From my Blog
Amateur web research. All drawings by me unless otherwise stated. This is not intended to be authoritative or exhaustive so corrections and updates always welcome. Thanks to everyone who has helped in the research.
-------------------------------
PART 1
I’ve been compiling this for some time, on and off, and it’s just such a massive topic I cannot do all the illustrations I’d like or publish in one go. I figured I had to put it down now or I’ll never finish it – some of the illustrations are years old already – and follow up with Part 2 later. Part 2 will include major warships (AEGIS comparison etc) and how China could invade Taiwan.
_________________
INTRO: The Chinese navy, more properly known as PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy), is among the world’s largest and most powerful, but suffers from the stigma of a legacy of outdated designs and limited training and employment. There are clear signs of this changing and the latest Chinese combatants, both indigenous and imported, closely match Western equivalents in several areas. What sets the PLAN apart from Western navies, and causes so much controversy, is the rate at which it’s updating and expanding its capability.
Contents:
1. PLAN carrier program
2. Nuclear deterrence
3. Submarines
4. Missile boat menace
_________________
1. PLAN Carrier Program
Spearheading the Chinese carrier program is the single ‘Varyag class’ carrier obtained, unfinished, from the former USSR. The Chinese service name for the Varyag has yet to be confirmed. Varyag is a Admiral Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier (more properly Project 1143.5, but I prefer the now old NATO reporting name of Kremlin Class).
Although Varyag is undoubtedly an aircraft carrier, it is not designed to operate in the same manner as American carrier battle groups – it is designed around Soviet doctrine and can better be described as an aircraft carrying cruiser, escorting offensive assets, rather than the centre of the task force itself. Therefore the Varyag was intended to field an air-superiority (Su-33 Flankers) and anti-submarine (Ka-28 Helix) focused wing, rather than the multi-role/strike focused US air wings of today. People often debate why the Soviets’ chose that path, but the fact remains that Varyag was not designed to operate in the Western CV mold. At any rate budget is probably the biggest factor affecting the Russian air-wing since the collapse of USSR, and finally Russia shows signs of changing this doctrine.
But this essay is about China not Russia; in Chinese service I expect her to operate more like a Western carrier with a general purpose air wing, generally similar to France’s Charles De Gaulle in overall throw-weight. Evidence from the training facilities now taking shape in Wuhan, China, suggest that the heavy anti-ship cruise missiles, located in VLS on the forward deck at the base of the ski-jump, will not be retained (at any rate China was unlikely to purchase the Russian Granit (SS-N-19) cruise missiles). Similarly the Flankers onboard, notionally Su-33s but possibly a local derivative, are shown with YJ-83 anti-ship missiles unlike their purely anti-air equipped Russian counterparts.
A recent photo of Varyag in dry dock in Dailan, Northern China – brave cameraman! In recent months the island has been partially remodeled and a new mast added.
The Varyag was towed from Ukraine to China, and moved around Dailan docks to a new pier built for her. She is currently in dry dock again.
Famous image of the part finished Varyag under tow on her way to China.
The deck-plan and flight operations of the Varyag are likely to remain as per those of the Russian sister ship, with a ski-jump on the bow to assist takeoff (no catapults) and three take-off positions, as shown below. There are two deck-edge lifts (green) and a regular angled landing strip:
Varyag is likely to be commissioned in late 2010 or 2011, and enter service in 2012-13 timeframe. This is painfully slow for some observers but quite reasonable for PLAN. In the meantime PLAN is ramping up training to prepare, including the innovative full size deck mock-up complete with island at the 701st Institute in Wuhan. This most likely intended for deck handling practice and establishment of deck routines.
The Wuhan facility is not for actual aircraft launch or recovery, which is being trained on a mock-up ski-jump at Yanliang AB, Shaanxi. This facility is similar to those used by the Russian Navy in Ukraine, and the Royal Navy/Air Force at Yeovilton in UK. Although Google Earth imagery has yet to be updated to show the ramp, satellite imagery and photos can be found on Chinese military forums:
There has been a lot of speculation as to the composition of the Varyag’s air wing when she enters service. The safest bet remains a derivative of the Su-27/33 Flanker, with persistent reports of China ordering a batch of Su-33s from Russia. The specification of these naval flankers is unclear but it is likely to be somewhat more modern that Russia’s own 1980s legacy Su-33s. The mock-up Flanker used a Wuhan suggests a Chinese version, perhaps most closely related to the J-11B. The Flanker photographed at Yanliang does not have the canard fore-planes of the regular Su-33.
The deck model at Wuhan (above) is armed with Chinese YJ-8 series missiles, probably representing anti-ship versions, or possibly land attack, and what appears to be PL-8 short range missiles. This non-Chinese weapons fit suggests both a multi-role capability (unlike Russian Navy Su-33s) and Chinese manufacture. It’s not clear if the model’s wing folds.
