China's SCS Strategy Thread

[tidalwave]

The idea of DF-21D is this.
Each missile carries warheads and decoys. If multiple DF-21D coming down. Is the carrier group gonna engage and shoot every single decoy and warhead?
SM missile gonna take out all warheads and decoys regardless whether its has good targeting. it cannot take chances. It can overload the system.


Keep in that swarms of antiship missiles coming side ways too and some of them reach Mach 4 speed,

It's a game changer in a sense that before this, carrier group doesn't need to worry about Mach10 warheads and decoys raining on top of its head

Now it has to worry regardless whether that missile has good targeting because you just don't know and can't take chances and therefore has to take them out high up in the atmosphere, This creating alot more strain and stress to combat system.

When you under stress for certain things you are expecting, then most likely you will likely get killed by something else unexpected.

 

[Iron Man]

DF-21D will be launched amid heavy confrontation of conventional forces.
It's gonna be used in conjunction with all other weapons.
Why singling out DF-21D by itself? It ain't gonna go solo. Makes No Sense.

Think about the kinds of weapons that China can bring to bear at various ranges from China's coast. The further out you go, the less the number and types of weapons China could use to attack targets at range. The maximum range of the DF-21D is 1,500km. How many other weapons can reach out that far? China has a theoretical maximum of 240 JH-7/As, 24 Su-30MK2s, and 30? H-6M/Ks that can be used in the maritime strike capacity that could potentially reach out that far, but they are not only based inland from the coastline, their bases are also spread out along the entire Chinese coastline, so it is not clear to me how many of them could actually be sent out against a CSG at once, especially at near their maximum ranges. Perhaps 1/3 or even less. While the H-6M/Ks could launch outside the range of the SM-6 (the JH-7/A and Su-30MK2 cannot), probably all three aircraft types are vulnerable to carrier CAP before they could launch anything at all. It seems to me to be highly unlikely that the PLAN would be willing to put a few dozen of these aircraft at risk so far from the Chinese coast just so that a dozen? or whatever DF-21Ds can have some 'company' on the way in, when the combination of all of these would almost certainly still not be enough to penetrate the air defenses of the CSG anyway. Which is why I say that if the DF-21D launches against targets that far out, it will be launching against them alone. Far more likely is that the Chinese military will wait until a far larger strike package can be sent out at the same time, accompanied by ASCMs launched from shore, from ships, and from subs in order to maximize the power of the alpha strike.

It's a game changer in a sense that before this, carrier group doesn't need to worry about Mach10 warheads and decoys raining on top of its head

Now it has to worry regardless whether that missile has good targeting because you just don't know and can't take chances and therefore has to take them out high up in the atmosphere, This creating alot more strain and stress to combat system.

When you under stress for certain things you are expecting, then most likely you will likely get killed by something else unexpected.

If that's all Aegis has to worry about, then it's not stressful at all. A thousand ASCMs inbound, that's stressful.

 

[solarz]

Think about the kinds of weapons that China can bring to bear at various ranges from China's coast. The further out you go, the less the number and types of weapons China could use to attack targets at range. The maximum range of the DF-21D is 1,500km. How many other weapons can reach out that far? China has a theoretical maximum of 240 JH-7/As, 24 Su-30MK2s, and 30? H-6M/Ks that can be used in the maritime strike capacity that could potentially reach out that far, but they are not only based inland from the coastline, their bases are also spread out along the entire Chinese coastline, so it is not clear to me how many of them could actually be sent out against a CSG at once, especially at near their maximum ranges. Perhaps 1/3 or even less. While the H-6M/Ks could launch outside the range of the SM-6 (the JH-7/A and Su-30MK2 cannot), probably all three aircraft types are vulnerable to carrier CAP before they could launch anything at all. It seems to me to be highly unlikely that the PLAN would be willing to put a few dozen of these aircraft at risk so far from the Chinese coast just so that a dozen? or whatever DF-21Ds can have some 'company' on the way in, when the combination of all of these would almost certainly still not be enough to penetrate the air defenses of the CSG anyway. Which is why I say that if the DF-21D launches against targets that far out, it will be launching against them alone. Far more likely is that the Chinese military will wait until a far larger strike package can be sent out at the same time, accompanied by ASCMs launched from shore, from ships, and from subs in order to maximize the power of the alpha strike.

If that's all Aegis has to worry about, then it's not stressful at all. A thousand ASCMs inbound, that's stressful.

Like you said, the aim of the PLAN right now is to push USN carrier battle groups as far away from Chinese coast as possible. The farther those carriers need to stay away, the less effective they are.

