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Australian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
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Jura The idiot
General
Saturday at 3:35 PM
Senate Estimates probes into LHD pod issues
now
Senate Estimates probes into LHD pod issues
LOL! while the animation (the link in the last sentence of the above article) was loading, at first I thought my notebook was hacked (it liked blocked the browser window, put a 'progress bar' in the middle); here's what appeared after about two(?) minutes:During a Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence, Trade and Legislation Committee (Senate Estimates) hearing today, top Navy and Defence personnel were subjected to sustained questioning on the issues affecting the two Canberra class LHDs which are currently being investigated at Fleet Base East in Sydney.
Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, in answer to questions from Labor Senator Kim Carr, confirmed that migration of oils across seals in the azimuth propulsion pod systems had been observed and investigations were continuing to confirm whether this was was a design problem or rather one due to excessive wear and tear.
In HMAS Adelaide, currently in drydock, there was also the discovery of tiny metal particulates in the pod lube oil which, according to VADM Barrett, may be a result of excessive loads being placed upon bearings.
The two LHDs have been conducting an ambitious program of trials and evaluations since they were commissioned in 2015 and 2016. But VADM Barrett said the Navy had been careful to operate the ships within the specifications outlined by the manufacturers.
"We've not operated the ships beyond the sustainment for which we've been given funding for," he said.
VADM Barrett confirmed the total days spent at sea by both vessels in 2016 numbered 118 with Adelaide and Canberra having conducted 42 and 19 days respectively so far in 2017.
Senator Carr asked whether similar issues had been observed in pods in service elsewhere in the world, including in the merchant marine. Deputy Secretary CASG Kim Gillis replied that in the early introduction of similar systems, which were in regular use by cruise liners and other large vessels, there had been issues with seals but the particular Siemens pods in use by both the Australian and Spanish navies were quite unique. In response to further questioning from Senator Carr, Gillis confirmed the the Spanish Armada's Juan Carlos I did have an issue with its pods but they were unrelated to those believed to be affecting the Australian vessels.
Original equipment manufacturer Siemens had sent its top engineers and designers of the system to Sydney to inspect the problem on the HMAS Adelaide, Gillis said.
"It is a concern to them as much as it is to us," he said.
VADM Barrett said Navy was in the midst of conducting a root cause analysis and it was far too early to suggest that the problems may be a result of a design flaw.
HMAS Canberra had conducted further trials at sea on 17th and 18th May. Oil samples had been taken and were currently being tested with results due within two weeks.
At this stage he confirmed HMAS Canberra would participate in the multinational amphibuious exercise in off Queensland at the end of June; Exercise Talisman Sabre. He admitted that she may have operational restrictions placed on her depending on the outcome of the ongoing propulsion pod investigations.
At that point HMAS Adelaide was expected to leave the Captain Cook graving dock. She would then undergo further testing and any learnings from this would be applied to HMAS Canberra.
"Both ships will be back in service by the fourth quartyer this year," VADM Barrett said.
With the original intent of improving the LHDs amphibious capability at Talisman Sabre now in jeopardy, VADM Barrett said that Navy would now need to consider other ways of doing that and referred to experience that had been gained by HMAS Canberra from the recent Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise conducted off Hawaii last year.
Gillis confirmed that Navy was able to draw upon one complete set of spares for the propulsion pods, but further spares were required as a result of problems in the additional pod. Imports of further spares were given top priority after there had been some initial delays he said.
An interactive schematic of the Siemens propulsion pod system very similar to the one in use on the LHDs can be viewed .
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LAND 400 Project Phase 2 contenders (Rheinmetall Boxer CRV (left) and the BAE Systems Patria AMV35 (right))
Blackstone
Brigadier
A nuclear-armed Australia? Looks like events are pointing that way, because most media reports say the DPRK already has about 10-20 nukes, and is fast making advancements on delivery.
SYDNEY – Senior Trump administration officials fear a nuclear arms race will ensue in the Asia-Pacific if increasingly belligerent North Korea is not reined in, Australia’s foreign minister said Friday after talks in New York.
Pyongyang has launched several missiles this year, including an intermediate-range Hwasong-12 this month that the North claimed was capable of carrying a “heavy” nuclear warhead, fueling tensions with Washington.
It has carried out two atomic tests since the beginning of last year, insisting it needs nuclear weapons to defend itself against the threat of invasion.
