Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Interesting read about evolving Chinese nuclear doctrine I think those minimal deterrence is outdated and need to be replaced
China’s Evolving Approach to Nuclear War-Fighting
China is dismantling the barriers impeding a war-fighting posture. Does that spell the end of No First Use?
By James Johnson
November 22, 2017
For decades, minimal deterrence, de-mated nuclear warheads, and a no-first-use pledge have formed the bedrock of China’s nuclear posture. China’s conventional deterrence posture, in contrast, has been characterized by war-fighting, pre-emption, asymmetry, and the development of offensively configured . indicates that these postures are far more integrated, flexible, and dynamic than Beijing’s official rhetoric suggests, and that during the past decade a de facto shift toward a limited nuclear war-fighting (or the use of nuclear weapons for victory denial purposes at all stages of warfare) posture has already taken place.
The closer alignment of these postures would accomplish Beijing’s regional military objectives articulated in its defense strategic concept — including the use of asymmetric and pre-emptive tactics during future “informatized” — and link geographically dispersed military forces for joint operations.
If Beijing modified its nuclear forces to meet the operational requirements of a war-fighting doctrine (e.g., sizable deployments of and missile-defense capabilities, or the adoption of a nuclear posture), Washington would indubitably view it as a radical shift in China’s longstanding nuclear posture, and thus, a fundamental challenge to the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region.
In a forthcoming article in , I argue that the existing literature has painted a relatively benign, static, and isolated (from China’s conventional war-fighting capabilities) picture of the evolution of Chinese thinking on strategic deterrence, which risks underestimating the increasingly dynamic, integrative, and flexible features of this shifting security paradigm. In particular, I argue that China’s increasingly commingled and diversified strategic missile forces have already been incorporated into a limited war-fighting military posture.
By overemphasizing the gradualist and passive aspects of China’s formal nuclear posture, policymakers risk overlooking the very real possibility that as (technological, military-organizational, and arms-control) to adopting a nuclear war-fighting doctrine are dismantled, the gap between China’s nuclear capabilities and the modest war-fighting ambitions of Chinese strategists will be reconciled.
Unimpeded by these restrictions, therefore, Beijing’s strategic thinking in future regional conflicts will likely reflect more accurately the new options it has amassed in both the nuclear and conventional domains; to maximize the synergies that exist between these domains for local high-intensity “.
Above all, China’s increasingly commingled and diversified strategic missile forces have already been incorporated into a . Furthermore, in developing tactical theater weapons and systems has, in conjunction with its conventional forces, enhanced its nuclear deterrence, and enabled the kinds of early and pre-emptive strike tactics consistent with a war-fighting posture.
Simply put, this approach increasingly strains the credibility of Beijing’s official rhetoric that depicts China’s nuclear posture as inherently restrained, in contrast to its conventional forces. As a result, Beijing’s characterization of its declaratory nuclear posture has become increasingly out of step with China’s evolving force structures and . The lip-service paid to this stance by most external observers needs to be adjusted to reflect the more nuanced realities.
Admittedly, only a few Chinese strategists have advocated a shift in the function of nuclear weapons from minimal deterrence to war-fighting; these minority views, however, reflect broader pressures to assimilate Western nuclear strategies into traditional Chinese approaches to nuclear thinking. Recent evidence suggests that, far from fading into obscurity or being eschewed by Beijing’s official rhetoric, Chinese strategic thinking on war-fighting has continued to shape and inform Beijing’s nuclear modernization efforts.
Chinese Strategists’ Pent-up Interest in Nuclear War-Fighting
Chinese military writings intimate a pent-up interest in an expanded role for China’s nuclear weapons, which has yet to be integrated into China’s . In short, over the past two decades qualitative improvements to China’s nuclear forces have given Beijing the ability to use nuclear weapons (and pre-emptively) in regional wars. This implies a much broader and discriminate use for nuclear weapons than the proponents of minimum deterrence or assured retaliation envisaged.
One of my main findings is that military-technological advancements across a range of capabilities has meant that China’s aggregate nuclear posture should no longer be conceptualized independently of the PLA’s capabilities and concepts. Rather, these military domains (especially space, cyber, and missile defense) are being synthesized into a force structure that incorporates , designed to deter both conventional and nuclear wars.
In other words, Chinese offensive-dominant space, cyber, and conventional precision strike capabilities have been inexorably fused into China’s nuclear deterrence posture (for integrated strategic deterrence), a trend that is likely to continue as new and increasingly sophisticated capabilities are fielded. During a , for example, Beijing revealed its new intermediate-range ballistic missile (Dongfeng 26) a dual-payload weapon capable (albeit untested) of targeting land and maritime targets in ranges .
In short, several recent technological innovations will likely expedite China’s emerging generation of strategic missiles across the entire nuclear triad, which will have profound implications for the trajectory of its nuclear posture and policies. These military-technological advancements have enhanced the accuracy, speed, precision, ranges, maneuverability, and survivability of Chinese nuclear weapons in a manner that appears incongruous with the requirements of .
As a corollary, even in the absence of formal changes to China’s nuclear doctrine the integration of its nuclear weapons and operations with non-nuclear capabilities in offense-dominant domains, together with the ongoing qualitative advances associated with China’s nuclear modernization, risks exacerbating U.S.-China dynamics, including most worryingly in the nuclear domain itself.
