China's SCS Strategy Thread

[Blitzo]

I really admire your patience, especially for a known character with an entrenched opinion.

Thank you... I do believe in giving equal opportunity to all positions of an argument, even if they hold positions which I may not agree with, so long as they are generally well mannered. If there are insufficiencies in logic, premise, or evidence for their conclusions, I would not hesitate to call them out and challenge it.

 

[joshuatree]

A couple of comments. Firstly, the article itself is self refuting in a couple of key places. As a defence against the allegations that the Obama administration botched the operation, it does poorly for this reason. For example, one of the key premise of the FON and policy is being neutral towards the dispute. The implicit recognition of a territorial limit by innocent passage contradicts its own policy by its actions. This is either incompetence or deliberate but still reflects poor decision choices. The rationale offered can't get past the choice of selecting Mischief instead as it doesn't present such a problem. Additionally, when territories are in dispute and until title is resolved, customary law does not require the US to abide by territorial limit conditions imposed by any party.

I don't see any contradiction between being neutral to a territorial dispute and acknowledging a territorial sea belonging to a land feature via innocent passage at the same time. Otherwise, the USN can't be sailing within 12 NM of any SCS feature occupied by any claimant or it be contradicting its neutral position every time.

The customary law for the US has been to accept all parts of UNCLOS except Part XI which is about seabed mining provisions. Reagan himself issued a statement on this. So the FONOP has to be in line with UNCLOS and as the article explained, Subi may not be able to generate its own territorial sea, but it certainly lies within another's (Sandy Cay) and may even be used as a baseline for Sandy Cay and extend that territorial sea. UNCLOS only allows innocent passage within a territorial sea. Acknowledging a right afforded to a land feature is not the same as acknowledging who that land feature belongs to. To pretend the feature is terra nullius would be a joke as there are at least three claimants to it. UNCLOS does not afford any stipulation on disregarding sea limits if a feature is disputed. The US could perhaps ask the UN to determine if Sandy Cay has a territorial sea or not but it is caught in its own twilight zone by not ratifying UNCLOS.

China's domestic law does require prior notification for warships to conduct innocent passage and the Lassen sailing did openly challenge that. If any other claimants have the same stipulation, (I believe Vietnam does), then the Lassen sailing also challenged them too.

But as you say, the White House could have chosen Mischief instead. We just don't know if it was testing the waters first to see what the Chinese response would be. But it's already made known FONOP will continue in those waters.

Secondly as to your comments, China can and has done what it wants to do regardless of UNCLOS. It should just be reminded that if you wish to invoke UNCLOS then it carries the responsibility to abide by them. The Hague ruling is just around the corner and that will remove some of the smoke screen that China has placed around the disputes through its ambiguity.

Marking Sandy Cay outright will definitely reinforce Subi's standing under UNCLOS but it doesn't mean China has to openly invoke UNCLOS. It would be hedging one's claims. It is China's strategy to be ambiguous but when one examines the land reclamation they are conducting, they are not out of line with UNCLOS. Even when protesting Lassen's FONOP, they were very careful in labeling the surrounding waters. In fact, China could use the Lassen sailing as a pretext for marking Sandy Cay which can be a message to rival claimants about egging on the US for more FONOP.

The only smoke screen I see the Hague removing will be that the nine dash line cannot mean an actual territorial water boundary. But then, China has never clarified it as such either so no matter what the media and opponents will want to portray, the nine dash line won't be completely absolved by the Hague, just merely refined. And China can still play along that line.

 

[Brumby]

I don't see any contradiction between being neutral to a territorial dispute and acknowledging a territorial sea belonging to a land feature via innocent passage at the same time. Otherwise, the USN can't be sailing within 12 NM of any SCS feature occupied by any claimant or it be contradicting its neutral position every time.

