The rapid rise of the Chinese Navy has challenged U.S. maritime dominance throughout East Asian waters. The United States, though, has not been able to fund a robust shipbuilding plan that could maintain the regional security order and compete effectively with China’s naval build-up. The resulting transformation of the balance of power has led to fundamental changes in U.S. acquisitions and defense strategy. Nonetheless, the United States has yet to come to terms with its diminished influence in East Asia.
The New Balance of Power in East Asia
In early 2017, the Chinese Navy had
ships. It now possesses nearly 350 ships and is already larger than the U.S. Navy. China is the largest ship-producing country in the world and at current production rates could soon operate 400 ships. It commissions nearly three submarines each year, and in two years will have more than 70 in its fleet. The Chinese Navy also operates growing numbers of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, all equipped with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Between 2013 and 2016, China commissioned more than 30 modern corvettes. At current rates, China could have 430 surface ships and 100 submarines within the next 15 years.
According to the
, China’s fleet is also now more modern, based on contemporary standards of ship production. In 2010, less than 50 percent of Chinese ships were “modern;” in 2017, over 70 percent were modern. China’s diesel submarines are increasingly quiet and challenge U.S. anti-submarine capabilities. China’s ship-launched and air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles possess significant range and stealth and are guided by increasingly sophisticated targeting technologies. China’s Navy now poses a significant
to the U.S. surface fleet. Moreover, its DF21C and DF26 conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles also pose a challenge to U.S. assets in the region, and can target U.S. maritime facilities in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Guam.
Despite the growth of the Chinese Navy, the United States retains maritime superiority throughout East Asia. But the trend is what matters and the trend is less rosy. In early 2018, the size of the active U.S. fleet was
ships. Going forward, according to the Congressional Budget Office, if the Navy’s budget is the average of its budget over the prior 30 years in real dollars and it maintains its aircraft carrier and ballistic submarine construction schedules, in 12 years the active naval fleet will decline to 237 ships. In six years, the U.S. submarine fleet will decline to 48 ships, and in eleven years the number of U.S. attack submarines will decline to 41 ships.
Both the Navy and the White House have pushed to grow the U.S. fleet, but budgets have not kept pace with their plans. In 2015, the Navy planned to increase the fleet to 308 ships by 2022, and the Trump administration plans a 355-ship navy. To reach
ships, the Navy will have to spend 36 percent more than the average shipbuilding budget over the past 30 years, requiring a one-third increase in its current budget. If funding continues at the average over the past 30 years, the Navy will likely purchase 75 fewer ships than planned over the next three decades. To reach
ships, the Navy will need a budget 80 percent more than the average Navy shipbuilding budget over the past 30 years and about 50 percent more than the average budget of the past six years. Moreover, the Navy’s
are understaffed and in poor condition, contributing to delays in maintenance and reduced ship-days at sea. It is also currently experiencing significant challenges in meeting
requirements,
problems are increasing, and the U.S shipbuilding
has been in decline over the past decade. Adequate staffing and construction of a larger fleet is by no means assured.
Reallocation of the federal budget to support ship construction is not likely. Mandatory spending and interest payments on the federal debt constitute 68 percent of the federal budget, and in recent years Washington has increased spending on Medicare, Medicaid, transportation, and veterans. The Pentagon already receives over 55 percent of the discretionary budget. The United States will not raise taxes to increase funding for the Navy; instead, it reduced taxes earlier this year. Nor can the United States print more money and increase the federal deficit to increase naval spending; the harm to the economy would offset any benefit that a larger navy might contribute to U.S. security. To contend with the national debt, the White House has told the Pentagon to expect that defense spending will “
” in the near future. Finally, although the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force receive approximately equal shares of the annual defense budget, there is little resolve in Washington to reallocate funding within the military.
But even a 355-ship navy would be inadequate to contend with China’s capacity to continue and expand its naval build-up. As a share of GDP, the U.S. defense budget is nearly 75 percent larger than China’s defense budget. In contrast to the United States, China’s social welfare budget, including veterans’ benefits, is a minimal part of its national budget. China does not have a costly volunteer force, it can easily reallocate defense spending to support its navy, and it is not involved in distant wars that strain its military budget. It is better positioned that the United States for a maritime arms race.
Developments in the maritime balance have weakened the confidence of East Asian countries in the ability of the United States to fulfill its security commitments and they are improving security cooperation with China. South Korea recently reached an agreement with China to limit missile-defense cooperation with the United States and security cooperation with the U.S.-Japan alliance, and it has moved ahead with cooperation with North Korea, with Chinese support and despite U.S. opposition. The Philippines has reduced the scale of its defense cooperation with the United States and improved security ties with China. Beijing now constrains Vietnamese defense cooperation with the United States, as well. And China and Malaysia have begun joint military exercises and Malaysia has not supported U.S. policy on Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Most recently, China and ASEAN have
their first joint naval exercise. The United States enjoys continued robust defense cooperation with all of these countries. But, as is the case with the maritime balance, it is the trend that matters and the trend is not good for U.S. security.
...
