The Richard Fisher Strikes Back!

Fisher's credibility keeps sinking lower.

When I see something published by Rand Corporation, for example, I may disagree with some of its conclusions, but at least I know that it was professionally researched and written.

Richard Fisher's publications, on the other hand, appear to have almost no substance behind them. The reason that the US abandoned "spaceplane" weapons concepts when it cancelled the X-20 DynaSoar back in the early 70s, was because on a bang-per-buck basis, there was almost no payback. Yet to hear Fisher tell it, we have entered a new Cold War - all because of a few pictures posted on the internet. Sorry, I don't buy it. Call me when one of these things is actually launched and works as advertised.

The saddest part is that Fisher is adept at self-promotion. His proclamations are routinely picked up by the mainstream press and repeated as "fact".

Fisher writes more of his opinions and speculations about what is going to happen in future than facts in his articles...which is fine as long as he clearly states that its his opinions and not what is actually happening - which he doesnt do.

I read the above article with after-thought of "maybe China can achieve that sometime in the long distant future..."

Here's his latest. I wonder if he even bothers to confirm any of these things he obviously pulls from internet forums. Such an easy job.

http://www.strategycenter.net/resear...pub_detail.asp

Chinese Dimensions of the 2007 Dubai Airshow

by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on January 20th, 2008
ARMS SHOW REPORTS


Although located in a region of tension and conflict the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has successfully deterred foreign predation by building modern and professional armed forces and by maintaining a broad aviation talent by hosting some of the world’s most competitive airlines. The UAE has also made itself a center of the region’s civil and military aerospace trade by hosting two of the most popular arms shows, IDEX in Abu Dhabi and then the Dubai Airshow. The 2007 Dubai Airshow from November 11 to 15 proved a boon for the airline and military aircraft industry, with over $100 billion in orders registered for over 500 aircraft.

This year’s show featured a modest presence by China’s CATIC aviation marketing company, with little to no effort by the sales team to speak to, much less display any of its modern offerings, such as the Chengdu J-10 fighter reportedly on offer to Iran and Syria. However, several of the international companies attending the Dubai show that are aiding China’s aerospace modernization would speak to their business and concerns with China.

Thrust Vector Engines for the J-10 and Carrier News

Russian sources stated that China and the Russian Salyut engine concern were in the process of negotiating a future sale of the AL-31FN engine, but with a axisymmetric thrust vectoring nozzle. These sources would not state the number of engines in this package, but did confirm previous statements that the thrust vectored engines were intended to support a Chinese Navy version of the Chengdu J-10 fighter--presumably for aircraft carrier use. In 2005 a Russian source had noted China’s interest in the thrust vectored modified version of the AL-31FN, but in 2007 it is now apparent that such a sale is under negotiation. With its forward stabilizer “canard” configuration, thrust vectoring for the J-10 could conceivably allow a lower landing speed, or enable a faster recovery take-off from a “Bolter,” or a failed arrested carrier deck landing. Both capabilities would be of interest to the PLA Navy to increase operational safety. In addition, other sources indicate the PLA will use the thrust-vectored J-10 version to better enable useful payloads to be lifted from the high-altitude bases of the Tibetan Plateau just north of India. Otherwise, thrust vectoring would add more to the already inherit high maneuverability of the J-10’s canard configuration. Russian sources claim that the thrust vectoring nozzle will not add additional weight to the engine, which might then require airframe or ballast modifications for aircraft.



More AL-31FN Engines: China and Russia are now negotiating a sale of thrust-vectored AL-31FN engines to support a new version of the Chengdu J-10 4th generation fighter. Source RD Fisher


Possible Russian Engine Upgrades

Russian sources are also “confident” that China will purchase new advanced higher thrust versions of the AL-31 to modernize existing PLA Sukhoi fighters, and potentially, to comprise future engine orders for the J-10. For example, the AL-31M-3 is intended to produce a 15,000 kg thrust engine, a bit less than that for the Pratt Whitney PW119 that powers the Lockheed Martin F-22A fifth generation fighter. These sources were also confident that Russia would produce a new generation engine to support Russia’s 5th generation fighter program. This engine would also be in the 15 ton thrust range and be able to support a “supercruise” mission, or supersonic flight for an operational distance without recourse to fuel guzzling afterburners.


Engine Upgrade Interest: Russian sources indicate that China is interested in purchasing new higher thrust versions of the AL-31 to upgrade its fleet of Russian-produced Sukhoi fighters and to support upgrades for the J-10.


Russian sources also confirmed that China continues to make steady progress in her decade long drive toward the completion of its first modern high power fighter turbofan, sometimes called the WS-10A Taihang. These sources expected that the J-10 would transition from primary reliance on Russian engines to the Chinese engine in less than five years. In late 2006 the “Taihang” emerged with some publicity after a long period of Chinese development. Since then, Chinese sources have suggested that China may soon develop its own advanced 15,000kg thrust capable version of the Taihang. China’s engine sector has long been viewed as the “Achilles Heel” of its aircraft sector, but this is changing fast, the Russian sources concede.

Russian 5th Generation Tidbits

Commenting on Russia’s 5th generation fighter plans, one Russian source affirmed that a first flight for their new generation fighter would take place in 2009. Other Russian sources were less optimistic, noting the 5th generation fighter might fly by 2012. Russian Premier Ivanov recently noted the first flight would occur in 2010. This fighter would combine 5th generation levels of advance in terms of stealth, supercruise and advanced electronic systems, to include a new active phased array radar system. While responding to unique Russian requirements, this source asserted the new 5th Generation fighter would be “better than the F-35” and close to competitive with the F-22. Such a distinction flows more from Russia’s unique requirements for its 5th generation fighter which does not include a requirement to match or exceed the F-22 in all aspects. This source also suggested that there would be a naval carrier version of this new aircraft. Fully aware of the Russian government’s gathering commitment to build a new fleet of up to six nuclear powered aircraft carriers, this source noted, “if there is a new ship there should be a new aircraft.” This source noted that existing Russian naval aircraft designs like the Su-27KUB would not be the design to meet future Russian naval combat aircraft requirements.


Russian Naval 5th Generation Fighter: While no official images of Russia’s 5th generation fighter have been released, this is but one Russian-source estimation of its configuration. Russian officials are now talking about a naval variant of the 5th generation fighter. Source: Russian Internet


Four To Six Chinese Aircraft Carriers?

Interestingly, a U.S. source that recently spoke with high PLA Navy officers relayed to the IASC that these officers stated that China would eventually build four to six aircraft carriers. In 2007 Chinese officials have been more willing to acknowledge their ambitions to build large aircraft carriers, an ambition that had previously been consistently denied. China is known to have had extensive contact with Russian aircraft carrier design and component manufacturing companies, and is now refurbishing the former Russian/Ukrainian carrier Varyag in Dalian harbor. In addition, PLA Navy officers have visited the French nuclear carrier Charles de Gaulle, which may also influence China’s eventual choice of carrier size and configuration.