The customary law for the US has been to accept all parts of UNCLOS except Part XI which is about seabed mining provisions. Reagan himself issued a statement on this. So the FONOP has to be in line with UNCLOS and as the article explained, Subi may not be able to generate its own territorial sea, but it certainly lies within another's (Sandy Cay) and may even be used as a baseline for Sandy Cay and extend that territorial sea. UNCLOS only allows innocent passage within a territorial sea. Acknowledging a right afforded to a land feature is not the same as acknowledging who that land feature belongs to. To pretend the feature is terra nullius would be a joke as there are at least three claimants to it. UNCLOS does not afford any stipulation on disregarding sea limits if a feature is disputed. The US could perhaps ask the UN to determine if Sandy Cay has a territorial sea or not but it is caught in its own twilight zone by not ratifying UNCLOS.

Whilst I agree with the plausibility in your reasoning it is in my view seriously counter productive to the FONOP by saying there is recognition in general but not specific. This is simply adding confusion into the picture. The US could have invoked terra nullius because title is not established even though it is contested or a simpler path would be to choose Mischief. This just add weight to the picture that the exercise was poorly considered and constituted.

On the point of non provision to disregard sea limits when in dispute I think the articles are silent which I would construe as non mandatory to observe. I think this view is in alignment with customary international law when title is not established.

China's domestic law does require prior notification for warships to conduct innocent passage and the Lassen sailing did openly challenge that. If any other claimants have the same stipulation, (I believe Vietnam does), then the Lassen sailing also challenged them too.

I understand in the past there had been disputes over the meaning of notification but I think the meaning since is established as procedural. In this case the US insisted no prior notification was given or else it would be implicit recognition. This further reinforce the point that in disputed cases, terra nullius assumption makes sense because there is no recognised party to notify.

But as you say, the White House could have chosen Mischief instead. We just don't know if it was testing the waters first to see what the Chinese response would be. But it's already made known FONOP will continue in those waters.

I have a view the WH was testing waters but adding a black out on the FONOP just adds confusion in the absence of facts.

Marking Sandy Cay outright will definitely reinforce Subi's standing under UNCLOS but it doesn't mean China has to openly invoke UNCLOS. It would be hedging one's claims. It is China's strategy to be ambiguous but when one examines the land reclamation they are conducting, they are not out of line with UNCLOS. Even when protesting Lassen's FONOP, they were very careful in labeling the surrounding waters. In fact, China could use the Lassen sailing as a pretext for marking Sandy Cay which can be a message to rival claimants about egging on the US for more FONOP.

The only smoke screen I see the Hague removing will be that the nine dash line cannot mean an actual territorial water boundary. But then, China has never clarified it as such either so no matter what the media and opponents will want to portray, the nine dash line won't be completely absolved by the Hague, just merely refined. And China can still play along that line.

The smoke screen I was referring to is the Hague's determination on what constitutes an island as opposed to rock. This will limit some of the claims around them. As for the nine dash, let's see what comes out of Hague.

 

[joshuatree]

I understand in the past there had been disputes over the meaning of notification but I think the meaning since is established as procedural. In this case the US insisted no prior notification was given or else it would be implicit recognition. This further reinforce the point that in disputed cases, terra nullius assumption makes sense because there is no recognised party to notify.

Not giving prior notification merely demonstrates what UNCLOS permits when conducting innocent passage through another's territorial waters. That doesn't reinforce anything about terra nullius. The USN not giving prior notification (though the constant media pretty much did) has nothing to do with if there's a recognized party. It has to do with simply what UNCLOS allows and anything demanded more by any party is excessive in the eyes of FONOP.

 

[ahojunk]

Okay, now back on topic.

A bit of nostalgia. The following picture shows the 7 reefs/islands before reclamation started. They are shown in their relative sizes (to scale). How things have changed!

If China chooses, they can further develop Chigua (Johnson South) and Huayang (Cuateron). I think it's only a matter of time.

 

[weig2000]

Okay, now back on topic.

A bit of nostalgia. The following picture shows the 7 reefs/islands before reclamation started. They are shown in their relative sizes (to scale). How things have changed!

If China chooses, they can further develop Chigua (Johnson South) and Huayang (Cuateron). I think it's only a matter of time.

View attachment 21850

Developing these islands/reefs costs money, a lot of them. The three currently under construction were picked thoughtfully, IMO. There is no need to invest to build the other four to the same scale; no ROI there.