The U.S. is worried that if North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is not stopped, other countries in the region, including Japan and South Korea, would be compelled to seek their own nuclear capability as a defense measure.
Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop told The Australian newspaper that this was conveyed to her in New York, where she held meetings with the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley.
“In my discussions with senior officials in both South Korea and the U.S., the view was that should North Korea ever be recognized as a nuclear weapons state, then Japan and (South) Korea would have little option than to develop their own nuclear weapons capability,” she said.
“That is why there is such a strong view that North Korea must be denied this capability.”
On the campaign trail last year, Trump raised the possibility of Japan and South Korea arming themselves with nuclear weapons, an issue that is particularly sensitive in Japan — the only country to ever be attacked by atomic bombs — but later drew back from the remarks.
The United States says it is willing to enter talks with North Korea if it halts its nuclear and missile tests, but it has also warned that military intervention was an option, sending fears of a conflict spiraling.
Bishop said the “loud and clear” message from Haley was that “when the United States said all options are on the table, they mean it, they are not kidding,” pointing to the U.S. sending a nuclear submarine to the region.
More encouragingly, the North’s main trade partner and ally China appeared to be getting on the same page with the global community, she added in a separate interview with radio station 2GB.
“North Korea currently is rebuffing overtures from China, which is frustrating China,” she said.
Bishop urged Beijing to adhere to a new sanctions regime, saying it would “change the economic scenario in North Korea and essentially bring it to the negotiating table.”
“We have a window of opportunity in relation to economic sanctions and this is where we need China’s support,” she said.
Jura The idiot
General
now noticed
source is Breaking Defense
... the article goes on below due to size limit;Australian highlighted the “institutional interoperability which was shaping with its closest allies, and notably with the US Air Force and the US Navy during his recent visit to the US. are not simply camp followers – they are shaping a way ahead an integrated force, rather than staying at the service platform level.
When Davies introduced the new RAAF strategy at the Avalon Air Show earlier this year, he highlighted the service’s way ahead:
“I don’t believe we, as an Air Force, understand how joint we need to be. We have come a long way – we talk a lot about joint, but I am not sure we are culturally able to shift from doing Air Force stuff first. I would like the Air Force in a joint context to begin to put the joint effect before our own Air Force requirements.”
When I interviewed him recently in his Canberra office, Davies underscored that the RAAF and the other services were adding new platforms as part of force modernization. But adding a new platform, even a key one like the F-35 was not enough to generate force transformation.
“It is not about how does this new platform fit into the force as it is, it is about how does this new platform enable the force to fight the way we need to be able to in the future?
“It has to be realistic but in a sense the reality we are looking at is not just the Air Force as it has fought in the past and present, but the Air Force as it vectors towards the future fight. If you don’t do this you will be only discussing and debating platforms in the historical combat space,” he said. “And , we are positioning ourselves to ask the right question of the services: How does a particular platform fit how we will need to fight in 10 year’s time? Is the Navy or the Army or the Air Force entitled to that particular capability choice if it doesn’t fit that criteria?”
The Aussies a more integrated force. In simple terms, this means that the services are looking at how they could get beyond a service concept such as the Naval integrated fires approach to a Joint integrated fires approach?
There are a number of key factors or reasons why getting a better strategic grip on the evolution of the force from a joint perspective is essential. First, given the shift to high intensity operations the need to maximize one’s combat effect compared to the adversary is essential. A connected force can provide an advantage but only if it is synergistic and survivable; otherwise it is vulnerable and can generate fratricide rather than destruction of the adversary’s forces.
Second, the core enablers of combat power, such as C2 and ISR, are being dispersed throughout the services. Creating a tower of Babel is not the outcome you want to have.
Third, a number of the new platforms being acquired are software upgradeable. It is desirable to be able to be able to manage tradeoffs among these platforms in terms of investments to get the best impact on the joint force. It is also the case that getting the kind of transient advantage one wants from the software requires agility of the sort that will come with applications on top of middleware on top of an open architecture system.
Fourth, much of the force is already here. This means that there will be considerable adaptation of the platforms towards greater joint effect. How to ensure that the legacy modernization programs provide effective joint effects, rather than simply stovepiped upgrades?
Fifth, the information and communication systems, which are the enablers for the joint force, are dynamic elements subject to market change and adversary disruptions. How to best develop IT and Coms packages which can support cross-cutting modernization and evolving force integration?
