Modern Carrier Battle Group..Strategies and Tactics

Originally Posted by jantxv

Any electro-optical technology that can burn through 20 feet of steel per second is stunning.

And what range can that be done at? 10 feet? Or 10km?

Nonetheless, the claim that Free Electron Lasers are immune to atmospheric conditions are interesting. Will need to see how that turns out.

Originally Posted by Ambivalent

Stark's captain was relieved because they didn't use the SLQ-32 to jam the Exocets, and the Phalanx was not operational to shoot them down. You can't count on commanders to make those sorts of mistakes routinely in combat. And keep in mind we were not at war with anyone, so the crew isn't actively looking for hostile targets to engage. The ROE are different.
A CVN is not a frigate, and it would take a lot more than one Exocet or similar to stop a carrier. Read up how much damage Enterprise took early in the Guadalcanal campaign, how external hull damage was field repaired and how yard workers completed repairs over a six month period as the ship sailed in combat. You can fight a damaged ship and we have in the past.
When USS Tripoli struck a mine leading a minesweeping task force during OIF (ironic isn't it that the flagship of a minesweeping task force hits an enemy mine) the ship suffered a 20 ft X 30 ft hole in the hull. The boiler fires were blown out by the shock of the explosion leaving the ship dead in the water and flooding. The crew isolated the flooding, re-lit the boilers (half hour job), shored up the bulkheads containing the flooding and continued on the mission. The ship was drydocked after the mission was complete. That is how the USN fights. Hitting one of our ships does not guarantee it is out of action.

Yes, the US military has some impressive combat records and experience. And no doubt it will take a lot of damage to cause a CVN to be mission-kill. That does not mean it cannot be done.

The most powerful arm of a CBG is the air wing. If flight ops are sufficiently disrupted for a few hours, what do you think will happen to the CBG? All the land-based, air-launched and ship-launched missiles will be coming in from stand-off ranges.

Originally Posted by Ambivalent

This is why we have EP-3's and why we like to fly them into the naval exercises of potential adversaries. The above photos are all in the public domain, the systems replicated are all obsolete, so you have to wonder what is out there now.

And China has been accused of hacking into Pentagon's computers. They have also had their hands on a US EP-3. Yet you guys don't seem to wonder what they have eh?

When US intel under-estimates PLA's capability once, you'd think that the estimates would be adjusted accordingly, and it won't be too far off the next time. Unfortunately, even senior US officials (including the former CNO) acknowledge, US intel consistently under-estimates PLA's technological advances. Doesn't it make you wonder how much US intel doesn't know is happening in PRC?

Originally Posted by Ambivalent

I have to laugh at this whole thread. For such a supposedly obsolete weapon, China is certainly in a big hurry to build one! It's not as if they are cheap to build and operate. Want to bet the fanbois and other know-nothings in the press who like to prophesy the end of the carrier (which I'v heard my entire adult life) never spent a day in any navy? I'm sure the PLAN leaders who are so anxious to have an operation carrier know their value, understand the risks to them from weapons such as their own and feel a carrier is survivable and worth the money. If carriers were suddenly obsoleted by a DF-21 (which borrows more than a little from declassified information on Pershing II, meaning we could do it ourselves ) then why bother? Maybe the fanbois don't know as much as they think. Just sayin' .............

Did you think I was stating the case that it is the end of the carrier age? Since when have I made that statement?

The point about the carrier is that when PLAN has 1 (or more operational), South China Sea effectively becomes a Chinese lake. Why do you think Southeast Asian countries are nervous about China's naval expansion (some more than others)?

Have a PLAN CBG put up its air defence bubble and basically they control all the air space in the South China Sea (including land-based aircraft from Hainan/Paracels). Heck, they can probably stage fighters from that air strip they built in the Spratlys too if they really want.

The same applies for East China Sea and Yellow Sea. In other words, when PLAN has an operational CBG, the 1st Island Chain effectively becomes an area where they are dominant in the ar, on the surface and below the surface. The only navy capable of challenging that is the USN. Which is why PRC is devoting resources into access-denial weapons.

And given their recent track record of surprises (ASAT, J-20), they may just have a few more surprises up their sleaves.

Originally Posted by delft

Your arguments are all relevant, but if it is impossible to protect your missile otherwise against a future laser defense you might, eventually, get to the extreme measures I mentioned.

I'd say that the ASBM concept actually solves the issue quite elegantly.

A ballistic missile comes designed with a level of heat shielding to protect the missile from the heat of atmospheric re-entry. Hence, it already has an inherent level of protection against lasers. It may not be much, but it certainly beats cruise missiles.

Secondly, using a ballistic trajectory, the ASBM will be coming in almost directly on top of its target. I'd love to see someone point me in the direction of a warship that has radars pointing directly upwards to track an incoming ASBM. Without such an upward facing radar, the target ship will not be able to track the incoming track and designate missiles/CIWS/laser to take it out.

Thirdly, even if taken out in mid-air, gravity will be pulling the resulting debris down onto the target vessel anyway. If that ASBM is a DF-21, it will be what remains of a 14+ ton weapon. That's quite a lot of debris.

