China's SCS Strategy Thread

Discussion in 'Strategic Defense' started by lilzz, Apr 16, 2007.

  1. weig2000
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    weig2000 Junior Member

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    ...Continued

     
  2. Equation
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    Equation Senior Member

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    All that writing and it boils down to maintain that status quo is that China must accept the US exceptionalism regardless if the world and times are changing.o_O
     
  3. Hendrik_2000
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    Hendrik_2000 Senior Member

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    This guy Parameswaran has wishful thinking that all of China neighbor hate China Well the reality is bit more complex and nuances. They don't necessarily love China but they can live with strong China because they learn from their history as Mahathir once said when China is strong they don't colonize Malaysia he appreciate that. Singapore should take page from Malaysia!
    From Diplomat. Hey Forbin I use your image
    CH Song.jpg

    Why Are China's Submarines Visiting Malaysia?
    A brief look at how to read the latest naval engagement between the two sides.
    http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/why-are-china-submarines-visiting-malaysia/
    By Prashanth Parameswaran
    January 04, 2017

    This week, two Chinese submarines paid a visit to Malaysia in the first naval engagement between the two countries in 2017.

    The CNS Chang Xing Dao and CNS Chang Cheng of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) visited Sabah, according to a statement by the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN).

    The RMN described the visit by the submarines as part of the regular navy-to-navy interactions that have been occurring between the two countries as part of their growing defense diplomacy, and no further details were disclosed by the end of Tuesday. Although this may seem like an unsurprising attempt to downplay this single interaction, it is also true that while this visit included Chinese submarines, other Chinese vessels have been making more of such visits to Malaysia during the past few years.

    To take just one example, from October 7-11 last year, three Chinese vessels – CNS Xiang Tan, CNS Zhou Shan, and CNS Chao Hu – arrived in Malaysia’s Port Klang for a five day tour which included interactions with Malaysian naval officials as well as visits to Malaysian facilities. At the time, the RMN also described the visit similarly as a defense diplomacy initiative to strengthen cooperation between the two navies.

    But the presence of Chinese submarines in Malaysia at the start of 2017 has nonetheless drawn attention given recent developments in defense ties between the two countries as well as the evolving security environment more generally. Though I often emphasize that Sino-Malaysian defense relations have evolved slowly even since the inking of a formal defense pact between the two countries back in 2005, it is also true that ties have been strengthening much quicker in the last year or two.

    In 2015, Malaysia and China began annual military exercises and China secured access to the port of Kota Kinabalu following the visit of PLA Navy commander Admiral Wu Shengli (See: “Why Did China’s Navy Gain Access to a Malaysia Port Near the South China Sea”). And in 2016, during Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s visit to China, the two countries inked their first major naval agreement. Though the significance of the visit and the agreement was somewhat exaggerated, it nonetheless marked an important development in military ties (See: “Malaysia Is Not Pivoting to China With Najib’s Visit”).

    Meanwhile, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has continued unabated amid concerns about disunity among Southeast Asia’s four claimant states – Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines (under President Rodrigo Duterte) – with respect to Chinese behavior and uncertainty about the direction of U.S. Asia policy under President-Elect Donald Trump (See: “What Will Donald Trump’s Asia Policy Look Like?”).

    But as I have noted previously, the Najib government’s approach to the South China Sea, which it views as inextricably linked to the country’s overall relationship with China, is based on both engaging Beijing where possible, including in the defense realm, while also taking specific, albeit much quieter (and arguably insufficient) moves partly aimed at balancing it (See: “Malaysia’s South China Sea Policy: Playing it Safe”).
     
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  4. delft
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    delft Senior Member

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    Exactly. Unless US is particularly unambitious in its leadership in East Asia it will maintain Taiwan as an armed auxiliary and there will be no peaceful re-unification of Korea. As for human rights the use of subversion by US recently in for example Syria and the scale of killing black people by the police in US will not be considered to be something to be imitated by China.
     