Sixth, to get the kind of cross-cutting modernization one needs with an evolving 21st century force, how can the acquisition system be altered? How to move from a platform linear project approach to a broader program approach which allows trade offs to be made with regard to platforms within a capability stream?
Seventh, the only way there will be the ongoing rapid transformation of the force will be shaping an effective industrial-military partnership where there is shared understanding and shared risk to achieve outcomes which are more targets than well-defined platforms. How can this be achieved?
There are just some of the core questions. But the core point is that raising questions, which drive you towards where the force needs to go, is the challenge. This is not about generating studies and briefing charts which provide visuals of what a connected force might look like. It is about creating the institutional structure whereby trust among the services and between government and industry is high enough that risks can be managed while creative destruction of legacy approaches is open ended as well.
It is about empowering a network of 21st century warriors and let the learning cycle being generated by this network, modernization and operational concepts. It is about innovations within concepts of operations generated by the network to flow up into strategic change.
Rather than pursuing after market integration or simply connecting stove piped service platforms after the fact with a bolt on network, how might integration be built from the ground up?
The approach being taken is not theological or an application of set of propositions or laws written down in a guidebook. The approach is to work greater integrative processes within and among the services, and to highlight the need to pose hypotheses along the way concerning how greater integration is achievable where appropriate and ways to achieve more effective outcomes for the development of the force.
It is a quest, which is being shaped by realigning organizations, and trying to build from the ground up among the junior officers a willingness to shape interconnectivity from the ground up. With regard to organizations, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, is in charge of much of the force structure redesign. There is a Force Design office headed by and the Joint Capability and Management and Integration Office headed which are direct reports to the Vice Chief.
In a recent presentation, Griggs underscored that “we are seeing real changes in culture and behavior across defense.” In part this is due to the fact that the warfighting domains are blending and becoming highly interactive with one another.
He opined that as we returned to a more congested and contested environment the five war fighting domains are becoming increasingly blurred. Effective integration then is critical to gain superiority in 21st century warfighting. He argued for an integrated strategic direction but flexibility in shaping operating concepts: “We need central orchestration of the effort rather than a top down dictat.”
Griggs also highlighted the need to shape a continuous capability review cycle within which to manage ongoing modernization, new acquisitions and effective management of trade offs in budget terms. He chairs the investment committee where the principals met to make strategic decisions on investments. Obviously, control of the purse strings is crucial to make suggestions turn into recommendations with clout for force structure development.
Shaping a way to conduct the quest is very difficult; but the Australian Defence Force is clearly been empowered to do so by its government.
Such a quest inevitably will fail and succeed along the way; but without setting this objective from the ground up, it will be difficult to change the operating concepts and the then the concepts of operations, which can drive the transformation of the force.
...
source is Breaking Defense
Jura The idiot
General
continuation of the above post:
The United States may have the ; the ADF actually has a transformation process underway. They are following the Nike model: Just do it!
Even when the Aussies are adopting out own platforms, they are doing so in a very different context in which force integration is a strategic goal, rather than the pursuit of service modernization. In effect, the Aussies are providing the experimental model, which can be quite relevant to others, including the United States.
In short, the Aussies are taking the new platforms and systems and working to bend these towards a And being Aussies they will not lie to you and argue that this easy or not contentious. But it is the way the technology and the warfighting capabilities are pointing; but remaining within service islands will not get you there, something the United States will continue to learn until it leverages the new platforms more effectively to shaping greater warfighting capabilities from the new platforms it is introducing, developing and innovating with largely on a service level.
In the mid 1990s when I worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses, I worked with the Roles and Missions Commission. One of the key tasks, which Congress had tasked the commission to pursue, was to determine what the United States might learn from allies. We worked hard on our white paper but when we delivered it to the commission we were told by a very senior member: “Good work; but why did you really examine the question? We are so much bigger than any of our allies, there is very little we could learn from them or apply to our own practices!”
Unfortunately, not much has changed in the attitude of many American defense civilians. However, few leaders in the US military share such views, as allies and the US adopt some of the same key platforms at the same time, like the , Triton, and the F-35, while some allies operate more equipment more advanced than the US itself.
Lethe
Captain
A nuclear-armed Australia? Looks like events are pointing that way, because most media reports say the DPRK already has about 10-20 nukes, and is fast making advancements on delivery.
