China's SCS Strategy Thread

now I read (dated Dec 26, 2016)
China's 1st Aircraft Carrier Sails into South China Sea
China's first aircraft carrier and five other warships passed by Taiwan and sailed into the contested South China Sea on Monday, Taiwan's Defense Ministry said.

The ships, led by the Liaoning, sailed past the Pratas Islands, also known as the Dongsha Islands, a Taiwan-controlled atoll in the northern part of the South China Sea, according to the ministry.

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that the Liaoning had set off for a routine open-sea exercise in the Western Pacific as part of its annual training. But its entering into the politically sensitive South China Sea follows rising tensions between Beijing and Taipei over the status of the self-ruled island.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has refused to endorse Beijing's concept that Taiwan is a part of China. Beijing claims the self-governing island as its own territory and says failing to endorse the one-China principle would destabilize relations.

The Taiwanese ministry said the Liaoning and warships had on Sunday sailed 90 nautical miles south of Taiwan in the Bashi Channel, a waterway between Taiwan and the Philippines.

Tensions have mounted in the South China Sea, where the U.S. and China accuse each other of engaging in a dangerous military buildup. China claims nearly all of the sea and is pitted against smaller neighbors in multiple disputes over islands, coral reefs and lagoons.

The U.S.-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative think tank said this month that satellite imagery showed China building large anti-aircraft guns on artificial islands in the contested waters, where China has also laid airstrips, built communications facilities and deployed suspected missiles.

China has characterized its moves as defensive in nature and accused U.S. warships of making provocative passes through the region.

The Liaoning, commissioned by the Chinese navy in 2012, first sailed to the South China Sea in 2013, when it docked at a navy base near the Chinese holiday resort of Sanya. The vessel at the time was not outfitted with a full aircraft complement.
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delft

Brigadier
Countries great and small have always mouthed high-sounding ideals/morals while doing whatever they could to pursue their interests. Hypocrisy is just part of the package, and the more powerful the country, they greater the ability to flaunt it.
That's the way UK earned its sobriquet "Perfidious Albion".
 
one of USNI News Top Stories 2016: International Operations
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China and the South China Sea
In July, China’s expansive claims to dominion over the South China Sea were invalidated by a
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of the Law of the Sea in the Hauge over a dispute over territorial holdings with the Philippines.

While Beijing
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the ruling and said it would not recognize the decision, the practical reaction from Chinese forces were more muted and trickled out over the year.

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, Russian and Chinese naval forces teamed up when “a five-ship Russian Navy flotilla arrived at the port of Zhanjiang in southern China on Monday for Joint Sea 2016, an eight-day bilateral exercise to be conducted in the South China Sea,” reported USNI News.

Satellite imagery
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.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy deployed its carrier strike group centered on the Chinese carrier Liaoning in late December.

Perhaps the largest direct conflict with the U.S. came in December when a
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ship plucked a U.S. Navy unmanned underwater vehicle from waters off the coast of the Philippines.

The low-cost buoyancy glider was eventually returned but not before it enflamed tensions between Beijing and President-Elect Donald Trump.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
While Beijing
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the ruling and said it would not recognize the decision, the practical reaction from Chinese forces were more muted and trickled out over the year.

I am not sure that is the case . The rumor has it the Chinese are ready to use DF 21D just in case the carrier task force do something foolish.
I do remember Adm Wu issue a stern warning .But again this is rumor from Odo soldier

In July 2016, a war cloud is laid in the South China Sea, and rocket army and navy develop joint action. Our Navy's warfare formation does not fear the enemy, not knowing, but face difficulties. Receiving a joint operation order from a rocket army base outside the thousand miles, wait for launch as if more than ten new missiles are prepared . "(Unfinished)

According to the report at the time, this exercise is commanded directly by the Chinese Navy Commander ·Wu ShengLI and the Central Military Committee are in the field. The other day, the report of the state-run Central Electric Power Co., Ltd. revealed a part of this incident. CCTV introduced the exercise in July 2016 when introducing the rocket exercise in 2016 (unfinished