4 to 6 Carriers?: China may have ambitions to build up to six large aircraft carriers. The uncompleted Russian nuclear powered Ulyanovsk may also be influencing China’s carrier design. Source: Russian Internet


Since 2005 this analyst has tracked China’s aggressive pursuit of its carrier air wing. This has included negotiations to purchase modified Sukhoi Su-33 carrier fighters, which have yet to reach any conclusion, as well as the Shenyang Aircraft Co.’s efforts to copy the Su-33, which have included the purchase of Su-33 prototypes from Ukraine. But an additional PLA Navy carrier air wing candidate might be the naval version of Russia’s 5th generation fighter. Or, perhaps a naval version of China’s 5th generation fighter. In November a Chinese commentator asserted that China’s 5th generation fighter could fly as early as 2014 to 2015. Chinese sources indicate that China is developing a 15-ton maximum thrust version of the Taihang engine, which conceivably could support a Chinese “5th generation” supercruise mission. Chinese sources have also recently suggested that China is actively developing unmanned combat aircraft for carrier operations.



China’s 5th Generation Fighter Mystery: China has disclosed no official data about its 5th generation combat aircraft plans, but previous designs revealed by Shenyang (top) and Chengdu may provide some indication. Source: Chinese Internet


Twin Seat JF-17 Back On

A Pakistani official stated that the Pakistan side has elected to proceed with the development of a twin-seat version of the Chengdu FC-1 or JF-17 in Pakistan service. A CATIC official refused to comment on this development. The Pakistan Air Force’s requirement for a twin seat version of this fighter was first noted to the author by Pakistan Air Force officials in 2004. However, subsequent reports have noted that China was not interested in such a twin-seat version of the FC-1. The Pakistani official at the Dubai show stated, however, that Pakistan has elected to pay for the development of the twin seat version, and that is now proceeding. This official explained that as Pakistan is sharing in the full spectrum of production, usage and sales of the JF-17, that it therefore requires the twin seat version to fully exploit this aircraft. The twin seat version will be used to support training missions and will also be developed into a dedicated attack model. This same official noted that Pakistan will only purchase the Chengdu J-10 fighter, which is therefore of less industrial interest to Pakistan. Other sources have noted that Pakistan intends to purchase an initial force of 40 J-10 fighters.


FC-1/JF-17 Multirole Fighter: Pakistan is now funding development of a twin-seat version of this low-cost multirole fighter. Source: RD Fisher


Since the Dubai show Russia’s Kommersant has reported that Russia has approved the Klimov RD93 engine in the FC-1/JF-17 for re-export to six countries: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Re-export to Pakistan had been an issue of serious contention between Russia and India, which uses the RD33, the basis for the RD93, in its MiG-29 fighters. Russia’s decision is a blow for Delhi, which will now face the JF-17 in significant numbers not only in Pakistan but also potentially in Bangladesh. China will also soon be able to arm the FC-1/JF-17 with 5th generation air-to-air missiles, such as the PL-10 derived from the South African Denel A-DARTER, and another radar-guided missile derived from the Denel R-DARTER. These weapons will greatly increase the combat potential of this low-cost but modern platform. At the same time, it is a major boost for Pakistan’s and China’s effort to promote the FC-1/JF-17 as the pre-eminent low-cost 4th generation multirole fighter. Until South Korea can market a single-seat combat version of its T/A-50 trainer, the FC-1/JF-17 will face no competition in its price range. The willingness of China and Pakistan to transfer full co-production capability will enhance the attractiveness of this fighter to many countries also looking to bolster their developing aerospace industries.



New AAMs: Revealed by Chinese Internet sources last December and then very early January 2008, the PL-10 (PL-ASR) and a yet to be identified AAM, appear to be derived from A-DARTER and R-DARTER, both developed by the Denel Corporation of South Africa. Source: Chinese Internet


Interest in a Beriev Megalift Concept

A Russian source also noted that based on several conversations at the 2007 Moscow Airshow that Chinese officials were rather interested in the Beriev Be-2500 very large cargo carrying amphibious aircraft. First seen at the 2003 Moscow Airshow, the eight-engine Be-2500 is one of the more recent concepts to emerge from a Russia’s longstanding fascination with very large aircraft. The Be-2500 is derived from designs dating back to the 1960s, when Beriev and others developed large “Ekranoplanes,” which fly at low altitude exploiting ground effect, and “Ekranolyots,” which can fly at medium altitudes. Earlier Beriev water-borne large Ekranolyots were designed to actually launch small fighters off a ramp on top of the fuselage. The Be-2500 would be a massive amphibian that could carry up to 1,000 tons of cargo and still fly at an altitude of 8,000m. While it can utilize runways, very few would be wide enough to accommodate its undercarriage. By comparison the latest versions of the Antonov An-124 are designed to carry up to 150 tons.


Beriev Be-2500 Megalifter: While an imaginative concept, the sheer expense and complexity of realizing this aircraft may serve to limit China’s interest in this program. But China’s interest in this and other mega-lift concepts should be monitored. Source: RD Fisher


The Russian source indicated that Beriev could not build a Be-2500 prototype without substantial foreign investment. While confident that it could follow through with the work and build the aircraft, it lacks the financial and physical plant to do the job currently. Putting an aircraft the size of the Be-2500 into series production would require a multi-national investment and production effort comparable to that which produced the Airbus A-380.

For these reasons it is questionable whether Chinese interest would be realized beyond the level of consulting or information gathering. However, China’s interest in the Be-2400 becomes understandable from the perspective of its immediate military and looming economic requirements. The ability to airlift 1,000 tons of military equipment to a secured beach on Taiwan would prove very attractive to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). With a force of Be-2500s the PLA could better exploit options to invade Taiwan from many more directions, from the South or on the East Coast. The Be-2500 could also rapidly reinforce forces on secured beaches, to more rapidly assemble assault forces needed to occupy a major Taiwanese city and more rapidly terminate the war. For China the Be-2500 could also support rapid high value cargo delivery at a far more economical scale. Chinese products could be shipped to distant markets more rapidly and critical resources could then be taken back to China at far greater speed.

EC-175 Progress

An official with Eurocopter noted that as previously reported, Eurocopter and China are on track to jointly developed and produce the EC-175 or Z-15 6-ton utility helicopter, which could be tested as early as 2009. While it is to be powered by Pratt Whitney Canada PT6 engines, Eurocopter is not ready to release definitive performance parameters until next year. However, the EC-175 is expected to be very close in performance to the Agusta A-139, which can carry 15 passengers in its civil version. The official stressed that this program is intended to be truly joint. Both sides have shared in the full development, with the European side designing the rotor and the Chinese side designing the blades. Component production is also to be shared, with no duplication between the sides.


Eurocopter-China Cooperation: The EC-175/Z-15 model shown with Premier Wen Jiabao. Assurances that China will not produce a military version of this helicopter contradict the history of China-Eurocopter relations. Source: Chinese Internet


This official dismissed the notion that China would develop military versions of the Z-15, despite the fact that every version of a Eurocopter helicopter either co-produced or copied by China has been produced in military versions. This official insisted that Eurocopter would uphold “international responsibilities” and that a recent co-production agreement for the EC-120 light helicopter had not led to a Chinese copied version. However, the EC-120 does equip Chinese Army Aviation training units.

