Uhhh...they didn't. That's not a Mig-29.
China Flanker Thread II
- Thread starter sumdud
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Since the Su-35 thread is locked, so I post here:
There are some rather reliable rumors (including these from PLA's senior pilot) going around Chinese BBS for a while, that mention the deal of SU-35 is about over.
1)The price of SU-35: China only accept $50M per unit, while Russians ask for $100M
2)China ask Russia to hand over source code of the fire control system of SU-35
3)China ask Russian side to make SU-35 fully compatible with Chinese weaponary and China AWACS/data link and make many other minor tweaks
Most importantly, China ask Russia to fullfill all the requirements above by the end of this year, or there will be no deal, and Russia told it is impossible.
So there is high chance the SU-35 saga is finally over.
Some rumors says this year, China have broken most agreement reached with Russian side on SU-35 deal, and add new and harsh requirements suddenly, so it is likely due to the rapid development of J-20 and other fighter project, China dont need SU-35 anymore, so it is possible that the new harsh conditions are Chinese attemp to terminate this neogation.
There are some rather reliable rumors (including these from PLA's senior pilot) going around Chinese BBS for a while, that mention the deal of SU-35 is about over.
1)The price of SU-35: China only accept $50M per unit, while Russians ask for $100M
2)China ask Russia to hand over source code of the fire control system of SU-35
3)China ask Russian side to make SU-35 fully compatible with Chinese weaponary and China AWACS/data link and make many other minor tweaks
Most importantly, China ask Russia to fullfill all the requirements above by the end of this year, or there will be no deal, and Russia told it is impossible.
So there is high chance the SU-35 saga is finally over.
Some rumors says this year, China have broken most agreement reached with Russian side on SU-35 deal, and add new and harsh requirements suddenly, so it is likely due to the rapid development of J-20 and other fighter project, China dont need SU-35 anymore, so it is possible that the new harsh conditions are Chinese attemp to terminate this neogation.
JayBird
Junior Member
Or China never broken any agreement with the Russian side regarding SU-35 deal because there was never any agreement reached to begin with.
The alleged new and harsh requirements suddenly added by China sounded to me more like facing saving excuses from the pro Russian fans on Chinese BBS.The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical Positioning - Robert H. Donaldson
"Most analysts agree that Russia's commercial motivations have dominated in its arms sales relationship with China. In this context, Russia all but abandoned the cautious approach to arms sales it had taken in the 1950s. The first exchange of military visits in several decades occurred in June 1990, and resumed arms sales were apparently on the agenda. The following May, Moscow agreed to sell 24 SU-27s to China. Reportedly, only 35 percent of the sales price was to be paid in hard currency. The rest was to be paid as barter, in the form of foodstuffs and consumer goods. However, whereas the barter method initially constituted about three-fourths of Chinese payments, China's growing dollar trade surpluses have enabled Russian negotiators to arrange for hard currency payment in recent contracts. (Felgengauer, 1997a)"
"Combat aircraft have continued to be the chief component of Russian deliveries; China has now purchased at least six dozen transcontinental SU-27 fighters, which are capable of making the Beijing-to-Moscow trip in two and one-half hours with one mid-air refueling. In 1999, China concluded an agreement, valued at more than $2 billion, for forty to sixty SU-30s--two-seat multipurpose fighters capable (with certain modifications) of carrying nuclear weapons. Other categories of purchases which have been concluded or which are being discussed include naval vessels (Sovremennyi-class destroyers equipped with supersonic missiles, two Kilo-636 diesel-powered submarines, and less advanced Varsha-vianka submarines), S-300 surface-to-air missile complexes, T-72 tanks, Smerch multiple rocket launchers, and the technology for advanced gas centrifuges used in uranium enrichment and for MIRVed missiles."
