Necessary Reading and Discussion for US Armchair Generals

Originally Posted by Finn McCool

I think we should have a thread where we can post links to things that people can read to improve their knowledge about military affairs. Also I'd like to have place where we can discuss general military theory and history.

Let me tell you all, I've been posting here for quite sometime and I've been interested in military things my whole life, and there's no better way to understand war than learning the history of war. Your understanding of any situation you can think of will be improved vastly if you really know about military history. So read it all you can. History and theoretical knowledge are way more important than knowing about hardware specs.

So let's start it up with the writings of the War Nerd. He's the best military theorist writing today that I know. These columns are meant as entertainment as well as being informative in a news-background sort of way. But there is serious weight behind the ideas he presents. They're short pieces so there's a lot of things omitted sometimes and I don't always agree with things he has to say, and it's definitely not PC. But then neither is war. The War Nerd has an extremely good record of predicting events too. That's one of the reasons why understanding history and theory is so important; it gives you predictive power.

More recent pieces:
THE EXILED – MANKIND'S ONLY ALTERNATIVE » The War Nerd

All the way back to 2002:
THE EXILE - The War Nerd

I'll update this with other writings as I think of them.

I have not followed your links, but I'm familiar with this guy and he's funny and fun to read. Of course it's hard to agree with all his stuff, but he does make good points. If you look at the website, exile.ru, which hosts his stuff, its not for children! It used to be a whole internet publication and the War Nerd just had a column in it. I think he was actually part of them, rather than just being tacked on the the website. That site was totally hilarious, and of course, mostly not "politically correct" from any angle. My impression was that they were mostly Americans living in Moscow, perhaps ex left-wingers more or less stranded by the end of the cold war. They tended to satirize both American politics and Russian ones, as well as the more degenerate aspects of post-Soviet collapse Russian social and cultural life. From the non- War Nerd stuff still there, you can see what kind of stuff it was.

One of the more recent things I read from him, and that was already in 2008 or so, was his account o British wars in Tibet. It was interesting, and told in a very funny way.

excellent website, thnx for making this available to us...saving it in my favourites now

Originally Posted by Red Moon

I have not followed your links, but I'm familiar with this guy and he's funny and fun to read. Of course it's hard to agree with all his stuff, but he does make good points. If you look at the website, exile.ru, which hosts his stuff, its not for children! It used to be a whole internet publication and the War Nerd just had a column in it. I think he was actually part of them, rather than just being tacked on the the website. That site was totally hilarious, and of course, mostly not "politically correct" from any angle. My impression was that they were mostly Americans living in Moscow, perhaps ex left-wingers more or less stranded by the end of the cold war. They tended to satirize both American politics and Russian ones, as well as the more degenerate aspects of post-Soviet collapse Russian social and cultural life. From the non- War Nerd stuff still there, you can see what kind of stuff it was.

One of the more recent things I read from him, and that was already in 2008 or so, was his account o British wars in Tibet. It was interesting, and told in a very funny way.

Oh yeah, the Exile was legendary. They were the true badasses of journalism. I've been reading their stuff for quite a while and know a dude that lived amongst American ex-pats in the 90s in Moscow, and knew Mark Ames and the other Exile guys, and he said that they did indeed party as hard and flout the law as much as their reputation would lead one to believe. They pretty much revel in being nihilistic curmudgeons and hate on all parts of the political spectrum equally. It's unfortunate that the Russian government finally shut them down but its also very surprising they survived as long as they did. There's so much built up euphemistic BS amongst most journalism, and it seems like they try to make all events fit neatly into the conventional wisdom. The Exile and especially War Nerd totally rejected conventional wisdom and that's where they're at their best.

And you're welcome pla101prc, hopefully I can keep up the caliber of informative links.

So if there's one point I'm trying to make today it's that leadership, intelligence, political context, and morale are the truly important things in war. And that the hardware-driven conventional warfare discussions that are SDF's bread and butter are all actually pretty pointless. Conventional warfare will be almost non-existent in the 21st century.

actually now that i read a couple of his articles i'll have to say i disagree with some of the stuff as well...but i'll continue to read them because i think the level of knowledge presented in his works warrants my attention...and this guy is hella funny LMFAO

Well it looks pretty ignorant to me. I don't like this sort of dribble at all. I see no redeeming value at all. None. I'm 57 years old and have no time to waste on this sort of BS.