Chances for Mi-17 Co-production Dim

A Russian source familiar with PLA orders for the Russian M-17 medium weight utility helicopter downplayed reports earlier this year that there might be a co-production agreement to build this popular helicopter in China. Recent reports indicate that a Chinese-Russian joint venture in Chengdu to repair Mi-17 helicopters may be trying to co-produced this helicopter as well. So far the PLA has ordered about 200 of this 10-ton capacity helicopter. The Russian source indicated that while a co-production arrangement had indeed been explored, the Russian side had doubts that a “civil” co-production agreement could be implemented that would sufficiently protect Russian intellectual property. This is a major concern for Russians given China’s great progress in “stealing” the Sukhoi Su-27 design to support its “indigenized” J-11B fighter program. But the Russians are also reluctant to lose the chance to secure a stronger foothold against its European competitor Eurocopter, which is pressing ahead with a full co-development program.


Mil Mi-17: Russian concern over intellectual property protection appears to be an issue impeding Mi-17 co-production in China. Source: RD Fisher


Progress Engines for L-15

A Ukrainian source indicated that the Motor Sich Company was completing an order for 100 Al-222 turbofan engines to support the Chinese twin-engine Hongdu L-15 supersonic trainer. In 2005 there were reports that China would order over 200 of these engines, so this update indicates the PLA has settled on a smaller initial number for this new supersonic trainer. The L-15 was developed with design consulting from Russia’s Yakovlev, and the L-15 is basically a cleaned up Yak-130 with after-burning engines to support supersonic training. An order of 100 engines might support a small number of test aircraft and then about two regiments of training aircraft. The L-15 program deserves watching as it is the most modern trainer now in production in China. Reports indicate China may be considering a navy carrier version for pilot training. And as has been the case with the Yak-130, the L-15 basic design could also support potential dedicated close air-support or even unmanned combat aircraft versions.


Hongdu L-15: This modern Chinese supersonic trainer could be developed into multiple versions. Source: RD Fisher


Russian Moon Ideas

An official from the Energia Company, which has manufactured most of Russia’s manned space structures, plus major components for the International Space Station, offered some ideas on how Russia might consider sending its personnel to the Moon, provided that Russian officialdom follows through with the enormous funding required to fulfill recent positive statements in that direction. One intriguing notion is that Russia eventually would want all of its manned space equipment to be as reusable as possible, to save on costs. A second interesting idea is that Russia is considering a permanent reusable lunar orbit space station to serve as a waypoint to support manned missions to the Moon. But such ideas are tentative and very preliminary, as the Russian government has yet to commit to real Moon programs.

Conclusions

The peak and decline in Chinese purchases of Russian arms, plus Russia’s renewed economic vigor, due largely to rising oil prices, have given Moscow cause for reducing its dependence on Chinese money to sustain its arms sector. While there has been steady commentary for about two years about rising Russian frustration with their military-technical relationship with Russia, their respective political leaders have been eager to sustain their “United Front” of “Multilateralism” against the United States. One Russian source at the show noted that the Russian military has consistently opposed Russian high technology sales to China, but has been overruled by the political class and the previously desperate arms sector. But Russian military concerns as well a rising military-corporate concerns with China’s aggressive copying of Russian systems, may lead to a real change in heart in Moscow. One Russian source in Dubai noted, “in time, this time of open doors to China will come to an end.” The problem is that Russia has already sold so much of its most advanced weaponry to a China, arming a potential rival for Central Asian dominance that also poses a growing threat to U.S., Japanese and Taiwanese security interests.

(Japanese sources recently suggested to my colleague Arthur Waldron that under Putin Russia has substantially modified its approach to China arms sales, substituting a degree of caution and suspicion for previous willingness to provide whatever China could buy. The same source confirmed Russia’s desire to maintain China as part of an anti-US coalition. China and Russia have plenty of issues between them and Putin has given highest priority to securing the Far East, the Russian territory closest to China. So Russian China policy appears to be in flux).

Nevertheless, even though outright weapon purchases are down, Russia today remains a critical source for China of all manner of military technology. For example, recent Chinese data suggests Russia has sold China the means to make very long-range ramjet powered air-to-air missiles that might out-range all current models of the U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM. Though China may be attempting to develop a carrier compatible version of the Shenyang J-11B, an “indigenized” version of the Su-27, a lack of success may force Beijing to swallow its pride and purchase an upgraded Russian Su-33 or Su-27KUB. But another potential option may be the carrier version of Russia’s 5th generation fighter, which would offer clear superiority over a 4++ generation version of the Su-33. It would also offer potentially decisive superiority over the Boeing F/A-18E/F, to which the U.S. Navy remains committed as its dominant carrier fighter for decades to come. The chance also exists that China has already included a carrier variant in its 5th generation fighter requirements, which both Shenyang and Chengdu are striving to meet.


New AAM: The above has been identified by one Chinese Internet poster as the “PL-13,” which may indicate that Russia has sold experimental anti-air missile ramjet motor technology to China. It appears Russia’s Vympel firm sold ramjet technology from its advanced R-77 program, which is reported to have had to goal of developing a missile with a range of 160km. Source: Chinese Internet


Therefore, one conclusion from Dubai is that neither the United States nor its allies can rely for much longer on significant numbers of upgraded 4th generation fighters to provide adequate deterrence in the air. There will be added pressure on the U.S. Air Force to fund adequate numbers of the Lockheed-Martin F-22A and to sustain production plans for the F-35. Furthermore, the U.S. Navy must either modify its future attack-mission oriented Lockheed-Martin F-35C 5th generation fighter to better conduct air-superiority missions, or develop a new 5th or 6th generation fighter to sustain air superiority at sea. In addition, Japan will have to commit to a plan to meet its 5th generation fighter requirements. So far, these include purchase of the F-22, purchase or co-production of the F-35, or an accelerated development of the new 5th generation design based on the ATD-X or “Shinshin” technology demonstrator now under development by the Ministry of Defense Technology Research and Development Institute (TRDI). Other countries like Australia and South Korea are already facing increased pressure to upgrade their air forces to 5th generation fighters.

I'd like to know who exactly his sources are. Government bureaucrats, officers or just a lot of think tank warriors?

This very website and some of what is written here certainly figure in his papers.

Originally Posted by AssassinsMace

Thrust Vector Engines for the J-10 and Carrier News

Russian sources stated that China and the Russian Salyut engine concern were in the process of negotiating a future sale of the AL-31FN engine, but with a axisymmetric thrust vectoring nozzle. These sources would not state the number of engines in this package, but did confirm previous statements that the thrust vectored engines were intended to support a Chinese Navy version of the Chengdu J-10 fighter--presumably for aircraft carrier use.

I doubt this is correct. Single engined J-10 will not be adopted for carrier operations. I think the TVC engines are for the stealthy J-10 -- one that will have RAM, double V tail fins, AESA and TVC.

