especially Japan, India and the US.

“None of this is to underrate the potential challenge to regional stability from China’s military modernisation, but neither is it to succumb to the current fashion of exaggerating China’s military capabilities,” the Kokoda Foundation says.

The debate about China’s military modernisation has been raging for years between those who see it as part of broader ambitions to project power far beyond its shores and others who see it as a natural and non-threatening part of China’s economic and political emergence. In the 2009 defence white paper the then prime minister Kevin Rudd took a hawkish view of China’s military expansion and ordered that the size of the future submarine fleet be doubled from six to 12 to deal with the perceived threat of a modernised Chinese navy.

Although the Kokoda report plays down the China threat, it says Australia “must be able to resist Chinese coercion — whether by military or other pressures — with regard to our own direct security interests, including if necessary our economic security”.

“We should develop the high-technology naval and air assets necessary to contribute to any allied conflict in the region where we might need to make a contribution or where Australia needs to help resist Chinese military adventurism,” it says.

Professor Dibb, from the ANU, authored a 1986 report that laid the foundations of Australia’s modern defence policy, while Dr Lee is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC. The Kokoda Foundation is an independent not-for-profit think tank to promote debate on security challenges.

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