Excellent article on China's Missile centric strategy to defeat US platform centric warfare
Got an excellent section on ASBM and why all those THAAD is of no significant when it come to ASBM
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/3...ts--China-s-Mi

OVERCOMING THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES
To cope with the rising missile challenge in the past several decades, the United
States has invested heavily in active missile defenses.84 Unfortunately, the current
and projected American strategies are unlikely to provide any reasonable
measure of effectiveness against China’s missiles. For its part,China has invested
in a number of countermeasures specifically meant to foilU.S.missile defenses.
Currently the U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) architecture is designed to
engage ballisticmissiles in their midcourse and reentry phases. The chief system
to strike down missiles in the midcourse stage is the sea-based SM-3 missile.85
The principal systems to engage ballisticmissiles in the reentry phase are the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), for the “upper tier” of the atmosphere,
and the PAC-3 SAMs and Navy’s SM-2 Block IV SAM, for the lower tier.86
However, even thismultilayered defense network has serious, and probably insurmountable,
limitations in terms of simultaneous-engagement volume, available
interceptor inventories, and interceptor performance.
The first limitation is on the number of targets that it can realistically engage
within a single time window. As no interceptor would have better than an 80
percent chance of success even under ideal conditions, it is almost certain that
two interceptors would have to be fired per target. However, one “target” does
notmean one missile. It is common for modern ballisticmissiles to release chaff
or from five to ten decoys, indistinguishable from the warhead to TMD sensors,
during the midcourse phase.87 The PLA also discusses firing previously decommissioned
obsolete missiles, less accurate or capable armed weapons (some releasing
their own decoys), and even cheaper SRBMs as “bait” for interceptors.
Thus a volley of ten missiles could produce fromfifty to a hundred targets, aside
from chaff. The TMD system would be forced either to select targets randomly
or to attempt to engage them all. Since the vast majority of the targets would be
decoys, the former would offer an impracticably low probability of picking out
PRADUN 27
the true warheads; the latter would exhaust the interceptor launch capacity at
once. Eitherway, theTMDsystemwould allowunengaged targets,many of them
presumably warheads, to penetrate to their targets. Notably, whereas decoys
would burn up during reentry, decommissioned or otherwise low-capability
missiles would survive and continue acting as decoys against reentry-phase defenses.
For these reasons, the PLA feels confident of its ability to saturate the
defense in this way in each launch window.88
The second major limitation of the TMD is in interceptor inventory. For example,
the United States is currently planning to procure 329 SM-3 missiles,
tasked with midcourse stage interception, for its entire navy.89 Because two interceptors
would most likely be fired per target, that entire inventory might intercept
atmost 160 or so targets.However, it is fallacious to assume an exchange
based merely on respective ballistic-missile and interceptor inventories. Factoring
in decoys released in the midcourse stage, 160 targets could correspond to as
few as sixteen to thirty-two actual missiles. If decommissioned missiles and the
like are added, the number of high-value airframes the Chinese would need to
deplete the entire SM-3 inventory falls even lower.Other interceptor systems are
similarly limited in their inventories. This means that a number of concerted
volleys of low-valuemissiles containing just several capable missiles, especially
if equipped with decoys, would inevitably deplete the entire TMD inventory, let
alone the fraction of it deployed to the theater.
The third limitation of the TMDlies in the doubtfulness of its interceptor capabilities.
Few realistic data exist. For example, the SM-3missile-based architecture
has demonstrated sixteen successful intercepts in twenty attempts.90
However, a prominent analysis suggests test conditions (which provide the basis
for developers’ claims) tend to be far fromwhat themissiles would deal with in a
real combat scenario.91What is more, the deployed systems are strictly limited in
the kinds of targets they can intercept at all.Notably, the PAC-3 and SM-2 Block
IV are designed for SRBM interception but would be ineffective against longerrange
ballistic missiles, due to the targets’ higher reentry speeds. The speed of a
PAC-3 interceptor, the faster of the two, is only 2.5 kilometers per second, allowing
it to intercept only missiles with ranges no longer than 1,500 km.92 Indeed,
U.S. forces deployed to the theater would be within 1,500 km of China’s launch
points. But the Chinese could respond by simply sending MRBMs on lofted trajectories,
traveling the same horizontal distance but descending at much higher
velocities and so easily outrunning lower-tier defenses. Also, although THAAD,
PAC-3, and SM-2 Block IV missiles can engage objects descending on set trajectories,
they cannot chase downMaRVs descending in unpredictable trajectories
at high hypersonic speeds.93 Finally, all lower-tier defenses have IR seekers;
simply enclosing reentry vehicles in cooled shrouds would throw them off.
28 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Hence, none of the missile defense systems in development by the United
States could provide effective protection from Chinese missiles. Moreover, because
fielding additional missiles and developing additional countermeasures
are always substantially easier and cheaper than expanding or enhancing missile
defenses, this is not an imbalance that the United States could realistically hope
to redress. This prospect ultimately gives China three options for dealing with
American theater missile defense. First, it could attack campaign-relevant targets
regardless of TMD.Using decoys, high reentry speeds, and penetration aids,
China would likely be able to strike its preferred targets with MRBMs and
ASBMs, accepting the risk of potentially losing a few missiles to interceptors.
Second, in the unlikely event that U.S. defenses proved particularly effective in
intercepting individual missiles, sustained high-volume missile volleys, possibly
including decommissioned missiles, could consistently saturate them, allowing
the majority of the missiles in each wave to leak through. Third, China might
attempt to target the TMD architecture itself early in the campaign. Attacking
PAC-3 batteries with MRBMs, THAAD TELs with ARMs, and TMD-capable
ships with either ASBMs or ASCMs would significantly degrade the TMD architecture
and greatly facilitate subsequent missile strikes against campaignrelevant
targets.