What you are saying above may be true if a war between China and the USA was to happen tomorrow, but it won't. The DF-21D is a game changer both for its unprecedented capability and for what it signifies: that China's military technology is not just playing catch up. Who knows what 5 or 10 years down the road might bring? How about cheap UAV swarms that can strike in conjunction with the DF-21D?

 

[PanAsian]

Think about the kinds of weapons that China can bring to bear at various ranges from China's coast. The further out you go, the less the number and types of weapons China could use to attack targets at range. The maximum range of the DF-21D is 1,500km. How many other weapons can reach out that far? China has a theoretical maximum of 240 JH-7/As, 24 Su-30MK2s, and 30? H-6M/Ks that can be used in the maritime strike capacity that could potentially reach out that far, but they are not only based inland from the coastline, their bases are also spread out along the entire Chinese coastline, so it is not clear to me how many of them could actually be sent out against a CSG at once, especially at near their maximum ranges. Perhaps 1/3 or even less. While the H-6M/Ks could launch outside the range of the SM-6 (the JH-7/A and Su-30MK2 cannot), probably all three aircraft types are vulnerable to carrier CAP before they could launch anything at all. It seems to me to be highly unlikely that the PLAN would be willing to put a few dozen of these aircraft at risk so far from the Chinese coast just so that a dozen? or whatever DF-21Ds can have some 'company' on the way in, when the combination of all of these would almost certainly still not be enough to penetrate the air defenses of the CSG anyway. Which is why I say that if the DF-21D launches against targets that far out, it will be launching against them alone. Far more likely is that the Chinese military will wait until a far larger strike package can be sent out at the same time, accompanied by ASCMs launched from shore, from ships, and from subs in order to maximize the power of the alpha strike.

If that's all Aegis has to worry about, then it's not stressful at all. A thousand ASCMs inbound, that's stressful.

Just want to add that in any scenario around Taiwan or further north in the ECS, any Chinese asset will likely be facing a wall of land based counters along the first island chain.

China may be able to keep the waters within the first island chain contested but will not be able to wholesale prevent any hostile assets including CSGs from operating well within the first island chain nor will Chinese forces be able to easily approach or get past that section of the first island chain.

Can't agree more with your 500km estimate from the Chinese coast as the effective hostile asset denial zone.

 

[PanAsian]

I don't think it is a game changer, but it it seriously one of many variables to be dealt with by USN ...... I think the main objective is to deter USN CBG to get close to China' shore .... I think China would be reasonably happy if it can deter USN CBG and stay far away from China's coast (1500-2000 kms)

Well, there is Taiwan and the section of the first island chain north of it which is well under 1500-2000km from China's mainland coast.

I think China's goal is to be able to safely and freely operate all along the Asian continental coast even in times of war, obviously while not warring with any country actually located along that coast. In order to achieve this China needs the capability to successfully conventionally attack any hostile asset anywhere along or within the first island chain including on first island chain landmasses.

My estimation is that they will need real strategic bombers and a good number of them, at least a dozen naval task forces (all anti-air, -surface, -sub, and land attack capable), with all the requisite support assets, to achieve this given the current regional alignment and balance of forces. Obviously they are very far from achieving this.

 

[solarz]

Well, there is Taiwan and the section of the first island chain north of it which is well under 1500-2000km from China's mainland coast.

I think China's goal is to be able to safely and freely operate all along the Asian continental coast even in times of war, obviously while not warring with any country actually located along that coast. In order to achieve this China needs the capability to successfully conventionally attack any hostile asset anywhere along or within the first island chain including on first island chain landmasses.

My estimation is that they will need real strategic bombers and a good number of them, at least a dozen naval task forces (all anti-air, -surface, -sub, and land attack capable), with all the requisite support assets, to achieve this given the current regional alignment and balance of forces. Obviously they are very far from achieving this.

Actually, and to bring the discussion back on topic, I would say the more immediate concern is the SCS.

This is where the DF-21D's range becomes most useful. By themselves, the Chinese bases and naval assets in the area are highly vulnerable. Having the support of a long range ASBM is like having a sniper covering you while you conduct hostage negotiations.

