China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

Status
Not open for further replies.

FORBIN

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
China needs to improve both offense and defense to maintain a strategic balance. So in addition to what's already been said about the nukes themselves and delivery systems they also need to make significant advances in BMD.

China don' t need ABMs really can need eventualy ABMs vs ICBMs, SLBMs LR ( exist only one GBI and very difficult to build and expensive ) coz she is realy " threatened "by very few BMs : SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs only neighbour South Korea have, normaly no problem with North korea...

South Korea have Hyunmoo-2A/B based on the Nike Hercules about 100 +
Taiwan don' t have
Japan don' t have politic matters offensive weapons same for Cruise missiles

It is completely different of USA, Western countries with potentials ennemy which have and in qty.
Western countries except some missiles types don' t have SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs.

Same thing for USA they don' t need have the best SAMs as S-400 etc...and in big qty they have always have air superiority from 1942.

All countries don't have money for all so identifiy essential needs according enemy 's arsenal in relation with strategy.
 
Last edited:

FORBIN

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
Interesting chart showing Chinese missile's.

588f7d31dd0895a8218b4c25-2400


Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
HN-3A don' t exist DH-10 range 1500 -2000 km.
 

FORBIN

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
South Korea have Hyunmoo-2A/B based on the Nike Hercules about 100 +
Taiwan don' t have
Japan don' t have politic matters offensive weapons same for Cruise missiles

Russia have only close 1 Brigade of 12 SS-26 Iskander TELs
USA have ATACMS launched by MLRS or HIMARS but only supersonic mach 3, 300 km not really BM with these speed and vs it Chinese SAM LR S-300PMU-1/2, HQ-9 are largely sufficient.
 
China don' t need ABMs really can need eventualy ABMs vs ICBMs, SLBMs LR ( exist only one GBI and very difficult to build and expensive ) coz she is realy " threatened "by very few BMs : SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs only neighbour South Korea have, normaly no problem with North korea...

South Korea have Hyunmoo-2A/B based on the Nike Hercules about 100 +
Taiwan don' t have
Japan don' t have politic matters offensive weapons same for Cruise missiles

It is completely different of USA, Western countries with potentials ennemy which have and in qty.
Western countries except some missiles types don' t have SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs.

Same thing for USA they don' t need have the best SAMs as S-400 etc...and in big qty they have always have air superiority from 1942.

All countries don't have money for all so identifiy essential needs according enemy 's arsenal in relation with strategy.

All that is true but all those countries can easily acquire/re-acquire the capability, there is also Pakistan and India with the capability with third party and native risk respectively in using it against China.

China should do the R&D but not necessarily deploy en masse nor strictly for BMD, technologies for detection, tracking, soft/hard kill, can be applied towards other capabilities as well.
 

weig2000

Captain
China don' t need ABMs really can need eventualy ABMs vs ICBMs, SLBMs LR ( exist only one GBI and very difficult to build and expensive ) coz she is realy " threatened "by very few BMs : SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs only neighbour South Korea have, normaly no problem with North korea...

South Korea have Hyunmoo-2A/B based on the Nike Hercules about 100 +
Taiwan don' t have
Japan don' t have politic matters offensive weapons same for Cruise missiles

It is completely different of USA, Western countries with potentials ennemy which have and in qty.
Western countries except some missiles types don' t have SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs.

Same thing for USA they don' t need have the best SAMs as S-400 etc...and in big qty they have always have air superiority from 1942.

All countries don't have money for all so identifiy essential needs according enemy 's arsenal in relation with strategy.

Largely true, but China's BMD program isnot really geared toward the US or Russia, more like against regional players such as India or North Korea.
 

weig2000

Captain
IMO really the only infrastructure developed for the DF-5 that would still be relevant for the DF-41 is the underground Great Wall. The problem with the silo infrastructure in China's case is that there are too few silos, making them too easily targetable by the US. The only thing keeping the US from taking these out in a first strike is the possibility that the US may not have found all of them. It is not a very strategically tenable position if what you're doing is hoping that the US didn't find all your silos so that you can launch maybe one or two F-U revenge nukes against the US just as most of your major cities are being incinerated, and if the US ever decides that the cost of a couple US cities is worth the near-total destruction of China, it may be willing to make this trade. The fact that it was better than nothing is all that China could count on at the time; but no longer.