"From China's standpoint, however, the most significant purchase break-through came as a result of the October 1992 visit of Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin, which resulted in an agreement to transfer significant technology and production rights. In 1995 China agreed to pay about $1.4 billion for the technology and licenses to manufacture the SU-27 at a factory in Shenyang province. The Russian press reported concerns that China would thereby free itself of the need to purchase aircraft from Moscow in the future, and that if China made minor modifications to the plane's design, it might even become a competitor in the export market. (Indeed, by 1999 China had already climbed to fourth place in global arms sales.) Russian officials were quoted as saying that Russia needed the contract to save its defense industry, and that profits from the contract would be plowed back into development of new aircraft technology. But another account claimed that there was no prospect of a new generation of Russian-made planes in the foreseeable future, and that officials were simply trying to cover up a major blunder on the part of Russian negotiators, the circumstances of which were even scheduled to be discussed in a special meeting of the Security Council. (Bagrov, 1996) Subsequent reports claimed that part of the funds from deals such as this were siphoned off by Yeltsin's senior aides into foreign bank accounts, some of which were tapped for the president's 1996 re-election campaign expenses. (Sergounin and Subbotin 1999: 67) Such examples of the domination of weapons sales by private and political interests, and the surrounding air of corruption, have led one analyst to describe the result as the "privatization" of Russia's security policy in Asia. (Blank, 1997)"
"Even though the Russians have withheld some of the most advanced technologies sought by China, there is little doubt that their assistance to the modernization of China's armed forces has been a significant positive contribution to their bilateral relationship. In addition to the SU-27 contract, other forms of technology transfer are taking place. Large numbers of Russian scientists and engineers with long-term contracts are working in Chinese design bureaus and defense plants, Chinese engineers are training at Russian facilities, and more than 100 joint production projects have been launched. And yet these contacts are said to be carried on within strict limits:"
Skip to the end...
"A second way in which domestic politics has figured in this case focuses on the importance of the Russian arms industry, and Moscow's effort to stave off its collapse. Generally speaking, the domestic goals for states selling arms are twofold: first, to benefit the national economy by acquiring profits--usually in hard currency--and supporting employment; and second, to support and strengthen the state's defense industry and maintain its long-term viability by achieving economies of scale, preserving infrastructure, and recouping research and development costs. Both are critical elements in Russia's decision to sell arms to China. Desperate to stave off the collapse of an industry crucial to its economy and security and to earn urgently needed hard-currency, Russia is compelled to ignore even its short-term relative position, and ally with--and even arm--a powerful and potentially threatening neighbor."
"Contemporary international relations theory--assuming that economic motivations are subordinated to national security--is blind to situations when domestic economic crises can trump national security interests. Most international relations theorists who focus on domestic politics willingly concede this point, and focus on the effect domestic politics has on international political economy. Though Waltz himself argues that economics is always linked to the security position of all nations, traditionally economic concerns have taken a back seat to national security. When compelled to choose, most theorists agree, nations will sacrifice the former in favor of the latter. Often, as in this case, the two are inseparably linked."
Full Article:
"Most analysts agree that Russia's commercial motivations have dominated in its arms sales relationship with China. In this context, Russia all but abandoned the cautious approach to arms sales it had taken in the 1950s. The first exchange of military visits in several decades occurred in June 1990, and resumed arms sales were apparently on the agenda. The following May, Moscow agreed to sell 24 SU-27s to China. Reportedly, only 35 percent of the sales price was to be paid in hard currency. The rest was to be paid as barter, in the form of foodstuffs and consumer goods. However, whereas the barter method initially constituted about three-fourths of Chinese payments, China's growing dollar trade surpluses have enabled Russian negotiators to arrange for hard currency payment in recent contracts. (Felgengauer, 1997a)"
"Combat aircraft have continued to be the chief component of Russian deliveries; China has now purchased at least six dozen transcontinental SU-27 fighters, which are capable of making the Beijing-to-Moscow trip in two and one-half hours with one mid-air refueling. In 1999, China concluded an agreement, valued at more than $2 billion, for forty to sixty SU-30s--two-seat multipurpose fighters capable (with certain modifications) of carrying nuclear weapons. Other categories of purchases which have been concluded or which are being discussed include naval vessels (Sovremennyi-class destroyers equipped with supersonic missiles, two Kilo-636 diesel-powered submarines, and less advanced Varsha-vianka submarines), S-300 surface-to-air missile complexes, T-72 tanks, Smerch multiple rocket launchers, and the technology for advanced gas centrifuges used in uranium enrichment and for MIRVed missiles."