The argument that decoys make THAAD and SM-3 ineffective falls apart when one realizes that both these BDM's can intercept enemy missiles in space before they can deploy their decoys.
The article also implies that there is no mechanism for discriminating between decoys and warheads, which even the open source literature on the subject suggests to be quite possible and perhaps in service already.
I'm a little suspect regarding this article number one because the link provided does not work and number two because the number of SM-3 and THAAD being procured in not available in open source literature. The relevant P-40 Budget Justification Exhibits do not state a number of either missile to be procured as they do for other versions of Standard, or other missiles in general. Budget numbers are all top level with no detail and not cost per unit that might allow an enemy to estimate the numbers being bought.

Originally Posted by Hendrik_2000

From the article:

Hence, none of the missile defense systems in development by the United
States could provide effective protection from Chinese missiles. Moreover, because
fielding additional missiles and developing additional countermeasures
are always substantially easier and cheaper than expanding or enhancing missile
defenses, this is not an imbalance that the United States could realistically hope
to redress..

Sorry, but so many premises of this article are just flat out mistaken, or stretched to lead where the authors want it to lead.

Sort of like determining what the outcome of a scientific experiment is before the research is even conducted and then conducting the research to come up with just those conclusions.

Happens all the time.

In this case, the defenses being developed by the US are capable of hitting the incoming missiles before they deploy decoys.

In addition, the defensive system is already working and developing new methods to defeat added capabilities to the new offensive system is not so difficult as the authors would have you believe, particularly when the principle offensive system for attacking a moving carrier at sea has not even been operationally tested at all yet, much less successfully.

While these defensive systems have been tested and are continuing to be tested as we speak. The US Navy and US Military takes very seriously the defense of these vessels and have been and continue to apply the budgets necessary and, more importantly, the talent necessary to solve the problem. And they are solving them.

I say again, the entire talk about the Ballistic missile offensive weapon against carriers that is getting so much press rings much more (to me at least) of a Sung Tsu deception plan more than a real system. I am sure the plan is being studied...but I will take it as an actual weapon system much more seriously when actual tests far out into the China Sea or beyond are conducted. Even then, I will still consider them playing into the very strength of the AEGIS system defenses and would be willing to bet that other, true asymetrical weapons systems are more than likely getting a cover by the loud pronouncements about this system.

But that is just my own opinion.

Originally Posted by Bltizo

Sure, no problem.

but arming an F-22 with JDAMs is not the same as arming a J-20 with rocket pods. One is useful, the other isn't. You wouldn't arm a J-20 with rocket pods anyway, you'd arm them with precision guided (satellite, optic, laser, or even a combination) munitions.

Hahaha, Bltize, if you are a rich guy, and I am a poor guy, to "WASTE", to me, dump unfinished drinks is waste enough; to you, maybe dump $1K worth of untouched meal, is only getting started to be "wasty". - Yet we are both "wasting".

JDAMs maybe guided, but think it as "expensive bombs". You call an otherwise delicated-workforce like F-22, to do the boring (if not danger, and IT IS ALWAYS DANGEROUS!) job - and almost anyone else can do - kind of job - and you think, as long as the F-22 didn't get shot down and the bomb hits, it is WORTHY.

....

Hear this hypothesis of mine - I got this NEW KIND OF ROCKETS, that can fire from a lot longer distant and more accurate than ever, the rocket pod do not spoil the J-20's stealth. So if I use J-20 with this rocket pod, let it do the "anyone can do" kind of job (still danger job), should I call the idea WORTHY?

I see your point of "stealth fighter penetrate the air defense better.", but please see my point of "if you want job done, call the PROFFESSIONALs to do the job."

Inaddition, who knows there isn't a dedicated stealth striker on the go?

Originally Posted by Bltizo

Hitting the runway or sensors of a ship with a relatively small size warhead will only temporarily disable the target vessel -- the US for one are known for having their ships take damage and then getting it back in the frontlines in no time. Why risk J-20s through a phalanx of aerial and sea based sensors, SM-2, SM-6, fighter craft... just to inflict relatively minor damage?

No point on its own, but it depends on the rest of the strategy. Presumably this would be part of a coordinated attack. Once the ship is disabled, follow-up attacks have a greater chance of success. Firstly, it's already operating at less than 100% capacity (fewer sensors or fewer planes in the sky), secondly, you can make it harder and more dangerous to fix the damage.