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  5. KIENCHIN
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    KIENCHIN New Member
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    I wouldn't read too much into Chinese warships visit to Malaysia as what the Diplomat is implying. It is just the current administration under Najib trying to deflect attention from th 1MDB corruption scandal. There is a deep rooted hatred of China and the local Chinese population by the Malaya which will not change and the current policy would change on a drop of a dime.
     
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  6. Janiz
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    Janiz Junior Member

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    He signed the contract last year. Makes you a headache if you're Malaysian I assume. It's so corrupt to the bone that he shouldn't live there for the rest of his miserable life.
     
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  7. t2contra
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    t2contra Senior Member

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    The submarine visit may not have anything to do with the 1MDB saga. Even if there was no swirl of corruption surrounding 1MDB, there would still be the submarine visit. After all, Chinese warships have visited other countries as well, including the US and Australia. So have US warships been visiting other countries all over the world. As it is, naval visits have been conducted for a long time.
     
  8. Hendrik_2000
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    Hendrik_2000 Senior Member

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    I thought this is an excellent article that explain why Cambodia is stead fast friend of China. It is this local conflict that most westerner miss and they are baffled why Cambodia is pro China.First posted by Swoosh in CDF. Not only geopolitic but China is the main source of FDI to Cambodia and technical assistance . Sharing Buddhism help too and so do most Cambodian politician are SinoKhmer including the wife of HunSen and opposition leader Sam Rhainsy

    Cambodia Wants China as Its Neighborhood Bully

    Phnom Penh's pivot toward Beijing has less to do with the United States than hatred for Vietnam.
    BY TANNER GREERJANUARY 5, 2017

    [​IMG]

    In the closing months of 2016, all of Southeast Asia seemed to be pivoting toward China. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak was hailed as a “visionary leader” by fellow Malaysian politicians for “tilting to China.” Thailand agreed to build an arms-maintenance and production center for China’s People’s Liberation Army, and the president of the Philippines declared in a speech delivered in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People: “In this venue I announce my separation from the United States.”

    Americans have been left to ask: What did we do wrong? What has caused the leaders of Southeast Asia to turn away from Washington and toward Beijing? It is tempting to look for the answer to these questions in the policies of the Obama or Xi administrations, or blame it on shifting fortunes in the balance of power. But focusing on the spectacle of Sino-American rivalry masks the dozens of smaller dramas and power plays that usually escape the attention of Western observers. Often it is these smaller conflicts of interest that drive lesser powers into the arms of the great ones.

    There is no better example of this than Cambodia, one of the first countries in the region to openly align itself with China. Cambodia’s position became clear in 2012, when it prevented ASEAN from issuing a joint communiqué that mentioned the South China Sea. Long-standing Cambodian dictator Hun Sen has reaped many rewards for this decision: In October, China granted Cambodia $237 million in direct aid, $90 million in canceled debt, and an additional $15 million in military support. Yet there is more behind Cambodian support for China than the size of Beijing’s pocketbook. In the minds of many Cambodians, the most difficult geopolitical challenge facing their country is not balancing the demands of the United States and China, but managing its relationship with Vietnam, an undertaking that cannot be successful without Chinese cooperation.

    Ethnic disharmony is not hard to spot in Southeast Asia, but few of its prejudices — outside of the Myanmese hatred toward the Rohingya, at least — can match the distrust and disgust the average Khmer feels toward the Vietnamese. Recall how conservative Americans talked about the Soviet Union at the height of communist power, add the way their counterparts in modern Europe discuss Arab immigration now, and then throw in a dash of the humiliation that marked Germany in interwar years, and then you might come close to getting a fair idea of how wild and vitriolic a force anti-Vietnamese rhetoric is in Cambodian politics.

    Cambodians have not forgotten the centuries of warfare that led Vietnamese armies to pillage the Khmer heartland and strip away more than half of its territory. Cambodian nationalists still pine for Khmer krom (“Lower Khmer”), a term used to describe both the ethnic Khmer living outside Cambodia and the lands they inhabit.