But fortunately these two aircraft carrier groups can not do anything and leave the South China Sea, this has a theory that the front navy commander of the US Navy does not execute orders of General Harris. The South China Sea arbitration ruling was virtually blanked as it was hoped by China without any change in the present situation. (Complete)
 
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davidau

Senior Member
Registered Member
News claimed new DF series missile can reach all corners of the world.....
Below is a New Year gift of anti-air, anti-ship missile fired by China Rocket Force with a view to protecting South China Sea area.....


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400_34305_571631.jpg


400_34288_793947.jpg



400_34295_786039.jpg




400_34299_798014.jpg
 
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Equation

Lieutenant General
not sure about every corner of the world, surely it (DF series) wouldn't reach NZ, Antartic or Falklands/Malvinas
The missile can travel along a suborbital trajectory (therefore no fuel burning constantly for propulsion needed) to reach near it's destination and than fire it's later stage rocket engine back into the atmosphere towards the intended target.
 

weig2000

Captain
A well-written and thoughtful article by some of the more influential people well-versed in US-China relationship, representing diverse backgrounds.

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China is in no position to seek regional dominance.
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December 12, 2016

America in a Multipolar World: New Challenges Require New Approaches

As the Trump administration assumes leadership of American foreign policy, questions prevail about how it perceives the United States’ role in the world and how it will exercise that role. The appearance of a potentially unconventional U.S. president amidst a world in flux highlights the enormous uncertainties and the potential risks to U.S. stability and prosperity that are now confronting us.

The United States is today facing a fundamentally different world from the one it has known for many decades. In fact, the scope and magnitude of global change represents the greatest challenge since America’s emergence as a world power a century ago. Economic, technological, political and military power has dispersed globally in ways that make it impossible for the United States to pursue its interests unilaterally at acceptable costs and untenable for it to sustain indefinitely its economic and military primacy throughout the world.

Domestically, the United States confronts a range of problems and trends that further challenge its ability to adjust to this changing global environment. A highly polarized political and social environment is inhibiting efforts to rejuvenate vital foundations of the economy, and to deal with mounting national debt, growing income inequality, eroding infrastructure and spiraling entitlement costs. If allowed to continue, such U.S. political and economic difficulties will constrain Washington’s ability to compete in a multipolar world, diminish confidence in U.S. staying power among friends and allies and probably intensify downward pressure on U.S. defense spending.

Notwithstanding these challenges, the United States remains the world’s largest economy and boasts a relatively young and optimistic population, the best universities, and an outstanding capacity for scientific innovation. Even faced with constraining economic and political forces, it still retains the world’s strongest military and an extensive system of global alliances. Moreover, the United States continues to exert enormous influence through its soft power.

Given this decidedly mixed picture of unprecedented challenges despite lasting strengths, Washington cannot continue business as usual. While leveraging its many strengths more effectively, it must recognize and adjust to the emerging limits on U.S. capabilities and influence. This will require a serious review of U.S. strategic goals and the means of pursuing them, to include:

— Defining America’s primary and secondary interests more clearly.

— Matching objectives more closely with both capabilities and resources.

— Adopting a more judicious approach to the deployment and use of force, with a much keener appreciation of which issues are susceptible to military solutions and which are not.

— Nurturing and funding the full range of American foreign policy tools in addition to those in the military realm.

— Recognizing the need to work through coalitions and stable balances of power rather than relying on continued primacy.

East Asia Will Remain Critical

Nowhere are these needs more clearly evident than in East Asia. As almost certainly the foremost center of global economic growth and great power rivalry in the 21st century, it presents by far the greatest long-term challenge but also the greatest opportunity for the United States. It will almost certainly remain the primary source of U.S. economic growth for decades to come. It contains some of America’s closest allies, and presents enormous opportunities for expanding collaboration with the major powers of the region on a growing array of regional and global challenges. Indeed, in contrast to the protracted problems afflicting the Middle East and Europe, East Asia could constitute an anchor of global stability and prosperity if key relationships and friction points are managed properly.