Yeah, no.
Bloviations from our political class aside, North Korea is of no relevance to Australia.
Ofc they don' t have plans and surely never in addition some problems with French nuclear test to Muruora, Polynesia in 1990's same with Kiwis/N-Z again more...A nuclear-armed Australia? Looks like events are pointing that way, because most media reports say the DPRK already has about 10-20 nukes, and is fast making advancements on delivery.
In addition NK is completely unable to targeted Australia only " tests " much failure in facts and very bad missiles...
don' t be naive propaganda weapons for terror in fact they are unable, very few accurate missiles as use Saddam in the M-E and i hope the dictator get the same end and soon !
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Jura The idiot
General
interestingly Prime Minister Turnbull dismisses notion that Australia must choose between China and US
source is DefenseNewsAustralian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull says that he expects the Trump Administration will realize continued engagement in the Indo-Pacific region is in the interest of the U.S., during a speech at an annual regional security summit in Singapore.
In a wide-ranging speech that was well-received by the audience, Turnbull also urged China to respect the sovereignty of other nations and called on regional countries to continue to work together to combat terrorism.
He was speaking at the keynote address of the Shangri La Dialogue, an annual intergovernmental summit that brings together defense and security professionals from the region and the wider world to discuss the security challenges that affect the region.
Turnbull gave a passionate defense of the rules-based structure that has existed in the region, crediting it with enabling regional countries to succeed “in creating the fastest growing, most dynamic part of the world,” adding that “the peace and stability of our region has been enabled by consistent U.S. global leadership.”
However, he also acknowledged the substantial cost of the U.S. commitment to stability in the region, noting that he understood President Donald Trump’s “request that those who benefit from the peace America secures do more militarily and financially to contribute.” Australia, for one, has firm plans to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2020-21, he said, in order for it to "pull its weight in an increasingly multipolar region" marked by the restoration of China and India to the ranks of economic giants.
Noting that “China’s growing power continues to be the topic of most intense debate,” he acknowledges that “it is natural that Beijing will seek strategic influence to match its economic weight.”
Turnbull denounced as “an utterly false choice” the view put forward by some quarters that Australia has to choose between its largest trading partner Beijing and traditional ally Washington, declaring that the “alliance with the United States reflects a deep alignment of interests and values” while describing China as Australia’s “good friend and partner”.
The problem of terrorism in the region was also touched on in Turnbull’s address, where he highlighted the twin problems: battle hardened and trained fighters seeking to return to the region, as ISIL’s so-called caliphate is destroyed in Syria and Iraq; and terrorist organizations like Al Qaida and ISIL continuing to be very active in the region.
This was evidenced by last week’s bombings in Jakarta, Indonesia and the Philippine military’s ongoing battle with ISIL-linked militants in that country’s southern island of Mindanao. In his speech Turnbull reminded the audience that “we all have a vested interest in each other’s security” and that just as the terrorists’ networks are transnational, so must be multinational collaboration to defeat it.
The speech has been praised by many in the audience, with Dzirhan Mahadzir, a delegate from Malaysia, telling Defense News he felt that Turnbull “balanced his thoughts pretty well by getting point across without being too provocative, delivering a message to China that working with the international system and respecting the rules would benefit them far greater than their current approach of running roughshod over everyone."
Jura The idiot
General
now I read (dated Jun 1 2017; will make two posts due to size limit and yeah I read it all)
Australia's Barracuda submarines: too expensive and too little, too late
Australia's Barracuda submarines: too expensive and too little, too late
It sounds like something out of Monty Python. A crimewave hits a neighbourhood and the police can't cope. A delegation from plodders' HQ asks the crims to hold off until local police numbers are adequate.
Bizarrely, Australia could face a similar dilemma with its mother-of-all-defence-purchases –
Among other things, the original impulse to order the subs was to bolster Australia's maritime capacity for a worst-case scenario where conflict arises with China in the South China Sea.
However, the first of the will not be ready until mid-way through the 2020s – at the earliest. The last one may not be finished until well into the 2050s.
To understand how different the world could be by then, consider that in the time it took from deciding that Australia needed new subs, to inviting bids and finally making a decision, China has grown about seven times over as an economy and now rivals the US.
A decade of stuffing around
According to Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the ANU, "both sides of politics carry a lot of blame" for the long delay. "We lost a decade stuffing around."