If China's nuclear defense posture is going to be a "limited deterrence" (one step up from "minimal deterrence"), its arsenal must remain hidden and mobile as much as possible. This means underground, road, off-road, and rail movement. Perfect for a smaller solid-fueled missile like the DF-41. Note that the DF-41 is extremely similar in specs to the US Peacekeeper (size, weight, range), also a solid-fueled missile. I'm not sure China needs a larger missile than the DF-41, because this missile's destructive capability is no less than the Peacekeeper, a missile that was retired by the US as part of START II talks because of its massively destructive capabilities (which had become utterly wasted by START II's imposition of a single warhead per missile). Fortunately for China it is not a party to any of these talks and can fully pack each DF-41 with 10 warheads. Keep several dozen of these roaming around underground and hidden in train cars and the US will have a far larger headache on its hands than merely having to take out the vast majority of DF-5 silos as a prelude to total war. It would not be able to find most or even all of them if hidden in this way. Scatter a few dozen more along China's thousands of km of highway and the nightmare for the US truly begins. We are no longer talking about a few warheads reaching the continental US, but rather a few hundred warheads. I think such a number would give even someone like Trump significant pause, enough to make him take his hand off the button as much as Russia would.

Liquid fuel silo base missile would never survive long enough to retaliate. Unlike solid fuel missiles, liquid fuel missile sit in their silo unfueled and would need to be fueled up for launch by which time whatever silos that survive would have been subject to another strike. The only good about China's silo based missile is to act as a trip wire that atrracts a first strike attack. To pour more money into these old technology does not make sense. The possibilty that the DF5 just tested maybe to test the multiple warhead buss for the DF41 kinda make sense since it maybe the chinese using up these missile before they are phased out.

Note that I was not setting up heavy liquid-fueled MIRV ICBM vs. DF-41 competition. I'm fully aware of the pros and cons of liquid-fueled vs solid-fueled, and silo-based vs mobile missiles. The context is China developing its next-generation deterrence weapons and platforms and change its current minimum deterrence policy. With the modernization of China's strategic arsenals, people would naturally think of phasing out the aging liquid-fueled DF-5/5B. My suggestion is that there is still value and usefulness for a heavy liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBM class with at least 10-warheads, to complement other delivery platforms. The idea is NOT retaining the liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBM as the center piece of China's next-gen strategic deterrence force.

DF-41 is mobile and likely carries at most 3-6 warheads by its weight class, it's more in the class of Minuteman. A heavier liquid-fueled ICBM carrying at least 10-warheads will form part of the deterrence force. It's not as survivable as DF-41 or SLBMs, but China has made huge investments in its Great Wall project and there are many fake silos built - so that any adversaries would have to expend quite some missiles to take them out first. And it's not like China does not have second-strike capabilities. Also remember that both the US and Russia have deployed large numbers of silo-based ICBMs.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
From Henri K blog East Pendulum
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

We talked here on Saturday 14 January,
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
, for which we have highlighted the presence of an unusually large impact area south of the Taklamakan desert, where the possibility Whether it is a test of missile with several independent warheads (MiRV) is evoked. Finally according to two American officers close monitoring of missile tests, it would, in fact, a test firing of 10 MiRVs worn by a Chinese ICBM model DF-5C.

The information was relayed by Bill Gertz, an editor and observer of Asian affairs on
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
.

Before going further into the interpretation of this new provision by the Americans, let us first recall what we said at the time:

It should be noted that this zone of ballistic impact is abnormally large and measures more than 125 000 km². By way of comparison, during the DF-41 intercontinental missile test which took place on 12 April 2016, where two MiRVs were tested according to US intelligence services, the impact area measured only 100 km × 60 Km, ie an area of 6,000 km², it is almost 21 times smaller than that of the test of January 15, 2017.

The size of this impact zone could thus indicate the test of several MiRVs - the French M-4A ballistic missile can cover, for example, a wide area of 150 km × 350 km - or a Boost- Glide.

We can see in the bottom diagram the impact zone of the supposed DF-5C - circular - and those rectangular (in orange) of the trial of another ICBM Chinese DF-41 April 12, 2016, where two Ogives would have been dropped, still according to American sources.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

The areas forbidden in the DF-5C test in yellow and the DF-41 in orange (Source: East Pendulum)

So what can we say more about this almost unpublished test because this is the first time that such a number of Chinese MiRVs have been used in a test while China has mastered this technology at least since September 2008 when two Chinese satellites, HJ-1A and HJ-1B, were placed in two different orbits with a rocket CZ-2C .

The PBV (post-boost vehicle) of a ballistic missile, which makes it possible to "distribute" MiRVs and lures in different orbits, is technologically similar to a civilian rocket top that injects satellites into different orbits. It should be noted that the ability to release several satellites in space does not necessarily mean that the country has mastered the MiRVs technologies, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

One of the few images on a supposed Chinese PBV

Indeed, you can imagine a PBV that releases MiRVs like a remote controlled car to which you add a mechanism of distribution of the balls. The remote-controlled car can therefore drop a ball in one place, then roll freely to another place to drop another, and so on. This all depends of course on the autonomy of the remote-controlled car in question, its carrying capacity, as well as the precision and the range of your control handle.