Unfortunately, many of these friction points have seen increasing tensions in recent years.

— North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are on a path that could foment a dangerous crisis.

— Sino-Japanese ties have deteriorated, and the bonds between key U.S. allies Tokyo and Seoul are strained.

— New uncertainties have emerged in relations between Taiwan and mainland China.

— The South China Sea has become a cauldron of sovereignty disputes as China’s expansion into maritime territories also claimed by other countries has created deep anxieties across the region.

— Political winds from the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand are testing ASEAN unity and raising questions about their commitment to cooperation with the United States.

— Russia has drawn closer to China and is determined to expand its role in the region.

Compounding these problems is the fact that, despite growing areas of cooperation, Washington’s relations with a rising China are in danger of being overshadowed by deepening levels of distrust and strategic rivalry. Most notably, the changing power configuration in East Asia resulting from China’s growing military capabilities and economic and diplomatic influence is increasing the potential for confrontations between Beijing and Washington over contentious regional issues. It is also fueling an emerging regional arms race that taxes U.S. resources.

This negative dynamic is reinforcing doubts among our allies and other countries about the durability of the U.S. commitment to remain fully engaged in Asian affairs. Many Asian nations fear the United States no longer has the domestic discipline, political and social cohesion, resources and attention span to sustain its longstanding role as a force for stability and prosperity in the region. As a result, they view U.S. skill in managing our relationship with China as the litmus test of our reliability as a long-term partner.

Yet Asians do not want to be forced to choose between Washington and Beijing. China’s rapid economic rise has been the engine of growth in East Asia. When China behaves responsibly, its neighbors want to strengthen economic cooperation with it. When Beijing seeks to use its new military and economic muscles in a more coercive fashion, its neighbors look to the United States for support. But at the same time they deeply fear the prospect of any U.S.-China military conflict.

Thus, the key challenge for the United States in East Asia is to forge a path that reassures in both directions: to use our military presence and political influence to counter destabilizing Chinese behavior, while ensuring our allies and partners that we seek to avoid conflict and are expanding cooperation with China in areas where our interests overlap.

For this approach to succeed, the United States must set as the goal of its policy the establishment of a stable balance of power with a more influential and powerful China, rather than pursuing a vain quest to preserve our traditional absolute regional military superiority. If the United States can capture this dynamic in our policy approach to the region, the East Asian miracle will continue to have a solid footing.

to be Continued...
 

weig2000

Captain
... Continued.

The Essential Relationship

Such an approach must be rooted in the reality of a complex, interdependent and essential Sino-U.S. relationship. Beijing is neither an enemy nor an ally. It is both a strong competitor and an essential collaborator in many areas.

The stakes involved in getting America’s China policy right are extremely high. China has a larger population, longer history, more foreign currency holdings and more trade than the United States or any other country. Its economy, which is in the process of surpassing America’s in overall size, is integrated into a global network that demands ever-deeper levels of multilateral coordination to function smoothly.

American consumers depend on China for an enormous range of manufactured products. China in turn is a major market for key U.S. products, from machinery to agriculture and services. It holds large amounts of American debt and has an enduring interest in a strong and vibrant U.S. economy. At the same time, China’s huge market size and industrial growth pose competitive challenges for the U.S. industrial and service sectors.

China also sends more students abroad than any other country—with an unprecedented three hundred thousand plus students in the United States alone—many of them absorbing ideas for management and technology as they gain a deeper understanding of how open market economies function.

In Asia and parts of the world beyond, China is rapidly becoming the principal trader and lender—including for key U.S. allies—and could eventually become the primary investor. A foretaste is provided by Beijing’s ambitious “one belt, one road” plan to advance the economic integration of Eurasia, with China in a central role.