Originally Posted by AssassinsMace

In November a Chinese commentator asserted that China’s 5th generation fighter could fly as early as 2014 to 2015. Chinese sources indicate that China is developing a 15-ton maximum thrust version of the Taihang engine, which conceivably could support a Chinese “5th generation” supercruise mission. Chinese sources have also recently suggested that China is actively developing unmanned combat aircraft for carrier operations.

Actually, the PLA officer said that J-XX will arrive within 5-7 years, no problem. To me this means that J-XX will enter service between 2012-2014.

New AAM: The above has been identified by one Chinese Internet poster as the “PL-13,” which may indicate that Russia has sold experimental anti-air missile ramjet motor technology to China. It appears Russia’s Vympel firm sold ramjet technology from its advanced R-77 program, which is reported to have had to goal of developing a missile with a range of 160km. Source: Chinese Internet

What is so ridiculous here is that he must have assumed this by the appearance of the missile. You know, when it comes to ramjet intakes, there isn't much variation going around. In fact, there seems to be only two, and you either belong to one or the other. The first is a angled canted intake, and the second one is an intake with a nose cone.

The idea the J-XX would enter service in 2013 to 2015 as Roger asserts isn't credible. The F-35 is flying in prototype form today after a decade long design period and a Low Rate Initial Production decision at Milestone C will not be made until all the IOT&E is complete in 2012. Somehow China is going to start from scratch and put a "Fifth Generation" fighter into service before a decade old US project reaches initial production? Well now...........

The Chinese and Russians also don't build prototypes until the component technologies are ready. The prototype stage is much shorter, more work is focused on the design stage. The design was completed in 2006. A prototype should be flying by next year, I think.

China isn't starting from scratch. The J-10 is already a quantum leap forward for Chinese aviation. An improved version of the J-10, I believe, is already flying. I expect we'll see this improved J-10 enter service next year.

The PLAAF shows you only the tip of the icerberg. There's a lot more beneath the surface!

Yeah, I don't understand the call for "transparency" when everyone seems to know everything. Like a little ASAT test that's not suppose to happen at least for another 10 years. The question is did the program start earlier than estimated by the experts or was the technology quickly developed? Either way, China probably doesn't follow other known models.

Originally Posted by man overbored

The idea the J-XX would enter service in 2013 to 2015 as Roger asserts isn't credible. The F-35 is flying in prototype form today after a decade long design period and a Low Rate Initial Production decision at Milestone C will not be made until all the IOT&E is complete in 2012. Somehow China is going to start from scratch and put a "Fifth Generation" fighter into service before a decade old US project reaches initial production? Well now...........

The fifth generation project has been ongoing for a while now. They are building a modern assembly line at SAC for it. CAC has been assigned most of the design work and SAC got some too. We are not sure when the first flight will happen, but probably anywhere from 2010-2012. It's often believed that the fifth gen fighter will achieve IOC at around 2015. The status of WS-15 (the engine for the fighter) seems to corroborate on this.

Richard Fisher is NOT an idiot. He is probably a tool instructed by his superiors to publish China-fear articles to justify US military expansion. Then his articles are used by the US press as authoritative sources to convince most of the US on why the US must build up its arms against China.

Fisher claims the US must now design space weapons to defend the US against China. The truth is that the US has been researching space bombers and satellite gun for many decades, such as the current Global Strike space bomber and Rods from God satellite gun.

He and Pinkov occupy two different ends of the spectrum regarding the China Threat hype.

Strategy page seems to want to be in both places simulataneously, though.

It Is Time for the Pentagon’s PLA Report to Grow Up

by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on March 22nd, 2008
ARTICLES


For the first time in many years, on March 3 the Pentagon issued its annual China Military Power report prior to the March 15 deadline called for by the 1997 Congressional authorization language.[1] One apparent reason for the early delivery was to use the report as part of an intensified effort to convince China to relax its deeply ingrained resistance to “military transparency.” However, the key requirement for this annual report as mandated by the Congress was that the Department of Defense report “on the future pattern of military modernization of the People's Republic of China.” The 2008 report offers some interesting new data, even as it prompts new and old questions. Responding fully to its Congressional mandate and serving better to convince China to reveal more about its capabilities and intents will require more. The time has come to greatly expand and upgrade the China Military Power report.

China’s Foreign Ministry replied to this latest PLA Report by urging the U.S. to “abandon its Cold War mentality.”[2] It also accused the U.S. of playing up the “China Military Threat Theory.” The fact remains, however, that the annual China Military Power report is the most authoritative statement concerning China’s military power and intentions made by any government.[3] No other government seeks to make such an assessment and China’s annual condemnation nicely reflects its fear of even 66 pages of “transparency.”


Cold War Mentality: On March 4, 2008 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang offered the annual reply to the PLA Report by urging the U.S. drop its “Cold War mentality.” Source: People’s Daily


The China Military Power report is nevertheless not a wholly satisfactory document. While guided by Congressional demands it is also the product of compromises between the demands of policy and intelligence security. But there is apparently scope for creativity. For 2008 the report’s drafters apparently chose to add a chapter length “Special Topic” on “Human Capital in the PLA Force Modernization” which examines the PLA’s progress in creating a more professional and capable personnel core. Other topics might be at least as informative and relevant: for example, “China’s Continued WMD Proliferation and How Chinese Leaders Profit,” but not surprisingly, that nettle was left un-grasped.[4]

As with previous versions this review will focus on threat-related concerns.

Space Warfare Concerns

For 2008 the Pentagon’s PLA Report places a new stress on China’s space and counter-space capabilities, due largely to the “unannounced test” on January 11, 2007 of the PLA’s SC-19 direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) interceptor. Regarding future direct ascent ASAT weapons, the PLA Report notes curiously that “Beijing’s efforts to develop small, rapid reaction space launch vehicles currently appears to be stalled.” (2008, p. 27) It is not clear whether this is a reference to China’s intention to build mobile space launch vehicles out of the DF-31 ICBM family, known as the KT-2 and KT-2A. In terms of other “rapid reaction” vehicles the PLA may be working on two air-launched space launch vehicles that could be used to deploy ASAT weapons. The first is similar to the U.S. Orbital Sciences Pegasus air launched vehicle revealed at the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow. The second may be based on larger version of the Shenlong space plane vehicle first revealed in December 2007.[5] Air launched ASAT carriers are far more flexible than ground-mobile systems like the SC-19 or a potential future KT-2 based system.



Possible Air Launched SLVs: A Pegasus-like space launch vehicle and the Shenlong space place form two possible air launched “rapid reaction” space launch vehicles for the PLA. Source: Chinese Internet


Regarding China’s manned space program the 2008 PLA Report notes “The majority of the technology used in China’s manned space program is derived from Russian equipment, and China receives significant help from Russia with specific satellite payloads and applications.” (2008, p. 3) In October 2008 China will likely fly its Shenzhou-8, its third manned mission and the first to exercise a space-walk. The below image from a Chinese government website indicates that China’s extravehicular activity (EVA) suit is substantially derived from the Russian Orlan-D space suit. The PLA Report also notes “China’s goal is to have a manned space station and conduct a lunar landing, both by 2020.” (2008, p. 27) However, the PLA Reports have not noted how China has used all Shenzhou missions thus far to support military surveillance missions, which sets a precedent for the possibility of China using its future space stations and Moon program to support military goals.