The air wing is also likely to include Helix ASW, Z-9 (Aerospatiale Dauphin/Cougar) for ASW and/or SAR, and an AEW platform, most likely based on the Z-8 (Aerospatiale Super Frelon) airframe. The deck model Super Frelon at Wuhan does not have this radar.The Super-Frelon AEW radar system is mounted similarly to the French Horizon system:
Speculation that the L-15 trainer may be used, possibly as a light strike fighter, seems plausible. I am less convinced that a version of the J-10 fighter will be employed. The L-15 is a two-seat advanced trainer based on the Russian Yak-130 series, but more closely equivalent to South Korea’s Golden Eagle. It is not hard to imagine single and twin seat versions operating in the light strike and deck training roles.
For defencive armament I suspect the Varyag will be equipped with relatively few Type-730 CIWS and possibly a medium SAM system such as the HHQ-16, a derivative of the SA-11/17 family. This will contrast with the immense close-in defences of the Russian sister ship Admiral Kuznetsov which is bristling with Kashtan CIWS, Klinok SAM complex and AK-630 CIWS.
I’ve created a model of Varyag with provisional air-wing and defensive weapons and uploaded it to Google Earth. She is escorted by a Type-052B destroyer. Download it
Excellent source for following Chinese Carrier developments:
Future Carriers
Reports and speculation abound of the indigenous carrier program, with at least one hull reportedly laid. Separating credible reports from fanciful speculation can be difficult, with ideas ranging from amphibious carriers to full blown CVNs. I’d expect the carriers to be similar in size to Varyag and possibly using a catapult launching system (China has the technology from their experience with the Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne). A mixed fleet of ski-jump (STOBAR) and catapult equipped (CATOBAR) carriers would be a training issue, but that does not rule this out.
_________________
2. Nuclear deterrence
The mainstay of Chinese nuclear deterrence is land based mobile ICBMs, but the PLAN has long harbored the desire to carry its load of the burden. The first ballistic missile submarine was a sole Golf class diesel boat built with Russian assistance. The boat never became operational, instead being a testing boat for subsequent designs.
The Golf class boat was widely reported inactive but has recently be refitted, probably to assist in the JL-2 ballistic missile program. Due to its limited endurance and stealth the boat is unsuitable for operational employment except from Chinese waters from where, with JL-2s, it could hit Australia, Japan, Taiwan and some Russian and US overseas/Alaskan targets, but not mainland US. Compared to modern SSBNs to golf only carries two missiles verses a more typical load of 16.
The Golf was superseded by the altogether more modern Type-092 Xia class, with nuclear power and a hull form not unlike contemporary British and French SSBNs. The Xia class was comparatively unreliable and rarely ventured out of Chinese waters, it’s relatively short ranged JL-1 missiles not posing a serious threat relative to other SSBNs of the 1980s. Two boats were launched but one was lost and only one remains. This was reported out of service but has recently been refitted, repainted and as far as we can tell, returned to service possibly with upgraded missiles. The remaining Xia Class boat is ported near Qingdao:
Reports that the Xia class boat has been converted to a cruise missile carrier are interesting but unconfirmed.
The follow-on to the Xia class is the Type-094 Jin class SSBN. Compared to the Xia class these are of a similar design but significantly longer with the missiles placed further aft, and general improvements. The boats are overall comparable to Western SSBNs such as the French Le Triomphant class, although a notable characteristic is the older-generation conventional screw propulsion rather than the increasingly common pump-jet arrangement.
At least two boats have been commissioned with a total of 5 expected. Armed with just 12 SLBMs the Jin’s continue to carry fewer missiles than their western and Russian contemporaries, but the reported 8,000km range of the JL-2 is very formidable. It is unconfirmed as to whether they have MIRVs.
8,000km is not far enough however to hit mainland US from Chinese waters.
In order to threaten mainland US targets the Jin would have to make it past the formidable submarine tracking assets of US forces in the region (we can speculate bases in Guam, the tip of Alaska and Hawaii) and other ‘western’ allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan. In essence the Chinese naval bases are every bit as ‘encircled’ by Western forces as the Soviets were, however unlike the Russians they cannot escape under the ice of the North Pole. China’s natural “bastion” is the Bohai Gulf to the west of Dalian, where we can reason that Chinese subs are relatively safe, but this does not offer the range advantage inherent of ocean-going submarine operations.
Perhaps a more likely operational patrol might be sailing south into the deep water of the South China Sea, or carefully sneaking into the Gulf of Thailand or Java Sea to target India from another less predictable angle, perhaps circumventing India’s growing anti-ballistic missile defences. There are reports of Type-094 SSBNs porting at the new submarine base on Hainan in southern China which lends itself to this latter scenario.