Oh yea...feel free to discuss this site/subject within the parameters of the rules of this forum.

Originally Posted by Finn McCool

So if there's one point I'm trying to make today it's that leadership, intelligence, political context, and morale are the truly important things in war. And that the hardware-driven conventional warfare discussions that are SDF's bread and butter are all actually pretty pointless.

Well you're about 80 years behind Chairman Mao on that one.

Originally Posted by Roger604

Well you're about 80 years behind Chairman Mao on that one.

And Mao is a couple thousand years behind Sun Tzu, a couple hundred behind Saladin, or Clausewitz.

Here's a question I would like to put up for discussion:

Lately I've been wondering how the professional militaries of the world's great powers can handle the problem of the irregular/guerrilla warfare that predominates today. I've decided that having dedicated counterinsurgency divisions is one possible solution.

All soldiers in these divisions would be trained differently from conventional warfare divisions. They'd learn from day one how to do things like manning traffic checkpoints, riot control, searching houses and cars, law enforcement techniques like how to spot someone lying, as well as rules of engagement/sensitivity to civilians. As far as combat goes, extra emphasis would be given to ambush (both planning and escaping), urban warfare, and IEDs of all kinds.

A counterinsurgency division would be comprised of (roughly):

• 3x Mech Infantry brigades. These brigades would be made up of your basic rifle companies and squads. They're the grunts manning checkpoints, patrolling neighborhoods, etc. However each brigade would have dedicated companies trained for intelligence/prisoner interrogation etc. and psyop/propaganda/liasion with local civilians and security forces type work.
• An elite airmobile commando unit of indeterminate size. I don't feel like this needs to be the size of a whole brigade but a company is far too small. Somewhere in between. Basically this unit would be the "kinetic" part of the equation. They're the ones making offensive raids or whatever against insurgent/guerilla targets or leaders. Most offensive, firepower driven work is left up to them. Think US Army Rangers.
• A dedicated rotary-wing and UAV unit. Comprised of the helis necessary for general unit function, transportation of the commando unit and attack helis for fire support, as well as UAVs for intelligence/strike.

The idea is to have a unit that can be rapidly deployed and which can bring enough firepower to dominate your average guerrilla force but which can also play their game and root them out of the civilian population. Total strength would probably be 15-20,000.

I think that's an interesting topic you bring up.
At first, I'd say that except for large militaries like the US maybe, a dedicated division of COIN troops is perhaps a little much to support. If you still want have a regular warfare army beside that.
In an earlier force structure for the Bundeswehr, about five+ years old by now and still assuming a 250.000 strong force, there was the idea of having three categories of forces. 35.000 fast reaction forces for mid-high intensity stuff like peace enforcement, 70.000 stabilizing forces for low-med intensity peace keeping ops, and 147.000 supporting troops.
That might have been a way to breake it down, but with the new design aim of around 180.000 troops, that's an idea of the past. Biggest problem here is still the deployability of a usefull amount of troops, compared to the overall size of the force.
Yet this new training concept to include the stuff like checkpoints, foot patrols, interacting with local population etc has come a pretty good way so far, here at least. The basics are tought pretty much tought throughout the forces and then more indepth in pre deployment training.
We also do have units specially trained in gaining info from the locals through talking and in questioning caught hostiles, although in small numbers only.

I do think that you don't need seperate, dedicated forces for these jobs, regulars can do that pretty good as well, if they are well prepared, and if the strategic-political idea behind it is sound.
Look at southern A-stan, we finally seem to be making some progress. Why did it take nine years? I think because someone finally realized, nation building is not done by networking drones and satellites and a few next gen soldiers that rush through an area and then leave again. But by securing an area and then holding it to allow the local population to prosper. Again, a troop surge may have turned the tide. I'm reading that sometimes commanders wanted 300.000troops for a country the size of A-stan. In these missions, numbers do matter, a lot.

I also storngly advocate sophisticated, highly mobile COIN / CT "hunter/killer" forces with good firepower. That means UAVs for good survaillance, modern helos etc. It seems in prolonged, high tempo ops, they can put a real strain on hostile force structures. And we need the regular combat troops that secure an area from the foot guerillas and then stay to prevent these from trickling back.