If you degraded the sensors for an hour or so, that window is enough for a volley of land-based cruise missiles to come in and do some more damage.

Originally Posted by Bltizo

Yes duh. My argument is that the idea of J-20s being used to directly attack carriers is... near ridiculous, until they get a capable missile that's able to fit internally.

Then there's no point in constructing a straw-man scenario only to tear it down. If you agree that there are many ways a J-20 can be useful in hitting the support infrastructure, like the carrier and its battle group, then focusing on whether or not it could directly sink a carrier with the missiles available today just creates noise.

If you know that aircraft carriers are likely to play a role in any conflict that the J-20 is involved in, then it's worth asking how that knowledge affected the design of the plane. I admit that I don't know much about fighter design, but I figure that thrust/weight ratio is an important element in maneuverability. Bigger tanks mean more weight which means less maneuverability. And that particular trade-off leads me to think that the J-20 is intended to engage the enemy early - while he's still far enough away that he can't strike easily at mainland bases.

Originally Posted by Red___Sword

Hahaha, Bltize, if you are a rich guy, and I am a poor guy, to "WASTE", to me, dump unfinished drinks is waste enough; to you, maybe dump $1K worth of untouched meal, is only getting started to be "wasty". - Yet we are both "wasting".

I honestly have no idea what you mean here.

JDAMs maybe guided, but think it as "expensive bombs". You call an otherwise delicated-workforce like F-22, to do the boring (if not danger, and IT IS ALWAYS DANGEROUS!) job - and almost anyone else can do - kind of job - and you think, as long as the F-22 didn't get shot down and the bomb hits, it is WORTHY.

Far out, I thought I've been quite clear on this matter -- the jobs F-22+JDAM or J-20+LS-6/FT bombs will be used for are completely different to ones F-15E or JH-7 or H-6 can do!! You can't send in a F-15E or JH-7 as the first wave to take down radar stations or SAM sites because they WILL BE DETECTED AND SHOT DOWN. F-22s or J-20s, stealthy, faster can strike those high value targets and get out without being shot down.
Do you think I'm proposing we use the F-22 or J-20 as CAS aircraft or something?? (To make it claer, I am NOT proposing that)

Hear this hypothesis of mine - I got this NEW KIND OF ROCKETS, that can fire from a lot longer distant and more accurate than ever, the rocket pod do not spoil the J-20's stealth. So if I use J-20 with this rocket pod, let it do the "anyone can do" kind of job (still danger job), should I call the idea WORTHY?

If you can use this hypotehtical rocket pod to hit high value targets without putting your own assets in danger then of course you don't ahve to put it on a J-20.
But at the moment we don't have a super rocket pod which can fire rockets that travel massive distances... and there are places only J-20 can go and targets J-20 can destroy.

I still don't really know what you mean here, can you stop being so abstract?

I see your point of "stealth fighter penetrate the air defense better.", but please see my point of "if you want job done, call the PROFFESSIONALs to do the job."

Inaddition, who knows there isn't a dedicated stealth striker on the go?

By the 'professionals" you mean JH-7, H-6, cruise missiles and the like, right?

The problem is that those professionals can't do what the J-20 can do. Understand that.

Originally Posted by Anton Gregori

No point on its own, but it depends on the rest of the strategy. Presumably this would be part of a coordinated attack. Once the ship is disabled, follow-up attacks have a greater chance of success. Firstly, it's already operating at less than 100% capacity (fewer sensors or fewer planes in the sky), secondly, you can make it harder and more dangerous to fix the damage.

So you're proposing risking J-20s to "degrade" the defenses of a CVBG, with unpowered munitions (like LS-6, FT series bombs -- only those can fit into the internal weapons bay at the moment)?

If you degraded the sensors for an hour or so, that window is enough for a volley of land-based cruise missiles to come in and do some more damage.

Wouldn't it be easier just to directly use relatively cheap anti ship missiles instead of expensive J-20s?

Then there's no point in constructing a straw-man scenario only to tear it down. If you agree that there are many ways a J-20 can be useful in hitting the support infrastructure, like the carrier and its battle group, then focusing on whether or not it could directly sink a carrier with the missiles available today just creates noise.

Support infrastructure as in airbases... Not carriers and its battle group -- F-22s don't operate from carriers, as I'm sure you know.
I do not agree that there are any ways a J-20 can directly hit a carrier and its battle group. That has been my stance all along. Taking out aerial assets, which will not be operating with the CVBG is a whole different matter.

If you know that aircraft carriers are likely to play a role in any conflict that the J-20 is involved in, then it's worth asking how that knowledge affected the design of the plane. I admit that I don't know much about fighter design, but I figure that thrust/weight ratio is an important element in maneuverability. Bigger tanks mean more weight which means less maneuverability. And that particular trade-off leads me to think that the J-20 is intended to engage the enemy early - while he's still far enough away that he can't strike easily at mainland bases.