Amateur web research. All drawings by me unless otherwise stated. This is not intended to be authoritative or exhaustive so corrections and updates always welcome. Thanks to everyone who has helped in the research.
-------------------------------
PART 1
I’ve been compiling this for some time, on and off, and it’s just such a massive topic I cannot do all the illustrations I’d like or publish in one go. I figured I had to put it down now or I’ll never finish it – some of the illustrations are years old already – and follow up with Part 2 later. Part 2 will include major warships (AEGIS comparison etc) and how China could invade Taiwan.
_________________
INTRO: The Chinese navy, more properly known as PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy), is among the world’s largest and most powerful, but suffers from the stigma of a legacy of outdated designs and limited training and employment. There are clear signs of this changing and the latest Chinese combatants, both indigenous and imported, closely match Western equivalents in several areas. What sets the PLAN apart from Western navies, and causes so much controversy, is the rate at which it’s updating and expanding its capability.
Contents:
1. PLAN carrier program
2. Nuclear deterrence
3. Submarines
4. Missile boat menace
_________________
1. PLAN Carrier Program
Spearheading the Chinese carrier program is the single ‘Varyag class’ carrier obtained, unfinished, from the former USSR. The Chinese service name for the Varyag has yet to be confirmed. Varyag is a Admiral Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier (more properly Project 1143.5, but I prefer the now old NATO reporting name of Kremlin Class).
Although Varyag is undoubtedly an aircraft carrier, it is not designed to operate in the same manner as American carrier battle groups – it is designed around Soviet doctrine and can better be described as an aircraft carrying cruiser, escorting offensive assets, rather than the centre of the task force itself. Therefore the Varyag was intended to field an air-superiority (Su-33 Flankers) and anti-submarine (Ka-28 Helix) focused wing, rather than the multi-role/strike focused US air wings of today. People often debate why the Soviets’ chose that path, but the fact remains that Varyag was not designed to operate in the Western CV mold. At any rate budget is probably the biggest factor affecting the Russian air-wing since the collapse of USSR, and finally Russia shows signs of changing this doctrine.
But this essay is about China not Russia; in Chinese service I expect her to operate more like a Western carrier with a general purpose air wing, generally similar to France’s Charles De Gaulle in overall throw-weight. Evidence from the training facilities now taking shape in Wuhan, China, suggest that the heavy anti-ship cruise missiles, located in VLS on the forward deck at the base of the ski-jump, will not be retained (at any rate China was unlikely to purchase the Russian Granit (SS-N-19) cruise missiles). Similarly the Flankers onboard, notionally Su-33s but possibly a local derivative, are shown with YJ-83 anti-ship missiles unlike their purely anti-air equipped Russian counterparts.
A recent photo of Varyag in dry dock in Dailan, Northern China – brave cameraman! In recent months the island has been partially remodeled and a new mast added.
The Varyag was towed from Ukraine to China, and moved around Dailan docks to a new pier built for her. She is currently in dry dock again.
Famous image of the part finished Varyag under tow on her way to China.
The deck-plan and flight operations of the Varyag are likely to remain as per those of the Russian sister ship, with a ski-jump on the bow to assist takeoff (no catapults) and three take-off positions, as shown below. There are two deck-edge lifts (green) and a regular angled landing strip:
Varyag is likely to be commissioned in late 2010 or 2011, and enter service in 2012-13 timeframe. This is painfully slow for some observers but quite reasonable for PLAN. In the meantime PLAN is ramping up training to prepare, including the innovative full size deck mock-up complete with island at the 701st Institute in Wuhan. This most likely intended for deck handling practice and establishment of deck routines.
The Wuhan facility is not for actual aircraft launch or recovery, which is being trained on a mock-up ski-jump at Yanliang AB, Shaanxi. This facility is similar to those used by the Russian Navy in Ukraine, and the Royal Navy/Air Force at Yeovilton in UK. Although Google Earth imagery has yet to be updated to show the ramp, satellite imagery and photos can be found on Chinese military forums:
There has been a lot of speculation as to the composition of the Varyag’s air wing when she enters service. The safest bet remains a derivative of the Su-27/33 Flanker, with persistent reports of China ordering a batch of Su-33s from Russia. The specification of these naval flankers is unclear but it is likely to be somewhat more modern that Russia’s own 1980s legacy Su-33s. The mock-up Flanker used a Wuhan suggests a Chinese version, perhaps most closely related to the J-11B. The Flanker photographed at Yanliang does not have the canard fore-planes of the regular Su-33.
The deck model at Wuhan (above) is armed with Chinese YJ-8 series missiles, probably representing anti-ship versions, or possibly land attack, and what appears to be PL-8 short range missiles. This non-Chinese weapons fit suggests both a multi-role capability (unlike Russian Navy Su-33s) and Chinese manufacture. It’s not clear if the model’s wing folds.