    Without the intervention of the French in the 1860s, which transformed Cambodia into a French protectorate and southern Vietnam into a French colony, Cambodia would have been totally swallowed by the Vietnamese maw. French imperialism brought peace, but not harmony: Relations between the two groups only worsened under colonial control, as the French gave the Vietnamese a privileged status, and imperial policy supported Vietnamese migration to the Cambodian heartland. The subsequent governments that came to power in post-colonial times — the Sisowath, Lol Non, and Khmer Rouge regimes — relied on anti-Vietnamese rhetoric to legitimize their rule to the Cambodian people.

    Historically informed Cambodians are quick to point out that the Khmer Rouge was a creation of the Viet Cong; the more conspiratorial of their countrymen insist that the Khmer Rouge’s massacres were directed by them as well. Conspiratorial or not, Cambodians remember that 150,000 Vietnamese soldiers invaded Cambodia in 1978 and then occupied their country as foreign conquerors for the next 10 years. Though that decade-long war was not entirely the fault of the Vietnamese (China, Thailand, and the United States would support their own armed proxies), the violence of Vietnam’s counterinsurgency operations slowly eroded what goodwill they had earned by removing the Khmer Rouge from power.

    During this time the spigot of Vietnamese migrants moving into Cambodia was opened once again, sharpening fears that Vietnam sought to permanently subvert Khmer autonomy. Although both Vietnamese immigration and government influence has waned since Hanoi ordered its troops to withdraw from Cambodian territory, distrust of Vietnam’s government and disgust toward Cambodia’s Vietnamese minority remain. You can see this even in the Khmer communities of the United States. To walk the streets of an American Cambodiatown is to see a half-dozen posters warning of Vietnamese aggression, or (if you speak Khmer) be pressed to attend activist get-togethers or donate to help fight Vietnamese imperialism.To walk the streets of an American Cambodiatown is to see a half-dozen posters warning of Vietnamese aggression, or (if you speak Khmer) be pressed to attend activist get-togethers or donate to help fight Vietnamese imperialism.

    Many of these donations go straight into the coffers of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), the opposition to Hun Sen’s ruling regime. The CNRP faces a stacked deck when squaring off against hostile authorities, but anti-Vietnamese agitation is a game they can’t lose. When the Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge, the man they chose to head their new puppet regime was none other than Hun Sen. The party he now heads is a direct descendant of the party the Vietnamese created to rule Cambodia. While Westerners sometimes call Hun Sen a Chinese puppet, his domestic enemies are far more likely to attack him as a Vietnamese figurehead.
     
    #3958 Hendrik_2000, Jan 6, 2017
    Last edited: Jan 6, 2017
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  9. Hendrik_2000
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    Hendrik_2000 Senior Member

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    (Cont)
    His regime’s abuses are regularly blamed on Vietnamese designs — I have friends who insist that the soldiers who broke up the January 2014 election protests were all Viet — and everything from the prime minister’s fluency in Vietnamese to his refusal to deport all ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia is used as irrefutable proof of his traitorous intent.

    There is a kernel of truth behind these accusations. Hun Sen has worked hard to nip anti-Vietnamese sentiment before it grows to explosive (or violent) levels, and he has proven extremely hesitant to rock the boat with his old — and far more powerful — patrons in Hanoi.

    Hun Sen no longer tolerates organized attempts to use anti-Vietnamese rhetoric against him. Last month, in response to a 2016 CNRP media campaign designed to expose Vietnamese incursions into Cambodian territory, Sam Rainsy, former head of the CNRP, and Sok Hor, a CNRP senator, were sentenced to five and seven years in jail, respectively. Likewise, Hanoi still has a powerful voice in Cambodian affairs. The Vietnamese state-owned enterprise Viettel operates the only Cambodian telecom company whose coverage reaches across the entire country, Phnom Penh constantly needles away at boosting cross-border trade and investment with Vietnam, illegal Vietnamese logging and smuggling operations are tacitly sanctioned by the government, and with the occasional diplomatic warning aside, the government turns a blind eye to Vietnamese construction near the areas where the two countries’ border has not been clearly demarcated.