And that leads to the question on how much heavier the J-20 is to the F-22... And from pictures we can see it's no more than half a meter longer if anything.
Let's say J-20 does have a longer range, and it is intended to strike CVBGs... and it didn't require AShMs... do you think the PLAAF will risk these fighters trying to go past the defenses of a CVBG?

One of the S requriements of the "4s" for J-20 was supermanouverability, which again, doesn't necessarily mean you have to be super light nor a high T/W ratio. I think the F-22's T/W ratio is slightly lower than the F-15's, but the former is obviously considered mroe manouverable.

Can you say again what you mean by engaging the enemy "early"? Do you mean attacking the enemy's base of operations or attacking them as they take off or before they get within 500 km of the chinese coast or what?

Can you just sum up what roles you think the J-20 will have? I'm not quite sure where you're coming from, with the whole "strike at the enemy before they strike you" thing.

Originally Posted by Anton Gregori

No point on its own, but it depends on the rest of the strategy. Presumably this would be part of a coordinated attack. Once the ship is disabled, follow-up attacks have a greater chance of success. Firstly, it's already operating at less than 100% capacity (fewer sensors or fewer planes in the sky), secondly, you can make it harder and more dangerous to fix the damage.

If you degraded the sensors for an hour or so, that window is enough for a volley of land-based cruise missiles to come in and do some more damage.

I agree with this viewpoint. It is almost impossible to single handily sink an aircraft carrier like back in WWII with the kamikaze style attack. With AAW surrounding the carrier and CAP constantly on the lookout, it is almost impossible to penetrate the defense nowadays with one hit attack with "conventional" non-stealth aircraft. The successful strategy would rely on a war of attrition - constant barrage of AShMs (either land based, sea launched or air launched) to slowly degrade the defence, and to completely empty the enemy AA munitions. The J-20 *could* serve as first strike weapon to deliver AShMs in early stage, as it can get much closer to the target, thus greatly increase the penetration and destruction of the target. It can also serve as CAP for the follow on bombers to intercept enemy CAPs.

If you know that aircraft carriers are likely to play a role in any conflict that the J-20 is involved in, then it's worth asking how that knowledge affected the design of the plane. I admit that I don't know much about fighter design, but I figure that thrust/weight ratio is an important element in maneuverability. Bigger tanks mean more weight which means less maneuverability. And that particular trade-off leads me to think that the J-20 is intended to engage the enemy early - while he's still far enough away that he can't strike easily at mainland bases.

I thought this argument relies ENTIRELY on the capability of the engine - larger aircraft due to larger internal fuel tank - doesn't necessary mean the sacrifice of maneuverability - its all relative to the thrust to weight ratio which depends on WS-15's capability. While we can't expect miracle, I think WS-15's design is still evolving, and could gain significant advances as China's overall industrial capabilities advances.

Originally Posted by Asymptote

I agree with this viewpoint. It is almost impossible to single handily sink an aircraft carrier like back in WWII with the kamikaze style attack. With AAW surrounding the carrier and CAP constantly on the lookout, it is almost impossible to penetrate the defense nowadays with one hit attack with "conventional" non-stealth aircraft. The successful strategy would rely on a war of attrition - constant barrage of AShMs (either land based, sea launched or air launched) to slowly degrade the defence, and to completely empty the enemy AA munitions. The J-20 *could* serve as first strike weapon to deliver AShMs in early stage, as it can get much closer to the target, thus greatly increase the penetration and destruction of the target. It can also serve as CAP for the follow on bombers to intercept enemy CAPs.

Or... you could just launch a barrage of stand off anti ship missiles from ships, land, submarines, air. Or you can use the much vaunted anti ship ballistic missile. Or you could use quiet small diesel subs lying in wait to take down ships with torpedos... Any of those are better than wasting J-20s to directly attack CVBGs in any way, even if it's part of a concerted attack -- unless the defenses are already down, in which case aircraft like flankers or JH-7 can do the job just as well.

--------

Really, it's interesting there's red sword on one end saying J-20s won't be used for strike because that'd be a waste of it's air to air capabilities, then anton's saying J-20 wont only be used for strike, but also to strike CVBGs, and that it's not got a lot of capability in air superiority...
-sigh- I'm sure the truth is somewhere between the two.

Originally Posted by Bltizo

So you're proposing risking J-20s to "degrade" the defenses of a CVBG, with unpowered munitions (like LS-6, FT series bombs -- only those can fit into the internal weapons bay at the moment)?

Wouldn't it be easier just to directly use relatively cheap anti ship missiles instead of expensive J-20s?

Anti-ship Missiles (AShM) are non-stealth flying objects. Thus it is easier to be detected than stealth fighters like J-20. The reason being you don't want to put your stealth technologies on missiles that can malfunction and not detonate - thus compromising ALL of your stealth technologies if fallen into enemy hand. This happen to many American 'conventional' cruise missiles during Balkan war and Iraq War with several of them that didn't explode on command and eventually acquired by China. The AGM-129 "Advanced Cruise Missile" is the ONLY american cruise missile with stealth technologies. And its only tipped with nuclear warhead (with no conventional warhead variants) - meaning it is only use as the last resort with total certainty of mutual annihlation (when used with other nuclear weapons), thus no possibility of stealth technology can be compromised.