The air wing is also likely to include Helix ASW, Z-9 (Aerospatiale Dauphin/Cougar) for ASW and/or SAR, and an AEW platform, most likely based on the Z-8 (Aerospatiale Super Frelon) airframe. The deck model Super Frelon at Wuhan does not have this radar.The Super-Frelon AEW radar system is mounted similarly to the French Horizon system:
Speculation that the L-15 trainer may be used, possibly as a light strike fighter, seems plausible. I am less convinced that a version of the J-10 fighter will be employed. The L-15 is a two-seat advanced trainer based on the Russian Yak-130 series, but more closely equivalent to South Korea’s Golden Eagle. It is not hard to imagine single and twin seat versions operating in the light strike and deck training roles.
For defencive armament I suspect the Varyag will be equipped with relatively few Type-730 CIWS and possibly a medium SAM system such as the HHQ-16, a derivative of the SA-11/17 family. This will contrast with the immense close-in defences of the Russian sister ship Admiral Kuznetsov which is bristling with Kashtan CIWS, Klinok SAM complex and AK-630 CIWS.
I’ve created a model of Varyag with provisional air-wing and defensive weapons and uploaded it to Google Earth. She is escorted by a Type-052B destroyer. Download it
Excellent source for following Chinese Carrier developments:
Future Carriers
Reports and speculation abound of the indigenous carrier program, with at least one hull reportedly laid. Separating credible reports from fanciful speculation can be difficult, with ideas ranging from amphibious carriers to full blown CVNs. I’d expect the carriers to be similar in size to Varyag and possibly using a catapult launching system (China has the technology from their experience with the Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne). A mixed fleet of ski-jump (STOBAR) and catapult equipped (CATOBAR) carriers would be a training issue, but that does not rule this out.
_________________
2. Nuclear deterrence
The mainstay of Chinese nuclear deterrence is land based mobile ICBMs, but the PLAN has long harbored the desire to carry its load of the burden. The first ballistic missile submarine was a sole Golf class diesel boat built with Russian assistance. The boat never became operational, instead being a testing boat for subsequent designs.
The Golf class boat was widely reported inactive but has recently be refitted, probably to assist in the JL-2 ballistic missile program. Due to its limited endurance and stealth the boat is unsuitable for operational employment except from Chinese waters from where, with JL-2s, it could hit Australia, Japan, Taiwan and some Russian and US overseas/Alaskan targets, but not mainland US. Compared to modern SSBNs to golf only carries two missiles verses a more typical load of 16.
The Golf was superseded by the altogether more modern Type-092 Xia class, with nuclear power and a hull form not unlike contemporary British and French SSBNs. The Xia class was comparatively unreliable and rarely ventured out of Chinese waters, it’s relatively short ranged JL-1 missiles not posing a serious threat relative to other SSBNs of the 1980s. Two boats were launched but one was lost and only one remains. This was reported out of service but has recently been refitted, repainted and as far as we can tell, returned to service possibly with upgraded missiles. The remaining Xia Class boat is ported near Qingdao:
Reports that the Xia class boat has been converted to a cruise missile carrier are interesting but unconfirmed.
The follow-on to the Xia class is the Type-094 Jin class SSBN. Compared to the Xia class these are of a similar design but significantly longer with the missiles placed further aft, and general improvements. The boats are overall comparable to Western SSBNs such as the French Le Triomphant class, although a notable characteristic is the older-generation conventional screw propulsion rather than the increasingly common pump-jet arrangement.
At least two boats have been commissioned with a total of 5 expected. Armed with just 12 SLBMs the Jin’s continue to carry fewer missiles than their western and Russian contemporaries, but the reported 8,000km range of the JL-2 is very formidable. It is unconfirmed as to whether they have MIRVs.
8,000km is not far enough however to hit mainland US from Chinese waters.
In order to threaten mainland US targets the Jin would have to make it past the formidable submarine tracking assets of US forces in the region (we can speculate bases in Guam, the tip of Alaska and Hawaii) and other ‘western’ allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan. In essence the Chinese naval bases are every bit as ‘encircled’ by Western forces as the Soviets were, however unlike the Russians they cannot escape under the ice of the North Pole. China’s natural “bastion” is the Bohai Gulf to the west of Dalian, where we can reason that Chinese subs are relatively safe, but this does not offer the range advantage inherent of ocean-going submarine operations.
Perhaps a more likely operational patrol might be sailing south into the deep water of the South China Sea, or carefully sneaking into the Gulf of Thailand or Java Sea to target India from another less predictable angle, perhaps circumventing India’s growing anti-ballistic missile defences. There are reports of Type-094 SSBNs porting at the new submarine base on Hainan in southern China which lends itself to this latter scenario.