Can you win a war with only light infantry in the 21st century?

solarz

Brigadier
To be accurate, in Libya and Syria the rebels weren't/aren't fighting Western technological superiority. The rebels there are/were fighting much more limited local government technological superiority as per older Russian weapons and maybe intelligence help.

The rebels have gotten/are getting help from Western technological superiority via intelligence and/or weapons in both cases. In Libya the rebels also received direct help from Western air forces' attacks on government forces. Not to mention all sorts of external logistical help given to at least the Syrian rebels which may not directly relate to technology but are crucial in facilitating their capabilities.

The imminent French/Malian/African governments' fight with the Malian Islamist rebels should be a better contemporary example of how a mostly self-sustained light infantry force might fare against technologically superior combined arms forces.

Actually, I would say that by providing Islamic rebels in Libya with air superiority, the West gave them valuable insight (and quite possibly direct training) into infantry tactics used by the West. Know your enemy and all that.

In Syria, while the rebels are technically fighting Russian technological superiority, the lessons learn are still applicable to fighting the West.
 

leibowitz

Junior Member
Actually, I would say that by providing Islamic rebels in Libya with air superiority, the West gave them valuable insight (and quite possibly direct training) into infantry tactics used by the West. Know your enemy and all that.

In Syria, while the rebels are technically fighting Russian technological superiority, the lessons learn are still applicable to fighting the West.

This is like some shit out Frank Herbert's Dune:

Among the many challenges an invading army will face is the inhospitable terrain, Fowler said, which is so hot that at times "it was difficult to draw breath." A cable published by WikiLeaks from the U.S. Embassy in Bamako described how even the Malian troops deployed in the north before the coup could only work from 4 a.m. to 10 a.m., and spent the sunlight hours in the shade of their vehicles.
Yet Fowler said he saw al-Qaida fighters chant Quranic verses under the Sahara sun for hours, just one sign of their deep, ideological commitment.

"I have never seen a more focused group of young men," said Fowler, who now lives in Ottawa, Canada. "No one is sneaking off for R&R. They have left their wives and children behind. They believe they are on their way to paradise."

Just replace the AQIM with the Fremen, and France with House Harkonnen, and any special ops with Sarduakar, etc. etc.

Plus, the AQIM seems to have gotten tons of Libyan equipment, including SAMs, BM-21 artillery rockets, and bulldozers (more important in warfare than most people realize).
 

solarz

Brigadier
This is like some shit out Frank Herbert's Dune:

Just replace the AQIM with the Fremen, and France with House Harkonnen, and any special ops with Sarduakar, etc. etc.

Plus, the AQIM seems to have gotten tons of Libyan equipment, including SAMs, BM-21 artillery rockets, and bulldozers (more important in warfare than most people realize).

Well, I don't think the AQIM can actually stand against French SOF like the Fremen could against the Sardaukar.

As for the Libyan connection, it goes even deeper than that:

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The main Islamist group in Mali, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), comprises three battalions made up mostly of Algerians who fled south after a long and bloody Islamist underground war against the Algerian army in the 1990s. But it also includes Mauritanians, Malians and other recruits attracted to northern Mali since the Malian army was scattered last spring after a bungled coup d’etat in Bamako.

A second group, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, led by Hamad Ould Kheiru, split off from AQIM but operates in close cooperation with AQIM units, according to Mathieu Guidere, a French specialist on African terrorism.

Together, they have long thrived on proceeds from hostage-taking and smuggling of cigarettes and Europe-bound cocaine, Guidere said. As a result of their flush finances, they are well armed with light weapons and move freely about the region in pickup trucks mounted with machine guns or aged anti-aircraft weapons.

Ansar al-Dine, a third group, is led by Iyad ag Ghali, a rebellious former Malian army officer who was converted to extremist Salafist doctrine while serving in the Malian consulate in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia.

Ghali is a member of the Tuareg ethnic group, which differs from the black Africans who rule in Bamako and has repeatedly sought to throw off government control. Since his return from Saudi Arabia, Ghali has split with other Tuareg independence leaders in favor of a close alliance with AQIM leaders and a fierce determination to impose strict Muslim law in the Tuareg area.

The Malian army was driven out of northern Mali, however, by a fourth group, the secular Azawad National Liberation Movement led by Col. Mohammed ag Najim.

Najim’s militia served for several years in Libya as an adjunct to Moammar Gaddafi’s army. When Gaddafi was toppled by a French-led air campaign in coordination with Libyan rebels in 2011, Najim returned to Mali with plentiful supplies of weapons and ammunition lifted from Gaddafi’s warehouses.


Some reports said Najim brought with him some of Libya’s portable surface-to-air missiles, raising the prospect of their being sold to AQIM and used against civilian airline flights that pass routinely over the area. Those fears were cited by French diplomats as they sought to round up support for an international intervention to drive the Islamist militias out of Mali.

In any case, the Malian army, leaderless after the coup in March, was no match for Najim’s well-equipped men. Malian forces collapsed immediately, and Najim and his AQIM allies declared an independent Tuareg state.

Within a short time, however, Najim’s soldiers were shoved aside by AQIM and Ansar al-Dine, whose leaders were intent on setting up an Islamic “caliphate” with a population ruled according to sharia, or strict Koranic law.

Since then, Najim has been courted by French and other diplomats seeking to recruit him and his secular Tuareg forces into the battle against Islamist militias. But so far, he has steered clear of the conflict, reportedly from refuge in a neighboring country.
 

leibowitz

Junior Member
Well, I don't think the AQIM can actually stand against French SOF like the Fremen could against the Sardaukar.

As for the Libyan connection, it goes even deeper than that:

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France isn't just sending an unit of SOF. They're sending a full-fledged brigade. This could turn ugly--the last two instances of French counterinsurgency ended in Dien Bien Phu and the Algierian pullout of 1962, respectively.
 
This should be interesting as a case study then.

As far as I know the Islamists don't have any significant external support nor overwhelming local population support, terrain is so-so for guerilla warfare.

France has a power-projection capability but what it is committing to this fight seems just enough rather than outright overwhelming. Its African allies are a fair match for the Islamists.

The circumstancial and technological advantages to intelligence and logistics should tip the resolution in France's favor.
 
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