So, like I have said in the previous post, the best plan would probably be using J-20 to deliver air-launch AShMs to penetrate the enemy air defenses at closest possible distance, giving enemy little time to react. Using J-20 as launching platform for AShM also has the advantage of decreasing the fuel payload of AShM (compare to land based/sea based version), thus increase the explosive payload of the missile and greatly increase the destruction of the target.

Originally Posted by Bltizo

Or... you could just launch a barrage of stand off anti ship missiles from ships, land, submarines, air. Or you can use the much vaunted anti ship ballistic missile. Or you could use quiet small diesel subs lying in wait to take down ships with torpedos... Any of those are better than wasting J-20s to directly attack CVBGs in any way, even if it's part of a concerted attack -- unless the defenses are already down, in which case aircraft like flankers or JH-7 can do the job just as well.

--------

Really, it's interesting there's red sword on one end saying J-20s won't be used for strike because that'd be a waste of it's air to air capabilities, then anton's saying J-20 wont only be used for strike, but also to strike CVBGs, and that it's not got a lot of capability in air superiority...
-sigh- I'm sure the truth is somewhere between the two.

While the ASBM project is a great success for the PLA, I don't think they can use it as abundantly as conventional missiles. Balllistic missile by nature, are very expensive to produce. Separation of stages must be carefully machined and calibrated, and the solid fuel rockets are notorious for being expensive and prone to failures. I am almost certain PLA can only field limited amount of ASBM (less than ~100 - since the very similar DF-21 in the inventory are around 60-80 so far only) only as deterrent, not as offensive weapon. So the tactics of using ASBMs sparingly to saturate the target would not be possible. It is impossible to break the american fleet air defense since each CVBG (or CSG - carrier strike group) would have 1-2 Aegis guided missile cruisers (CG) (each equipped with standard missiles SM-2 or SM-3 which are designed to intercept ballistic missiles), of the Ticonderoga class (68 SM-2 each); 2-3 guided missile destroyers (DDG), of the Arleigh Burke class (96 SM-3 each), that's a total of (68+92+92) 260 SM missiles MINIMUM to overcome, or (68+68+92+92+92) 424 at the upper range of the count. With less than 100 ASBMs to utilize, it simply cannot be a threat to the american CSG fleet if you only use ASBM.

The Russians had this "mass missile swarming" strategy to overcome american CSG back in the cold war days, and the Americans knew about this and already had strategies to counter this. I don't think replaying the same strategy in this day and age 20 years after cold war ended this is very smart.

On the other hand, I think Americans for whatever the reason have not anticipated other countries to acquire stealth technologies. I have NEVER heard of talk of such in any of the defence circles and they seem to think they can keep stealth tech to themselves forever. So I think they are totally not prepared for stealth based offensive weapons. All of their current OP plans and naval strategies and physical assets are based around the cold war era of assuming the other side have only conventional / ballistic weapons and no stealth weapons.


Ask BD Popeye or Jeff Head. I am sure they have never heard of any contingency plan to counter enemy stealth offensive on CSG. I think this has only become a topic now after the unveiling of J-20 beginning of this year.

That made me think this "public unveiling" of J-20 is kinda premature. Had China not publicly unveil the J-20, Americans would probably never even imagine a stealth offensive from counter force and they would continue the same strategies and OP plans well into the future.

Originally Posted by Asymptote

While the ASBM project is a great success for the PLA, I don't think they can use it as abundantly as conventional missiles. Balllistic missile by nature, are very expensive to produce. Separation of stages must be carefully machined and calibrated, and the solid fuel rockets are notorious for being expensive and prone to failures. I am almost certain PLA can only field limited amount of ASBM (less than ~100 - since the very similar DF-21 in the inventory are around 60-80 so far only) only as deterrent, not as offensive weapon. So the tactics of using ASBMs sparingly to saturate the target would not be possible. It is impossible to break the american fleet air defense since each CVBG (or CSG - carrier strike group) would have 1-2 Aegis guided missile cruisers (CG) (each equipped with standard missiles SM-2 or SM-3 which are designed to intercept ballistic missiles), of the Ticonderoga class (68 SM-2 each); 2-3 guided missile destroyers (DDG), of the Arleigh Burke class (96 SM-3 each), that's a total of (68+92+92) 260 SM missiles MINIMUM to overcome, or (68+68+92+92+92) 424 at the upper range of the count. With less than 100 ASBMs to utilize, it simply cannot be a threat to the american CSG fleet if you only use ASBM.

The Russians had this "mass missile swarming" strategy to overcome american CSG back in the cold war days, and the Americans knew about this and already had strategies to counter this. I don't think replaying the same strategy in this day and age 20 years after cold war ended this is very smart.

On the other hand, I think Americans for whatever the reason have not anticipated other countries to acquire stealth technologies. I have NEVER heard of talk of such in any of the defence circles and they seem to think they can keep stealth tech to themselves forever. So I think they are totally not prepared for stealth based offensive weapons. All of their current OP plans and naval strategies and physical assets are based around the cold war era of assuming the other side have only conventional / ballistic weapons and no stealth weapons.