That is if you choose to rather build a nation to a certain degree.
Then there's the other way, the shadow method, like what we see much more often recently. With a big deployment you get tied down, everybody watches etc. But you could also just dispatch small strike forces that harm an enemies infrastructure / network like we start seeing in Yemen or Somalia. These could be specialized branches somewhere inside SOCOM with support from outside as needed.

Originally Posted by Finn McCool

And Mao is a couple thousand years behind Sun Tzu, a couple hundred behind Saladin, or Clausewitz.

Really? Can you provide a reference that Sun Tzu, Saladin or Clausewitz specifically emphasized that war is ultimately fought by people not machines and the spirit of the soldiers is more important than technological advantage?

I'm particularly skeptical about cold weapons area references to this.

Originally Posted by Scratch

I do think that you don't need seperate, dedicated forces for these jobs, regulars can do that pretty good as well, if they are well prepared, and if the strategic-political idea behind it is sound.
Look at southern A-stan, we finally seem to be making some progress. Why did it take nine years? I think because someone finally realized, nation building is not done by networking drones and satellites and a few next gen soldiers that rush through an area and then leave again. But by securing an area and then holding it to allow the local population to prosper. Again, a troop surge may have turned the tide. I'm reading that sometimes commanders wanted 300.000troops for a country the size of A-stan. In these missions, numbers do matter, a lot.

I also storngly advocate sophisticated, highly mobile COIN / CT "hunter/killer" forces with good firepower. That means UAVs for good survaillance, modern helos etc. It seems in prolonged, high tempo ops, they can put a real strain on hostile force structures. And we need the regular combat troops that secure an area from the foot guerillas and then stay to prevent these from trickling back.

That is if you choose to rather build a nation to a certain degree.
Then there's the other way, the shadow method, like what we see much more often recently. With a big deployment you get tied down, everybody watches etc. But you could also just dispatch small strike forces that harm an enemies infrastructure / network like we start seeing in Yemen or Somalia. These could be specialized branches somewhere inside SOCOM with support from outside as needed.

It is true that traditional infantry forces can perform COIN ops pretty well if they're trained and led properly. But I don't see conventional war making a big comeback in the 21st century, certainly not long-term conventional war. So while regular infantry can do the job, it would be easier for a specialized force, and indeed the threat from irregular combatants is far greater today than it is from conventional armies. Why fight with a force that is less than optimized for the threat? So I maintain that it would probably be a pretty good idea for the great powers to go with forces like this.

You're certainly onto something with the idea about hunter/killer forces. The British in Northern Ireland used them as did the French in Algeria (they lost but it was actually a very effective part of their strategy). The "surge" in Iraq was greatly aided by SOCOMs vicious and still very secret campaign of assassination against insurgent leaders. And now in Afghanistan we're seeing Petraeus put a lot of emphasis on causing casualties.

I tried to incorporate that into my idea with the inclusion of airmobile commandos and organic air assets. Doctrinally I would think that these forces could be used in a manner similar to how the Rhodesian Light Infantry regiment operated in the Rhodesian Bush War during the 1970s. They were wondrously effective at destroying guerrilla forces in the bush. Here's a brief description of their methods (it's quite similar to some American airborne operations in Vietnam)
Fireforce - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Now, it is true that both the Rhodesians and Americans lost those conflicts, but on an operational level these tactics were quite effective. The idea is to use airmobile elite light infantry sort of as "bird dogs" for heavier fire power. They can be set down in insurgent controlled territory and advance into an area, flushing out unprepared insurgents and, by engaging them, making them visible and vulnerable to airpower of all types. Fireforce-type missions can be made even more effective when recon units are clandestinely inserted into insurgent controlled areas, who call in the airmobile forces when insurgent concentrations are spotted. Nowadays we also have UAVs to do this sort of work. Additionally, these airmobile forces can enter insurgent controlled territory and erect temporary checkpoints on transportation routes or conduct surprise cordon and search operations in populated areas. Should these operations draw insurgent fire, all the better. They've made themselves visible and can be destroyed by firepower from the air or elsewhere. Finally they can conduct more strategic-level raids of the type that the Rhodesian Light Infantry conducted against guerrilla camps in Mozambique and other countries.

Of course, hunter-killer operations are not at all sufficient to quell an insurgency and can even make it worse if civilians are frequently harmed. And these operations need to be planned for the specific circumstances of the war they are in. For example, the FireForce missions that were appropriate and effective in Rhodesia would not have been appropriate or effective in Northern Ireland. But the need for an offensive capability to disrupt insurgent activity and keep them on the defensive remains.