"From China's standpoint, however, the most significant purchase break-through came as a result of the October 1992 visit of Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin, which resulted in an agreement to transfer significant technology and production rights. In 1995 China agreed to pay about $1.4 billion for the technology and licenses to manufacture the SU-27 at a factory in Shenyang province. The Russian press reported concerns that China would thereby free itself of the need to purchase aircraft from Moscow in the future, and that if China made minor modifications to the plane's design, it might even become a competitor in the export market. (Indeed, by 1999 China had already climbed to fourth place in global arms sales.) Russian officials were quoted as saying that Russia needed the contract to save its defense industry, and that profits from the contract would be plowed back into development of new aircraft technology. But another account claimed that there was no prospect of a new generation of Russian-made planes in the foreseeable future, and that officials were simply trying to cover up a major blunder on the part of Russian negotiators, the circumstances of which were even scheduled to be discussed in a special meeting of the Security Council. (Bagrov, 1996) Subsequent reports claimed that part of the funds from deals such as this were siphoned off by Yeltsin's senior aides into foreign bank accounts, some of which were tapped for the president's 1996 re-election campaign expenses. (Sergounin and Subbotin 1999: 67) Such examples of the domination of weapons sales by private and political interests, and the surrounding air of corruption, have led one analyst to describe the result as the "privatization" of Russia's security policy in Asia. (Blank, 1997)"
"Even though the Russians have withheld some of the most advanced technologies sought by China, there is little doubt that their assistance to the modernization of China's armed forces has been a significant positive contribution to their bilateral relationship. In addition to the SU-27 contract, other forms of technology transfer are taking place. Large numbers of Russian scientists and engineers with long-term contracts are working in Chinese design bureaus and defense plants, Chinese engineers are training at Russian facilities, and more than 100 joint production projects have been launched. And yet these contacts are said to be carried on within strict limits:"
Skip to the end...
"A second way in which domestic politics has figured in this case focuses on the importance of the Russian arms industry, and Moscow's effort to stave off its collapse. Generally speaking, the domestic goals for states selling arms are twofold: first, to benefit the national economy by acquiring profits--usually in hard currency--and supporting employment; and second, to support and strengthen the state's defense industry and maintain its long-term viability by achieving economies of scale, preserving infrastructure, and recouping research and development costs. Both are critical elements in Russia's decision to sell arms to China. Desperate to stave off the collapse of an industry crucial to its economy and security and to earn urgently needed hard-currency, Russia is compelled to ignore even its short-term relative position, and ally with--and even arm--a powerful and potentially threatening neighbor."
"Contemporary international relations theory--assuming that economic motivations are subordinated to national security--is blind to situations when domestic economic crises can trump national security interests. Most international relations theorists who focus on domestic politics willingly concede this point, and focus on the effect domestic politics has on international political economy. Though Waltz himself argues that economics is always linked to the security position of all nations, traditionally economic concerns have taken a back seat to national security. When compelled to choose, most theorists agree, nations will sacrifice the former in favor of the latter. Often, as in this case, the two are inseparably linked."
Full Article:
SinoSoldier
Colonel
Sorry bud, but when China re-equips its J-11B/S/H with AESA radars, any prospect of a Su-35 purchase goes out the window.
? He was saying that there were rumors for why the Su-35 purchase was unlikely to happen.
As for AESAs on SAC flankers, you are making the assumption that the PLA was only interested in Su-35 because of its radar, or even that Su-35s defining difference in capability between it and SAC flankers is related to its radar.
There was a discussion over on CDF a while ago about this and I suggested a possible reason for PLA interest in Su-35 was less to do with its capabilities relative to J-11B but more because they wanted more large, long range fighters that SAC's build rate might not be able to fulfill especially as they are shifting production from J-11B to J-15 and J-16
SinoSoldier
Colonel
If the PLAAF wanted to compensate for the low Flanker production with a J-11B analogue, then buying only twenty-four Su-35s would not address the problem one bit.
Hence, the only plausible reason why anybody would buy such a low number of Flanker-Es would be for either its engine or its radar. Now, avionics are becoming less likely of a reason for a notional purchase (due to installation of powerful radars on J-16 and soon J-15), which leaves the 117S engine as the sole selling point of the Su-35.
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