Ask BD Popeye or Jeff Head. I am sure they have never heard of any contingency plan to counter enemy stealth offensive on CSG. I think this has only become a topic now after the unveiling of J-20 beginning of this year.

That made me think this "public unveiling" of J-20 is kinda premature. Had China not publicly unveil the J-20, Americans would probably never even imagine a stealth offensive from counter force and they would continue the same strategies and OP plans well into the future.

Just some things I'd like to add.

1. Even though I'm not sure how the DF-21D AShBM got into this, a U.S.N. CBG does have at least 2 Ticonderoga Class missile cruisers and 2 Arleigh Burke class Destroyers, HOWEVER, they do not carry a standard load of ABMs. Their VLS are modular, in that they allow multiple missiles of different classes to be carried (i.e. one Ticonderoga class can carry some Tomahawk missiles, some Harpoon missiles, some SM-2 missiles, etc). So that 260 missile number is actually the Maximum number of missiles for the DF-21 AShBM to overcome.

Another thing to add, is that you really don't need 260 missiles to shoot one DF-21 down. High-speed maneuvers do not make a missile easy to destroy but the thing about that DF-21D, i.e. what makes it so different, is that it's a Ballistic missile, and thus, out range many conventional AShM designs but also in that because it's Ballistic, it's trajectory allows a high-speed dive, Mach 10 I believe, or 3.4 km per second, which means that defense systems have less time to detect and destroy the Missile. The problem with the DF-21D also comes from the fact that it's a Ballistic missile. For one, high-speed sea skimmers like the Russian 3M54 Klub are had to detect by virtue of it's cruise height, some say as low as 3 meters above sea level. The DF-21D however, will end up at a relatively high altitude, which will allow almost every sensor in that CBG to detect it, and thus, engage and destroy it. Finally, the DF-21D is fast, but it's not beyond current ABM technologies. I am unsure of the maximum engage speed of the SM-3, but an inferior ABM system, the S-400 SAM from Russia, can engage missiles with speeds up to 4.8 km per second (almost Mach 14). So, the DF-21D is certainly an interesting AShM, but it won't clear the seas so to say. Now going back on topic.

Uh, I'm not sure about that conjecture regarding American defense circles, but many countries outside the U.S. has studied and experimented and sometimes, produced, Stealth-based technologies and prototypes. In a way, the U.S. is prepared for "Stealth offensive weapons", as the only anti-stealth, so to say, missile out there relies on Infrared seeking (Heat Seekers) technology, the simplest way to defeat that is of course, a flare. And yes, I can confirm that the F-22 does indeed emit a rather large heat signature, despite the reductions.

Uhm, I do believe you are confused. The Current U.S. operational plans revolve around Asymmetrical warfare, that's to say, we don't plan on engaging a competent opponent like Russia or China, but rather, folks like Pre-war Iraq, crap Army, non existent navy, and propaganda-pumped airforces. In a way, again, we are prepared for Anti-stealth warfare. The simplest way to counter Stealth is again, Infrared. Recent developments in the field of QWIP (Quantum Well Infrared Photodetector) by us, Europe, and Russia, has further advanced IR sighting technologies. Hell, we already have an IR ball equipped with QWIPs, something I haven't seen from Europe or Russia yet (check FLIR's website).

That made me think this "public unveiling" of J-20 is kinda premature. Had China not publicly unveil the J-20, Americans would probably never even imagine a stealth offensive from counter force and they would continue the same strategies and OP plans well into the future.

Measure and Countermeasure. This also gives a peak maybe, at China's plans. Unlike some warmongering folks I have read on other forums who have thought this same thought, perhaps China is not preparing for a total war with NATO. And they have perfectly fair reasons for not wanting a war. For one, nukes. For two, the economy. For three, is Taiwan or Tibet worth all those lives? Hell, this "public" revealing, and I put quotes on public as it's not like they pulled out the red carpet for the J-20, doesn't prove as much as some may think. Guys in the defense circle has already known for one, that U.S. stealth has been sold to China, for two, that China is a competent developer in Stealth techs, and for three, it's still a ways off, 4 years at best for production.

Originally Posted by IronsightSniper

Just some things I'd like to add.

1. Even though I'm not sure how the DF-21D AShBM got into this, a U.S.N. CBG does have at least 2 Ticonderoga Class missile cruisers and 2 Arleigh Burke class Destroyers, HOWEVER, they do not carry a standard load of ABMs. Their VLS are modular, in that they allow multiple missiles of different classes to be carried (i.e. one Ticonderoga class can carry some Tomahawk missiles, some Harpoon missiles, some SM-2 missiles, etc). So that 260 missile number is actually the Maximum number of missiles for the DF-21 AShBM to overcome.

I was just replying to Bltizo's post because he brought up the topic of ASBM being cheaper option than using J-20 with AShM.

I agree, maybe my calculation is wrong, as I am assuming the maximum load - for every VLS launchers to be ABM SM missiles which is unrealistic scenario.