China’s EVA Suit: This is the first image of China’s manned space suit, which will likely be used during the Shenzhou-8 mission planned for this October; it shows a marked similarity to the Russian Orlan-D suit. Source: Chinese Internet


More Missile Data Prompts Old Questions

The 2008 PLA Report provides interesting updates from 2007 regarding the PLA’s increasing nuclear missile forces. While the 2007 report noted that that the 7,200km range solid-fuel and road-mobile DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) had “achieved initial threat availability in 2006” (2007, p. 9), the 2008 report asserts that DF-31 deployment is now less than 10 (2008, p. 66). The 2007 report also noted that the larger 11,200km range DF-31A “is expected to reach initial operational capability (IOC) in 2007” (2007, p. 3), and indeed, the 2008 reports that fewer than 10 are now considered deployed. This could suggest an annual production rate of 5 to 10 missiles for both types. Chinese Internet images of what is likely the DF-31A ICBM show that is it is much larger than the DF-31 and is carried by a 16-wheel transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) similar to the MAZ-7916 used by the Russian SS-27 ICBM. A 1996 reported noted that U.S. satellite had detected a large MAZ TEL outside a Chinese factory,[6] indicating that Belarus or Russian firms have cooperated with China’s development of these new large TELs.




Recent DF-31 ICBM Images: Appearing in mid-2007, this image show that recent production DF-31 ICBMs now have a four-door truck cab. In July 2007 China for the first time revealed a model of the DF-31 ICBM. The Pentagon reports close to 10 may be deployed. Source: Chinese Internet


Regarding nuclear missile submarines (SSBNs), the 2008 PLA Report states that by 2010, the PLA could have “up to five JIN-class SSBNs, each carrying between 10 and 12 JL-2 SLBM.” (2008, p. 25). This formalizes an estimate revealed by the U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence in late 2006 that Type 094 SSBN (JIN-class) production could reach five. Fairly clear Chinese Internet-source images of the Type 094 show that this second-generation Chinese SSBN carries 12 SLBMs. Provided that subsequent Type 094 do not carry more than 12 missiles, this points to a new Chinese SLBM force of 60 missiles. Might China build more? Again, Beijing is not revealing its intentions. Concern about the future numbers of PLA ICBMs and SLBMs is heightened for three reasons.


12 SLBMs Per 094: This image of the Type 094 SSBN clearly shows it carries 12 SLBMs. However, Chinese Internet sources suggest that future 094 versions could carry 16 or 18 SLBMs. Source: Chinese Internet


No.1: How many nuclear missiles will China build? The 2002 PLA Report contained an estimate that China could deploy 60 ICBMs by 2010 (2002, p. 27). With the deployed number of upgraded DF-5Mod2 missiles remaining at 20, and an annual production rate of 5 to 10 DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs, it is thus possible that the PLA could possibly triple its land-based long range nuclear ICBM force to 60 missiles by some time in 2009. But will the PLA stop at a force of 60 or so ICBMs or continue building additional DF-31 and DF-31A units? Will there be follow-on more capable ICBMs? At least one recent unconfirmable Chinese Internet source asserts there will be an initial DF-31A force of 60 missiles.[7] Such an assertion might be easy to dismiss. However, the Chinese government is unwilling to reveal its planned ICBM numbers. The variance is significant: Is China moving toward a nuclear missile force of 60 ICBMs and 60 SLBMs or a force of 100 ICBMs and 60 SLBMs?





Possible DF-31A Images: These images, two revealed in early 2007, and a new side view first seen on March 8, show a much larger 16- wheel TEL similar to the MAZ-7916 used by the Russian SS-27 mobile ICBM. This could be the DF-31A mobile ICBM. Source: Chinese Internet


No.2: Is China arming its new missiles with multiple warheads? While one might prefer to temper concern about even 160 new Chinese nuclear ballistic missiles compared to the nuclear missile arsenals of the United States (500 ICBMs and 336 SLBMs) and Russia (452 ICBMs and 172 SLBMs), what if China is arming these new missiles with multiple warheads? The 2002 PLA Report noted that “perhaps” China would develop multiple warheads, most likely for the new DF-5Mod2, as a means of countering U.S. National Missile Defenses (2002, p. 28). Now after six years, the 2008 PLA Report revives the matter of possible Chinese multiple warheads by noting countermeasures to U.S. missile defenses that “China is researching.” It is worth quoting the entire passage:

“The addition of nuclear capable forces with greater mobility and survivability, combined with ballistic missile defense countermeasures which China is researching—including maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRV), multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding and ASAT weapons—will strengthen China’s deterrent and enhance its capabilities for strategic strike.” (2008, p. 25)

The 2008 PLA Report does not make any statement that Chinese missiles have multiple warheads now, but having revived this issue, the report then fails to explain how the potential for multiple warhead missiles could impact China’s nuclear weapon capability. The author, however, has previously cited estimates of other Asian military officials, which include: DF-5Mod2: 8 warheads; DF-31A: 3-4 warheads; JL-2: 3-4 warheads.[8] As before, the author cannot verify if these numbers are true. However, after six years it is reasonable to question whether the PLA not only has such programs, but also have they made progress? The 1999 Cox Report, which was based on broad U.S. Intelligence Community testimony before a Select Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, noted that if China were to aggressively develop multiple warheads for its missiles it could have 1,000 by 2015.[9] The chart below shows estimates for China’s nuclear missile force based on low and high estimates for missile numbers and for potential multiple warhead configurations.





MaRV and MIRV Indications: The top Chinese television image from 2005 suggests a maneuverable warhead that could potentially be used by the single warhead DF-31 ICBM. The second image from December 2007, from the display table of a Chinese hypersonic research institute, shows a blunt-nose missile at the back of the table, a configuration that could indicate multiple warhead carriage. This missile may represent the DF-31A or the JL-2 SLBM. Source: Chinese Internet


More clarity is required from either from U.S. government or Chinese government sources regarding future numbers of Chinese nuclear missiles and warheads. The U.S. and Russia are now in the process of reducing their nuclear warhead count to about 2,200-1,700 by 2012 as part of the May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia. The U.S. is also in the process of reducing the warhead load of most of its 500 fixed-silo Minuteman-III ICBMs from three to one.

No.3: Is China’s ASAT program tied to an ongoing strategic missile defense program? The issue of nuclear warhead numbers becomes even more critical if one considers the indications that China may also be working on a new strategic missile defense program. Successive Pentagon reports have not spoken directly to this possibility. However, the listing of China’s ASAT capability in the above quoted list of “ballistic missile defense countermeasures which China is researching,” can be interpreted as an indication that some in the U.S. Intelligence community are concerned with China’s potential development of missile defenses. After all, the technological capabilities needed for intercepting satellites and ballistic missile warheads are basically the same, as the U.S. demonstrated on February 21 by using U.S. Navy ship-based SM-3 ballistic missile interceptors to prevent an errant U.S. reconnaissance satellite from causing harm on earth. From 1963 to 1980 China pursued its 640 Program missile defense project, which was intended to produce short and long-range missile interceptors, new long range radar, and also had an off-shoot ASAT project. Chinese sources also mention a possible strategic defense program with the numerical designator “863-8XX,” meaning it is under China’s famous “863 Program” started in 1986 to mobilize technological resources to achieve a broad range of military modernization goals.