 

[mr.bean]

Developing these islands/reefs costs money, a lot of them. The three currently under construction were picked thoughtfully, IMO. There is no need to invest to build the other four to the same scale; no ROI there.

According to Taiwan pundits they think each of these islands will cost approx US$5 billion each, that's including everything from reclamation to infrastructure building to equipment that will be installed. I don't know how credible these numbers are but it's interesting perspective from Taiwan.

 

[plawolf]

Developing these islands/reefs costs money, a lot of them. The three currently under construction were picked thoughtfully, IMO. There is no need to invest to build the other four to the same scale; no ROI there.

I think its less to do with money and resources and more to do with long term strategy.

China is using reclamation as a means to send messages and apply pressure as much as it was about the strategic value of having those new islands.

The strategic advantages of having such island bases right at the heart of the region obviously would have factored massively, but I feel a big part, if not the main reason China green lighted the existing projects was to serve notice to some of the other claimants who have been upping the ante lately (notice and contrast how Vietnam and the Philippines were making all sorts of noises and moves before the reclamation, but have calmed right down after the scale of China's operations became evident).

The scale and scope of China's reclamation efforts was a timely abject lesson to those countries of China's power and reach. It was a bit of non-violent shock and awe designed to remind them of just how much more powerful China is without having to resort to the crude measures of bringing out the big stick and waving it about like some countries only know to do.

China stopped because it feels it has achieved all its objectives, but also to leave some room for manoeuvring and bargaining in the future.

If China went and reclaimed all the features it controlled, that's that card fully played and cannot be used again.

By only developing some of them while leaving others largely as they were, China is leaving itself the option of either developing, or using the threat of developing some or all of the remaining features as leverage against future misadventures by other rival claimants.

The message is simple - play nice if you don't want enormous Chinese islands appearing on your doorstep.

I think China will want to leave those islands it has already built with no or minimal military presence for the same reason - leverage. China will be effective saying, "you know those giant new islands we just built? Play nice or they turn from civilian outposts to massive military bases effectively overnight".

I think the main question now is whether the other claimants are smart enough to see the implicit threat, or if they are continue to push and need China to follow through and transform some of those new islands into massive military bases before the message sinks in.

 

[Equation]

I think its less to do with money and resources and more to do with long term strategy.

China is using reclamation as a means to send messages and apply pressure as much as it was about the strategic value of having those new islands.

The strategic advantages of having such island bases right at the heart of the region obviously would have factored massively, but I feel a big part, if not the main reason China green lighted the existing projects was to serve notice to some of the other claimants who have been upping the ante lately (notice and contrast how Vietnam and the Philippines were making all sorts of noises and moves before the reclamation, but have calmed right down after the scale of China's operations became evident).

The scale and scope of China's reclamation efforts was a timely abject lesson to those countries of China's power and reach. It was a bit of non-violent shock and awe designed to remind them of just how much more powerful China is without having to resort to the crude measures of bringing out the big stick and waving it about like some countries only know to do.

China stopped because it feels it has achieved all its objectives, but also to leave some room for manoeuvring and bargaining in the future.

If China went and reclaimed all the features it controlled, that's that card fully played and cannot be used again.

By only developing some of them while leaving others largely as they were, China is leaving itself the option of either developing, or using the threat of developing some or all of the remaining features as leverage against future misadventures by other rival claimants.

The message is simple - play nice if you don't want enormous Chinese islands appearing on your doorstep.

I think China will want to leave those islands it has already built with no or minimal military presence for the same reason - leverage. China will be effective saying, "you know those giant new islands we just built? Play nice or they turn from civilian outposts to massive military bases effectively overnight".

I think the main question now is whether the other claimants are smart enough to see the implicit threat, or if they are continue to push and need China to follow through and transform some of those new islands into massive military bases before the message sinks in.

Not only that there are like over 200 or so reefs and barriers left (that's not claim by anyone)that can become reclamation projects if China wants to easily.

 

[antiterror13]

I thought China had stopped it ... a bit too late, a bit meaningless
Read some comments there, very interesting and funny

Obama says China must stop land reclamation in South China Sea

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