    However, Viet-Cambodian relations are no longer what journalist Sebastian Strangio labeled the “quasi-colonial relationship” of Hun Sen’s early years. Hun Sen is no longer accompanied by Vietnamese minders while on government business, nor must he report his decisions to Vietnamese commanders. It is within this context that Sino-Cambodian relations must be understood. In geopolitical terms, Beijing’s flowering relationship with Phnom Penh is a powerful check on Cambodia’s neighbors.

    The United States, a longtime ally of the Thais and newfound courter of Vietnamese affection, could not be trusted to put Cambodian interests above the other powers in the region. In Beijing, the Cambodians see a more reliable great power — an ally that not only has a fractious relationship with Cambodia’s traditional enemy, but one that has demonstrated a willingness to go to war with that country to preserve a favorable balance of power in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the last war China waged was not only against the Vietnamese, it was against them in defense of Cambodia. Beijing’s decision to send troops across Vietnam’s northern border as the bulk of the Vietnamese army was fighting an insurgency in Cambodia, and then to keep a threatening military presence on that border through the next decade, badly hampered the Vietnamese push to become the premier armed power in Southeast Asia. For Cambodia, the strategic benefits of friendship with China could not be clearer. Playing spoiler in ASEAN meetings is a small price to pay to guarantee this friendship.

    In Cambodian terms, Hun Sen’s decision to tilt Cambodian foreign policy toward Beijing is quite moderate. Other voices in Cambodian politics advocate even closer ties to China in hopes of generating more leverage vis-à-vis the Vietnamese. Rainsy declared in 2014 to a group of CNRP party supporters that his party is “on the side of China, and we support China in fighting against Vietnam over the South China Sea issue. … The islands belong to China, but the Viets are trying to occupy them, because the Viets are very bad.” He would later defend these comments in a post on his Facebook page, arguing, “when it comes to ensuring the survival of Cambodia as an independent nation, there is a saying as old as the world: the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

    The CNRP, acutely aware of its image in Western circles, has since distanced itself from Rainsy’s comments, but his logic is solid. If Vietnam truly does threaten the sovereignty of Cambodia, closer relations with China is a geopolitical imperative. Cambodia’s politicians have depended, since French colonialism if not earlier, on foreign sponsors. But being tarred as a friend of the Vietnamese is the most toxic slur in Cambodian politics. For Hun Sen or Rainsy, leaning toward China doesn’t send a message of dependence on Beijing, but of hostility toward Hanoi.

    Even radical changes in Cambodia’s internal politics are unlikely to produce a revolution in Cambodia’s foreign relations. Hun Sen’s patronage machine requires huge influxes of money to maintain. China provides that. It does so without asking Hun Sen to protect the liberties of average Cambodians in return. But even if the machine were to fall apart and the opposition were to rise to power, Cambodia’s new leaders would face strong political pressure to give Beijing pride of place.

    Cambodia is a small country tucked between its historical enemies. The grip anti-Vietnamese sentiment has on the Cambodian masses only strengthens this geopolitical anxiety. As long as Cambodian nationalism defines itself in opposition to the Vietnamese, Cambodian politicians will never stop searching for a great power that can stand as a bulwark against Vietnam. For the foreseeable future, that country will be China. Next to this, the perceived balance of power between China and the United States will never be anything more than a sideshow.

    https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/05/cambodia-wants-china-as-its-neighborhood-bully/
     
    #3959 Hendrik_2000, Jan 6, 2017
    Last edited: Jan 6, 2017
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  10. solarz
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    solarz Senior Member

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    The US simply does not understand Asian politics, and even this article betrays that ignorance.

    The US is located on a continent with only two neighbors, one to the north and one to the south. It has never had to deal with the dynamics of a dozen foreign interests on its own doorsteps.

    On the other hand, China has always been at the center of Asian politics. It has had to deal with dozens of fickle neighboring states since time immemorial. Strategically, it has a wealth of history to draw from.

    "The enemy of my enemy" is not my friend. It's a lot more complicated than that.
     
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