While for some countries that manage to put several see dozens of satellites in orbit, sometimes it's just like a train that drops the same balls on well-defined rails. What I also tend to say is that it's a "rabbit that shits by going straight" ...

Officially nothing more can be said knowing that all the data of the nuclear vectors are highly confidential for any country. But we can still make some working hypotheses as a basis for exchange.

First, the Chinese rocket CZ-2C is, basically, a civilian variant "Batch 02" of the intercontinental ballistic missile DF-5. Therefore any improvements made to the CZ-2C in terms of performance - especially the carrying capacity - could be extrapolated to the new versions of DF-5.

It is estimated that the DF-5B , the ICBM MiRVs China officially unveiled to the public during the military parade in September 2015, can carry about 5000 kg of payload, against 3100 kg for the version based DF-5 and extended reach version DF-5A . The latter two have only one head of megaton class.

The maximum number of independent warheads carried by the DF-5B remains unknown to date and varies according to estimates, but a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 6 can be expected. Knowing that all DF-5 missiles have Same diameter, ie 3.35 meters at the widest, an increase in the number of conveyed warheads suggests, almost naturally, that the warheads have been further miniaturized.

And this miniaturization of the warheads would also imply a decrease in the power of the nuclear weapon and an improvement in its accuracy - the less powerful a head is, the more accurate it must be to be equivalent in terms of damage to nuclear weapons To a "large bomb", depending on the type of targets targeted.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

The arrangement of warheads on their LVBs within an ICBM MX of the United States (Source: USAF)

Therefore, assuming that the carrying capacity of the DF-5C is always equivalent to that of the DF-5B, ie about 5,000 kg, it can then be estimated that the new Chinese nuclear warheads weigh in the 250 kg each, General that PBV and lures and other equipment occupy about 50% of the projectile mass.

Then, concerning the size of the new warheads of the DF-5C, we know that the DF-5 have a diameter of 3.35 meters, and once the thickness of the cap has been removed, we have fallen to 3 meters usable, A CZ-2C. If we now consider the DF-5C PBV has a size comparable to the upper floor YZ-1 , the Chinese have developed for the launch of multiple satellites by rockets of 3.35 meters in diameter, then we can assume That the PBV has a diameter of 2.8 meters.

The calculations therefore give, for 10 MiRVs, a diameter of less than 0.885 meters for each of the heads (in fact much less to leave room for the arrangement).

In short, it can be assumed, very approximately, that each head is about 0.7 meters in diameter and weighs at least 250 kg. The power of each warhead is unknown, so we are not in a position to say whether the Chinese level of miniaturization of nuclear weapons is approaching or reaching the western level or that of the Russians.

It should also be noted that, the Americans are the first to officially reveal this reference DF-5C. No official Chinese official document has mentioned this model so far, but some rumors have actually talked about it since July 2016.

Finally, some US observers are already talking about a change in China's nuclear doctrine - recall that the country has limited nuclear deterrence strategy (sometimes called "minimum" by some), and
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
- this discourse is certainly alarming as always but still has a certain meaning, insofar as it can be considered, in a non-rigorous way, that the MiRVs missiles at the silos can rather be seen as a weapon of first strike, whereas the Missile "mobile", MiRV or not, rather as a means of retaliation. And with a range of more than 12,000 km, the "target" target can only be the United States, as 10,000 km will be enough to reach any point of Russia and Europe.

To be continued.

Henri K.
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
Note that I was not setting up heavy liquid-fueled MIRV ICBM vs. DF-41 competition. I'm fully aware of the pros and cons of liquid-fueled vs solid-fueled, and silo-based vs mobile missiles. The context is China developing its next-generation deterrence weapons and platforms and change its current minimum deterrence policy. With the modernization of China's strategic arsenals, people would naturally think of phasing out the aging liquid-fueled DF-5/5B. My suggestion is that there is still value and usefulness for a heavy liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBM class with at least 10-warheads, to complement other delivery platforms. The idea is NOT retaining the liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBM as the center piece of China's next-gen strategic deterrence force.
The problem with silo-based deterrence is that you need a lot of silos to make it useful as a true deterrent. Silos are packed in at calculated distances from other silos so that one silo's destruction would not result in another silo's destruction but are yet close enough that an enemy warhead that destroys one silo could potentially cause destructive interference with another warhead reigning down trying to destroy a nearby silo. That is why both the US and Russia have open fields of hundreds of silos in plain view of the world. This is entirely not the case with China. Because it only has 20 (+/-) DF-5s, its silos are all over the map, widely spaced and hidden as much as possible. Unfortunately, you have to assume that the US will know the locations of most of these silos by now. When China was weak and slow response, liquid-fueled ICBMs was all it had, they had to do. But now there is no reason to invest more money into solitary stationary silos that will almost certainly get taken out during the initial stages of a nuclear war. I think the test of the "DF-5C" is a limited use of your proposal (or it could just be a test for the benefit of the DF-41), but IMO the PLARF is just using what life the existing DF-5s have left to give itself a temporary boost in ready-to-launch warhead capability while it ramps up DF-41 production. The main form of deterrence will inevitably shift to the DF-41, along with the JL-2/3.