China’s Evolving Approach to Nuclear War-Fighting
China is dismantling the barriers impeding a war-fighting posture. Does that spell the end of No First Use?
By James Johnson
November 22, 2017
For decades, minimal deterrence, de-mated nuclear warheads, and a no-first-use pledge have formed the bedrock of China’s nuclear posture. China’s conventional deterrence posture, in contrast, has been characterized by war-fighting, pre-emption, asymmetry, and the development of offensively configured . indicates that these postures are far more integrated, flexible, and dynamic than Beijing’s official rhetoric suggests, and that during the past decade a de facto shift toward a limited nuclear war-fighting (or the use of nuclear weapons for victory denial purposes at all stages of warfare) posture has already taken place.
The closer alignment of these postures would accomplish Beijing’s regional military objectives articulated in its defense strategic concept — including the use of asymmetric and pre-emptive tactics during future “informatized” — and link geographically dispersed military forces for joint operations.
If Beijing modified its nuclear forces to meet the operational requirements of a war-fighting doctrine (e.g., sizable deployments of and missile-defense capabilities, or the adoption of a nuclear posture), Washington would indubitably view it as a radical shift in China’s longstanding nuclear posture, and thus, a fundamental challenge to the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region.
In a forthcoming article in , I argue that the existing literature has painted a relatively benign, static, and isolated (from China’s conventional war-fighting capabilities) picture of the evolution of Chinese thinking on strategic deterrence, which risks underestimating the increasingly dynamic, integrative, and flexible features of this shifting security paradigm. In particular, I argue that China’s increasingly commingled and diversified strategic missile forces have already been incorporated into a limited war-fighting military posture.
By overemphasizing the gradualist and passive aspects of China’s formal nuclear posture, policymakers risk overlooking the very real possibility that as (technological, military-organizational, and arms-control) to adopting a nuclear war-fighting doctrine are dismantled, the gap between China’s nuclear capabilities and the modest war-fighting ambitions of Chinese strategists will be reconciled.
Unimpeded by these restrictions, therefore, Beijing’s strategic thinking in future regional conflicts will likely reflect more accurately the new options it has amassed in both the nuclear and conventional domains; to maximize the synergies that exist between these domains for local high-intensity “.
Above all, China’s increasingly commingled and diversified strategic missile forces have already been incorporated into a . Furthermore, in developing tactical theater weapons and systems has, in conjunction with its conventional forces, enhanced its nuclear deterrence, and enabled the kinds of early and pre-emptive strike tactics consistent with a war-fighting posture.
Simply put, this approach increasingly strains the credibility of Beijing’s official rhetoric that depicts China’s nuclear posture as inherently restrained, in contrast to its conventional forces. As a result, Beijing’s characterization of its declaratory nuclear posture has become increasingly out of step with China’s evolving force structures and . The lip-service paid to this stance by most external observers needs to be adjusted to reflect the more nuanced realities.
Admittedly, only a few Chinese strategists have advocated a shift in the function of nuclear weapons from minimal deterrence to war-fighting; these minority views, however, reflect broader pressures to assimilate Western nuclear strategies into traditional Chinese approaches to nuclear thinking. Recent evidence suggests that, far from fading into obscurity or being eschewed by Beijing’s official rhetoric, Chinese strategic thinking on war-fighting has continued to shape and inform Beijing’s nuclear modernization efforts.
Chinese Strategists’ Pent-up Interest in Nuclear War-Fighting
Chinese military writings intimate a pent-up interest in an expanded role for China’s nuclear weapons, which has yet to be integrated into China’s . In short, over the past two decades qualitative improvements to China’s nuclear forces have given Beijing the ability to use nuclear weapons (and pre-emptively) in regional wars. This implies a much broader and discriminate use for nuclear weapons than the proponents of minimum deterrence or assured retaliation envisaged.
One of my main findings is that military-technological advancements across a range of capabilities has meant that China’s aggregate nuclear posture should no longer be conceptualized independently of the PLA’s capabilities and concepts. Rather, these military domains (especially space, cyber, and missile defense) are being synthesized into a force structure that incorporates , designed to deter both conventional and nuclear wars.
In other words, Chinese offensive-dominant space, cyber, and conventional precision strike capabilities have been inexorably fused into China’s nuclear deterrence posture (for integrated strategic deterrence), a trend that is likely to continue as new and increasingly sophisticated capabilities are fielded. During a , for example, Beijing revealed its new intermediate-range ballistic missile (Dongfeng 26) a dual-payload weapon capable (albeit untested) of targeting land and maritime targets in ranges .
In short, several recent technological innovations will likely expedite China’s emerging generation of strategic missiles across the entire nuclear triad, which will have profound implications for the trajectory of its nuclear posture and policies. These military-technological advancements have enhanced the accuracy, speed, precision, ranges, maneuverability, and survivability of Chinese nuclear weapons in a manner that appears incongruous with the requirements of .
As a corollary, even in the absence of formal changes to China’s nuclear doctrine the integration of its nuclear weapons and operations with non-nuclear capabilities in offense-dominant domains, together with the ongoing qualitative advances associated with China’s nuclear modernization, risks exacerbating U.S.-China dynamics, including most worryingly in the nuclear domain itself.