So doctrinally, if this force were to be created and employed, I envision the brigades of infantry securing the most populated areas and routes of transportation. They're the ones that protect and engage with the local population. They build networks of informants, man checkpoints, do development projects, protect elections, etc. All that normal COIN stuff. Outside of areas that are "secured", the hunter-killer teams will operate, taking the fight to the enemy in the manner that I described. I suppose that the idea would be to eventually expand the "secured area" outwards, but that might not be possible without increasing troop numbers indefinitely, depending on the situation.

Well, the kinetic parts of COIN, especially quick raids, ambushes, searches, can be done by specialized / special forces that may emphazise the COIN environment a little more. But I do think on the individual / squad level the employment is not so much different from raiding an airfield or forward command post in a more regular war. An A-Team - Ranger combo (in US terms) is probably always a good solution, maybe Delta for high value targets. The FireForce units (the hint was great, not known it before, thanks) weren't special COIN troops either, as I see it, but paratroopers specializing in a certain type of quick, airborne assault, that fit the need at the moment. And besides these, or the SAS in Northern Ireland, I think early Seal teams were also quite effective in harrasing the VC in North Vietnam.
For the things that go more into policing action, like quickly and randomly setting up checkpoint, sealing off certain areas for a search, or just showing some presence in villages, light - medium infantry that focuses on these tasks does indeed seem sensible, though.
On another note, I think Northern Ireland, and to e certain extent Rhodesia are a little different, in that these were more or less domestic issues. The "great powers" you describe will most likely be stable at home and fight COIN abroad in a more expeditionary nature. But it's true that COIN requires different employment methods and individual skills on some levels then were seen before in the military.

I guess what is of the greatest concern to me is how much you want to blow up the scale of such an operation. Meaning you either stay low key, out of view and in the shadow; or you do the full up, open intervetion.
When you go in with the intent to eventually build state structures with lots of troops providing general security, you're in total public view. Your enemy has a visible target and will be attracted, and the enemy have a powerful audiance in your home population. If you do that, then you have to leave behind a stable, built up country. Otherwise, if your opponent remains able to cause insecurity and uncertainty after you leave, they'll be able to say they outlasted you, wich in the long run hurts perception of your ability to succeed militarily. So you either need troops to fill the viod after your COIN teams sweep through, or a local force that can fill that viod right away. There a lot depends on the local situation.
On the other hand, if you can find some basic state / tribe / security structures in place, you can have your specialized troops clear an area out of too much public view with quick raids, searches, checkpoints etc. while the locals pick up from there, building their society from the local level in their way. That way, your ops can go ahead without a visible enemy for the insurgency. They don't know and can't show who they're really fighting, so you can get to their morale. This way, you can built hubs of security, from wich to operate. This would mean just a few thausand troops maybe in one theater.

On the equipment side armed UAVs for survaillance, overwatch or stand alone strike are a great option.
Good helicopters to quickly reach spots of reported activity, or maybe randomly pop up in certain villiges to say hello. A light ground attack plane would be a great asset, it would help the low key small infrastructure approach. Unfortunately, I think the USAF canceled that project in spring this year. A Super Tucano like plane would be a great addtion to gunships.

Time to bring this thread back.

I'd like to introduce all of you who don't know to Mr. H. John Poole. He was a Marine officer of various ranks for about 30 years and saw lots of combat in Vietnam. He has written more, and better, pieces about fighting modern insurgent-style warfare than almost anyone else I know, especially when it comes to the use of smaller infantry units and individual infantrymen. The style of warfare he calls for is truly suited to the sort of fighting that is most common amongst professional military forces in the world today.

Unfortunately, all of his writings are books, not online, and they're sort of hard to find. But you can at least skim his books on Amazon and get an idea of what he's talking about. Here's a few of his best

The Tiger's Way
Amazon.com: The Tiger's Way: A U.S. Private's Best Chance for Survival (9780963869562): H. John Poole, Edward Molina, Ray L. Smith: Books

One More Bridge To Cross (A pretty excellent, very, very detailed piece on the importance and future of infantry. He lays out a really great comprehensive view of how to use infantry in modern conventional war and make it survivable)
Amazon.com: One More Bridge to Cross: Lowering the Cost of War (9780963869531): H. John Poole, Edward Molina, William S. Lind: Books

He's written a lot of other books, generally oriented at dissecting and analyzing what he seems to see as "culturally specific warfare techniques" that show up around the world, which the US might face. Thus he has a couple of books analyzing lessons from America's wars in East Asia, and some about the Middle East.