In the diplomatic realm, China is gaining significant influence in world affairs. Beijing has taken an increasingly active part in existing international organizations but has also begun to develop new regional structures in which it is playing a central role, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Boao Forum and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

China is also expanding its multilateral engagement across the globe, often presenting itself as a spokesperson for the developing world. Beijing formally adheres to most international norms but differs strongly with the United States on basic issues like the protection of human rights and individual freedoms. And it favors state control of various areas of societal behavior such as the internet.

An Inevitable Security Challenge

In the security realm, for the first time in modern history, China is developing military capabilities that significantly improve its ability to defend its interests within at least the “first island chain” that extends from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to continental Southeast Asia. This represents a challenge to traditional U.S. air and sea superiority in the western Pacific, a status that the United States has enjoyed since the end of World War II. In particular, China’s growing military capabilities directly impact U.S. defense alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, and U.S. security commitments with respect to Taiwan.

While China’s growing military capabilities and ambitions certainly create challenges for the United States, they do not necessarily reflect aggressive or expansionist intentions and instead derive largely from Beijing’s difficult security environment and historical experience. China has land borders with fourteen countries, some small and inconsequential but others, like Russia and India, wielding significant power and resources. Four of these neighbors have nuclear weapons, and the United States has a nuclear umbrella over Japan and South Korea. China's “near abroad” also includes major countries such as Indonesia and Iran.

While China can develop formidable naval capabilities along its coastal areas, it lacks unfettered access to the open seas, whether the Pacific, Indian, or Arctic Oceans. It does not control the island chains on its eastern flanks, and narrow straits restrict its naval access to the Indian Ocean. In this sense, anti-access and area denial, a concept often applied to China’s military strategy along its maritime periphery, can also work against it.

Modern history has not been kind to China. It lost vast swathes of its territory because of its earlier weakness, and it lagged behind Japan in modernization. In the 19th and 20th centuries, multiple wars were fought inside China or on its borders. In addition, vast sweeps of China's western regions are occupied by ethnic minorities, such as the Tibetans and the Uighurs in Xinjiang, living in their historic homelands. These regions are vulnerable to separatist sentiments, which reinforces the importance China attaches to preserving national unity and territorial integrity.

Understandably, the Chinese believe that over the last two hundred years they have been bullied and victimized by stronger powers. They are determined not to let this happen again, and genuinely believe their own rhetoric that their goal is not to dominate but to avoid being dominated. Their neighbors, not surprisingly, are skeptical of this claim. Moreover, the Chinese may be poor judges of their own future behavior since their military modernization gives them growing capabilities to bully weaker countries around their periphery.

Despite these insecurities and historical grievances, postulating that China’s goal is to dominate East Asia ignores geographic, historical and domestic political factors. History has demonstrated that some regions of the world are not conducive to sustained domination by major powers. No major power has been able to dominate Europe for the last two hundred years, despite several attempts. East Asia is another such region. Japan tried to dominate it and suffered a catastrophic defeat. While the United States has enjoyed maritime primacy in Asia for seventy years, it has certainly not dominated East Asia as a whole.

Moreover, domestically, China—like the United States—faces huge challenges, including slowing economic growth, an aging population, a shrinking workforce, and badly skewed income distribution. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is shaking up the party, the government and the military. The leadership’s economic reforms threaten the giant state owned enterprises that constitute a powerful interest group in China. And the military reforms Xi is undertaking pose significant implications for promotions and career patterns.

With such an external mindset and these internal challenges, China’s interests are no better served than ours by a Cold War-style strategic competition with the United States – especially when the two sides are economically interdependent and facing joint responsibility for the management of climate change and other transnational global threats. Instead, Beijing’s priorities require stability, lessened security competition and continued growth. China is in no position to seek regional (much less global) dominance.

to be Continued...
 
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