Moreover, White says, "we have accepted a very protracted acquisition process" at a time when "the strategic environment" – a la the South China Sea – is becoming more problematic".
In an article on the snail-like progress of Australia's submarine replacement program headlined "Shakespearean Tragedy", the Pacific Defence Reporter pointed out that in 2012 Singapore "initiated a program to replace the oldest of its six submarines".
"Less than two years later it had entered into a contract with Germany's TKMS for the supply of two highly capable Type 218SG submarines for delivery to the island state by 2020/21."
Defending marginal seats
This compares with an Australian time frame of more than a half a century from first deciding to commission a new generation of subs to the projected delivery of the last of the Shortfin Barracudas. Our "Shakespearean tragedy" is part government-bureaucratic muddle, but also due to the demand that Australia retain a significant local ship-building capacity for Navy vessels –
Critics argue there are no significant defence reasons for building naval platforms in Australia. Australia does not manufacture jet fighters or build tanks for the army; in fact, we do not produce any significant weapons systems.
The same critics argue a sensible defence acquisition policy should focus on value for money. This appeared to be the initial approach taken by the Abbott government when it indicated a preference for buying Japanese Soryu class submarines off the shelf.
Apart from its cost, the DCNS proposal involves significant risks. The slow delivery schedule means the existing Collins-class submarines may require major upgrades, costing about $15 billion. There are also safety concerns, including the need to convert a submarine designed for nuclear propulsion to diesel-electric, involving substantial technical risks.
The German price guarantee
At the same time, . It guaranteed the cost of building 12 submarines in Adelaide would be no higher than in Germany and offered a fixed-price contract with a delivery schedule that would remove the need for the costly Collins-class upgrade.
On paper, this seems like a better option. But Australian defence planners wanted a big, long-range sub, one capable of travelling 7000 to 8000 kilometres into the northern reaches of the Pacific off the coast of China, monitoring movements in the waters near major Chinese ports like Shanghai, even moving near the Russian seaport of Vladivostok.
Indeed, the interminable bid process spawned a virtual sub-industry of submarine experts furiously working out the reasons why the government's decisions are wrong. They have many strong points in argument, but what is glossed over in this mine's-better-than-yours rhetoric is that in the end the decision must be based on a series of judgments about the future which may prove to be right, or way off the mark.
Shorn of the jargon littering Defence documents, the French subs were preferred because they are big, have a long range, will carry a big delivery platform, are backed by a major defence-ship building-submarine construction company with experience dating back more than a century, and, crucially, they are quiet and can therefore avoid detection.
These are big subs
At the same time "it's not hard to identify what's driving the project's cost, risk and schedule", White has written. "At 5000 tonnes, the boat is very big.
"We're aiming so big for two reasons: range and roles. We're after a boat that can operate for a long time, far from home and we want it to do many things when it gets there, including intelligence collection, land strike missions, special forces support, and to operate autonomous underwater vehicles, as well as traditional anti-surface and ASW operations."
While "longer range and diverse capabilities are good", projected benefits "have to be set against their costs and risks. Prudent capability development means trading off what we'd like against what we can afford, what has a reasonable chance of actually working in service and of being available when we need it."
"Minimising cost and risk is always important, but it's critical here because submarines are so central to Australia's defence and because our strategic risks are rising sharply," White points out
Time waits for no one
However, as the old Rolling Stones songs puts it, time waits for no one. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Defence Budget brief, released early last month, warns about rising world tensions. According to the Pacific Defence Reporter, the Australian Defence Department is working behind the scenes and responding to this tension by "modelling a range of contingencies/conflicts in which Australia might see itself facing off against the People's Liberation Army (PLA) – or more likely its Navy cousin, the PLA(N)."
"No one would suggest that Australia would become involved in a bilateral confrontation with China. But a multilateral confrontation is not beyond the probability horizon.
"A number of events could trigger a multilateral conflict; the invasion of Taiwan or a miscalculation over a disputed island between, say, China and Japan, or any of a number of countries who lay claim to some of the disputed islands in the South China Sea."
However, underlining the exposed nature of Australia's position, there is no record in the history of warfare of one party holding back until another is combat ready.
ASPI's Defence Budget Brief says the federal government has surrendered Defence policy to the "jobs and growth" mantra. "There's a lot of debate going on about Defence, but none of it addressing the issue of Australia's security," ASPI's Dr Mark Thomson says
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