Let me caution you about one thing. Poole is a bit crazy. His books often start out with rambling, almost philosophical throat clearings about this or that which usually ends up in a flag-waving rah-rah USA sort of thing. He sometimes goes out of his way to denounce the "Chi-coms" or "Islamofacists". He's pretty much a super-patriot. I can see that causing a lot of SDFers to not listen to what he has to say. But he has real respect for fellow warriors, even those he sees as America's enemies. He'll never minimize the skill and cunning of an enemy for ideological reasons.

(also could a mod change the title of this thread so that US isn't capitalized? I wanted it to say "us" rather than implying this is for Americans)

Originally Posted by Scratch

I guess what is of the greatest concern to me is how much you want to blow up the scale of such an operation. Meaning you either stay low key, out of view and in the shadow; or you do the full up, open intervetion.
When you go in with the intent to eventually build state structures with lots of troops providing general security, you're in total public view. Your enemy has a visible target and will be attracted, and the enemy have a powerful audiance in your home population. If you do that, then you have to leave behind a stable, built up country. Otherwise, if your opponent remains able to cause insecurity and uncertainty after you leave, they'll be able to say they outlasted you, wich in the long run hurts perception of your ability to succeed militarily. So you either need troops to fill the viod after your COIN teams sweep through, or a local force that can fill that viod right away. There a lot depends on the local situation.
On the other hand, if you can find some basic state / tribe / security structures in place, you can have your specialized troops clear an area out of too much public view with quick raids, searches, checkpoints etc. while the locals pick up from there, building their society from the local level in their way. That way, your ops can go ahead without a visible enemy for the insurgency. They don't know and can't show who they're really fighting, so you can get to their morale. This way, you can built hubs of security, from wich to operate. This would mean just a few thausand troops maybe in one theater.

You're right, the best solution to any war is to avoid it in the first place. I suppose you've been reading some Sun Tzu; he would always advocate dealing with a problem secretly rather than going ahead with an invasion of some kind. One of the things I've harped on throughout this thread is that "all out war" is less and less of a solution to the problems that states have. So you're right, what you have to look for now, in modern strategic military thinking, is ways to exert maximum leverage; you're always looking for the option that allows the biggest positive outcome to resource input ratio. How can I use a minimum of force to achieve as much of my desired outcome as possible?

Indeed, i think that a classic full scale war would require full scale occupation afterwards to have the stability needed to built the structures you'd like the future state to have. We saw that in WW II were millions of soldiers were available patrol a country until objectives were met.
Nowadays, with the structural changes that have taken place, such a feat would be nearly impossible, numbers wise and economicly wise. So nations will indeed have to find ways to achieve objectives, wich actually fail to be set in the first place lately, with different means. Through coalitions or so on.

A point in case I'd like to bring up and see how others think about it, because it's fairly relevant and current IMO, is Somalia.
I don't reject military force in generall at all, it must just be mated to todays realities. And I believe that military force will have to be part of the solution to the Somalia & piracy problem.
I imagine a naval taskforce that is actually patrolling the somali cost very agressively and close to the actual costline, thus already controlling and boarding suspect skiffs and motherships right when they leave port. These TF could then provide a persistant ISR & fire support role along the cost for further missions.
That naval force must also encompass amphib forces that are ready to move ashore and securey and/or clear out certain ports wich are know piracy hot spots. Maybe even hold them for some time. Plus I think this military operation should assist AU troops in clearing and securing Mogadishu at least. From there on, however, the objective of the opertation should just be to continue securing the costline, the capital and then support an AU mission in spreading controll further throuout the country. With maybe some spec op missions against high value targets.

This would then be less of a modern COIN and more of a classical military operation again. The MOUT part of clearing Mogadishu could well be a rather bloody and nasty thing to do. But with a AU mission already involved it doesn't have too much a colonial look to it. And after that rather short time, the main ground ops could be left to an african operation while outside forces just support and patrol, again out of too much public attention.

+++ Btw, Finn, since you started the thread, shouldn't there also an "edit thread" button available for you? I think in a thread I started, I had that option. +++