640 Program ABM Precedent: The FJ-1 and FJ-2 anti-ballistic missile interceptors, though never fully developed and produced, were two products of the 640 Program. These set a precedent for China’s potential current interest in strategic missile defense, in stark contrast to its long-standing harsh rhetoric against such systems. Source: Chinese Internet


The future configuration of China’s strategic offensive, and potential strategic defensive capabilities should be of critical concern to the United States, which unlike Russia and China, extends its nuclear deterrent to treaty allies in Europe and Asia. The U.S. does this because it believes that it is in America’s strategic interest that many of its allies not do so themselves—a point perhaps not sufficiently appreciated in Beijing and Moscow. Precisely because China has used its current limited nuclear arsenal to attempt to “intimidate” or “coerce” the United States from aiding Taiwan in the event of a Chinese military strike, several U.S. allies in Asia, themselves not yet nuclear, are quite sensitive to U.S.-Chinese-Russian nuclear balance.[10] Should a much larger Chinese nuclear offensive and defensive nuclear force come to be judged as “neutralizing” the American strategic deterrent in Asia, or worse, come to aid a hostile Chinese conquest of Taiwan, some may see little choice but to pursue their own strategic or even nuclear deterrent.

As it did in 2007, the 2008 PLA Report repeats doubts about China’s oft-state “No First Use” policy for nuclear weapons, in light of “periodic PRC military and academic debates” which question this policy. For example, in January 2008 Chai Yuqiu, a vice principal with the Nanjing Army Command College, told the Ta Kung Pao newspaper that China’s no-first-use nuclear policy is not unlimited, saying,

"The policy of not to use nuclear weapons first is not unlimited, without conditions, or without premises,” Chai also noted, “China will never use nuclear weapons first, especially not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries…When big powers equipped with nuclear arms disregard the completeness of sovereignty and territory of Chinese people and make frequent moves that are unconventional and hurt the fundamental interests of Chinese people, however, it is not impossible to break such a strategy on tactical issues.”[11]

This is apparently the latest reference, albeit veiled, that China could use nuclear weapons against the United States in an offensive manner in the event of a full conflict over the future of Taiwan. It follows previous threatening statements made by former General Staff Second Department (Intelligence) Director General Xiong Guangkai in late 1995 and then National Defense University professor General Zhu Chenghu in July 2005.[12]

To diminish China’s capacity for nuclear coercion, it is necessary that the U.S. maintain a sufficient nuclear weapons capacity to deter nuclear attack against itself and against regional allies. If China is indeed building up toward a nuclear force of 500 or more warheads, then it is logical that the U.S. reconsider whether SORT warhead numbers and the current limited National Missile Defense posture are sufficient to sustain the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. There may or may not be a need for the U.S. to alter its planned nuclear missile and defensive missile posture. But at a minimum, it would be a necessary hedge against uncertainty and retain, as the U.S. has reportedly decided, 25 of its Minuteman-III ICBMs armed with multiple warheads[13] and to fully fund the Reliable Replacement Warhead program to ensure a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent.[14]

Despite China’s potential for pushing the U.S.-China nuclear competition in the direction of a new “Cold War,” not all this is necessarily bad news. China’s interest in strategic missile defenses, within a political context that does not exist today, offers the potential to achieve negotiated offensive-defensive limits that could form the basis for global weapon reductions. This is one of many reasons to press hard, as the Bush Administration has been doing, for a real dialogue with the PLA on nuclear weapon related issues. But it is likely that any lasting progress toward a verifiable nuclear stability with China will require 1) a significant resolution of the ideological-strategic conflicts between Communist China and the community of Democratic nations, especially as regards Taiwan; and 2) a sea-change in China’s longstanding resistance to the levels military transparency needed to foster real military confidence with other countries.

Update on Threats to Taiwan

A key reason why a Communist Party led China is not going to evolve positively in these two areas of concern for some time is China’s strengthening commitment to force “unification” on a democratic Taiwan that wants preserve its democratic freedoms as it decides, on its own, the future of its relationship with China. Taiwan itself poses no military threat to China and Taiwanese appear willing to pursue greater economic integration with China. Ultimately it is Taiwan’s free-wheeling multi-party democracy which most threatens the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party. But in recent years Chinese military scholars have begun formulating geostrategic justifications for the conquest of Taiwan, as the PLA Report has repeatedly noted, is but a stepping stone toward greater strategic ambitions. While the PLA Reports for 2007 and 2008 have quoted a useful passage from the The PLA National Defense University (NDU) textbook The Science of Military Strategy (2008, p. 29), it is worth quoting additionally from this government-approved textbook:

“The reunification of China’s mainland and Taiwan not only is something that concerns China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity…buy also will exert impact upon the survival and development of the Chinese nation and the rejuvenation of the great nation of China in this century…If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only our maritime defense system would lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to the outside forces, but also a large water area and rich reserves of ocean resources will fall into the hands of others. What’s more, our line of foreign trade and transportation, which is vital to China’s opening up and economic development will be exposed to the surveillance threats of separatist and enemy forces, and China will be forever locked on the west side of the first chain of islands of the West Pacific…”The independence of Taiwan” means the start of war…Although this is something undesirable for China, we have to face it. Taiwan issue is the largest and the last obstacle which we must conquer in Chinese people’s path to rejuvenation in the 21st Century…”[15]

From this PLA perspective, control of Taiwan would “rejuvenate” Chinese power by causing a geostrategic shift in China’s favor. Far more important than the territorial or resource benefits to be gained, it would also give the PLA an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” astride the sea lanes vital to the economic security of South Korea, Japan, Australia, India and the Southeast Asian economies which depend on unhindered commerce. For sure, these sea lanes are just as important to China’s economy, and the PLA Navy could be almost as disruptive from its current bases. But Taiwan’s East Coast offer one advantage not allowed by bases on the mainland: immediate access to very deep water patrol areas for nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

As Ross Munro noted in 1999, “In the eyes of PRC leaders, Taiwan is first and foremost a strategic target that must soon be subjugated if China is to realize its goal of becoming Asia's dominant and unchallenged power.”[16] For Taiwan, this suggests that policies that seek to ameliorate conflicts with China will not alter Beijing’s ultimate goal of controlling Taiwan, which would require the eventual subjugation of Taiwan’s democratic government by force. A PLA conquest of Taiwan would almost certainly require violation of Japanese territory which extends, through the Sakishima Island chain, to Yonaguni Island, which is inhabited, sixty miles east of Taiwan’s Pacific coast. Such violation would almost certainly lead to wider war. Even if China somehow managed successfully to conquer Taiwan, the result would be to place Chinese forces about 60km from Japanese territory, a potentially explosive situation.

