(cont 3)
Shipbuilding
Since the late 1990s China has been building an increasingly-sophisticated, modern naval fleet. The world’s top commercial shipbuilder by volume, China has expanded and modernized its civilian and military shipyards. Its two largest state shipbuilding conglomerates collaborate with increasing efficiency. Propulsion is now one of the few areas of remaining limitation, and consequent reliance on foreign systems and technology.
China’s navy offers tangible proof its
. Quality is improving even faster than quantity, with older vessels swapped for bigger, better “multi-mission ships equipped with advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors.” Already this adds up to an impressive result: “The PLAN now possesses the largest number of vessels in Asia, with more than 300 surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships, and patrol craft.”
Submarine force modernization — a technologically demanding area — remains a top Chinese priority, with its navy projected to possess “between 69 and 78 submarines” by 2020. The Pentagon judges that four
Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are already “operational” and surmises that during the next decade “up to five may enter service before China begins developing and fielding its next-generation SSBN, the Type 096.” The Type 096 will boast the follow-on JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). During that time, China also “may construct a new Type 095 nuclear-powered, guided-missile attack submarine (SSGN), which not only would improve the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability but might also provide it with a more clandestine land-attack option.” As for nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), “four additional SHANG-class SSN (Type 093) will eventually join the two already in service.”
To ensure continued progress in its consistent focus area of anti-surface warfare, China is modernizing its
and over-the-horizon targeting needed to ensure their effectiveness at long range. In a typical example of China improving on Russian systems that it accesses, digests, and emulates,
Song– and
Yuan-class conventional submarines as well as
Shang-class SSNs will be equipped with its “newest indigenous submarine-launched ASCM, the
and its variants.”
Aviation
A Cold War laggard, China’s aviation industry is finally progressing expeditiously. Driven by a national priority to build its first major commercial jetliner, the C919, China’s commercial aircraft industry is exploiting mandatory joint ventures and foreign acquisition to tool up and learn leading edge production processes. As part of a consistent emphasis on civil-military integration, as literally embodied in eight major national aviation science and technology parks, China works consistently to “spin on” civilian aviation technology to its military sector. The one major enduring weakness: as in the marine sector, propulsion. Chinese civil and military aviation “remains reliant on foreign sourcing for
.” It is finally investing financially and organizationally to make major progress, but mastering such an
— the province of a mere handful of companies worldwide — is inherently difficult and time consuming.
As with warships, China is prioritizing qualitative over quantitative improvements in military aircraft. Replacing old platforms with new, improved ones, it is “rapidly closing the gap” vis-à-vis Western counterparts “across a broad spectrum of capabilities from aircraft and command-and-control (C2) to jammers, electronic warfare (EW), and datalinks.” As “the only country other than the United States to have two concurrent stealth fighter programs,” China is developing “fifth-generation aircraft, which could enter service as early as 2018.” Strongly emphasizing unmanned systems, “China is advancing its development and employment of
.”
Ground-Forces Materiel
With the standard of “good enough” generally being a far lower bar to reach than the previous three sectors discussed, this more mundane field of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery remains a lower priority for Chinese innovation and achievement. Even in this relative backwater, however, “China is capable of producing ground weapon systems at or near world class standards.” To be sure, “quality deficiencies persist with some export equipment,” but arms producers almost never sell their very best abroad; and the majority of China’s customers are still developing nations that either lack good political or financial options, or both.
What it All Means
In releasing authoritative information that no other organization is capable of, or willing to, provide, the Pentagon has performed a commendable public service. This section on Chinese counter-space activities and capabilities alone is worth far more than the $95,000 in taxpayer dollars spent in preparing its 2016 report.
The real world applications of Beijing’s manifold military improvements are numerous and troubling. “China’s multi-decade military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of Taiwan’s historical advantages” in self-defense, the report stated. Specifically, mainland China has deployed no fewer than 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles, the majority across from Taiwan. At its rollout to the media on Friday, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Abraham Denmark elaborated from a U.S. policy perspective: “we believe that
, but also needs to make investments in asymmetric capabilities….” After eight years of relative quiescence, cross-Strait relations are heating up as Beijing’s expectations have increased just as President-elect Tsai Ing-wen is poised to assume office advocating a different approach to their management. Much attention is focused on what she will say about relations with mainland China in her inaugural address this Friday, May 20.
Such issues will undoubtedly hang over the
in early June, not long after which the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague will likely announce its verdict concerning the legality of Beijing’s “nine-dashed line” claim over the South China Sea and related issues under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Initiated by the Philippines, the case involves China directly; yet, despite its clear legal responsibility as a party to UNLCOS to accept the verdict, Beijing categorically rejects the arbitration and refuses to participate or acknowledge the results.
Note well: Beijing has a habit of timing and publicizing the unveiling and testing of new weapon systems to signal capabilities and resolve. Looking forward, there are many potential instances for it to send such a message.
Fortunately, in its latest report, the Pentagon has at least contributed to public understanding of key Chinese military dynamics. These will be influencing regional and international security for a long time to come. So stay tuned, and fasten your seat belts. It’s going to be a bumpy ride for all concerned.
Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and Associate in Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center. He blogs at . The views expressed here are his alone, and do not represent the policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government.
... so, it is expected