Another thing to add, is that you really don't need 260 missiles to shoot one DF-21 down. High-speed maneuvers do not make a missile easy to destroy but the thing about that DF-21D, i.e. what makes it so different, is that it's a Ballistic missile, and thus, out range many conventional AShM designs but also in that because it's Ballistic, it's trajectory allows a high-speed dive, Mach 10 I believe, or 3.4 km per second, which means that defense systems have less time to detect and destroy the Missile. The problem with the DF-21D also comes from the fact that it's a Ballistic missile. For one, high-speed sea skimmers like the Russian 3M54 Klub are had to detect by virtue of it's cruise height, some say as low as 3 meters above sea level. The DF-21D however, will end up at a relatively high altitude, which will allow almost every sensor in that CBG to detect it, and thus, engage and destroy it. Finally, the DF-21D is fast, but it's not beyond current ABM technologies. I am unsure of the maximum engage speed of the SM-3, but an inferior ABM system, the S-400 SAM from Russia, can engage missiles with speeds up to 4.8 km per second (almost Mach 14). So, the DF-21D is certainly an interesting AShM, but it won't clear the seas so to say. Now going back on topic.

I think you misunderstood me. I didn't say a single DF-21D ASBM will take the entire 260 SM missiles to destroy. What I mean is that, It requires at worst 261 DF-21D ASBMs to overcome the american CSG AAW screen (assuming 1:1 interception - 1 SM-3 to 1 DF-21D). And I have no doubt about SM's capabilities either, as I have mention, SM missiles were designed to intercept ballistic missiles of speed upward 7-8 km/s, so DF-21D is well within SM's interception capabilities.

Ofcourse, let's not forget DF-21D is a ballistic missile, it can also carry penetration aids such chaffs and decoys, so it will complicate the defenses as it will probably requires upward 3-4 SM missiles to intercept a single DF-21D effectively.

But still, I think with an inventory of mere 100 DF-21D ASBM I highly doubt it will be effective strategy to overwhelm/swarm the american CBG/CSG with DF-21D alone. It will require 10 times that to be a credible threat to a USN CBG fleet.

Uh, I'm not sure about that conjecture regarding American defense circles, but many countries outside the U.S. has studied and experimented and sometimes, produced, Stealth-based technologies and prototypes. In a way, the U.S. is prepared for "Stealth offensive weapons", as the only anti-stealth, so to say, missile out there relies on Infrared seeking (Heat Seekers) technology, the simplest way to defeat that is of course, a flare. And yes, I can confirm that the F-22 does indeed emit a rather large heat signature, despite the reductions.

Yes, experimented, and most of them allies to US, so it has never really dawn on American to change their doctrine I think to counter the stealth offensive weapons. Or else their entire strategy and physical assets will be quite different today.

Uhm, I do believe you are confused. The Current U.S. operational plans revolve around Asymmetrical warfare, that's to say, we don't plan on engaging a competent opponent like Russia or China, but rather, folks like Pre-war Iraq, crap Army, non existent navy, and propaganda-pumped airforces. In a way, again, we are prepared for Anti-stealth warfare. The simplest way to counter Stealth is again, Infrared. Recent developments in the field of QWIP (Quantum Well Infrared Photodetector) by us, Europe, and Russia, has further advanced IR sighting technologies. Hell, we already have an IR ball equipped with QWIPs, something I haven't seen from Europe or Russia yet (check FLIR's website).

If I am not mistaken, QWIPs are reportedly to have a range of 70 nm (129.64 km)
Air Combat: Russia’s PAK-FA versus the F-22 and F-35

Let's assume that the QWIP tech advances and improve, to have over 200 km effective detection range, even for LO aircrafts, how much time do you think a AShM that's launched from J-20 from a distance of 201 km will reach its target?
Just for the fun of it, let's assume P-270 Moskit (I know I know, Moskit only has a range of 120 km max, but let's assume China has an air launch variant in the future that has range over 200 km) - with a speed of 2800 km/hr, and launching from a distance of 210 km (just outside the QWIP detection range), it would reach its target in 4 minutes 30 seconds - plenty of time for USN to intercept and have a coffee break in-between. So, I guess you are right, with QWIP in the game, its will be hard for China even with J-20 to penetrate the defence, and will require a war of attrition to wear down the CBG until it literally runs out of ammos.

Measure and Countermeasure. This also gives a peak maybe, at China's plans. Unlike some warmongering folks I have read on other forums who have thought this same thought, perhaps China is not preparing for a total war with NATO. And they have perfectly fair reasons for not wanting a war. For one, nukes. For two, the economy. For three, is Taiwan or Tibet worth all those lives? Hell, this "public" revealing, and I put quotes on public as it's not like they pulled out the red carpet for the J-20, doesn't prove as much as some may think. Guys in the defense circle has already known for one, that U.S. stealth has been sold to China, for two, that China is a competent developer in Stealth techs, and for three, it's still a ways off, 4 years at best for production.

Ofcourse, I am sure neither China nor America wants to risk a war with each other. But both actively planned for "what-ifs" well before the "what-ifs" really happen.