Such an outcome tragedy would have to assume either the defeat of U.S. forces or their political or military neutralization, and would herald the beginning of an era of Asian conflicts. A crisis of confidence in its American alliance could move Japan to rearm and build nuclear weapons, and have a similar effect on South Korea. Such outcomes are unpalatable for our allies, as would be the prospect of Washington becoming enmeshed in a new era of Asian nuclear-military competition.

For these reasons it is necessary to continue with the wisdom of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and continue to sell Taiwan the weapons it needs to deter a Chinese decision to attack. In addition to many campaign statements that he will seek new levels of understanding and tension reduction with China, presidential front-runner and Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou has also stated he would raise Taiwan’s defense spending to 3 percent of GDP and pursue the purchase of modern “defensive” weapons to ensure Taiwan will not be vulnerable to Chinese coercion.[17] The 2008 PLA Report notes new threats to Taiwan that will serve to justify Ma’s intention to increase defense spending.

Missile Threats: China’s missile threats to Taiwan continue to accumulate; presenting a potential first-strike force that could devastate Taiwan’s air and naval defenses and diminish fixed army systems. The 2008 PLA Report notes a high estimate of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) at 1070 (2008, p. 56), an almost 10 percent increase over the 2007 high estimate of 975. DF-21 (CSS-5) medium range missile numbers have increased from high estimates of 50 to 80 in the last year. A new anti-ship variant of the DF-21 could account for this increase. The PLA Report for 2008 does not detail the new variants for these missiles, which include the DF-15C deep-penetrating SRBM, the DF-15B with an apparent maneuvering warhead, or a new medium range missile called “DF-25” by some, but which may also be a new variant of the DF-21. For the first time the 2008 PLA Report notes that new land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) could number up to 250. This number could only represent land-based “DH-10” LACMs, and thus this number could increase rapidly as the PLA Air Force builds LACM-carrying H-6K bombers and a naval variant of this LACM arms new PLA Navy nuclear attack submarines.


More LACMs: This artist’s illustration from a Chinese military magazine offers one indication that China’s new air-launched LACMs may benefit from the Russian Kh-55 LACM, obtained by China from the Ukraine via A.Q. Khan’s nuclear smuggling network. Source: Naval Weapons


As far as is known, Taiwan has no ballistic missiles or LACMs aimed at China. While Taiwan is developing both, these are opposed by Washington and KMT leader Ma Ying-jeou has said he will halt the development of “offensive” missiles. After a long delay, it appears that Taiwan will buy new Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 missiles capable of intercepting most PLA SRBMs, but these are expensive and the numbers required are prohibitive. Instead, as this author has previously suggested, Taiwan requires energy intensive weapons like lasers and rail-guns. These have the potential of firing thousands of very inexpensive “rounds” and thus have a chance giving Taiwan’s “defensive” posture a significant advantage over the PLA’s offensive missiles.

Air Threats: The 2008 PLA Report notes that 20 percent of the PLA’s 2,250 combat aircraft can be considered “modern,” 4th generation or with 4th generation capabilities, which works out to an estimated 450 modern aircraft (2008, pgs, 34, 52). Of this number, close to 300 are from the Russian Sukhoi family of Su-27K, Su-30MKK, Su-30MKK2, plus the co-produced Shenyang J-11A, and soon, the largely copied J-11B—which may soon enter series production. Added to this there is close to 100 indigenous Chengdu J-10 multi-role fighters and then 50 or more of the indigenous Xian JH-7 and JH-7A strike fighters. Shenyang and Chengdu are developing twin-seat dedicated attack variants of the J-11B and the J-10. There are persistent though unconfirmed reports that the PLA will purchase the light-weight Chengdu FC-1 co-developed with Pakistan. Most Russian-made fighters are armed with the self-guided Vympel R-77 medium range and the helmet-sighted R-73 air-to-air missile (AAM). All new Chinese-made fighters carry the self-guided Luoyang PL-12, though they could also soon carry the helmet-display sighted PL-10/13 and the long-range ramjet-powered PL-13/14, which both apparently benefit from South African technology.[18] China is now developing two families of laser-guided and satellite-guided bombs for precision attacks.

But as repeated PLA Reports have noted, the PLA air threat also comes from increasing numbers of advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) acquired from Russia, and increasingly, produced by China (2008, p. 56). The PLA Air Force is in the process of acquiring up to 900 missiles of the deadly Russian S-300 family, to include 300 of the 150km range S-300PMU-2. From Fujian Province bases the S-300PMU-2 can reach targets over Taiwan. And with Russian technological help, China has put its 100-150km range HQ-9 into production, a SAM that is thought to be as good as early versions of the S-300. The 2008 PLA Report says there are 64 HQ-9 launchers, meaning a potential for at least 300 of these SAMs. The Pentagon for the first time mentions an “HQ-9 follow on” (2008, p. 56); Asian sources have noted that the PLA may be working on a 400km range SAM. These new SAMs combine very high speed and highly difficult to jam phased array radar guidance systems which pose a very high threat to U.S., Japanese and Taiwanese 4th generation combat aircraft.

Taiwan’s 390 combat aircraft face a rapidly increasing threat from the PLA’s missiles, LACMs and increasing numbers of advanced combat aircraft armed with modern aerial combat and precision ground-attack weapons. As repeated PLA Reports have noted, Taiwan would do well to invest much more in passive defenses such as shelters. However, Taiwan has also in the last year requested to begin the process of purchasing 66 new Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 50 fighters, which the Bush Administration has so far refused to commence. Given the rapidly increasing threat from Chinese missiles and precision strike aircraft that can target Taiwan’s Air Force, and the growing threat posed by modern Russian SAMs, it is necessary for the U.S. to consider Taiwan’s requirement for a 5th generation fighter like the Lockheed-Martin F-35B. This fighter has advantages of stealth which can counter the threat of the PLA’s new SAMs and a very-short take-off capability to allow for rapid aircraft dispersal to avoid missile attack.