DF-41 is mobile and likely carries at most 3-6 warheads by its weight class, it's more in the class of Minuteman. A heavier liquid-fueled ICBM carrying at least 10-warheads will form part of the deterrence force. It's not as survivable as DF-41 or SLBMs, but China has made huge investments in its Great Wall project and there are many fake silos built - so that any adversaries would have to expend quite some missiles to take them out first. And it's not like China does not have second-strike capabilities. Also remember that both the US and Russia have deployed large numbers of silo-based ICBMs.
I'm not sure how many fake silos China has built (20? 40?), but they will all be taken out no doubt. On the other hand, so will the real silos.

As I mentioned earlier, the DF-41's weight class is very similar to that of the Peacekeeper (80 tons vs 88 tons); contrast this with Minuteman III at 35 tons. The DF-41 is more than double the mass of the Minuteman III. The Peacekeeper could loft 12 W87 warheads at 200-270kg each to 14,000km, so the DF-41 should have a similar performance. Regardless, I would rather have one survivable DF-41 with a lesser throw weight than a likely destroyed DF-5C with a greater throw weight. Whatever you put into a silo, you'll have to roll the dice. Chances are it's going to be ash when the US launches a first strike.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
The problem with silo-based deterrence is that you need a lot of silos to make it useful as a true deterrent. Silos are packed in at calculated distances from other silos so that one silo's destruction would not result in another silo's destruction but are yet close enough that an enemy warhead that destroys one silo could potentially cause destructive interference with another warhead reigning down trying to destroy a nearby silo. That is why both the US and Russia have open fields of hundreds of silos in plain view of the world. This is entirely not the case with China. Because it only has 20 (+/-) DF-5s, its silos are all over the map, widely spaced and hidden as much as possible. Unfortunately, you have to assume that the US will know the locations of most of these silos by now. When China was weak and slow response, liquid-fueled ICBMs was all it had, they had to do. But now there is no reason to invest more money into solitary stationary silos that will almost certainly get taken out during the initial stages of a nuclear war. I think the test of the "DF-5C" is a limited use of your proposal (or it could just be a test for the benefit of the DF-41), but IMO the PLARF is just using what life the existing DF-5s have left to give itself a temporary boost in ready-to-launch warhead capability while it ramps up DF-41 production. The main form of deterrence will inevitably shift to the DF-41, along with the JL-2/3.


I'm not sure how many fake silos China has built (20? 40?), but they will all be taken out no doubt. On the other hand, so will the real silos.

As I mentioned earlier, the DF-41's weight class is very similar to that of the Peacekeeper (80 tons vs 88 tons); contrast this with Minuteman III at 35 tons. The DF-41 is more than double the mass of the Minuteman III. The Peacekeeper could loft 12 W87 warheads at 200-270kg each to 14,000km, so the DF-41 should have a similar performance. Regardless, I would rather have one survivable DF-41 with a lesser throw weight than a likely destroyed DF-5C with a greater throw weight. Whatever you put into a silo, you'll have to roll the dice. Chances are it's going to be ash when the US launches a first strike.


I think what you described and what he wrote, are not necessarily at odds with each other, specifically this part of his post:
My suggestion is that there is still value and usefulness for a heavy liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBM class with at least 10-warheads, to complement other delivery platforms. The idea is NOT retaining the liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBM as the center piece of China's next-gen strategic deterrence force.

Retaining a silo based DF-5C variant to complement introduction of new (and additional) road mobile DF-31A, road and probably rail mobile DF-41, and submarine JL-2/094 missiles with additional warheads (resulting in a likely net gain of total operational nuclear warheads compared to previous years) sounds quite sensible to me, especially in the foreseeable future.
If these missiles (including silo based ones) can be tied into an effective early warning system and nuclear decision making system with launch on command, then the fact that there will be some missiles retained in silos is not that much of a big deal, so long as you can fire your retaliatory missiles before they are destroyed by the opposing side's first strike.

That point however, is one reason why I'm not very sure about retaining a DF-5 variant is the fact that it is liquid fuelled and not as capable of being launched on notice.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top