 

[tidalwave]

Think about the kinds of weapons that China can bring to bear at various ranges from China's coast. The further out you go, the less the number and types of weapons China could use to attack targets at range. The maximum range of the DF-21D is 1,500km. How many other weapons can reach out that far? China has a theoretical maximum of 240 JH-7/As, 24 Su-30MK2s, and 30? H-6M/Ks that can be used in the maritime strike capacity that could potentially reach out that far, but they are not only based inland from the coastline, their bases are also spread out along the entire Chinese coastline, so it is not clear to me how many of them could actually be sent out against a CSG at once, especially at near their maximum ranges. Perhaps 1/3 or even less. While the H-6M/Ks could launch outside the range of the SM-6 (the JH-7/A and Su-30MK2 cannot), probably all three aircraft types are vulnerable to carrier CAP before they could launch anything at all. It seems to me to be highly unlikely that the PLAN would be willing to put a few dozen of these aircraft at risk so far from the Chinese coast just so that a dozen? or whatever DF-21Ds can have some 'company' on the way in, when the combination of all of these would almost certainly still not be enough to penetrate the air defenses of the CSG anyway. Which is why I say that if the DF-21D launches against targets that far out, it will be launching against them alone. Far more likely is that the Chinese military will wait until a far larger strike package can be sent out at the same time, accompanied by ASCMs launched from shore, from ships, and from subs in order to maximize the power of the alpha strike.


If that's all Aegis has to worry about, then it's not stressful at all. A thousand ASCMs inbound, that's stressful.

Aegis intercepting ASBM is a recent capability added. It has No track record in engaging numerous Ballistic warheads and decoys coming down. The test they done is always one at a time with No engaging AsHM coming simultaenously

ambushing Subs can get in the range to fire any type of AsHMs at Carrier group, along with Torpedoes.

H6K firing YJ100 at high attitude, which is 800 Km range.

J7HA flying low attitude under the cover of curvature of the earth, which opposing radar can detect within 50miles can fire YJ12 which is 400km range.

You can say China ASBM is not proven, I can say the aegis intercepting numerous Ballistic Missiles as one of the many simultaenous elements is not proven at all.

yeah! You want to play Russian Roulette with your carriers in real situation?

 

[Jeff Head]

This ASBM is no smoke and mirror . Admiral Willard the naval intelligence chief testify that indeed DF 21 D is operational in 2013 I believe

I never said it ws just smoke in mirrors.

In fact I said I am sure they are working on such a program and have deployed some.

As to the test they don't have to test in sea All they have to do is aim it close to the intended target and see if the system can find it We have seen mock up of carrier get hit by a missile

Yes, a static mockup in the desert with a hole in it.

That is what we have seen.

Far cry from hitting a maneuvering vessel hundreds of miles out at sea.

Sorry, but as one who has worked on such military programs, I know...and indeed China knows because to exhaustively tests other systems which it emplys for full production...that full up live fire tests are essential to producing a reliabal, rpobusyt system.

And before those full-up live fire tests, tou test it to varying degress, including simply hitting a moving target at sea without all of the C4SRI ruend on.

Yet none of this has happened.

As I say...until it does...and we will know it when it does...it is not a fully tested system, and not a system that could be relied upon in a crisis.

it is however a system that sends a message...one which hopes to dissuade an adversary from using a very credinble, very advanced and capable system, which itself is armed with one of the most advanced defense systems available to shoot down such ABMs.

Anyhow...that point needs to be remembered. I

This point is factual and something people should be aware of before they believe or spout talk or theories about an effective fully tested anti-shipping ballistic missile system.

That is all.

 

[vesicles]

Also, waiting to engage until a more opportune time and declining to engage altogether are entirely different responses. And I don't know exactly what you mean by "absolute" dominance, but the US has not had to choose to engage without a significant military advantage since the Vietnam War, so saying that it will not engage if it doesn't have a significant advantage is wrong, because it has always enjoyed such an advantage.

Well, absolute dominance, IMHO, means minimal casualty to achieve maximal strategic gain. The issue at hand is whether the US govn't can convince the American public. It is one thing to suffer a couple thousand casualties a year to secure oil and energy in the Mid East. It would be completely different with way higher casualty for a few pieces of uninhabitable rock in the middle of nowhere in the SCS.

I have no doubt that the US will win a fight against China under any scenario that I can think of. The question is casualty. How much casualty is acceptable to the American public? One thing is certain: China is not and will never be another Iraq. The casualty in any scenario between China and the US will be much much higher. Compounded with the fact that it would be so much harder to convince the American public about the potential strategic gain. Again, a few pieces of uninhabitable rock in the middle of nowhere? For that, any casualty would be too high for the American public to swallow...

 

[Jeff Head]

Guys, let's steer away from the specifics of any US Chinese direct conflict.

That's a part od SD Rules and we need to follow them.

Thanks.

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