Want Vs. Need: Taiwan is requesting 66 new F-16C Block 50 fighters to replace its very old F-5 fighters, but the mounting missile, air and SAM threat from the PLA would easily justify a future request from Taipei for the 5th generation F-35B V/STOL fighter. Source: RD Fisher


Naval/Invasion Threats: The 2008 PLA Report notes slight growth over 2007 in the PLA’s total submarine force, from 58 to 60, and further notes for the first time that a nuclear powered attack submarine is deployed with the East or South Sea Fleet near Taiwan. What this report does not note, however, is that after three years of trial and development, the PLA Navy has started series production of the new Yuan-class conventional submarine. Two new Yuans were spotted near the Wuhan shipyard in early 2008, and recent production runs for PLA submarines have ranged from 10 to 20. In 2007 Chinese sources also revealed the first images of the new Type 093 nuclear attack submarine, which Asian sources in the past have said three were launched by 2006. The 2008 PLA Report also does not assess the significance of the PLA Navy’s first Type 071 large LPD amphibious assault ship, launched at the end of 2006. It displaces about 20,000 tons and may carry up to 800 troops plus armor and equipment. In early 2008 Chinese Internet sources revealed the first images of the specialized hovercraft, similar in size to the U.S. Navy’s LCAC, which may be used by China’s LPD and LHD to move equipment rapidly to shore. Chinese sources and other reports also indicate that the PLA will be building a similarly sized helicopter assault ship or LHD.[19]

Quest For PLA Transparency Requires Better PLA Report

One key goal that the Bush Administration has sought to advance by releasing 2008 PLA Report early, and on the week it did, was clearly to increase pressure on Beijing to improve its willingness to become more “transparent” militarily. The 2008 PLA Report warns bluntly:

“China’s leaders have yet to explain in detail the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s modernizing military capabilities…The lack of transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. This situation will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown.” (2008, p. 1)

DoD released its report on Monday March 3, just as China’s largely rubber-stamp National People’s Congress (NPC) convened in Beijing. For Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the NPC provides an essential opportunity to justify its near total political control of China, by detailing economic goals and announcing budgets, usually led by its military spending announcement, which for 2008 marks 17.6 increase for 2007. But instead, the Bush Administration chose that week to put Beijing on the defensive by offering facts about China’s military build-up that the CCP would never reveal, and posing questions that it cannot answer at the risk of having to really justify its actions to the people of China.

It was indeed welcome that the Bush Administration would elevate its pressure in this way to seek to convince the Chinese government to become far more open about its military modernization and military-political goals. However, successive administrations since Ronald Reagan have pursued the same goal, with the Bush Administration the latest to resort to venting frustration. While pressing China to increase transparency may be laudable, it is simply the fact that China’s responses reflect a centuries-old abhorrence of military transparency.

When questioned on the BBC in 2006 about U.S. concerns about China’s military spending and transparency, China’s UN Ambassador to Geneva Sha Zukang said “It's better for the US to shut up and keep quiet.”[20] At least Dr. Shen Dingli of Shanghai’s Fudan University, an oft-cited unofficial “spokesman” for the Chinese government, offered an honest reason for Chinese reticence: "We have to keep certain secrets in order to have a war-fighting capability…We can't let Taiwan and the U.S. know how we are going to defeat them if the U.S. decides to send forces to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan.”[21] Ralph Sawyer has noted that for Sun Zi, perhaps China’s most venerated military strategist, a stress on secrecy was a “force multiplier,” quoting his formulation, “The pinnacle of military employment approaches the formless…If I determine the enemy’s disposition while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate my forces while the enemy is fragmented.”[22]

As long as China perceives that there will be opposition to its military goals, for Taiwan or for the Greater Asian region, it will seek to mask its intentions and to conceal its accumulating military capabilities. Largely cordial diplomatic attempts to make Beijing explain and reveal basic military information will only result in marginal gains. Even though these meager gains may justify continued effort, it is also time to greatly increase pressure on Beijing. During the Cold War the Reagan Administration’s Soviet Miltiary Power served not only to inform Americans and their allies of real threats, it also informed citizens in the former Soviet Bloc of the massive military expenditures that undermined economic and social conditions. A relatively easy upgrade for the online China Military Power report would be to translate it into several languages, including multiple Chinese dialects. But ultimately this report deserves to be a standing volume with extensive images and charts. The “risks to stability” of China’s military buildup are very real and deserve a far more serious investment in the China Military Report.




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[1] The text of the 1997 authorizing language for the annual Department of Defense China Military Power Report can be accessed at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/li...0619_china.htm

[2] Li Xiaokun, “Pentagon report smacks of Cold War Mentality,” People’s Daily, March 5, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2...nt_6507545.htm

[3] Annual Report To Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008, Office of the Secretary of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs..._Report_08.pdf

[4] Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III noted in his memoirs one reason for China’s persistence in selling missile technology to Pakistan in the 1990s was because “…several senior government and party officials or their families stood to gain from the performance of those contracts,” see, James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy, Revolution, War and Peace, New York: G.P.Putnam & Sons, 1995, p. 593.

[5] See author, “Shenlong Space Plane Advances China’s Military Potential,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, December 17, 2007, http://www.strategycenter.net/resear...pub_detail.asp

[6] Bill Gertz, “Missile-related Technology Sold To Beijing by Belarus,” The Washington Times, June 12, 1997, p. A9.

[7] This report appeared on the WarSky web page on March 3, 2008, titled, “The United States Wants China To Stop Deployment of DF-31A: China’s Military Rejects Categorically,” http://www.war-sky.com/forum/htm_dat...03/248075.html. This report also suggests that that China may eventually deploy 120 DF-31A ICBMs. The Chinese Internet is often a fertile source of disinformation and the author cannot confirm the veracity of this report, which is cited to illustrate the uncertainty surrounding projections of China’s future nuclear missile forces.

[8] “Two Cheers for the 2007 PLA Report,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, June 10, 2007, http://www.strategycenter.net/resear...pub_detail.asp

[9] Report of the Select Committee On U.S. National Security And Military/Commercial Concerns With The People’s Republic of China, Volume 1, Submitted by Mr. Cox of California, Chairman, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, p. 186.

[10] This point was made recently to the author by a Japanese defense official.

[11] Ta Kung Pao, January 20, 2008, relayed in “China rethinks no-first use of nuclear weapons: Policy not unlimited, without conditions,” East-Asia Intel.com, January 30, 2008.

[12] Alexandra Harney, Demetri Sevastopulo and Edward Alden, “Top Chinese general warns US over attack,” Financial Times, July 15, 2005, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/28cfe55a-f...00e2511c8.html

[13] Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. Might Retain Multiple Warheads on 25 Intercontinental Missiles,” Global Security Newswire, November 30, 2007, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_11_6.html

[14] For background see, “Reliable Replacement Warhead program,” National Nuclear Security Administration Fact Sheet, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factshe...A-07-FS-02.pdf

[15] Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy, English Edition, Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005, pgs. 442-443.

[16] Ross Munro, “Taiwan: What China Really Wants,” National Review, October 11, 1999.

[17] Ma Ying-jeou, “A SMART Strategy for National Security,” A Speech before the Association for the Promotion of National Security, Republic of China, February 26, 2008.

[18] See author, “China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-to-Air Missiles,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, February 2, 2008, http://www.strategycenter.net/resear...pub_detail.asp

[19] See author, “Chinese Aspects of Singapore’s IMDEX Naval Technology Show,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, June 20, 2007, http://www.strategycenter.net/resear...pub_detail.asp

[20] H. Josef Hebert, “Top Chinese Diplomat Tells US To ‘Shut Up’ On Arms Spending,” Agence France Presse, August 17, 2006.

[21] David Lague, “A Mystery in Beijing: Who Runs the Military?,” International Herald Tribune, June 22, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/22/asia/china.php

[22] Ralph D. Sawyer, “Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent and Projections,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2006/2007, pgs. 4,5.

http://www.strategycenter.net/resear...pub_detail.asp